Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: It is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. The ground is: that God is an agent acting through intellect.

COMMENTARY.

On the matter of this question the Scholastics dispute, 1 Sent., dist. 36. In this article three things are to be expounded by us. The first is what an idea is, and at the same time its nominal and its real definition will be explained. The second, whether ideas are to be posited in God, and with how great certitude. The third, whether ideas are the same as the divine Essence. Concerning the first, note from St. Thomas here and from Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46, that idea is a Greek noun, and has the same force as form and species; but it is most often called by the Latins account, which appellation, on Augustine's authority, in the place cited above, is not according to the proper interpretation of that word idea. It is, however, according to the propriety of the thing, in that an idea is a form pertaining to intellect alone. Luis Vives, expounding Augustine, book 7 of the City of God, chap. 28, asserts that idea is named from seeing: for one who is about to do something looks upon the idea to which he adapts his action. Which interpretation is indeed most true, proving that an idea is properly called by us an account, even as regards the interpretation of the word, since it is the account of looking. But by whatever name an idea may be called by us, it is thus defined by its real definition, namely, an idea is a form set before the intellect existing within it, to which the craftsman looks while he works. But before we explain that definition through its individual parts, two things are to be expounded by us. One is who was the inventor or assertor of ideas. The other is in what sense the ancient Platonic Philosophers used this word idea. Concerning the first, Eusebius, book 11 of the Evangelical Preparation, says Socrates was the first who disputed about ideas. But Aristotle, book 1 of the Metaphysics, text 5, openly teaches that Plato was the first inventor of ideas, and that Socrates disputed nothing about natural matter but converted himself wholly to moral disputation. This sentence of Aristotle, which seems contrary to Eusebius, has commonly been followed by the weightiest authors. Cicero, book 1 of the Tusculan Questions, says the divine mind possessed what he first called species, which other Philosophers called idea, and that this appellation was invented by Plato. Seneca, Letter 66, and Justin Martyr in the Exhortation against the Gentiles, say Plato was the inventor of ideas, on the occasion taken from Exodus 26: See that you make all things according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain. St. Augustine in the cited place says that if we speak of ideas, attending to the thing itself, Plato was not the first author of ideas, for it is not credible that ideas lay hidden from those wise men who preceded Plato. But if the question be about this word idea, the first author was Plato: so Augustine judges. I for my part would judge in this matter that the first who disputed about ideas was Socrates, Plato's master, by whom was persuaded the opinion of Heraclitus and Cratylus asserting that all natural things are posited in continuous flux, so that knowledge of them could be had in no other way unless we took refuge in ideas, which are the separate and stable forms of natural things; but yet, because it did not please Socrates to posit ideas of this kind, he separated his mind from the natural sciences, as Aristotle suggests in the cited place. But Plato his disciple, to whom the opinion of Cratylus and Heraclitus was not displeasing, took refuge in ideas in order to establish natural science, concerning which, as he himself teaches in the Cratylus, natural science would be had. Wherefore the first assertor of ideas was Plato, although not the first disputant.

Concerning the second, Aristotle in the place cited above and in 7 Metaphysics, text 28, and elsewhere not once, teaches that Plato feigned certain separate incorruptible and immortal forms of corruptible things, which are participated in singulars by way of a certain impression. Many of the Peripatetics follow Aristotle in this understanding. But it has pleased other weightiest authors to exempt Plato from that error, and they say his mind was that intelligible forms of all created things pre-exist in the divine intellect, which he himself called ideas: so teach Cicero, Seneca, and Augustine, in the cited places; moreover, Augustine himself, book 12 of the City of God, chap. 26, says thus. With which authors we most gladly agree, although I should believe that some Platonists feigned those ideas which Aristotle imposed upon Plato, from which sentence I can scarcely except Philo the Jew, in the book That the Worse Plots Against the Better. See Soto, q. 1 on Universals, and Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, q. 25, where he explains the arguments by which Aristotle confutes Plato's opinion taken in the first sense. That acceptance of ideas, then, is to be removed entirely from our disputation. Let us return then to the definition of ideas, in which is posited form in place of the genus, while the rest have the character of difference. It is said set before the intellect, to exclude habits and acts of the intellect, which in no way have the character of object; but an idea is the exemplar which the intellect contemplates, as Seneca teaches in the place cited above, and so is the object of the intellect. For the same reason the intelligible likeness is excluded from the character of idea, since a likeness is indeed a principle of understanding and not an object. But some object to us, thinking likenesses to be called ideas, that St. Thomas here teaches that an idea is a principle of knowing: therefore according to his mind a likeness has the character of idea. It is answered with Cajetan, here, that St. Thomas asserts an idea to be a principle of understanding, but not an effective one, of which kind is the impressed likeness, but a formal one, of which kind is the word. It is answered secondly that a likeness, although it is not an effective principle by its proper character, still is not an idea, since it is a form as it were in seed, and represents the object implicitly: but indeed

