Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST conclusion is affirmative. The second conclusion: God has certain and infallible knowledge of all future contingents. The reason is that God knows all contingent things, not only as they are in their causes, but also as they are in themselves: therefore He has certain and infallible knowledge of future contingents. The reason for this in turn is that the knowledge of God is measured by eternity, which, existing whole all at once, encompasses all time.

The third conclusion: future contingents in themselves can be known by certain and infallible knowledge. This is clear from what has been said.

The fourth conclusion: future contingents, as they are in their causes, can be known only by conjectural knowledge. The reason is that the very cause of a future contingent is indifferently disposed toward opposites.

The fifth conclusion: God knows future contingents as they are in themselves, outside their causes. The reason for this is the same as that of the second conclusion.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this article, which is most weighty, the School disputes with the Master in 1, dd. 38 and 39.

Concerning this article it is to be noted first that two conclusions, the first and the second, are certain according to faith. It is proved from Ecclesiasticus 23: «To the Lord God, before they are created, all things are known»; Jeremiah 1: «Before I formed thee in the womb I knew thee»; likewise Isaiah 41: «Tell us the things that are to come, and we shall say that you are gods». Behold where knowledge of future contingents is assigned as proper to God. Moreover Isaiah 45: «Thus saith the Lord God: Ask me of things to come, etc.». Wisdom 8: «She knoweth things past, and judgeth of things to come, she knoweth signs and wonders before they happen». Romans 4: «Who calleth those things which are not, as those that are». Hebrews 4: «For the word of God is living etc.». The second conclusion is proved particularly. The knowledge of God is according to faith the most perfect of all; but certitude is the highest perfection of knowledge: therefore. Secondly it is to be noted that future contingent here means the same as an effect which will at some time be in fact, yet can not be, and here future contingent is taken broadly, so as to include free effects, that is, those which proceed from our free will. It is to be noted thirdly that St. Thomas teaches two things among others which bear great difficulty, and on which not all theologians agree. The first is: all things which are or were or at any time will be are already present to God in His eternity. Thus Antichrist, who is future to us, is already present to God in eternity. The second is: the infallibility and certitude of divine knowledge concerning future contingents is weighed from the fact that God knows those future contingents in themselves, and outside their causes, insofar as they are present to Him in eternity.

Before we examine the truth of the former dictum, we must explain this latter dictum; for it is variously expounded by his disciples. The first sense is that the infallibility of divine knowledge concerning future contingents must be weighed only from the fact that they are known by God in themselves, as they are present in eternity. Thus, if God knew future contingents only in their causes, His knowledge would not be certain and infallible, but merely conjectural. This sense has its foundation in the letter of this article, in which it is said that future contingents cannot be known certainly and infallibly if they are known only as they have to-be in their causes. The second dictum of St. Thomas, taken in this sense, is attacked by many theologians, especially by Durandus in dist. 38, q. 5, and by Aureolus, in Capreolus, in the same distinction, q. 2.—The second sense is that the infallibility of divine knowledge is to be weighed not only from the fact that God knows them in their causes, but also as they are known by God in themselves, as they are present to God in eternity. Thus, according to this sense, if God, per impossibile, knew future contingents only as they have to-be in their causes, and not as they are present in eternity, His knowledge would be certain and infallible. This sense can also be gathered from St. Thomas, from the fact that he says in this article that God knows future contingents not only in their causes but also in themselves, insofar as they coexist with eternity. But this sense is gathered chiefly from 1 Contra Gentes, ch. 67|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.67, in the third proof, which runs thus: when an effect is known in its complete and unimpeded cause, knowledge of it is certain and infallible; but God knows future contingents in their complete and unimpeded causes: therefore He knows them certainly and infallibly. Behold, St. Thomas gathers the infallibility of divine knowledge concerning future contingents from the fact that He knows them in their causes. Ferrara, on that chapter, seems to hold a sort of middle sentence, which is as it were a third sense of this dictum of St. Thomas. For he says that future contingents are of two kinds: some are properly and strictly so called, namely effects of natural causes, which are called contingent for the reason that their causes can be impeded by other causes supervening accidentally: e.g., that a tree produce fruit in its season is a contingent effect, since, although the tree is the natural cause of its own fruit, it can nevertheless be impeded by other causes accidentally, as by excessive heat or drought, etc. Others are future contingents in the broad acceptation, namely effects which proceed from free will: e.g., that Peter write tomorrow. This supposed, he says that future contingents of the former kind can be known certainly and infallibly in their causes. He proves it: for such effects, as far as depends on their causes, happen necessarily and infallibly; and their whole contingency comes from accidentally impeding causes: therefore if it be known by God, or by another intellect, that in fact there will be no impeding causes, such effects will be known infallibly in their causes; and to these future contingents alone does that third proof of St. Thomas in 1 Contra Gentes apply. Secondly, Ferrara says: future contingents of the second kind can in no way be known certainly and infallibly in their causes. He proves it: for such effects do not proceed necessarily from their causes, nor do their causes have determination in the order to these effects, since a free cause is in itself indifferent and indeterminate: therefore.

On this matter the first conclusion is: the infallibility and certitude of divine knowledge concerning future contingents is derived neither from their causes nor from the presence of the same in eternity. The conclusion is proved: infallibility and certitude is the highest perfection of divine knowledge; therefore it is not to be derived from any extrinsic object, but from the divine Knowledge itself. The consequence is clear: otherwise the intrinsic perfection of God would depend on the creature. From this it follows that when St. Thomas and other theologians say that for the infallibility of divine knowledge concerning future contingents it is necessary that those futures be present to God in eternity, they do not mean that the infallibility of divine knowledge is derived from that presence; but they teach only this, that for future contingents to be the object of divine knowledge, a necessary condition is that they be represented to God as present to Him in eternity.

The second conclusion: future contingents are not known by God as they are in their indeterminate and impedible causes. It is proved: for such knowledge would be conjectural, fallible, and uncertain; but knowledge of this sort is repugnant to God: therefore. The major is plainly gathered from what St. Thomas teaches in the letter.

