Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: It is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. The ground is: that God is an agent acting through intellect.

COMMENTARY.

On the matter of this question the Scholastics dispute, 1 Sent., dist. 36. In this article three things are to be expounded by us. The first is what an idea is, and at the same time its nominal and its real definition will be explained. The second, whether ideas are to be posited in God, and with how great certitude. The third, whether ideas are the same as the divine Essence. Concerning the first, note from St. Thomas here and from Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46, that idea is a Greek noun, and has the same force as form and species; but it is most often called by the Latins account, which appellation, on Augustine's authority, in the place cited above, is not according to the proper interpretation of that word idea. It is, however, according to the propriety of the thing, in that an idea is a form pertaining to intellect alone. Luis Vives, expounding Augustine, book 7 of the City of God, chap. 28, asserts that idea is named from seeing: for one who is about to do something looks upon the idea to which he adapts his action. Which interpretation is indeed most true, proving that an idea is properly called by us an account, even as regards the interpretation of the word, since it is the account of looking. But by whatever name an idea may be called by us, it is thus defined by its real definition, namely, an idea is a form set before the intellect existing within it, to which the craftsman looks while he works. But before we explain that definition through its individual parts, two things are to be expounded by us. One is who was the inventor or assertor of ideas. The other is in what sense the ancient Platonic Philosophers used this word idea. Concerning the first, Eusebius, book 11 of the Evangelical Preparation, says Socrates was the first who disputed about ideas. But Aristotle, book 1 of the Metaphysics, text 5, openly teaches that Plato was the first inventor of ideas, and that Socrates disputed nothing about natural matter but converted himself wholly to moral disputation. This sentence of Aristotle, which seems contrary to Eusebius, has commonly been followed by the weightiest authors. Cicero, book 1 of the Tusculan Questions, says the divine mind possessed what he first called species, which other Philosophers called idea, and that this appellation was invented by Plato. Seneca, Letter 66, and Justin Martyr in the Exhortation against the Gentiles, say Plato was the inventor of ideas, on the occasion taken from Exodus 26: See that you make all things according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain. St. Augustine in the cited place says that if we speak of ideas, attending to the thing itself, Plato was not the first author of ideas, for it is not credible that ideas lay hidden from those wise men who preceded Plato. But if the question be about this word idea, the first author was Plato: so Augustine judges. I for my part would judge in this matter that the first who disputed about ideas was Socrates, Plato's master, by whom was persuaded the opinion of Heraclitus and Cratylus asserting that all natural things are posited in continuous flux, so that knowledge of them could be had in no other way unless we took refuge in ideas, which are the separate and stable forms of natural things; but yet, because it did not please Socrates to posit ideas of this kind, he separated his mind from the natural sciences, as Aristotle suggests in the cited place. But Plato his disciple, to whom the opinion of Cratylus and Heraclitus was not displeasing, took refuge in ideas in order to establish natural science, concerning which, as he himself teaches in the Cratylus, natural science would be had. Wherefore the first assertor of ideas was Plato, although not the first disputant.

Concerning the second, Aristotle in the place cited above and in 7 Metaphysics, text 28, and elsewhere not once, teaches that Plato feigned certain separate incorruptible and immortal forms of corruptible things, which are participated in singulars by way of a certain impression. Many of the Peripatetics follow Aristotle in this understanding. But it has pleased other weightiest authors to exempt Plato from that error, and they say his mind was that intelligible forms of all created things pre-exist in the divine intellect, which he himself called ideas: so teach Cicero, Seneca, and Augustine, in the cited places; moreover, Augustine himself, book 12 of the City of God, chap. 26, says thus. With which authors we most gladly agree, although I should believe that some Platonists feigned those ideas which Aristotle imposed upon Plato, from which sentence I can scarcely except Philo the Jew, in the book That the Worse Plots Against the Better. See Soto, q. 1 on Universals, and Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, q. 25, where he explains the arguments by which Aristotle confutes Plato's opinion taken in the first sense. That acceptance of ideas, then, is to be removed entirely from our disputation. Let us return then to the definition of ideas, in which is posited form in place of the genus, while the rest have the character of difference. It is said set before the intellect, to exclude habits and acts of the intellect, which in no way have the character of object; but an idea is the exemplar which the intellect contemplates, as Seneca teaches in the place cited above, and so is the object of the intellect. For the same reason the intelligible likeness is excluded from the character of idea, since a likeness is indeed a principle of understanding and not an object. But some object to us, thinking likenesses to be called ideas, that St. Thomas here teaches that an idea is a principle of knowing: therefore according to his mind a likeness has the character of idea. It is answered with Cajetan, here, that St. Thomas asserts an idea to be a principle of understanding, but not an effective one, of which kind is the impressed likeness, but a formal one, of which kind is the word. It is answered secondly that a likeness, although it is not an effective principle by its proper character, still is not an idea, since it is a form as it were in seed, and represents the object implicitly: but indeed