to the character of an idea it is required that it be a form which explicitly represents the object. From this it follows first that the art residing in the craftsman's mind is not an idea, since it does not have the character of object, but of effective principle only. It follows secondly that of all the things found in the intellect, only the word, which is the expressed likeness of the thing, can with propriety be called an idea. It is proved: for only the word, among all the things found within the intellect, has the character of object of the intellect. It is said moreover in the definition which exists within the intellect, to exclude the external exemplar to which the craftsman looks in his operation: but an idea is not an exemplar of just any kind, but formal and intrinsic to the intellect. Another part is to which the craftsman looks while he works, and this part is posited to exclude the forms of natural things. For although a natural agent produces an effect like its natural form, as fire produces fire, nevertheless the natural form itself does not have the character of idea, in that the natural agent does not work by looking to it. From this it follows first that in no natural agent which works from the inclination of nature is an idea found. Secondly it follows that purely natural effects do not have an idea of themselves in the proximate cause, but only in the first cause, on account of which it is customarily said that the work of nature is the work of intelligence, since natural effects imitate the ideas which the first cause, which is intelligent, contemplates in their production. It follows thirdly that purely chance effects, insofar as they are chance, have no idea: since effects of this kind happen fortuitously and do not proceed from the contemplation of some particular exemplar or idea. What I have said of fortuitous effects is to be judged the same of any effect whatever coming from the imperfection of a particular nature, since an effect of this kind falls short of the idea rather than imitates it. Thus far concerning the first point. In the second point, it is asked whether ideas are to be posited in God, and how great is the certitude of this matter? To this it is answered with a single conclusion. If discourse be about ideas as to the thing signified, it is certain both according to faith and according to natural reason that ideas are to be posited in the divine mind: but if discourse be about the word, that is, whether they ought to be called ideas, it is not so certain that ideas are to be posited in God. The first part of the conclusion, as regards the certitude of faith, is proved first from St. Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46, where he says it is not to be denied in any way that in God there are forms and accounts of all producible things: but an idea, if we attend to the thing signified, is nothing other than the form and account of the thing to be produced. Moreover, St. Thomas, q. 3 of On Truth, art. 1, in the first On the contrary argument, reports Augustine as saying: He is unfaithful who denies that ideas are in the divine mind. Further, all the Saints, especially Augustine, interpreting John 1: All things were made through him, and what was made, in him was life, teach that in this place is signified that the accounts of all things pre-exist in the divine mind; and Augustine, turning over this place, says that just as in the craftsman's mind there is the form and account of the crafted thing to be produced, so all things producible by God have their accounts and forms in the intellect of God, the supreme Craftsman. Finally it is proved from Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the ages were fitted by the Word of God, so that visible things might come from invisible ones, that is, that from the invisible accounts pre-existing invisibly in the divine mind these visible things might come to be outwardly, and this interpretation is commonly received by the Holy Fathers. Moreover this is proved to be certain according to evident reason, and at the same time according to faith. God, according to faith and according to evident reason, produces every creature through will and intellect in the manner of a supreme craftsman; but everyone who makes something through intellect in the manner of a craftsman must necessarily have the idea of the thing to be made, looking to which he works, and the opposite of this is not intelligible, for one who works through intellect works through an apprehended form, and the produced effect imitates that apprehended form. For other arguments see St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 3, art. 1. Lastly it is confirmed from the fact that Philo the Jew, as Eusebius reports, book 11 of the Evangelical Preparation, chap. 12, says that it is manifestly gathered that ideas are to be posited in the divine mind from the fact that Genesis 2 says: Let us make man in our image and likeness. But someone asks: if that sentence of the philosophers were true which asserted that God is the natural cause of all things, that is, working from the necessity of nature, would ideas be to be posited in the divine intellect? To this it is answered that it could be understood in a twofold sense that God produced the world from the necessity of nature. First, that creatures emanated from God and from his essence as if by a simple resultant, as the ray of the sun emanates from the essence and brightness of the sun. Secondly, that they proceeded from God through intellect and will and through the proper operation of the divine intellect and will: yet so that the divine will were naturally determined to this production of creatures, as it is determined to the love of God himself. Then I say that if that sentence proceeded in the first way, there would not

necessarily be ideas to be posited in the divine intellect: since then God would not work in the manner of a craftsman through intellect. But if it proceeded in the second way, there would necessarily be ideas in the divine mind, since although God worked necessarily, he would nevertheless work as a craftsman through intellect and will. The second part of the conclusion is proved, since neither is it certain according to faith, nor can it be established by natural reason, that the accounts and forms of producible things existing in the divine mind ought to be called by this word, ideas. It is true, however, that one who denied that this word properly belongs to those eternal accounts would speak not without some rashness, in that that word has already long been used not only by the weightiest philosophers, but also by the Holy Fathers, and by nearly all Catholic authors. This concerning the second point.

But now concerning the third point it is doubted: Whether the ideas which we have defined to be in the divine mind are really the same as the Divine Essence? And this doubt is moved concerning the solution to the third objection of this article, in which St. Thomas defines the affirmative part. The first sentence is that of Scotus in 1, dist. 35, q. 1, who teaches that ideas are not really the same as the Divine Essence, but are the creatures themselves according to a certain intelligible to-be produced from eternity by God, which is a mean between real to-be and to-be of reason. This sentence is a mere figment little in agreement with the Catholic faith, as was clear above, q. 14, art. 6. This sentence of Scotus seems to be the same as that which Walden reports in the book On the Antiquity of the Faith, chap. 8, from Wyclif's book On Ideas, where he asserted that ideas are nothing other than creatures according to the real to-be which they have from eternity, to-be, I say, not simply, but in a qualified sense, which sentence Walden confutes in the same place. The other sentence is that of Durandus, in 1 Sent., d. 36, q. 3, art. 3, who for the solution of this doubt supposes two things. The first is that all perfections of things are posited in a threefold difference: some are common to God and creatures, which are found formally both in God and in creatures. Of this kind are to live, to-be, to understand. But some are proper to God alone, which are repugnant to creatures, and their opposites intrinsically belong to creatures themselves, e.g. to be uncreated, to be infinite, omnipotent, etc. Finally others are those which properly belong to creatures, but in God are not found formally, but metaphorically: indeed, as Durandus says, there is nothing formally in God which corresponds to them according to likeness; of this kind are the quiddities of creatures, as rational animal, and all those perfections which above, q. 3, were called perfections in a qualified sense. He supposes secondly: that for any two things to stand as idea and ideated, it is necessary that in each be found something formally, according to which in each is attended some likeness and imitation of the one to the other. And the ground of this is that the ideated imitates the idea and is assimilated to it: but it seems impossible that it imitate it and be made like it, unless in that character which formally belongs to both, therefore. With these supposed, Durandus says first: according to those perfections which are proper to God alone and repugnant to creatures, the Divine Essence cannot have the character of idea of creatures. It is proved, since in perfections of this kind creatures do not imitate the Divine Essence, but rather are wholly dissimilar to it. He says secondly: according to those perfections which are found formally in creatures alone, of which kind are the quiddities of creatures, the Divine Essence is not the idea of those creatures. He proves from the second foundation. He says thirdly: according to those perfections which are common to God and creatures, as to live, to-be, etc., the Divine Essence has indeed the character of idea of creatures: but not perfectly, nor very properly. The first part is proved, since in perfections of this kind the creature imitates the Divine Essence and is assimilated to it, in that those perfections formally belong both to God and to the creature. The second part is proved, since those perfections are found imperfectly in creatures: indeed neither are they of the same character in God and creatures; for to-be and to live have unity in God and creatures only according to analogy: therefore creatures neither perfectly nor very properly imitate the Divine Essence as idea according to these perfections, but deficiently and with a certain impropriety. From these Durandus gathers that the Divine Essence, speaking simply, is not to be called the idea of creatures: but with the distinction and limitation made. He says fourthly that the ideas which the Theologians and Saints constitute in the divine mind are the creatures themselves according to the objective to-be which they have from eternity in the divine intellect. This sentence of Durandus is distinguished in this from the impugned sentence of Scotus, that Scotus feigned that objective to-be of creatures to be a certain being, a mean between real being and being of reason. But Durandus does not draw it out from being of reason. With Durandus agree Ockham, d. 35, q. 5, Gabriel, same d., q. 5, Gerson, part 3, book On the Spiritual Life, lect. 1, corol. 12. And this sentence is proved first: an idea is nothing other than the account and form which the ideated imitates: but the creature produced outwardly imitates itself according to the objective to-be