The third conclusion: God knows future contingents in their causes, but as determined and complete. The first part of the conclusion St. Thomas openly teaches in the letter, when he says: «But God knows contingent things not only in their causes, etc.». Moreover it is proved by reason: God knows all things, even contingent things, according to every mode they have; therefore He knows contingent things according to the mode they have in their causes. And it is confirmed: God knows that Antichrist does not now exist, and that he will afterwards be future: therefore He knows that Antichrist now has to-be in his causes. The second part of the conclusion, namely that God knows contingent things in determined and complete and unimpeded causes, is first gathered from the preceding conclusion. Moreover it is proved: God knows future contingents in their particular causes, insofar as those particular causes themselves are subjected to the determination and disposition of the divine knowledge and will, which is the first Cause; but the particular causes of future contingents, insofar as they are subjected to the determination of the divine knowledge and will, are determined and complete and unimpeded for producing their contingent effects: therefore God knows future contingents as they are in determined and unimpeded causes. The minor is most certain, and the major is proved: for God knows all created causes through His Essence, as it is the first Cause, giving to-be and power and determination to all causes: therefore. But it is to be observed concerning this proof that, although contingent causes, as they are subjected to the determination of the first Cause, are determined and complete for operating in the composite sense, yet simply and in the divided sense they remain contingent and indeterminate and incomplete; and consequently their effects are simply to be called future contingents. On this matter we shall say more at once. From this follows the explanation of our third conclusion, which consists in this, that God, on the part of the knower and on the part of the primary object of His knowledge, knows future contingents in their causes as they are determined and unimpeded; but on the part of the secondary object He knows those future contingents as they are in indeterminate, incomplete, and impedible causes. Thus God knows full well that Antichrist now has to-be in merely contingent and indeterminate causes, which can be impeded concerning the production of Antichrist.

The fourth conclusion: the infallibility and certitude of divine knowledge concerning future contingents is weighed not only from the fact that they are known by God as they are present in eternity, but also as they are known in their causes, in the sense expounded in the preceding conclusion. Thus, even if God did not know future contingents as present in His eternity, but only in their causes, His knowledge would be certain and infallible. This conclusion, like the preceding one, I understand of all future contingents, even of those which depend on free will alone. Thus contingent here includes the free. The conclusion is proved: first, because it is most plainly gathered from the second part of the preceding conclusion; for knowledge which is had through determined and complete causes is certain and infallible; but God knows contingent things through determined and complete causes, as we said in the preceding conclusion: therefore. Moreover it is proved: God knows future contingents through their own intelligible grounds which are in God, that is, through the proper ideas which are in God of future contingents; but an idea represents certainly and infallibly in the manner of exemplar and efficient cause, as will be said in question 15, article 3: therefore through the ideas which are in God, God has infallible knowledge of the future contingent. The major is asserted by St. Thomas in this article, and is explained by Cajetan in the second doubt of this article. But Scotus argues against this proof: an idea does not represent the accidental and contingent predicates which belong to the things represented in the idea; but actual existence is an accidental and contingent predicate of all creatures; therefore the idea does not represent to the divine intellect the actual existence which the future contingent will have; and consequently God through the idea of the future contingent does not know certainly and infallibly that that future contingent will at some time exist in the nature of things. The major is proved: an idea represents naturally and necessarily; therefore it represents only those things which belong to things naturally and necessarily, and not contingent and accidental predicates. To this argument I answer that an idea, taken completely and consummately, is not only the form which is the principle of knowing, but also the principle of operating, and in the manner of an exemplary cause, as will be said in the following question, art. 3. From this it follows that an idea, as it is the principle of operating, intrinsically includes the free determination of the divine will: for it cannot be the principle of operating except with the will joined to it; and only of those effects which the free will of God has decreed from eternity to be produced in time. Thus an idea has it that it is representative in the manner of an exemplary cause of future contingents, insofar as it represents the Divine Essence as it is the will of God, or, to speak more properly, as it is the form known by the divine intellect in the manner of the will of God; for in knowing His Essence as it is will, God knows every determination and disposition of the divine will itself concerning creatures to be produced. From this it follows that an idea, as regards the actual existence of creatures and other contingent predicates, does not represent naturally and necessarily, simply speaking, but only in the composite sense, that is, with the free determination of the divine will concerning those created effects supposed.

Against these conclusions, especially the third and fourth, there are two arguments. The first is: if for the infallibility and certitude of divine knowledge concerning future contingents it suffices that they be known by God in their causes, why then does St. Thomas in this article labor so anxiously to explain that God knows future contingents as they are present to Him in eternity? To this I answer that St. Thomas in this article wished to give a radical and a priori explanation of the way in which we can preserve the infallibility and certitude of knowledge concerning future contingents. And indeed, if we once admit that future contingents are present to God in eternity, it is very easily understood by what reason divine knowledge is altogether infallible and certain. Secondly I answer that St. Thomas wished to expound to us in this article that God has not only infallible and certain cognition of future contingents, but also intuitive cognition. Thus St. Thomas teaches us that God knows future contingents not by the knowledge of simple understanding, nor by abstractive cognition, but by the knowledge of vision and by intuitive cognition.

The second argument runs thus: at least from those conclusions and their proofs it follows that of sins, which depend solely on the free will of the agent, God cannot have certain knowledge in their causes. The consequence is proved: the divine will does not determine the created will to sin, but leaves it indifferent and free; but through an indifferent and indeterminate cause no certain knowledge of a future effect can be had: therefore. I answer by denying the consequence. And to the proof I say first that future evil of fault is known by God through the idea of the good to which it is opposed. Secondly I say that the created will infallibly fails concerning any matter of virtue whatever, unless it be efficaciously determined by the divine will to act well. Hence, from the fact that God knows that His will has not determined the created will to act well, in the matter, e.g., of temperance, He evidently knows that the created will shall sin and fail in the matter of that virtue. Thus God knows other future contingents in their causes as they are determined by the first cause; but future evil of fault He knows in its cause insofar as it is not determined by the first cause to act well. From what has been said it follows that the fourth conclusion of St. Thomas, in which it is said that knowledge of future contingents which is had in their causes cannot be certain, must be understood of knowledge which is had in causes as they are indeterminate and incomplete. Such knowledge is altogether repugnant to God, who, as we have said, knows futures in their causes as they are subjected to the determination of the first cause.