to the character of an idea it is required that it be a form which explicitly represents the object. From this it follows first that the art residing in the craftsman's mind is not an idea, since it does not have the character of object, but of effective principle only. It follows secondly that of all the things found in the intellect, only the word, which is the expressed likeness of the thing, can with propriety be called an idea. It is proved: for only the word, among all the things found within the intellect, has the character of object of the intellect. It is said moreover in the definition which exists within the intellect, to exclude the external exemplar to which the craftsman looks in his operation: but an idea is not an exemplar of just any kind, but formal and intrinsic to the intellect. Another part is to which the craftsman looks while he works, and this part is posited to exclude the forms of natural things. For although a natural agent produces an effect like its natural form, as fire produces fire, nevertheless the natural form itself does not have the character of idea, in that the natural agent does not work by looking to it. From this it follows first that in no natural agent which works from the inclination of nature is an idea found. Secondly it follows that purely natural effects do not have an idea of themselves in the proximate cause, but only in the first cause, on account of which it is customarily said that the work of nature is the work of intelligence, since natural effects imitate the ideas which the first cause, which is intelligent, contemplates in their production. It follows thirdly that purely chance effects, insofar as they are chance, have no idea: since effects of this kind happen fortuitously and do not proceed from the contemplation of some particular exemplar or idea. What I have said of fortuitous effects is to be judged the same of any effect whatever coming from the imperfection of a particular nature, since an effect of this kind falls short of the idea rather than imitates it. Thus far concerning the first point. In the second point, it is asked whether ideas are to be posited in God, and how great is the certitude of this matter? To this it is answered with a single conclusion. If discourse be about ideas as to the thing signified, it is certain both according to faith and according to natural reason that ideas are to be posited in the divine mind: but if discourse be about the word, that is, whether they ought to be called ideas, it is not so certain that ideas are to be posited in God. The first part of the conclusion, as regards the certitude of faith, is proved first from St. Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46, where he says it is not to be denied in any way that in God there are forms and accounts of all producible things: but an idea, if we attend to the thing signified, is nothing other than the form and account of the thing to be produced. Moreover, St. Thomas, q. 3 of On Truth, art. 1, in the first On the contrary argument, reports Augustine as saying: He is unfaithful who denies that ideas are in the divine mind. Further, all the Saints, especially Augustine, interpreting John 1: All things were made through him, and what was made, in him was life, teach that in this place is signified that the accounts of all things pre-exist in the divine mind; and Augustine, turning over this place, says that just as in the craftsman's mind there is the form and account of the crafted thing to be produced, so all things producible by God have their accounts and forms in the intellect of God, the supreme Craftsman. Finally it is proved from Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the ages were fitted by the Word of God, so that visible things might come from invisible ones, that is, that from the invisible accounts pre-existing invisibly in the divine mind these visible things might come to be outwardly, and this interpretation is commonly received by the Holy Fathers. Moreover this is proved to be certain according to evident reason, and at the same time according to faith. God, according to faith and according to evident reason, produces every creature through will and intellect in the manner of a supreme craftsman; but everyone who makes something through intellect in the manner of a craftsman must necessarily have the idea of the thing to be made, looking to which he works, and the opposite of this is not intelligible, for one who works through intellect works through an apprehended form, and the produced effect imitates that apprehended form. For other arguments see St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 3, art. 1. Lastly it is confirmed from the fact that Philo the Jew, as Eusebius reports, book 11 of the Evangelical Preparation, chap. 12, says that it is manifestly gathered that ideas are to be posited in the divine mind from the fact that Genesis 2 says: Let us make man in our image and likeness. But someone asks: if that sentence of the philosophers were true which asserted that God is the natural cause of all things, that is, working from the necessity of nature, would ideas be to be posited in the divine intellect? To this it is answered that it could be understood in a twofold sense that God produced the world from the necessity of nature. First, that creatures emanated from God and from his essence as if by a simple resultant, as the ray of the sun emanates from the essence and brightness of the sun. Secondly, that they proceeded from God through intellect and will and through the proper operation of the divine intellect and will: yet so that the divine will were naturally determined to this production of creatures, as it is determined to the love of God himself. Then I say that if that sentence proceeded in the first way, there would not