which it has in the divine intellect: therefore the creature according to that objective to-be is the idea of itself to be produced outwardly. The minor is proved. For the whole to-be which the creature produced outwardly has corresponds to that to-be which it has objectively in the divine intellect. Secondly it is proved: the idea which is in the mind of the craftsman of the house to be built is the house itself conceived by the craftsman: therefore the idea which is in the supreme craftsman with respect to the creature to be produced is the creature itself according to its conceived and objective to-be. The antecedent is proved: the craftsman in building the house looks to nothing other than the conceived house, and conformably to it he works outwardly, therefore. It is confirmed from Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 20, where he says that the proximate cause of the effect is univocal to the effect itself: therefore the idea of the craftsman, since it is the proximate cause of the house to be built, is univocal to it, that is, of the same character as it: but the formal concept of the craftsman is not of the same character as the exterior house, while the conceived house is altogether of the same character as the built house: therefore the formal concept of the craftsman is not the idea, but the conceived house itself. Thirdly it is proved: ideas are not the Divine Essence itself: therefore they are nothing other than creatures according to the objective to-be which they have in the divine intellect. The antecedent is proved: the Divine Essence is not the idea of creatures according to its quidditative and natural to-be of the essence itself: since as we have already said, an idea is a form conceived by the intellect and set before it. Nor is it an idea according to the objective to-be which it has with respect to the divine intellect. This is proved, since an idea is a real form; but that objective to-be which the Divine Essence has with respect to the divine intellect is a thing of reason; therefore. It is confirmed first: if the Divine Essence is the idea of creatures, insofar as it is a form conceived by the divine intellect and set before it, it follows that the character of idea is not common to the three Divine Persons, but belongs to the Divine Word alone, but this is false: since idea does not pertain to personal properties, but to essential ones. The consequence is proved: since the Person of the Word alone is a form conceived and set before the divine Intellect. It is confirmed secondly: an idea formally consists in a relation to the ideated: for formally speaking it is a likeness and image; but the Divine Essence according to reality does not import a relation to the creature, but only a respect of reason: therefore the Divine Essence really is not the idea of creatures. From this sentence of Durandus it is gathered that ideas are not subjectively in the divine intellect, but only objectively, which he himself and the other cited authors confess. But other Theologians proceed otherwise. A certain Cameracensis cited by Gabriel, in the place above, says that very many ideas are not the same as the Divine Essence, but are only objectively in the intellect of God, and of this kind are all ideas of creatures. In which he agrees with Durandus. But some ideas are the same as the Divine Essence, and those are the Son and the Holy Spirit: so that the Son, insofar as he is the object of the Paternal intellect, is the idea of himself insofar as he has real to-be from the Father through eternal generation, and the Holy Spirit insofar as he is the object of the Father and the Son is the idea of himself insofar as he really proceeds from both. Other Theologians more wisely teach that ideas in God are identified with the Divine Essence: but not all proceed in the same sense. Some, among whom is Marsilius, q. 1 of the Prologue, say ideas are the Divine Essence, insofar as the essence is knowledge of itself, insofar as it is imitable by creatures. Others say that the Divine Essence insofar as it is the science and factive art of creatures. But St. Thomas proceeds otherwise. For the exposition of whose sentence let there be a first conclusion.

First conclusion: Ideas in God are not creatures according to objective to-be, as Durandus said. It is proved first: an idea is a real form in God: but the creature, according to that objective to-be, is not something real, but of reason, which Durandus does not deny, therefore. Secondly it is proved: an idea is the real cause of the ideated: but the creature considered according to objective to-be cannot be the real cause of itself produced outwardly: therefore. The major is clear: since an idea is the exemplar of the ideated, but an exemplar is the real cause of the exemplified, as Aristotle very often commemorates the exemplar among real causes. The minor is proved, both since the creature, according to objective to-be, is a thing of reason, and consequently cannot be a real cause, and since it is a manifest implication for a thing to be the real cause of itself. It is confirmed from Dionysius, chap. 5 in the book On the Divine Names, asserting that ideas are the effecting accounts of all things: but it cannot be understood that the same thing be the effecting cause of itself. Thirdly it is proved: it follows from the opposite sentence that God per se and necessarily depends on the creature in his operations as on a co-principle, but the consequent is reputed sacrilegious by Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46. The sequel is proved: any craftsman whatever per se and necessarily depends in his operation on the idea of the crafted thing, which is the creature in objective to-be: therefore the supreme divine Craftsman depends per se in his operations on the ideas of creatures: further, therefore if the ideas of creatures are the creatures themselves, God per se and necessarily depends on creatures in his operations. This argument manifestly convinces the sentence of Durandus of falsity, indeed even of peril in faith.

