Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: It is necessary to posit several ideas in the divine mind. The ground is: that in God there is the idea of the order of the universe: therefore he has the accounts of those things out of which the whole is constituted.

Second conclusion: The plurality of ideas does not conflict with the divine simplicity. The ground is: that the idea of the thing worked is in the mind of the one working, just as what is understood; but it is not against the simplicity of the divine intellect that it understand many things.

COMMENTARY.

In this article the doubt is: Whether several ideas are to be posited in God; and at the same time it is doubted concerning the account of St. Thomas, whether ideas are to be distinguished by diverse respects to creatures, insofar as God compares his essence to diverse creatures, as imitable in diverse ways by them? It is proved first that several ideas are not to be posited. The Divine Essence according to its entity, before -- in our manner of understanding -- it is an object to the divine intellect, is the most express likeness of creatures, imitable by the creatures themselves according to itself: therefore, before it is an object to the divine intellect, and compared to diverse creatures, it has the character of the idea of creatures, and consequently is a single most simple idea. The antecedent is proved. For the Divine Essence does not have it, that it be the likeness of creatures, as imitable by them, from the fact that it is known by the divine intellect, but has it from its own infinite entity: therefore. You will say that the account of an idea intrinsically demands that the Divine Essence be an object to the intellect. Then there is the second argument. The Divine Essence, known by the divine intellect, before -- in our manner of understanding -- it is compared to diverse creatures, is a known likeness of creatures imitable by them: therefore, before it is compared to diverse creatures, it has the perfect character of an idea, and consequently, through comparison to diverse creatures, diverse ideas are not constituted in God. The antecedent is proved: for the Divine Essence does not have it, that it be the likeness of creatures, from the fact that it is compared to the creatures themselves, but has this from its infinite perfection. It is confirmed: for if the Divine Essence in the character of an idea depends on comparison to diverse creatures, it follows that the constitutive element of the divine idea is a respect of reason to creatures; but this is not to be said, because the divine idea is a real form and of infinite perfection: therefore. Third it is argued. If we posit several ideas in God on account of diverse respects to creatures, it follows that it must similarly be granted that in God there are several lordships, and that there are several mercies, and consequently it is false. Therefore. The sequel is proved: for just as the Divine Essence has several respects to creatures insofar as it is compared to them, so it seems to be said that it has several respects of lordship to diverse creatures which serve it, as to man and angel, etc. And similarly diverse respects of creation seem to be posited to diverse natures which are produced. Fourth. If in God there are several ideas, it follows that each idea is a divine attribute, and that several ideas are several attributes of God, so that one attribute is the idea of man and another the idea of the lion: but this multiplication of attributes in God does not seem to be admitted: therefore. Fifth. If ideas are distinguished in God by diverse respects of reason, it follows that these propositions must be granted: the idea of man is the idea of the lion, and the idea of the lion is the idea of the angel: but this seems false, and against St. Thomas here: therefore. The sequel is proved: a distinction of reason alone does not suffice to falsify a proposition, as the common maxim of the dialecticians holds: therefore if the idea of man and the idea of the lion in God are distinguished only by diverse respects of reason, this proposition will have to be granted: the idea of man is the idea of the lion. Lastly it is argued against what St. Thomas says in the text, that the Divine Essence can for this reason be several ideas, because an idea denotes the object of the divine cognition, and it is not unfitting that one most simple cognition of God be borne to diverse objects: but if an idea imported a principle of cognition, we could not distinguish several ideas while preserving the simplicity of the Divine Essence and of the divine cognition. Against this I argue thus: just as the divine cognition demands one most simple principle, that is, the Divine Essence, insofar as it has the character of a species, so likewise it demands one most simple primary formal object, namely the Divine Essence itself, although the material and secondary objects can be multiple, namely diverse creatures; but the divine idea does not have the character of a secondary material object, but of a formal and primary object of the divine intellect: therefore. It is confirmed: for either St. Thomas speaks of a distinction of reason alone, or of a real distinction: if of a real one, it is false that there are in God several ideas really distinct; if of a distinction of reason alone, it is false that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the principle of the divine intellection, has no distinction, since the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the principle of knowing an angel, differs in reason from itself insofar as it is the principle of knowing a man: therefore without cause did St. Thomas assign a difference between the Divine Essence insofar as it is a principle of cognition, and that same essence insofar as it is the object of the same divine cognition. On account of these arguments, Aureolus, cited by Capreolus, in 1 Sent., dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, teaches that the Divine Essence is the single most simple idea of all creatures.