necessarily be ideas to be posited in the divine intellect: since then God would not work in the manner of a craftsman through intellect. But if it proceeded in the second way, there would necessarily be ideas in the divine mind, since although God worked necessarily, he would nevertheless work as a craftsman through intellect and will. The second part of the conclusion is proved, since neither is it certain according to faith, nor can it be established by natural reason, that the accounts and forms of producible things existing in the divine mind ought to be called by this word, ideas. It is true, however, that one who denied that this word properly belongs to those eternal accounts would speak not without some rashness, in that that word has already long been used not only by the weightiest philosophers, but also by the Holy Fathers, and by nearly all Catholic authors. This concerning the second point.

But now concerning the third point it is doubted: Whether the ideas which we have defined to be in the divine mind are really the same as the Divine Essence? And this doubt is moved concerning the solution to the third objection of this article, in which St. Thomas defines the affirmative part. The first sentence is that of Scotus in 1, dist. 35, q. 1, who teaches that ideas are not really the same as the Divine Essence, but are the creatures themselves according to a certain intelligible to-be produced from eternity by God, which is a mean between real to-be and to-be of reason. This sentence is a mere figment little in agreement with the Catholic faith, as was clear above, q. 14, art. 6. This sentence of Scotus seems to be the same as that which Walden reports in the book On the Antiquity of the Faith, chap. 8, from Wyclif's book On Ideas, where he asserted that ideas are nothing other than creatures according to the real to-be which they have from eternity, to-be, I say, not simply, but in a qualified sense, which sentence Walden confutes in the same place. The other sentence is that of Durandus, in 1 Sent., d. 36, q. 3, art. 3, who for the solution of this doubt supposes two things. The first is that all perfections of things are posited in a threefold difference: some are common to God and creatures, which are found formally both in God and in creatures. Of this kind are to live, to-be, to understand. But some are proper to God alone, which are repugnant to creatures, and their opposites intrinsically belong to creatures themselves, e.g. to be uncreated, to be infinite, omnipotent, etc. Finally others are those which properly belong to creatures, but in God are not found formally, but metaphorically: indeed, as Durandus says, there is nothing formally in God which corresponds to them according to likeness; of this kind are the quiddities of creatures, as rational animal, and all those perfections which above, q. 3, were called perfections in a qualified sense. He supposes secondly: that for any two things to stand as idea and ideated, it is necessary that in each be found something formally, according to which in each is attended some likeness and imitation of the one to the other. And the ground of this is that the ideated imitates the idea and is assimilated to it: but it seems impossible that it imitate it and be made like it, unless in that character which formally belongs to both, therefore. With these supposed, Durandus says first: according to those perfections which are proper to God alone and repugnant to creatures, the Divine Essence cannot have the character of idea of creatures. It is proved, since in perfections of this kind creatures do not imitate the Divine Essence, but rather are wholly dissimilar to it. He says secondly: according to those perfections which are found formally in creatures alone, of which kind are the quiddities of creatures, the Divine Essence is not the idea of those creatures. He proves from the second foundation. He says thirdly: according to those perfections which are common to God and creatures, as to live, to-be, etc., the Divine Essence has indeed the character of idea of creatures: but not perfectly, nor very properly. The first part is proved, since in perfections of this kind the creature imitates the Divine Essence and is assimilated to it, in that those perfections formally belong both to God and to the creature. The second part is proved, since those perfections are found imperfectly in creatures: indeed neither are they of the same character in God and creatures; for to-be and to live have unity in God and creatures only according to analogy: therefore creatures neither perfectly nor very properly imitate the Divine Essence as idea according to these perfections, but deficiently and with a certain impropriety. From these Durandus gathers that the Divine Essence, speaking simply, is not to be called the idea of creatures: but with the distinction and limitation made. He says fourthly that the ideas which the Theologians and Saints constitute in the divine mind are the creatures themselves according to the objective to-be which they have from eternity in the divine intellect. This sentence of Durandus is distinguished in this from the impugned sentence of Scotus, that Scotus feigned that objective to-be of creatures to be a certain being, a mean between real being and being of reason. But Durandus does not draw it out from being of reason. With Durandus agree Ockham, d. 35, q. 5, Gabriel, same d., q. 5, Gerson, part 3, book On the Spiritual Life, lect. 1, corol. 12. And this sentence is proved first: an idea is nothing other than the account and form which the ideated imitates: but the creature produced outwardly imitates itself according to the objective to-be