Second conclusion. The ideas of creatures in God are really the same as the Divine Essence. This conclusion is so certain that the opposite is rash. It is proved first, since it is manifestly gathered from the preceding conclusion: for if creatures in objective to-be are not ideas in the divine mind, it cannot be explained what else ideas in the divine mind are, unless the Divine Essence itself, since from eternity there is nothing else in God except the Divine Essence itself and creatures in objective to-be. Secondly it is proved, since the Holy Fathers most manifestly call the Divine Essence the idea of creatures, especially Augustine, in the places cited above, in which they attribute those conditions of an idea which can belong to the Divine Essence alone. For he says an idea is an immutable, immortal and eternal form and account; Dionysius, in the cited place, says ideas are the effecting accounts of things. But there is no other effecting account of all things besides the Divine Essence. Clement of Alexandria, books 4 and 5 of the Stromata, very often says that the Divine Essence is the idea of all things, and Boethius, book 3 of the Consolation, calls the idea the supernal pattern, which appellation belongs to the Divine Essence alone. The ancient Philosophers too, Cicero, Seneca and others, manifestly understand by the name of ideas the eternal accounts, which are the same as the divine mind, as is clear from the words of Cicero cited above. Moreover the conclusion is proved by reason. The Divine Essence is the most express likeness of all things, and the living exemplar which all creatures imitate: for all partake their to-be and their quiddity from the Divine Essence: therefore there is no ground on account of which the Divine Essence does not have the character of idea of creatures. It is confirmed: the Divine Essence is the formal principle of knowing creatures to the divine intellect, it is also the principle of working creatures by way of exemplar; therefore it is the idea of creatures.

Third conclusion. The Divine Essence is not the idea of creatures insofar as it is an intelligible likeness, nor insofar as it is knowledge of creatures, nor insofar as it is science, nor insofar as it is art, but insofar as it is a form set before the divine intellect, and known by it as imitable by creatures. This conclusion, as to nearly all its parts, is left proved from what we said above explaining the definition of idea. But the last particle of the conclusion is to be explained in the following article, where with St. Thomas we shall show that in the intrinsic character of an idea is included a certain respect to creatures, insofar as an idea is imitable by them.

Fourth conclusion. The Divine Essence is the idea of creatures, not only as to those actions which are found formally in God and creatures, as to live and to-be, etc., but also as to those which are found formally in creatures alone, of which kind are the quiddities of creatures. This is against Durandus. And it is proved: the Divine Essence is the most express likeness of all these perfections, and creatures as to all these perfections imitate it, since every perfection of a creature is a certain participation of the Divine Essence: therefore. But note, to dissolve the argument of Durandus, that it is not necessary to the character of an idea that it have formally in itself that perfection according to which the ideated imitates it, in which Durandus was deceived, but it shall suffice that it be found eminently, and as in its expressed likeness. And in this way the quiddities of creatures are found in the Divine Essence.

But there is a doubt whether the Divine Essence is the idea of creatures as to those perfections which belong to God alone, as to-be uncreated, infinite, etc. To this it is said that without doubt the Divine Essence as to these perfections cannot be called the idea of creatures, since creatures do not imitate it in these perfections. But with respect to those conditions which are found in creatures and are opposed to those divine perfections, as to-be created, to-be finite, etc., whether the Divine Essence ought to be called an idea will be explained in article 8 following.

Fifth conclusion. The Divine Essence is not the idea of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, so that the Son does not have an idea in the intellect of the eternal Father, nor the Holy Spirit in the intellect of the Father and the Son, and the opposite is very rash, not to say erroneous. It is proved first: since the opposite sentence is against the common manner of speaking of the Saints and Theologians. Secondly, since an idea has the character of exemplary cause with respect to the ideated: but the Divine Essence is not the exemplary cause of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, and to assert the opposite is an error in faith: therefore. It is confirmed: an idea is a form to which the craftsman looks while he works, but the Father is not a craftsman in the generation of the Son, nor has the manner of a craftsman, since he is not its cause, but its principle, as faith teaches: therefore the Divine Essence, as it is in the intellect of the Father, is not the Idea of the Son. The same argument is made concerning the Holy Spirit. Lastly it is proved: an idea, as St. Thomas teaches in this article, is a form really separate from the ideated: but the Divine Essence is not really separate from the Son and the Holy Spirit, as faith teaches: therefore it is not the idea of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