Let this be the most certain conclusion: In the divine mind there are many ideas of creatures. This we are bound of necessity to admit, especially on account of the common manner of speaking of the Holy Fathers and of the weightiest authors, who not once assert that in the divine mind there are countless accounts and ideas of creatures. See the testimonies cited in the preceding article, and Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46. In order that this conclusion be proved and explained by us, we must resolve the arguments proposed, from whose solution it will remain explained and confirmed.

To the first argument, it has been well answered there. For I say that an idea is a form imitable not in any way whatever, but as the formal exemplar of the ideated thing: but a form of this kind is not to be considered according to natural existence, but according to objective existence, which it has within the intellect. Hence the Divine Essence does not have the character of an idea according as it is a likeness imitable in its entitative nature, but insofar as it is an object to the divine intellect, as the formal exemplar of creatures. In order to answer the second, note that just as our intellect can know its own concept in two ways, as it is a likeness of the thing outside: in the first way by a direct and primary cognition which is borne to the concept as it is a likeness of the thing, not in act signified but in act exercised, by referring the concept itself and comparing it to the thing outside, and this cognition of the concept is had whenever the intellect knows the thing outside in the concept itself; in the second way the concept is known as it is the image of the thing in act signified, by a quasi-reflexive cognition, by which the intellect distinctly and expressly knows the concept as it is a likeness of the thing outside, and so known compares it to the thing itself. So similarly it must be commented that the divine intellect knows its own essence as it is the likeness of creatures in two ways: in the first way, in act exercised, using it, in our manner of speaking, as a formal mean for knowing creatures, comparing it to creatures, by a quasi-direct and primary cognition. In the second way in act signified, and by a quasi-certain reflection, by knowing the Divine Essence expressly and formally as it is the likeness of creatures, and comparing it so known to creatures. It must be noted, however, that in God according to the thing there is not a twofold cognition, nor is there any reflection, but in a single simple cognition, on account of its infinity, all these things are found.

This being supposed, certain theologians (from whose opinion Capreolus does not seem to depart) in the place cited above say that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is an object to the first cognition and known as it is the likeness of creatures in act exercised, has the character of a most simple idea, common and inadequate to all creatures. But considered as it is an object to the second, reflexive cognition, and known in act signified, as it is the likeness of creatures, it has the character of many ideas, insofar as the divine intellect compares it to diverse creatures, as imitable in diverse ways by them. But this sentence is neither true, nor according to the mind of St. Thomas here. But the most true sentence is that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the primary object of the divine cognition, by which the divine intellect knows it in act exercised as it is the likeness of creatures, and in it knows all creatures as to all the things in which they both agree and differ among themselves, has the character of many ideas. It is proved first. For St. Thomas here and elsewhere proves that ideas are to be multiplied in the divine intellect, because it is necessary that God know in his Essence all creatures according as they are diverse among themselves, and consequently it is necessary that in the divine intellect there be all the accounts of creatures, which are distinct ideas. See, St. Thomas does not reduce the multiplicity of ideas to some reflexive cognition, but to the primary and direct cognition by which God knows things as they are diverse among themselves. Secondly it is proved. For diverse things, as they are diverse, a single most simple account cannot be assigned, but diverse accounts must necessarily be posited, formally speaking, since the account of each thing has an adequation, formally speaking, with the thing itself whose account it is; but God, by a primary and direct cognition, knows his Essence as it is the account of diverse things insofar as they are diverse: therefore the Divine Essence, as so known, is a multiple account of creatures, formally speaking, and consequently is several ideas, because an idea is an account. And it is confirmed: a single most simple likeness is not referred, formally speaking, to several things as they are several, through a single respect, but through diverse respects: therefore the Divine Essence, insofar as it is known by direct cognition as the likeness of diverse creatures, is referred by diverse respects to the diverse things themselves. But, as we shall say at once, the diversity of ideas in the Divine Essence is attended to according to the diverse respects to creatures: therefore. But in what way shall we explain the passage? Theologians commonly are wont to say that the Divine Essence is the common and inadequate idea of creatures. I answer that this is understood in this way: by comparing the Divine Essence to creatures, not as they are diverse among themselves, but insofar as they agree in one common and inadequate account of creatable being, according to which account they correspond immediately and formally to the most simple power of God, as its adequate effect. Secondly it is said that it can be called an inadequate idea, insofar as the Essence itself, as it precedes in our consideration all respects to creatures, is as it were the common likeness of all creatures according to its own entity, in which the diverse ideal respects to creatures are in some way founded. But yet it is impossible that