CONCERNING the first dictum of St. Thomas there is a doubt, whether all things which were and are and shall be are already present in the eternity of God? The negative side is proved.

First. If all these things are already present to God in eternity, therefore they are simply. The consequence is proved: because the presence of a thing requires its existence; but the consequent is most false, for Antichrist, who is future, does not now exist. And it is confirmed: judgment concerning the existence of a thing, simply speaking, is to be taken in the order to divine knowledge: therefore if future and past things exist in the order to divine knowledge, they exist simply.

Secondly. If Antichrist exists now in eternity, therefore he is already created; the consequent is most false: therefore. The consequence is clear: for Antichrist cannot exist except by means of creation.

Thirdly. If past, present, and future things coexist with the eternity of God, it follows that they coexist with each other, which is false, since Adam, who was, does not now coexist with Antichrist, who shall be: therefore. The consequence is clear: those things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other: therefore things which coexist with one third thing, namely eternity, coexist with each other.

Fourthly. From the opposite sentence it follows that these two contradictories are verified: Antichrist is in eternity; and Antichrist is not in eternity; the consequent is impossible: therefore. The consequence is proved: the affirmative is presupposed true from the opposite sentence, but the negative is proved. For it is granted that Antichrist is in eternity because he will have to-be in some difference of time which eternity encompasses; but Antichrist also in some difference of time which eternity encompasses has no to-be: therefore by the same reason it must be granted that Antichrist has no to-be in eternity. And it is confirmed: Antichrist has non-to-be in eternity; therefore Antichrist has no to-be in eternity. The consequence seems evident: for it holds by the dialectical rule from the infinite to the finite. The antecedent is clear: for Antichrist has no to-be in the difference of present time, to which eternity corresponds: therefore he has non-to-be in eternity.

Fifthly. If God knows future contingents as they already exist in eternity, therefore He does not know, formally speaking, future contingents; but the consequent seems to be against the common sense of theologians. The consequence is proved: He knows them as they are present to Him; therefore not as they are future.

Sixthly. It follows that an angel knows future contingents as they are present to him in his aevum; the consequent is most false: therefore. The falsity of the consequent is proved: for an angel by his own powers cannot have certain knowledge of future contingents, for this is proper to God alone. The consequence is proved: just as eternity encompasses all time in the manner of simplicity, so also does aevum: therefore just as all things which have to-be in some difference of time are already present to God in eternity, so are they present to the angel in his aevum. On the contrary stands the sentence of St. Thomas in this article, in the preceding question, and in q. 2, De Veritate, art. 12; and in 1 Contra Gentes, chs. 67 and 68; and in dist. 35, question 1.

In this doubt it is to be noted that the saying that all things which shall have to-be in some difference of time are already present to God in eternity can be expounded in two senses. The first is that they are present according to the mode of to-be which they have in the Divine Essence, in which they are virtually and eminently. This sense has been accepted by some disciples of St. Thomas; but certainly without cause, for it is not to the mind of St. Thomas, nor does it pertain to the explanation of his doctrine concerning the divine knowledge of future contingents.

The second sense is that future contingents are already present to God in eternity according to that very to-be which they shall have outside their causes in future time. And of this sense is the whole controversy among theologians.

This supposed, let the first conclusion be: all things which were, are, or shall be coexist now in eternity. This conclusion is the sentence of St. Thomas in the places cited, whom Capreolus follows, dist. 35, q. unique, art. 2; Ferrara, 1 Contra Gentes, ch. 67; and Cajetan in this article, who thinks himself to be in this sentence a singular follower of St. Thomas. All other Scholastics follow the contrary sentence: hence this conclusion does not pertain to faith. It is proved first from the sentence of Augustine on that of Ps. 49: «And the beauty of the field is with me»; and in Sermon 11 on the words of the Apostle; and in Book 11 of the City of God, ch. 21, in which places he teaches that all things are in God from the fact that they are present to Him in eternity. Boethius teaches the same, Book 5 of the Trinity, last prose, and the same seems to be gathered from the Master of the Sentences, in 1, dist. 35, near the end. Secondly it is proved by reason: eternity, as was said above in q. 10, is the most simple measure of the divine to-be and the divine operation, and it encompasses all time, and measures all temporal things; whatever are measured by some difference of past or future time are already in eternity. This is explained by an excellent example: the rational soul is an indivisible and spiritual form, and yet it coexists whole all at once with the single parts of the human body by reason of its excellence and perfection: so likewise eternity is a most simple and indivisible measure, and yet by its eminence it coexists whole all at once with all the differences of our time, both past and future. And consequently all things which were or shall be in time coexist now with eternity. Thirdly it is proved: if past things are not now in eternity, but were, and likewise if future things are not, but shall be in eternity, it follows that in the eternity of God there is succession; the consequent is most false and absurd: therefore.

The second conclusion: God knows future contingents as they are present to Him in eternity. And I understand this conclusion, like the preceding one, of the presence of future contingents according to the to-be which they have in themselves outside their causes. The conclusion is proved: for it is seen to be manifestly asserted by St. Augustine in the places cited in the preceding conclusion, and by Boethius in the place above, and by St. Ambrose, Book 5 On Faith, to Gratian, ch. 8, where he says that God so knows the things which are not as the things which are. With this Paul agrees, Romans 4, saying: «He calleth those things which are not, as those that are». From these words such an argument is drawn: the things which are, God knows as present in His eternity: therefore also the things which are not. And it is confirmed: otherwise it would follow that God knows a thing otherwise, even on the part of the knower, when it is,

and when it is not: the consequent is false and against St. Augustine, Book 11 of the City of God, in the place above: therefore. The consequence is proved: God knows a thing when it is, in the manner of presence in His eternity, and He knows it when it is not in the manner of futurity; but eternity is the proper measure of divine knowledge: therefore on the part of the knower, that is, on the part of the proper measure of divine knowledge, God knows a thing otherwise when it is and otherwise when it is not. Moreover, for some object to be known as present by intuitive cognition, it suffices that it coexist within the measure of such knowledge; e.g., for my vision to reach Peter as present to me, it suffices that Peter exist within the measure of my vision; but future contingents, as we said in the preceding conclusion, exist within eternity, which is the measure of the divine vision: therefore the divine vision is borne to future contingents as to things present to itself, and it is intuitive cognition of them.