To the arguments of Durandus it is answered. To the first, I deny the minor, and to the proof I say that the thing produced outwardly with respect to itself considered according to objective to-be has indeed the same to-be, yet not by way of imitation, so that it imitate it, but by way of identity, as it is customarily said that the possible thing and the thing produced outwardly is altogether the same, e.g. the Antichrist, who now is possible and who afterwards will be. To the second the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that the craftsman looks upon the house, not as an exemplar to be imitated, but as the thing to be produced. To the confirmation it is said that Aristotle in that place favors us, since he does not say that the proximate cause in artificial things is simply univocal, which however was to be said if the proximate cause, namely the idea, were the artificial thing itself objectively in to-be; but Aristotle says that it is partly univocal, that is, univocal by the character of likeness. To the third, the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is said that the Divine Essence is the idea of creatures not according to its natural to-be, but according to the objective to-be which they have in the divine intellect. Against the impugning of this, Cajetan answers that objective to-be with respect to a created intellect is a thing of reason: but, since the Divine Essence contains in itself in a most eminent manner every character of entity, therefore objective to-be in the Divine Essence is a real account and an infinite perfection. This solution is quite probable, but seems to be particular. For from it is gathered that a created idea, which is found in the craftsman's mind, is formally a being of reason. Hence that the solution be general to every created idea, it is answered that objective to-be in the thing known outside the intellect is a respect of reason, whether it be known by a created or uncreated intellect; e.g. the objective to-be which a stone has, as much with respect to the divine intellect as to ours, is a relation of reason in the stone. But objective to-be in the formal and intrinsic object, of a created intellect also, is a real relation. For the word of the mind, really and from its nature, is the intrinsic term and formal object of understanding: but an idea is the formal and intrinsic object of the intellect. To the confirmation it is answered that an idea per se primarily belongs not to the Divine Word, but to the Divine Essence. And the ground is twofold: the first, since an idea has the character of exemplary cause. But that God be the cause of creatures, whether efficient or exemplary or formal, belongs to God insofar as he is one by the character of the Divine Essence, and does not belong per se primarily to any Divine Person, as is explained in q. 45, art. 6. The second is, since an idea per se primarily regards the divine intellect, as it is the divine intellect, but the Word is not a form set before the divine intellect absolutely, but insofar as it is the intellect of the Father. Hence to the argument it is answered that the Divine Essence is a form set before the divine intellect absolutely: for it is the primary and formal object of the divine intellect, and thus the character of idea belongs to it per se primarily. It is to be noted, however, that just as by a certain accommodation we attribute Omnipotence to the Father, and Goodness to the Holy Spirit, so also to the Word we attribute Wisdom and the character of idea. To the second confirmation it is answered that an idea simply and formally is an absolute form, namely the Divine Essence; yet intrinsically it encloses a respect of reason to the creature, as its intrinsic complement. Concerning which matter in the following article.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: It is necessary to posit several ideas in the divine mind. The ground is: that in God there is the idea of the order of the universe: therefore he has the accounts of those things out of which the whole is constituted.

Second conclusion: The plurality of ideas does not conflict with the divine simplicity. The ground is: that the idea of the thing worked is in the mind of the one working, just as what is understood; but it is not against the simplicity of the divine intellect that it understand many things.

COMMENTARY.

In this article the doubt is: Whether several ideas are to be posited in God; and at the same time it is doubted concerning the account of St. Thomas, whether ideas are to be distinguished by diverse respects to creatures, insofar as God compares his essence to diverse creatures, as imitable in diverse ways by them? It is proved first that several ideas are not to be posited. The Divine Essence according to its entity, before -- in our manner of understanding -- it is an object to the divine intellect, is the most express likeness of creatures, imitable by the creatures themselves according to itself: therefore, before it is an object to the divine intellect, and compared to diverse creatures, it has the character of the idea of creatures, and consequently is a single most simple idea. The antecedent is proved. For the Divine Essence does not have it, that it be the likeness of creatures, as imitable by them, from the fact that it is known by the divine intellect, but has it from its own infinite entity: therefore. You will say that the account of an idea intrinsically demands that the Divine Essence be an object to the intellect. Then there is the second argument. The Divine Essence, known by the divine intellect, before -- in our manner of understanding -- it is compared to diverse creatures, is a known likeness of creatures imitable by them: therefore, before it is compared to diverse creatures, it has the perfect character of an idea, and consequently, through comparison to diverse creatures, diverse ideas are not constituted in God. The antecedent is proved: for the Divine Essence does not have it, that it be the likeness of creatures, from the fact that it is compared to the creatures themselves, but has this from its infinite perfection. It is confirmed: for if the Divine Essence in the character of an idea depends on comparison to diverse creatures, it follows that the constitutive element of the divine idea is a respect of reason to creatures; but this is not to be said, because the divine idea is a real form and of infinite perfection: therefore. Third it is argued. If we posit several ideas in God on account of diverse respects to creatures, it follows that it must similarly be granted that in God there are several lordships, and that there are several mercies, and consequently it is false. Therefore. The sequel is proved: for just as the Divine Essence has several respects to creatures insofar as it is compared to them, so it seems to be said that it has several respects of lordship to diverse creatures which serve it, as to man and angel, etc. And similarly diverse respects of creation seem to be posited to diverse natures which are produced. Fourth. If in God there are several ideas, it follows that each idea is a divine attribute, and that several ideas are several attributes of God, so that one attribute is the idea of man and another the idea of the lion: but this multiplication of attributes in God does not seem to be admitted: therefore. Fifth. If ideas are distinguished in God by diverse respects of reason, it follows that these propositions must be granted: the idea of man is the idea of the lion, and the idea of the lion is the idea of the angel: but this seems false, and against St. Thomas here: therefore. The sequel is proved: a distinction of reason alone does not suffice to falsify a proposition, as the common maxim of the dialecticians holds: therefore if the idea of man and the idea of the lion in God are distinguished only by diverse respects of reason, this proposition will have to be granted: the idea of man is the idea of the lion. Lastly it is argued against what St. Thomas says in the text, that the Divine Essence can for this reason be several ideas, because an idea denotes the object of the divine cognition, and it is not unfitting that one most simple cognition of God be borne to diverse objects: but if an idea imported a principle of cognition, we could not distinguish several ideas while preserving the simplicity of the Divine Essence and of the divine cognition. Against this I argue thus: just as the divine cognition demands one most simple principle, that is, the Divine Essence, insofar as it has the character of a species, so likewise it demands one most simple primary formal object, namely the Divine Essence itself, although the material and secondary objects can be multiple, namely diverse creatures; but the divine idea does not have the character of a secondary material object, but of a formal and primary object of the divine intellect: therefore. It is confirmed: for either St. Thomas speaks of a distinction of reason alone, or of a real distinction: if of a real one, it is false that there are in God several ideas really distinct; if of a distinction of reason alone, it is false that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the principle of the divine intellection, has no distinction, since the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the principle of knowing an angel, differs in reason from itself insofar as it is the principle of knowing a man: therefore without cause did St. Thomas assign a difference between the Divine Essence insofar as it is a principle of cognition, and that same essence insofar as it is the object of the same divine cognition. On account of these arguments, Aureolus, cited by Capreolus, in 1 Sent., dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, teaches that the Divine Essence is the single most simple idea of all creatures.