which it has in the divine intellect: therefore the creature according to that objective to-be is the idea of itself to be produced outwardly. The minor is proved. For the whole to-be which the creature produced outwardly has corresponds to that to-be which it has objectively in the divine intellect. Secondly it is proved: the idea which is in the mind of the craftsman of the house to be built is the house itself conceived by the craftsman: therefore the idea which is in the supreme craftsman with respect to the creature to be produced is the creature itself according to its conceived and objective to-be. The antecedent is proved: the craftsman in building the house looks to nothing other than the conceived house, and conformably to it he works outwardly, therefore. It is confirmed from Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 20, where he says that the proximate cause of the effect is univocal to the effect itself: therefore the idea of the craftsman, since it is the proximate cause of the house to be built, is univocal to it, that is, of the same character as it: but the formal concept of the craftsman is not of the same character as the exterior house, while the conceived house is altogether of the same character as the built house: therefore the formal concept of the craftsman is not the idea, but the conceived house itself. Thirdly it is proved: ideas are not the Divine Essence itself: therefore they are nothing other than creatures according to the objective to-be which they have in the divine intellect. The antecedent is proved: the Divine Essence is not the idea of creatures according to its quidditative and natural to-be of the essence itself: since as we have already said, an idea is a form conceived by the intellect and set before it. Nor is it an idea according to the objective to-be which it has with respect to the divine intellect. This is proved, since an idea is a real form; but that objective to-be which the Divine Essence has with respect to the divine intellect is a thing of reason; therefore. It is confirmed first: if the Divine Essence is the idea of creatures, insofar as it is a form conceived by the divine intellect and set before it, it follows that the character of idea is not common to the three Divine Persons, but belongs to the Divine Word alone, but this is false: since idea does not pertain to personal properties, but to essential ones. The consequence is proved: since the Person of the Word alone is a form conceived and set before the divine Intellect. It is confirmed secondly: an idea formally consists in a relation to the ideated: for formally speaking it is a likeness and image; but the Divine Essence according to reality does not import a relation to the creature, but only a respect of reason: therefore the Divine Essence really is not the idea of creatures. From this sentence of Durandus it is gathered that ideas are not subjectively in the divine intellect, but only objectively, which he himself and the other cited authors confess. But other Theologians proceed otherwise. A certain Cameracensis cited by Gabriel, in the place above, says that very many ideas are not the same as the Divine Essence, but are only objectively in the intellect of God, and of this kind are all ideas of creatures. In which he agrees with Durandus. But some ideas are the same as the Divine Essence, and those are the Son and the Holy Spirit: so that the Son, insofar as he is the object of the Paternal intellect, is the idea of himself insofar as he has real to-be from the Father through eternal generation, and the Holy Spirit insofar as he is the object of the Father and the Son is the idea of himself insofar as he really proceeds from both. Other Theologians more wisely teach that ideas in God are identified with the Divine Essence: but not all proceed in the same sense. Some, among whom is Marsilius, q. 1 of the Prologue, say ideas are the Divine Essence, insofar as the essence is knowledge of itself, insofar as it is imitable by creatures. Others say that the Divine Essence insofar as it is the science and factive art of creatures. But St. Thomas proceeds otherwise. For the exposition of whose sentence let there be a first conclusion.