The third conclusion. The blessed, through the beatific vision, can know future contingents in the manner of presence in that manner in which we said the vision of God is borne to future contingents. The conclusion is proved: the beatific vision is measured by the same eternity by which the vision of God is measured: therefore it is borne to future contingents in the same manner as the very vision of God. The antecedent was asserted by us above from St. Augustine, art. 8 of q. 12. But someone will say: the beatific vision is not measured by the essential and formal eternity by which the vision of God is measured, but by participated eternity, as we said in that place: therefore it does not have the same measure which the vision of God has. I answer that without doubt the beatific vision, from the fact that it has for its immediate object the Divine Essence, which is also the immediate object of the vision of God, is measured by the same essential and formal eternity by which the vision of God is measured. But it is usually said, as we said above, that it is measured by participated eternity; which way of speaking is to be understood not on the part of the measuring eternity itself, but on the part of the measured beatific vision, from the fact that it does not correspond adequately to the measuring eternity itself, but is an inadequate thing measured.

The fourth conclusion: knowledge of future contingents which is had through prophetic revelation or through another light outside the Word does not reach future contingents as present and outside their causes. It is proved: such knowledge, although it partakes of its certitude and infallibility from the eternity of God, in which future contingents are present, is nevertheless not measured by eternity, formally speaking; but future contingents have to-be outside their causes, and are present in themselves, in eternity alone: therefore. The minor is clear, since we can scarcely understand by what reason future contingents are present in eternity outside their causes: therefore it must necessarily be said that they are not present outside their causes in another lower measure outside eternity. On this matter it is usually disputed more broadly below, in q. 57, art. 3.

TO the arguments. To the first it is to be noted for its solution that this proposition, future contingents are now present in eternity, can be understood in two senses. One is that it be understood of the now of time. The other is that it be understood of the now of eternity. Taken in the second sense it is most true, and in it it is understood by St. Thomas in this article; and this proposition, so taken, makes this sense, that future contingents are present in the indivisible instant of eternity, which instant, although it is altogether indivisible, formally speaking, comprehends under itself all the differences of time. And thus whatever has or shall have to-be in some difference of time is present in that indivisible instant of eternity. But taken in the first sense that proposition can be understood in two ways: first, that that now of time be taken as the measure of the truth of that proposition, so that the sense be that in this instant of present time future contingents are present in eternity, and this sense is most true. In the second way that now can be taken as the measure of the existence of future contingents outside their causes, so that the sense be that the actual existence of future contingents is measured by this instant of present time. And this sense is most false, and in it many theologians have interpreted the sentence of St. Thomas in this article, and therefore they reprehend it, as Cajetan well notes here. This supposed, then, to the argument I deny the consequence. For the argument proceeds, dialectically speaking, from the more ample to the less ample: for in the antecedent it is asserted that future contingents are in eternity, which is an ample measure comprehending all the differences of time; but in the consequent it is asserted that they are in this instant of time, which is a stricter measure. To the proof it is said that the presence of a thing indeed requires its existence, but only in the order to that measure in which it is present; and thus future contingents exist in eternity, in which they are present. To the confirmation I answer that the presence of an actual thing, simply speaking, is not to be weighed in the order to the inadequate and first measure, which is eternity, but in the order

to the adequate and proper measure of the thing itself. To the second I answer, as to the first, that Antichrist, just as he exists in eternity, so is he created in eternity, but not in present time; and for him to be already created in eternity, it suffices that he shall be created in future time. To the third I deny the consequence. To the proof I answer that that proposition, things which coexist with one third thing, etc., has truth only when that third thing is something most simple both formally and virtually: but eternity, although formally it is a most simple and indivisible measure, virtually nevertheless is equivalent to all the differences of time. Hence that consequence of the argument has the same flaw as this one: Peter and Paul are together in this hall, therefore they are together in this chair. For we argue from a common place to a particular one. To the fourth, I deny the consequence. And I say that the negative proposition is false. To the proof I answer that, since the negation in that proposition is borne over the whole of eternity, which encompasses all the differences of time, for the truth of that proposition it is not enough that Antichrist have no to-be in some particular difference of time, but it was necessary that he have to-be in no difference of time. To the confirmation I answer that that proposition, Antichrist has non-to-be in eternity, is not to be granted: for it stands of contradictory extremes: for it is equivalent to this, Antichrist is a non-being. But other propositions like this can be granted: e.g., if Peter at one time is white and at another time becomes black, these propositions are true: Peter in eternity is white; Peter in eternity is black. Likewise these: Peter in eternity is non-white; Peter in eternity is non-black. Nor does the consequence hold: Peter in eternity is non-white, therefore in eternity he is not white: for that place of arguing, with the predicate varied in respect of the finite and the infinite, holds only when the copula is of simple inherence. Thus, both formally and virtually it imports only present time: but eternity includes all time, as we said. Just as, if we speak in the manner of the dialecticians, if the copula unites the extremes for a whole year, this consequence does not hold: Peter in this year is non-white, therefore in this year he is not white, supposing that in one part of the year he shall be white and in another black. To the fifth I answer that God, on the part of the knower, does not know future contingents, formally speaking, but rather present things. But on the part of the object, secondarily known, He knows simply future contingents. But someone insists: on the part of the object, secondarily known, God knows future contingents insofar as they are present in eternity: therefore even on the part of the secondary object God knows present things and not futures. I answer that on the part of the secondary object God knows future contingents as they are present to Himself in the most high measure of eternity; but He knows the same things as they are future to us in the proper measure of time. The first manner of knowing we comprehend under the knowledge of God on the part of the knower; but the second we comprehend under knowledge on the part of the secondarily known object. To the sixth I answer that eternity is the measure not only of the divine to-be, but of the whole divine operation: but aevum measures the angel indeed as to his to-be and as to the operation coeval with him, but it does not measure the knowledge by which the angel knows other creatures besides himself, as was said above, q. 10, art. 5; but the operation of the angel is measured by discrete time, in which true succession is found. Hence to the argument I deny the consequence.