Let this be the most certain conclusion: In the divine mind there are many ideas of creatures. This we are bound of necessity to admit, especially on account of the common manner of speaking of the Holy Fathers and of the weightiest authors, who not once assert that in the divine mind there are countless accounts and ideas of creatures. See the testimonies cited in the preceding article, and Augustine, book of the 83 Questions, q. 46. In order that this conclusion be proved and explained by us, we must resolve the arguments proposed, from whose solution it will remain explained and confirmed.

To the first argument, it has been well answered there. For I say that an idea is a form imitable not in any way whatever, but as the formal exemplar of the ideated thing: but a form of this kind is not to be considered according to natural existence, but according to objective existence, which it has within the intellect. Hence the Divine Essence does not have the character of an idea according as it is a likeness imitable in its entitative nature, but insofar as it is an object to the divine intellect, as the formal exemplar of creatures. In order to answer the second, note that just as our intellect can know its own concept in two ways, as it is a likeness of the thing outside: in the first way by a direct and primary cognition which is borne to the concept as it is a likeness of the thing, not in act signified but in act exercised, by referring the concept itself and comparing it to the thing outside, and this cognition of the concept is had whenever the intellect knows the thing outside in the concept itself; in the second way the concept is known as it is the image of the thing in act signified, by a quasi-reflexive cognition, by which the intellect distinctly and expressly knows the concept as it is a likeness of the thing outside, and so known compares it to the thing itself. So similarly it must be commented that the divine intellect knows its own essence as it is the likeness of creatures in two ways: in the first way, in act exercised, using it, in our manner of speaking, as a formal mean for knowing creatures, comparing it to creatures, by a quasi-direct and primary cognition. In the second way in act signified, and by a quasi-certain reflection, by knowing the Divine Essence expressly and formally as it is the likeness of creatures, and comparing it so known to creatures. It must be noted, however, that in God according to the thing there is not a twofold cognition, nor is there any reflection, but in a single simple cognition, on account of its infinity, all these things are found.