First conclusion: Ideas in God are not creatures according to objective to-be, as Durandus said. It is proved first: an idea is a real form in God: but the creature, according to that objective to-be, is not something real, but of reason, which Durandus does not deny, therefore. Secondly it is proved: an idea is the real cause of the ideated: but the creature considered according to objective to-be cannot be the real cause of itself produced outwardly: therefore. The major is clear: since an idea is the exemplar of the ideated, but an exemplar is the real cause of the exemplified, as Aristotle very often commemorates the exemplar among real causes. The minor is proved, both since the creature, according to objective to-be, is a thing of reason, and consequently cannot be a real cause, and since it is a manifest implication for a thing to be the real cause of itself. It is confirmed from Dionysius, chap. 5 in the book On the Divine Names, asserting that ideas are the effecting accounts of all things: but it cannot be understood that the same thing be the effecting cause of itself. Thirdly it is proved: it follows from the opposite sentence that God per se and necessarily depends on the creature in his operations as on a co-principle, but the consequent is reputed sacrilegious by Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46. The sequel is proved: any craftsman whatever per se and necessarily depends in his operation on the idea of the crafted thing, which is the creature in objective to-be: therefore the supreme divine Craftsman depends per se in his operations on the ideas of creatures: further, therefore if the ideas of creatures are the creatures themselves, God per se and necessarily depends on creatures in his operations. This argument manifestly convinces the sentence of Durandus of falsity, indeed even of peril in faith.

Second conclusion. The ideas of creatures in God are really the same as the Divine Essence. This conclusion is so certain that the opposite is rash. It is proved first, since it is manifestly gathered from the preceding conclusion: for if creatures in objective to-be are not ideas in the divine mind, it cannot be explained what else ideas in the divine mind are, unless the Divine Essence itself, since from eternity there is nothing else in God except the Divine Essence itself and creatures in objective to-be. Secondly it is proved, since the Holy Fathers most manifestly call the Divine Essence the idea of creatures, especially Augustine, in the places cited above, in which they attribute those conditions of an idea which can belong to the Divine Essence alone. For he says an idea is an immutable, immortal and eternal form and account; Dionysius, in the cited place, says ideas are the effecting accounts of things. But there is no other effecting account of all things besides the Divine Essence. Clement of Alexandria, books 4 and 5 of the Stromata, very often says that the Divine Essence is the idea of all things, and Boethius, book 3 of the Consolation, calls the idea the supernal pattern, which appellation belongs to the Divine Essence alone. The ancient Philosophers too, Cicero, Seneca and others, manifestly understand by the name of ideas the eternal accounts, which are the same as the divine mind, as is clear from the words of Cicero cited above. Moreover the conclusion is proved by reason. The Divine Essence is the most express likeness of all things, and the living exemplar which all creatures imitate: for all partake their to-be and their quiddity from the Divine Essence: therefore there is no ground on account of which the Divine Essence does not have the character of idea of creatures. It is confirmed: the Divine Essence is the formal principle of knowing creatures to the divine intellect, it is also the principle of working creatures by way of exemplar; therefore it is the idea of creatures.

Third conclusion. The Divine Essence is not the idea of creatures insofar as it is an intelligible likeness, nor insofar as it is knowledge of creatures, nor insofar as it is science, nor insofar as it is art, but insofar as it is a form set before the divine intellect, and known by it as imitable by creatures. This conclusion, as to nearly all its parts, is left proved from what we said above explaining the definition of idea. But the last particle of the conclusion is to be explained in the following article, where with St. Thomas we shall show that in the intrinsic character of an idea is included a certain respect to creatures, insofar as an idea is imitable by them.

Fourth conclusion. The Divine Essence is the idea of creatures, not only as to those actions which are found formally in God and creatures, as to live and to-be, etc., but also as to those which are found formally in creatures alone, of which kind are the quiddities of creatures. This is against Durandus. And it is proved: the Divine Essence is the most express likeness of all these perfections, and creatures as to all these perfections imitate it, since every perfection of a creature is a certain participation of the Divine Essence: therefore. But note, to dissolve the argument of Durandus, that it is not necessary to the character of an idea that it have formally in itself that perfection according to which the ideated imitates it, in which Durandus was deceived, but it shall suffice that it be found eminently, and as in its expressed likeness. And in this way the quiddities of creatures are found in the Divine Essence.