HENCEFORTH the solutions of the arguments of this article are to be examined, in which St. Thomas teaches many most difficult things. In the solution to the first he asserts two things: one is that the knowledge of God is a necessary cause. This assertion will be examined below, q. 19, art. 8, where it will be disputed whether the will of God imposes necessity on things. For knowledge and providence and predestination, if they have any necessity in the intelligible aspect of causing, partake it wholly from the efficacy of the divine will, in our manner of understanding. Hence in this article we shall examine only whether the knowledge of God has any necessity in the intelligible aspect of knowledge, and this shall be done concerning the solution to the second. The other thing which St. Thomas says is that the contingency of effects is derived from the immediate and proximate causes. Hence, although the first cause be necessary, the effects can be contingent. Concerning this assertion Cajetan here disputes whether the contingency of things is derived from the first Cause and from the freedom of the divine will. But this question will more fittingly be disputed in that cited article of q. 19. In the solution to the second, St. Thomas says three things much to be noted. The first is that this proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is absolutely and simply necessary. The second is that this proposition, Antichrist shall be, is simply contingent. The third is that this proposition, Antichrist shall be, in this consequence, God knew that Antichrist would be future, therefore Antichrist shall be, is not to be taken absolutely and according to itself, but as it falls under the divine Knowledge. From this he gathers that it is necessary, just as the antecedent from which it is inferred.

Concerning the first assertion of St. Thomas there is a doubt, and its falsity is proved. First, that proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, speaking absolutely, is of the present, and is of the past by voice alone: therefore it is not absolutely necessary, but in a qualified sense, and simply is contingent: just as this proposition, I see you writing, therefore you are writing. The antecedent is proved: the knowledge of God is measured by eternity; but in eternity nothing is past or future, but all things are present: therefore. And it is confirmed. It follows well: God knew that Antichrist would be future, therefore God knows that Antichrist will be future; and conversely it also follows, God knows that Antichrist will be future, therefore God knew that Antichrist would be future; therefore that proposition, although it appears of the past, in the thing itself is of the present, since it is equivalent to a proposition of the present. Secondly, in that consequence, God knew that Antichrist would be future, therefore Antichrist shall be, the antecedent is necessary in the same manner as the consequent; but the consequent, namely Antichrist shall be, is not simply and absolutely necessary, but in a qualified sense and from supposition: therefore the antecedent is not absolutely necessary. The major is asserted by St. Thomas in this solution; but the minor is most certain. And it is confirmed: in a good consequence the antecedent is not more necessary than the consequent: therefore the antecedent of that consequence is not more necessary than the consequent. Thirdly. After God knew that Antichrist would be future, there remains power in God Himself for not producing Antichrist: therefore likewise there remains in Him power for not knowing nor having known that Antichrist would be future; and consequently that proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is not absolutely necessary. The antecedent is manifest, for God shall freely produce Antichrist: therefore He can produce and not produce him. But the consequence is proved: for if Antichrist in fact is not future, it is impossible that God knew that Antichrist would be future: therefore if God has power for not producing Antichrist, after He knew that he would be future, He also has power for not having known that he would be future. In this doubt certain most grave theologians, as Victoria, Soto, and Cano, say two things: one is that this proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is of the past by voice alone, and in the thing itself of the present. Hence they infer that it is simply and absolutely contingent, and necessary in a qualified sense, by reason of the immutability of the divine Knowledge, just as this one, God knows that Antichrist will be future. Secondly they say that, although that proposition were of the past, it would nevertheless be simply contingent and necessary in a qualified sense; since, they say, that proposition includes something future and contingent, namely that Antichrist shall be. And when someone argues against them that St. Thomas in this solution expressly proposes and reprobates this reasoning of theirs—for he says that, although that proposition include something future and contingent, it cannot thence be gathered that it is simply contingent—to this they answer that St. Thomas taught only this, that the truth of that proposition does not depend on that future contingent, since the Knowledge of God does not depend on creatures. Hence, according to St. Thomas, the contingency of that proposition does not arise from any dependence which the Knowledge of God has on the future contingent. Yet St. Thomas does not deny that that proposition is contingent, and that that future contingent concurs toward its contingency as a necessary condition and as a secondarily known object. From what has been said these doctors gather that after God knew that Antichrist would be future, there remains power for Antichrist not to be; and consequently for God not to have known that Antichrist would be future. And likewise, after Christ said to Peter, Thou shalt deny me thrice, there remained free power in Peter for not denying Christ, and consequently for Christ not to have said to Peter, Thou shalt deny me thrice. The sentence of these theologians Gabriel also followed, in distinction 38, q. unique, last doubt. Cajetan in this commentary teaches the opposite sentence. For he says that that proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is simply of the past. Moreover he says that it is absolutely and simply necessary. His sentence certain most grave theologians follow. In this doubt, let the first conclusion be. Probable is the sentence of Cajetan asserting that proposition to be simply of the past, and to be ruled by the laws of other propositions of the past. For proving this proposition, it is to be noted first that eternity, although it be a most simple measure in which there is no succession of past or future, yet by reason of its eminence comprehends the differences of past and future time. From this it follows that the things which are in the eternity of God can be signified by us not only through verbs of the present, but also through verbs of the past and future. Secondly it is to be noted that for the truth of these and like propositions, God knew that Antichrist would be, God willed that Antichrist would be, etc., regard is to be had not only to the thing signified, as it is on the side of the thing, but also to the manner of signifying of the terms. Of this matter there is a twofold reason: the first is common in

every matter, since the manner of signifying of the terms bears much on the truth, the necessity, the contingency, the falsity of any proposition whatever. The second reason is peculiar to this matter, namely that eternity, although it be a present measure, formally speaking, admitting no succession of past or future, yet comprehends, as we said, the differences of past and future. Hence, when what is in eternity is signified in the manner of the past, that signified pastness, although it is not found formally in eternity, is nevertheless found eminently. And therefore such a proposition, as to necessity and contingency, seems to be ruled by the laws of other propositions of the past. From these foundations the proof and confirmation of the first conclusion is gathered in this manner. That proposition, from its manner of signifying, is of the past; and that manner of signifying of the past has its foundation in the eminence of eternity, insofar as it comprehends all time, even future and past: therefore that proposition is to be judged, simply speaking, as of the past. And it is confirmed: the truth of that proposition is best shown by us through the fact that it had in our time one true proposition of inherence, namely this, God knows that Antichrist will be future: which proposition in past time was true; but this is the proper manner for knowing some proposition of the past to be true: therefore that proposition is ruled by the laws of other propositions of the past, and consequently is a proposition of the past.