the Divine Essence, compared to diverse creatures as they are diverse, be referred to them by a single ideal respect. Just as the center, although according to itself it is common to the whole circumference of a circle, yet from it no single straight line can be drawn which would reach through the diverse parts of the circle, but to each part a distinct line must be drawn from the one indivisible center. The divine Essence is deservedly compared by the Philosophers to a center; but the diverse creatures have as it were the character of one circumference; but from this indivisible center one respect cannot proceed which would be terminated at the diverse parts of this circumference, namely at the diverse creatures as they are diverse. To the second argument, therefore, it is answered from these things: I deny the antecedent: for the Divine Essence to be compared to diverse creatures is nothing other than the very comprehensive cognition of the Divine Essence, by which God knows all creatures in the essence as in a formal and primary object: for this cognition is a comparison, in act exercised, of the Divine Essence to creatures. Wherefore the Essence is not known before it is compared to creatures. From this it follows that that reflexive cognition, by which God knows his Essence as the likeness of creatures in act signified, and formally and expressly compares it to creatures as their likeness, does not constitute the character of an idea, but presupposes it as constituted by the direct cognition: but the character of the idea already constituted is known through this reflexive cognition. This doctrine is gathered from the solution to the second argument of this article. But there is an example: just as the craftsman then constitutes in his mind the idea of the house to be made, when he forms the concept of the house and refers it in act exercised to the house, contemplating the house by direct cognition in that concept, but afterwards reflects upon the idea made, knowing it in the character of an idea in act signified. To the confirmation it is answered that Cajetan seems to hold that a respect of reason does not pertain intrinsically to the constitution of the idea, although the idea cannot be understood by us except through a respect to creatures. But this sentence is neither according to the mind of St. Thomas here, nor is it true: for according to St. Thomas and the truth it must absolutely be granted that in God there are several ideas, whereas according to the sentence of Capreolus it could indeed be granted that we understand several ideas in God, but not that there are several ideas, since the whole distinction of ideas is to be taken from the diverse respects to creatures. Wherefore Cajetan more learnedly teaches here that a respect of reason pertains intrinsically to the constitution of ideas, not indeed as the constitutive difference of a species, nor as the formal account which formally constitutes the idea, but the respect of reason stands to the idea as a certain intrinsic mode: just as truth intrinsically encloses a respect of reason to the intellect, as a certain intrinsic mode pertaining to the account of truth. Nor may it be inferred from this that an idea is formally a being of reason, just as neither may it be inferred that truth is a being of reason; for it is no inconvenience that some account, which is simply and formally real in things, include intrinsically a certain mode of reason which pertains intrinsically to its concept; as the act of faith is simply something real, although it intrinsically encloses the privation of clarity, which is an entity of reason; for intrinsically the act of faith is an obscure assent. But someone argues: it follows that the divine cognition per se depends on a respect of reason; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved: the cognition by which God knows creatures depends on the idea; for the idea is the principle of knowing the ideated thing: therefore if the idea intrinsically encloses a respect of reason, it follows that the divine cognition depends on this respect. To this argument it is answered: I deny the sequel: for the ideal respect of reason is not presupposed nor required beforehand for the divine cognition, but rather follows upon the cognition by which God knows creatures through his essence, or, to speak more properly with Cajetan in this article, this respect is in some way effected by the divine cognition, insofar as it is the comparison of the Divine Essence to creatures. And so the cognition indeed necessarily produces this respect in the way in which a being of reason can be said to be produced, yet it does not depend on it. Hence to the argument I say that the divine cognition depends on the idea as to the absolute to-be of the idea, but not as to the respective to-be; nor is the idea a principle of knowing or working according to its respective to-be, but rather according to its absolute to-be. To the third argument: I deny the sequel; to the proof it is said that the relation of lordship in God to men and angels is one most simple, since it belongs to God on account of a single coercive power, and is terminated at men and angels, not insofar as they are diverse among themselves, but insofar as they agree in one account of servitude and subjection. For by the same title, formally speaking, man and angel are subjected to God insofar as they are creatures of God himself. Similarly the relation of creation is one in God, because it is founded in a single creative power, and is terminated at creatures, not insofar as they are diverse, but insofar as they agree in the account of creatable being, which is the formal object of the creative power. But the ideal respects are diverse in God, because they are terminated at creatures as they are diverse, and imitate the Divine Essence in diverse ways and are founded in the Divine Essence insofar as it is imitable in diverse ways by creatures. To the fourth: I deny the sequel, and I say that this proposition is to be granted, an idea is a divine attribute, but this is to be denied, several ideas are several attributes of God. For an idea has it, that it be an