This being supposed, certain theologians (from whose opinion Capreolus does not seem to depart) in the place cited above say that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is an object to the first cognition and known as it is the likeness of creatures in act exercised, has the character of a most simple idea, common and inadequate to all creatures. But considered as it is an object to the second, reflexive cognition, and known in act signified, as it is the likeness of creatures, it has the character of many ideas, insofar as the divine intellect compares it to diverse creatures, as imitable in diverse ways by them. But this sentence is neither true, nor according to the mind of St. Thomas here. But the most true sentence is that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the primary object of the divine cognition, by which the divine intellect knows it in act exercised as it is the likeness of creatures, and in it knows all creatures as to all the things in which they both agree and differ among themselves, has the character of many ideas. It is proved first. For St. Thomas here and elsewhere proves that ideas are to be multiplied in the divine intellect, because it is necessary that God know in his Essence all creatures according as they are diverse among themselves, and consequently it is necessary that in the divine intellect there be all the accounts of creatures, which are distinct ideas. See, St. Thomas does not reduce the multiplicity of ideas to some reflexive cognition, but to the primary and direct cognition by which God knows things as they are diverse among themselves. Secondly it is proved. For diverse things, as they are diverse, a single most simple account cannot be assigned, but diverse accounts must necessarily be posited, formally speaking, since the account of each thing has an adequation, formally speaking, with the thing itself whose account it is; but God, by a primary and direct cognition, knows his Essence as it is the account of diverse things insofar as they are diverse: therefore the Divine Essence, as so known, is a multiple account of creatures, formally speaking, and consequently is several ideas, because an idea is an account. And it is confirmed: a single most simple likeness is not referred, formally speaking, to several things as they are several, through a single respect, but through diverse respects: therefore the Divine Essence, insofar as it is known by direct cognition as the likeness of diverse creatures, is referred by diverse respects to the diverse things themselves. But, as we shall say at once, the diversity of ideas in the Divine Essence is attended to according to the diverse respects to creatures: therefore. But in what way shall we explain the passage? Theologians commonly are wont to say that the Divine Essence is the common and inadequate idea of creatures. I answer that this is understood in this way: by comparing the Divine Essence to creatures, not as they are diverse among themselves, but insofar as they agree in one common and inadequate account of creatable being, according to which account they correspond immediately and formally to the most simple power of God, as its adequate effect. Secondly it is said that it can be called an inadequate idea, insofar as the Essence itself, as it precedes in our consideration all respects to creatures, is as it were the common likeness of all creatures according to its own entity, in which the diverse ideal respects to creatures are in some way founded. But yet it is impossible that the Divine Essence, compared to diverse creatures as they are diverse, be referred to them by a single ideal respect. Just as the center, although according to itself it is common to the whole circumference of a circle, yet from it no single straight line can be drawn which would reach through the diverse parts of the circle, but to each part a distinct line must be drawn from the one indivisible center. The divine Essence is deservedly compared by the Philosophers to a center; but the diverse creatures have as it were the character of one circumference; but from this indivisible center one respect cannot proceed which would be terminated at the diverse parts of this circumference, namely at the diverse creatures as they are diverse. To the second argument, therefore, it is answered from these things: I deny the antecedent: for the Divine Essence to be compared to diverse creatures is nothing other than the very comprehensive cognition of the Divine Essence, by which God knows all creatures in the essence as in a formal and primary object: for this cognition is a comparison, in act exercised, of the Divine Essence to creatures. Wherefore the Essence is not known before it is compared to creatures. From this it follows that that reflexive cognition, by which God knows his Essence as the likeness of creatures in act signified, and formally and expressly compares it to creatures as their likeness, does not constitute the character of an idea, but presupposes it as constituted by the direct cognition: but the character of the idea already constituted is known through this reflexive cognition. This doctrine is gathered from the solution to the second argument of this article. But there is an example: just as the craftsman then constitutes in his mind the idea of the house to be made, when he forms the concept of the house and refers it in act exercised to the house, contemplating the house by direct cognition in that concept, but afterwards reflects upon the idea made, knowing it in the character of an idea in act signified. To the confirmation it is answered that Cajetan seems to hold that a respect of reason does not pertain intrinsically to the constitution of the idea, although the idea cannot be understood by us except through a respect to creatures. But this sentence is neither according to the mind of St. Thomas here, nor is it true: for according to St. Thomas and the truth it must absolutely be granted that in God there are several ideas, whereas according to the sentence of Capreolus it could indeed be granted that we understand several ideas in God, but not that there are several ideas, since the whole distinction of ideas is to be taken from the diverse respects to creatures. Wherefore Cajetan more learnedly teaches here that a respect of reason pertains intrinsically to the constitution of ideas, not indeed as the constitutive difference of a species, nor as the formal account which formally constitutes the idea, but the respect of reason stands to the idea as a certain intrinsic mode: just as truth intrinsically encloses a respect of reason to the intellect, as a certain intrinsic mode pertaining to the account of truth. Nor may it be inferred from this that an idea is formally a being of reason, just as neither may it be inferred that truth is a being of reason; for it is no inconvenience that some account, which is simply and formally real in things, include intrinsically a certain mode of reason which pertains intrinsically to its concept; as the act of faith is simply something real, although it intrinsically encloses the privation of clarity, which is an entity of reason; for intrinsically the act of faith is an obscure assent. But someone argues: it follows that the divine cognition per se depends on a respect of reason; the consequent is false: therefore. The sequel is proved: the cognition by which God knows creatures depends on the idea; for the idea is the principle of knowing the ideated thing: therefore if the idea intrinsically encloses a respect of reason, it follows that the divine cognition depends on this respect. To this argument it is answered: I deny the sequel: for the ideal respect of reason is not presupposed nor required beforehand for the divine cognition, but rather follows upon the cognition by which God knows creatures through his essence, or, to speak more properly with Cajetan in this article, this respect is in some way effected by the divine cognition, insofar as it is the comparison of the Divine Essence to creatures. And so the cognition indeed necessarily produces this respect in the way in which a being of reason can be said to be produced, yet it does not depend on it. Hence to the argument I say that the divine cognition depends on the idea as to the absolute to-be of the idea, but not as to the respective to-be; nor is the idea a principle of knowing or working according to its respective to-be, but rather according to its absolute to-be. To the third argument: I deny the sequel; to the proof it is said that the relation of lordship in God to men and angels is one most simple, since it belongs to God on account of a single coercive power, and is terminated at men and angels, not insofar as they are diverse among themselves, but insofar as they agree in one account of servitude and subjection. For by the same title, formally speaking, man and angel are subjected to God insofar as they are creatures of God himself. Similarly the relation of creation is one in God, because it is founded in a single creative power, and is terminated at creatures, not insofar as they are diverse, but insofar as they agree in the account of creatable being, which is the formal object of the creative power. But the ideal respects are diverse in God, because they are terminated at creatures as they are diverse, and imitate the Divine Essence in diverse ways and are founded in the Divine Essence insofar as it is imitable in diverse ways by creatures. To the fourth: I deny the sequel, and I say that this proposition is to be granted, an idea is a divine attribute, but this is to be denied, several ideas are several attributes of God. For an idea has it, that it be an attribute of God, not from a respect of reason, but from the absolute perfection which it imports: but the diversity of ideas is not taken from the absolute which the idea imports, but from the diverse respects to creatures. Hence this consequence, an idea insofar as it is an idea is an attribute, but there are several ideas, therefore there are several attributes, has the same defect as this one: a person, insofar as it is a person, is the divine Essence, but there are several Persons, therefore there are several Essences: for the appellation is varied, since the plurality in the minor is borne upon the relative, and in the conclusion upon the absolute. But you will say: that the divine Essence be the idea of man consists in this, that it be the adequate likeness of man; and that it be the idea of the angel consists in this, that it be the adequate likeness of the angel: but that the Divine Essence be the adequate likeness of man and of the angel is a divine perfection: therefore ideas, according as they are several, import several divine perfections, and consequently are several attributes of it. It is answered that a divine attribute is a perfection which belongs to God according to his entity; but that the Divine Essence be the adequate likeness of man and of the angel does not belong to God according to his entity, but insofar as it is conceived through order to man or to the angel. It is answered secondly, and this solution is explained. That the Divine Essence be the likeness of man is indeed a great perfection of God; but that it be adequate does not express and posit a perfection in God, but a particular respect of reason to the nature of man; but the plurality of ideas is weighed from this, that the Divine Essence be the adequate likeness of man and of the angel, so that this adequation constitutes the plurality of ideas. To the fifth: I deny the sequel; and to the proof it is answered that a distinction of reason of the extremes alone does not suffice to falsify a proposition, unless when that distinction of reason is imported in the extremes themselves as conceived, e.g. although truth and goodness are distinguished in reason, nevertheless this proposition, truth is goodness, is most true; but this, the account of truth is the account of goodness, is most false, because in this second proposition the distinction of reason, in which entity and truth differ, is imported as conceived; but an idea, as is clear from what has been said, is a conceived form, and consequently in this proposition, the idea of man is the idea of the horse, the distinction of reason in which these ideas differ is signified as conceived, and to that extent this proposition is absolutely false. But someone will argue: if the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the idea of man, is not the idea of the horse, it follows that insofar as it is the idea of man it is not God. The sequel is proved: insofar as it is the idea of man it is a limited and finite likeness, because it is the adequate likeness of man, in such a way that it is not the likeness of the horse or of the lion: therefore it is not God. It is answered I deny the sequel, and to the proof I say that the Divine Essence, as it is the idea of man, is the infinite likeness of all things as to that absolute which the divine likeness imports, in which consists the account of the divine infinity: but it is not the likeness of all things if we attend to the respective to-be which it has, as it is conceived in order to creatures. A similar argument could be made to prove that the Father, insofar as he is the Father, is not God, in this way: the Father is not the Son, but the Son is God, therefore the Father is not God. To the last argument it is answered that the Divine Essence, insofar as it is the immediate object of the divine intellect, has in itself no distinction even of reason, nor ought it to be called several objects, since the character of an object is considered through a habitude to the intellect itself, which habitude is one and most simple; but if this immediate object of the divine intellect be considered through order to secondary and material objects, it is no inconvenience that a multiple distinction of reason be found in it: but the account of an idea is weighed according to the order to the material objects of the divine intellect. To the confirmation it is said that St. Thomas does not teach in this article that in that which stands as a principle of cognition in the divine intellect no distinction of reason is found; but he here teaches only that such a distinction is not found as would suffice to multiply simply such a principle, so that we could say that in God there are several sciences, several arts and several species, just as we grant that there are several ideas. And the ground of the difference is that the respect of reason from which the distinction is taken in an idea, and in any terminus of cognition whatever, is imported as conceived, and so absolutely constitutes plurality and distinction; but in the principle of cognition a relation of reason of this kind, from which the distinction is taken, is not imported as conceived; and consequently it does not cause, absolutely speaking, a plurality. From these things it follows that the plurality of ideas is not to be taken in the sense in which we say that diverse attributes are found in God, since the divine attributes in the abstract are predicated of themselves. For we grant that the divine mercy is justice, wisdom, etc.; but we do not grant that the idea of man is the idea of the lion. And by the same ground it is shown that ideas are not multiplied in the sense in which we say that in God there are several mercies, insofar as they relieve diverse human miseries. For the distinction of mercies is taken from the material object, namely from the diversity of miseries. And so it must absolutely be granted that there is formally one most simple mercy; but it must be denied that there is only one idea in God, because the distinction of ideas is taken from the diverse respects which formally pertain to the character of ideas in the manner explained above.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: If an idea be taken as it is a principle of working, there are ideas in God of all things which have been produced, or at some time will be produced. Second conclusion: If an idea be taken as it is a principle of knowing, there are ideas in God of all possible creatures. These conclusions are clear from the first and second articles.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED: Whether the idea of a possible thing, which will never exist, is practical? And it seems that it is not. For St. Thomas in the body of the article says that of those things which will never be future we posit ideas in God according as an idea is a principle of knowing, but not according as it is a principle of working. And in the solution to the second he says that of things which are not future God does not have an idea as an idea is an imitable exemplar: therefore according to St. Thomas, the idea of possible things is not practical but speculative. To this doubt let this be the first conclusion: simply speaking, it must be granted that an idea of this kind is practical. It is proved first from St. Thomas, q. 3 On Truth, art. 3, in the solution to 1 and 2. It is proved secondly. God through an idea of this kind knows a creature as it is operable, and knows it in an operable manner: and so, if he wished to produce the thing, he would not need another idea, but through this idea which he now has he would produce the thing itself: therefore it is a practical idea. It is confirmed: for the account of practical science and of a practical idea, one must look not to the end of the one working, but to the intrinsic mode of the science and idea itself: therefore from the fact that God does not wish to produce some thing outwardly, it may not be gathered that he does not have a practical idea of that thing, if nevertheless the idea itself by its nature can be a principle of producing that thing. It is confirmed secondly: St. Thomas, in the solution to the second of this article, speaks in the same way of the idea of possible things and of the divine knowledge of those same things; but the knowledge of possible things is simply practical: therefore. The minor is gathered from St. Thomas, in the last article of the preceding question, where he says that the divine knowledge of possible things is not practical insofar as the practical is said from the end, where he insinuates that it is simply practical and in a qualified sense speculative, as the account of the speculative and the practical is taken from the end: but an exemplary form imports the character of a cause: therefore an idea essentially imports the character of a cause, and consequently is simply practical. From this it follows that the mental word and the idea differ, and the difference consists in this, that the word is a ground of knowing only, but the idea is a ground not only of knowing but also of working. Wherefore the word is a speculative ground, simply speaking, but the idea is a practical ground.