The second conclusion: supposing that that proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is of the past, it is consequently probably defended to be absolutely necessary. This conclusion is established against the second dictum of the first opinion. And for its proof it is to be supposed first that a proposition of the past, in which the predicate is not of the intelligible aspect of the subject, is not necessary in every way, but with its truth supposed: e.g., this proposition, Adam was, is not absolutely and in every way necessary, since it is not simply necessary that Adam was. This foundation is drawn from St. Thomas, question 25, De Veritate, art. 4, to the first and fourth. Secondly it is to be noted that a proposition of the past, supposing that it is true, is absolutely and simply necessary. This is so true that Aristotle, Book 6 of the Ethics, ch. 2, from the sentence of a certain Agathon, says that this alone is to be denied to the divine power, that what has been done can be rendered undone. Thirdly it is to be noted with St. Thomas in the solution to the second of this article that in propositions of the past in which the copula imports an act of the soul, e.g., Peter willed, knew, etc., if the dictum of the proposition be something impossible or contingent, it does not take away the necessity of the proposition of the past, if once it is true; e.g., this proposition, Peter said that man is a horse, if it is true that Peter said it, is as necessary as this one, Paul said that man is an animal. The reason for this is assigned by St. Thomas: since that dictum is not the chief part of the proposition, but is the matter of that verb said. And the same reason holds when the dictum is contingent, as in this proposition, Peter said that rain would be future tomorrow: indeed the reason is greater, since if the impossibility of the dictum does not suffice to take away the necessity of the proposition of the past, much less shall the contingency of the dictum suffice. From what has been said the proof of the second conclusion is gathered in this manner. That proposition is of the past, and is true: therefore it is absolutely necessary. The third conclusion: supposing that that proposition is of the past and necessary, as we said, there is no power, neither on the part of the creature nor on the part of God, to render that proposition false, or to make it that God did not know that Antichrist would be future. This conclusion is also asserted against the authors of the first sentence. And it is proved: there is no power, even in God, to render this proposition, Adam was, false, supposing that it was once true; nor is there any power which can make it that Peter did not say that rain would be future tomorrow, supposing that he said it: therefore a fortiori there can be no power which renders that proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, false, supposing that it was once true, or which can make it that God did not know that Antichrist would be future. The consequence is clear: since it is wondrous that there be no power which makes it that Peter did not know or did not say what he knew or said, and that there be a power which can make it that God did not know what He knew, after He once knew it, in the composite sense. Thus far let it have been said concerning the opinion of Cajetan. According to this opinion of Cajetan, the arguments set down at the beginning of the doubt can probably be dissolved. To the first I answer that it is to be ruled entirely by the laws of other propositions of the past, both by reason of its manner of signifying, which it has of the past, and also because eternity corresponds to all the differences of our time, even the past. To the confirmation I answer that each of those consequences is good materially, but not formally, attending to the manner of signifying

of the terms. Hence formally speaking, a proposition of the present and one of the past are not equivalent. To the second I answer that St. Thomas does not intend in this solution to the second that the consequent of that consequence be necessary in the same manner as the antecedent is; but he teaches only this, that with the truth of the antecedent supposed, the consequent cannot be rendered false: because it is taken formally as it falls under the antecedent, or, what is the same, as it falls under the Knowledge of God. Hence that word just as in St. Thomas does not bespeak thoroughgoing parity. To the third I answer from the third conclusion, and it shall be explained more amply in this doubt. The fourth conclusion: more probable to me is that sentence which teaches that this proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is of the present and to be ruled by the laws of other propositions of the present, simply speaking. It is proved: that proposition is to be verified in the order to the instant of eternity, as is established from what was said in the preceding doubt; but in that instant of eternity there is no pastness, no succession, nor a vestige of it: therefore that proposition is to be verified in the order to the measure of presence, and consequently is simply of the present. This conclusion is proved by the first argument set down at the beginning of the doubt with its confirmation. I said simply speaking, since in a qualified sense, namely according to the manner of signifying of the terms, it is a proposition of the past. But yet in the order to the necessity or contingency of a proposition, regard is not to be had to the verbal manner and to the manner of signifying, as to the measure by which it is measured. And although eternity eminently comprehends all the differences of time, yet formally it is a most simple measure and whole all at once. Hence, since this proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, must be verified for the formal measure itself of eternity, it must necessarily be confessed to be verified, simply speaking, for the present instant. Moreover the conclusion is proved from the express sentence of St. Thomas, q. 6, De Veritate, art. 3, to 10, and in 1, dist. 39, q. 1, art. 1, to 1, in which places he says that, because in eternity nothing is past or future, therefore this proposition, God predestined Peter, imports the act of predestination as it egresses in the present from the free will of God. The fifth conclusion: that proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be future, is simply contingent, and necessary in a qualified sense. Before the proof of the conclusion, it is to be supposed first, from the solution to the first of this article, that the contingency or necessity, and likewise the freedom, of any effect is derived immediately and formally from the proximate cause of the effect or act. Secondly it is to be noted that a free or contingent cause then exercises its freedom or contingency, and transfers it into its effect or act, when first it is determined to the effect or act. The reason for this is that then it is determined freely or contingently to operate. From this it follows that a contingent or free cause in the first instant in which it produces the effect produces it freely or contingently, simply speaking, and the effect produced for that instant is simply free or contingent. Thirdly it is to be noted that an effect produced by a contingent or free cause in that first instant of its production can be considered in two ways: first, as it egresses from its cause; secondly, as it is already in act outside its cause. If it be considered in the first way, there is no necessity in that effect when it egresses from a cause operating freely or contingently. But if it be considered in the second way, it has some necessity: for, as Aristotle says, Book 1 of the Perihermeneias, last chapter, a thing while it is, it is necessary that it be. And this holds true chiefly in any free operation whatever of the divine will or intellect, by reason of the immutability of the divine intellect and will, by reason of which, supposing that God has some free operation, He cannot, in the composite sense, not have it for the whole of eternity. But it is necessarily to be observed that this second consideration of the effect, as far as pertains to its contingency or freedom, is altogether in a qualified sense, and the first consideration is simply: for, as I said, the contingency of an effect is simply and formally to be derived in the order to the proximate cause from which it egresses. These supposed, the first part of the conclusion is proved. In that proposition the act of divine knowledge is imported as it egresses in the present from the divine intellect operating freely: therefore that proposition imports a formally and simply free act, and consequently is simply a contingent proposition. The consequence is clear from what was presupposed. And the antecedent is plainly gathered from the preceding conclusion, in which we said that proposition to be simply of the present. And indeed that the knowledge of the future Antichrist be from the divine intellect operating freely is proved: for this knowledge pertains to the knowledge of vision, but every act of the knowledge of vision in God is simply free, depending on the free will of God, by which He willed from eternity to produce creatures in time. The second part of the conclusion, namely that that proposition is necessary in a qualified sense, is gathered from the foundation just presupposed. Since this act of the divine