But there is a doubt whether the Divine Essence is the idea of creatures as to those perfections which belong to God alone, as to-be uncreated, infinite, etc. To this it is said that without doubt the Divine Essence as to these perfections cannot be called the idea of creatures, since creatures do not imitate it in these perfections. But with respect to those conditions which are found in creatures and are opposed to those divine perfections, as to-be created, to-be finite, etc., whether the Divine Essence ought to be called an idea will be explained in article 8 following.

Fifth conclusion. The Divine Essence is not the idea of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, so that the Son does not have an idea in the intellect of the eternal Father, nor the Holy Spirit in the intellect of the Father and the Son, and the opposite is very rash, not to say erroneous. It is proved first: since the opposite sentence is against the common manner of speaking of the Saints and Theologians. Secondly, since an idea has the character of exemplary cause with respect to the ideated: but the Divine Essence is not the exemplary cause of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, and to assert the opposite is an error in faith: therefore. It is confirmed: an idea is a form to which the craftsman looks while he works, but the Father is not a craftsman in the generation of the Son, nor has the manner of a craftsman, since he is not its cause, but its principle, as faith teaches: therefore the Divine Essence, as it is in the intellect of the Father, is not the Idea of the Son. The same argument is made concerning the Holy Spirit. Lastly it is proved: an idea, as St. Thomas teaches in this article, is a form really separate from the ideated: but the Divine Essence is not really separate from the Son and the Holy Spirit, as faith teaches: therefore it is not the idea of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

To the arguments of Durandus it is answered. To the first, I deny the minor, and to the proof I say that the thing produced outwardly with respect to itself considered according to objective to-be has indeed the same to-be, yet not by way of imitation, so that it imitate it, but by way of identity, as it is customarily said that the possible thing and the thing produced outwardly is altogether the same, e.g. the Antichrist, who now is possible and who afterwards will be. To the second the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that the craftsman looks upon the house, not as an exemplar to be imitated, but as the thing to be produced. To the confirmation it is said that Aristotle in that place favors us, since he does not say that the proximate cause in artificial things is simply univocal, which however was to be said if the proximate cause, namely the idea, were the artificial thing itself objectively in to-be; but Aristotle says that it is partly univocal, that is, univocal by the character of likeness. To the third, the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is said that the Divine Essence is the idea of creatures not according to its natural to-be, but according to the objective to-be which they have in the divine intellect. Against the impugning of this, Cajetan answers that objective to-be with respect to a created intellect is a thing of reason: but, since the Divine Essence contains in itself in a most eminent manner every character of entity, therefore objective to-be in the Divine Essence is a real account and an infinite perfection. This solution is quite probable, but seems to be particular. For from it is gathered that a created idea, which is found in the craftsman's mind, is formally a being of reason. Hence that the solution be general to every created idea, it is answered that objective to-be in the thing known outside the intellect is a respect of reason, whether it be known by a created or uncreated intellect; e.g. the objective to-be which a stone has, as much with respect to the divine intellect as to ours, is a relation of reason in the stone. But objective to-be in the formal and intrinsic object, of a created intellect also, is a real relation. For the word of the mind, really and from its nature, is the intrinsic term and formal object of understanding: but an idea is the formal and intrinsic object of the intellect. To the confirmation it is answered that an idea per se primarily belongs not to the Divine Word, but to the Divine Essence. And the ground is twofold: the first, since an idea has the character of exemplary cause. But that God be the cause of creatures, whether efficient or exemplary or formal, belongs to God insofar as he is one by the character of the Divine Essence, and does not belong per se primarily to any Divine Person, as is explained in q. 45, art. 6. The second is, since an idea per se primarily regards the divine intellect, as it is the divine intellect, but the Word is not a form set before the divine intellect absolutely, but insofar as it is the intellect of the Father. Hence to the argument it is answered that the Divine Essence is a form set before the divine intellect absolutely: for it is the primary and formal object of the divine intellect, and thus the character of idea belongs to it per se primarily. It is to be noted, however, that just as by a certain accommodation we attribute Omnipotence to the Father, and Goodness to the Holy Spirit, so also to the Word we attribute Wisdom and the character of idea. To the second confirmation it is answered that an idea simply and formally is an absolute form, namely the Divine Essence; yet intrinsically it encloses a respect of reason to the creature, as its intrinsic complement. Concerning which matter in the following article.