attribute of God, not from a respect of reason, but from the absolute perfection which it imports: but the diversity of ideas is not taken from the absolute which the idea imports, but from the diverse respects to creatures. Hence this consequence, an idea insofar as it is an idea is an attribute, but there are several ideas, therefore there are several attributes, has the same defect as this one: a person, insofar as it is a person, is the divine Essence, but there are several Persons, therefore there are several Essences: for the appellation is varied, since the plurality in the minor is borne upon the relative, and in the conclusion upon the absolute. But you will say: that the divine Essence be the idea of man consists in this, that it be the adequate likeness of man; and that it be the idea of the angel consists in this, that it be the adequate likeness of the angel: but that the Divine Essence be the adequate likeness of man and of the angel is a divine perfection: therefore ideas, according as they are several, import several divine perfections, and consequently are several attributes of it. It is answered that a divine attribute is a perfection which belongs to God according to his entity; but that the Divine Essence be the adequate likeness of man and of the angel does not belong to God according to his entity, but insofar as it is conceived through order to man or to the angel. It is answered secondly, and this solution is explained. That the Divine Essence be the likeness of man is indeed a great perfection of God; but that it be adequate does not express and posit a perfection in God, but a particular respect of reason to the nature of man; but the plurality of ideas is weighed from this, that the Divine Essence be the adequate likeness of man and of the angel, so that this adequation constitutes the plurality of ideas. To the fifth: I deny the sequel; and to the proof it is answered that a distinction of reason of the extremes alone does not suffice to falsify a proposition, unless when that distinction of reason is imported in the extremes themselves as conceived, e.g. although truth and goodness are distinguished in reason, nevertheless this proposition, truth is goodness, is most true; but this, the account of truth is the account of goodness, is most false, because in this second proposition the distinction of reason, in which entity and truth differ, is imported as conceived; but an idea, as is clear from what has been said, is a conceived form, and consequently in this proposition, the idea of man is the idea of the horse, the distinction of reason in which these ideas differ is signified as conceived, and to that extent this proposition is absolutely false. But someone will argue: if the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the idea of man, is not the idea of the horse, it follows that insofar as it is the idea of man it is not God. The sequel is proved: insofar as it is the idea of man it is a limited and finite likeness, because it is the adequate likeness of man, in such a way that it is not the likeness of the horse or of the lion: therefore it is not God. It is answered I deny the sequel, and to the proof I say that the Divine Essence, as it is the idea of man, is the infinite likeness of all things as to that absolute which the divine likeness imports, in which consists the account of the divine infinity: but it is not the likeness of all things if we attend to the respective to-be which it has, as it is conceived in order to creatures. A similar argument could be made to prove that the Father, insofar as he is the Father, is not God, in this way: the Father is not the Son, but the Son is God, therefore the Father is not God. To the last argument it is answered that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the immediate object of the divine intellect, has in itself no distinction even of reason, nor ought it to be called several objects, since the character of an object is considered through a habitude to the intellect itself, which habitude is one and most simple; but if this immediate object of the divine intellect be considered through order to secondary and material objects, it is no inconvenience that a multiple distinction of reason be found in it: but the account of an idea is weighed according to the order to the material objects of the divine intellect. To the confirmation it is said that St. Thomas does not teach in this article that in that which stands as a principle of cognition in the divine intellect no distinction of reason is found; but he here teaches only that such a distinction is not found as would suffice to multiply simply such a principle, so that we could say that in God there are several sciences, several arts and several species, just as we grant that there are several ideas. And the ground of the difference is that the respect of reason from which the distinction is taken in an idea, and in any terminus of cognition whatever, is imported as conceived, and so absolutely constitutes plurality and distinction; but in the principle of cognition a relation of reason of this kind, from which the distinction is taken, is not imported as conceived; and consequently it does not cause, absolutely speaking, a plurality. From these things it follows that the plurality of ideas is not to be taken in the sense in which we say that diverse attributes are found in God, since the divine attributes in the abstract are predicated of themselves. For we grant that the divine mercy is justice, wisdom, etc.; but we do not grant that the idea of man is the idea of the lion. And by the same ground it is shown that ideas are not multiplied in the sense in which we say that in God there are several mercies, insofar as they relieve diverse human miseries. For the distinction of mercies is taken from the material object, namely from the diversity of miseries. And so it must absolutely be granted that there is formally one most simple mercy; but it must be denied that there is only one idea in God, because the distinction of ideas is taken from the diverse respects which formally pertain to the character of ideas in the manner explained above.