knowledge, after it is, it is necessary that it be, by reason of the immutability of the divine knowledge and will. This conclusion, as to each part of it, St. Thomas expressly teaches in 1, in the cited distinction, above, in the body of the article; and Capreolus in dist. 38, art. 2.

Sixth and last conclusion: it is to be granted without qualification that God has power not to know that Antichrist will be future. I gather this conclusion from the teaching of St. Thomas in the places just cited; and Capreolus teaches it ubi supra. Which is proved: concerning this proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be, the same judgment must be borne as concerning this one, God knows that Antichrist will be: for, as we have said, each is of the present; but it is to be granted without qualification that God has power not to know that Antichrist will be: therefore likewise He has power not to have known. The minor is proved: God with unqualified freedom knows that Antichrist will be: therefore He can without qualification not know, even when He knows. The consequence is proved: for what is done freely can without qualification not be done, even for that instant in which it is done: for in that instant it is done freely, as we just now said in the foundation. I said without qualification advisedly, that is, in the divided sense, for with qualification and in the composite sense God has no power not to know that Antichrist will be, that is, on the supposition that He knows He cannot not know, on account of the immutability of the divine intellect. Regarding which it is to be noted that God, speaking without qualification, has free power to know that Antichrist will be or not to know. And since the power of God is never lost, this holds so that even after He knew that Antichrist would be future, there remains with Him the same power not to know, nor to have known, that Antichrist would be future, without qualification and in the divided sense. But in God neither is nor was there power, after He knew that Antichrist would be future, in the composite sense not to know that he will be future, in such a way that these two be taken together and conjointly, God knew that Antichrist would be future, and after He knew, He also did not know: e.g. there is power in God to make true whichever of these contradictories, Peter runs, Peter does not run; yet there is no power in God to make both true at once. From this it follows that this proposition, after God knew that Antichrist would be, He can not have known, is true without qualification, even if it be of the past according to the opinion of Cajetan: for in strictness it makes the divided sense, and imports nothing other than that there remains in God that power which He has from eternity, so that He can from eternity not know that Antichrist will be future. But this proposition, God can not have known that Antichrist would be future after He knew, whether it be of the past or of the present, is in strictness false. For it renders the composite sense, in that the verb can is borne at once over both acts, namely to know and not to know. It will be prudent, however, always to distinguish these and similar propositions, so that if they make the divided sense they be granted as true, but if they render the composite sense, they be denied as false.

From all this, the teaching of St. Thomas in this reply to the second seems to support all that we have said in these three conclusions. For he says that this proposition, God knew that Antichrist would be, is absolutely necessary. From which it seems manifestly to follow that that proposition is of the past, and that it is not necessary only in the composite sense, by reason of the divine immutability alone. For if it were necessary only in this way, St. Thomas would not say it to be absolutely necessary, but rather with qualification and from supposition, and absolutely contingent. To this I answer that St. Thomas, as is established from the places cited above, and chiefly from 1, d. 38, q. 1, art. 5, ad 4, understands that proposition to be necessary in no other way than by reason of the immutability of God. Indeed in that reply ad 4 he agrees with the Master of the Sentences asserting that that proposition is not of the past but of the present; yet St. Thomas adds that it is necessary on account of the immutability of the divine intellect. Therefore St. Thomas calls this proposition absolutely necessary, not because it is necessary without qualification and in the divided sense, but because it is necessary according to itself, and not insofar as it is subject to another proposition. So much concerning this doubt.