Second conclusion: The idea of possible things which have never been produced is in some way, in a qualified sense, not practical. It is proved: for every practical principle which is in the intellect, whether it be a habit or an idea, is consummated and completed in the character of an operative and practical principle through determination to the work, which determination it takes from the will; but the idea of these things does not have determination from the will to the work: nay rather, the divine will is determined not to work through a likeness of this kind: therefore this idea does not have all its completion in the character of a practical principle, and consequently is in some way and in a qualified sense not practical. This second assertion St. Thomas intends to teach in the words which we have cited for the negative part of this doubt. The solutions of the arguments of this article are to be noted, that we may know of which things God has ideas: and St. Thomas is to be read, q. 3 On Truth, where these things are explained one by one.

Concerning the solution to the first, it is to be noted that the imperfections which are found in creatures fall under a twofold difference: some are defects of nature, and are privations of some perfection due in to-be, such as blindness. But some are natural conditions of things, which do not import the privation of some perfection due, but the negation of a higher perfection not due, such as potential and material to-be, finite to-be and participated to-be.

Then let this be the first conclusion: in God there is no idea of the first kind, whether it be taken in the abstract or in the concrete. And so God does not have an idea of blindness, nor of the blind man, formally speaking. It is proved: for God does not have in himself an effective principle of blindness, or of the blind man, since these imperfections do not come from the active power of God, but from the defect of a particular nature: therefore.

Second conclusion: of an imperfection of the second kind God does not have an idea, if these imperfections be considered formally in the character of imperfection, that is, insofar as they are negations of a greater perfection. This is proved, since a negation, as such, does not have any principle: therefore neither an idea.

Let this be the third conclusion: God has an idea of these imperfections of the second kind, if they be taken in the concrete: that is, he has an idea of the things which intrinsically include these imperfections, e.g. he has an idea of matter, which is pure potency. It is proved. For these imperfections, taken materially and in the concrete, are certain positive entities: for the potentiality of matter, according to the thing, is the substantial entity of matter itself: therefore, as such, they have an idea, for of any producible entity whatever God has an idea.