IT IS DOUBTED third, concerning the 2nd and 3rd saying of St. Thomas, whether this consequence, God knew that Antichrist would be, therefore Antichrist will be, is good? The negative side is proved: the antecedent of this consequence is absolutely necessary, while the consequent is absolutely contingent; therefore it is a bad consequence according to the rules of the dialecticians, who say that if the antecedent is necessary, so too the consequent. It could be answered to this argument that the antecedent, since it is a proposition of the present, as we have explained, is without qualification contingent and necessary with qualification; and the same must be said of the consequent. But this solution is rejected by St. Thomas against the Master of the Sentences in 1, dist. 38, q. 1, artic. 5, ad 4. For, says St. Thomas, although this proposition be of the present, it nevertheless has necessity in itself, on account of the immutability of the divine intellect; whereas the proposition placed in the consequent, namely Antichrist will be, has no necessity in itself, but mere contingency. Further, it is argued against this solution. For in these consequences, Christ said to Peter, thou shalt deny me thrice, therefore Peter was going to deny Christ thrice; Jeremiah said that Jerusalem would have to be devastated, therefore Jerusalem was going to have to be devastated, altogether the same difficulty remains; since the antecedent of each consequence is without qualification necessary, as each is a proposition of the past, and yet the consequent of each consequence is without qualification contingent. Nor does the solution hold which is assigned by some, and has its foundation in Cajetan at the end of the Commentary on this article, on the third doubt: for he says that the antecedent of each consequence, although in words it be a proposition of the past, yet in reality is of the present; since prophetic knowledge of future contingents is measured by participated eternity, and regards those futures themselves insofar as they are present outside their causes in eternity. This solution, I say, does not hold: both because, as we said in the last conclusion of the 2nd doubt of this article, prophetic knowledge, although it participates its certitude from the knowledge of God measured by eternity, is itself nevertheless not measured by eternity, speaking formally; and consequently does not attain the future contingent insofar as it is present in eternity: indeed, as Cajetan well says below, q. 57, perhaps it is not communicable by the divine power to any created species to represent the future contingent insofar as it is actually presently existing outside its causes, but this belongs to the Divine Essence alone: and also because, whatever be the case concerning prophetic knowledge, whether it be measured by eternity or not, those propositions, Christ said to Peter, thou shalt deny me thrice; Jeremiah said that Jerusalem would have to be devastated, are without doubt of the past. For those exterior prophetic foretellings were made in past time: therefore those propositions are absolutely necessary. Someone will say to these arguments that in all these consequences the antecedent is without qualification necessary, while the consequent in the divided sense and without qualification is contingent, but is necessary in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition of the necessity of the antecedent. Against this solution it is argued, and let this be the second argument: that proposition, Antichrist will be, even in the composite sense, is contingent: therefore. The antecedent is proved: even with the truth and necessity of that antecedent supposed, God knew that Antichrist would be future, Antichrist is born into the world contingently. For otherwise the divine knowledge would really take contingency away from things: therefore. And it is confirmed: when we ask whether the divine knowledge imposes necessity on things and takes away their contingency, we do not ask whether the things themselves considered in their natures on their own part, without order to the divine knowledge, are contingent, but what is asked is whether, with the divine knowledge posited, contingency is preserved in things: and the affirmative side of this doubt is true according to faith: therefore, with the divine knowledge standing, and consequently in the composite sense, that proposition, Antichrist will be, is contingent. It is argued third. If that consequence were good, it would be chiefly on account of the reason of St. Thomas, namely because the consequent must be taken not absolutely but insofar as it is subject to the knowledge of God; but it is false that the consequent must be so taken: therefore. The major is clear, since that is the reason of St. Thomas by which he proves, in the reply to the second, the goodness of this consequence. The minor is proved in two ways. First, if that proposition, Antichrist will be, were taken insofar as it is subject to the knowledge of God, it would have to be a proposition of the present and not of the future, since Antichrist, as we said above, is known by God insofar as he is present in eternity: therefore. It is proved second: in this consequence, I know the stone to be material, therefore the stone is material, the consequent is not taken insofar as it is subject to my knowledge, and yet in the antecedent is placed a term importing a scientific act: therefore that proposition of St. Thomas is false, that when in the antecedent a term importing an act of the soul is placed, the consequent must be taken insofar as it is subject to that act of the soul. The antecedent is proved: the stone, insofar as it is subject to the scientific act, is not material but rather immaterial, as St. Thomas says in the reply to the second; therefore that consequent, the stone is material, is taken according to the mode which the stone has in reality, and not insofar as it is subject to knowledge, for otherwise it would be false. It is argued fourth: with Antichrist born, that consequent, Antichrist will be, will be falsified; but the antecedent, namely God knew that Antichrist would be future, will always be true, even with Antichrist born; therefore that consequence is not good.

For the solution of this doubt it is to be noted first that we can speak of the knowledge of God both insofar as it is knowledge precisely and insofar as it is the cause of the things known. And indeed at present, although we shall say something of the knowledge of God insofar as it is a cause, our disputation nevertheless deals chiefly with it insofar as it is knowledge. For the disputation concerning the causality of the divine knowledge is reserved for question 19. In which place we shall bring forth something more meditated concerning this difficulty. Second, it is to be noted that the knowledge of God, insofar as it is knowledge, is necessary for a twofold reason. First because it is immutable, as we said above. Second because it is altogether certain and infallible. The former necessity is with qualification and from supposition. And we speak not of the knowledge of simple intelligence, since that is necessary without qualification and in every way in the account of knowledge; but we speak of the knowledge of vision, and especially of the knowledge of future contingents. The latter necessity, however, even in the knowledge of vision can be called necessity without qualification: since infallibility and certitude is intrinsic, and the chief perfection of knowledge insofar as it is knowledge. If the knowledge of God be considered insofar as it is a cause, it also has some necessity, which necessity does not consist in this, that it necessarily produces the effect; since the first cause operates freely and not necessarily. But it consists in two things. First, in the immutability of the divine intellect and will, on account of which, if it has once determined itself to operate, it necessarily remains determined to operate. Second, in the efficacy of the first cause, which no inferior cause can resist, nor withdraw itself from its determination, according to that of Paul, Rom. 9: Who resisteth His will? But this necessity, as will at once be explained, does not induce necessity without qualification in the effect.

With these things supposed, the doubt is answered with a single conclusion: that consequence about which there is controversy is good. It is easily proved. In no case can the antecedent be true in which the consequent is not true, as will be explained in the replies to the arguments: therefore it is a good consequence.

TO the arguments I answer. To the first I say that the solution assigned there does not appear sufficient. And it is chiefly impugned by the rejoinder made there, with the argument taken from similar consequences. Therefore that argument must be dissolved with the presupposition that the antecedent is absolutely necessary, as it really is in those two similar little consequences. Wherefore recourse must be had to the second solution assigned there, namely that the consequent, in the divided sense and without qualification, is contingent, but is necessary in the composite sense. For the understanding of this solution, against which the second argument militates, it is to be noted first that necessity in the composite sense must not be taken in that sense in which the second argument proceeds, namely that, with the knowledge of God concerning the future Antichrist standing, no contingency remains in the causes that will produce Antichrist, but they are totally determined by the very knowledge of God to produce Antichrist necessarily in the time disposed by God. For this sense is most false and against faith. For according to it, the knowledge of God manifestly takes contingency and freedom away from all things: for what does it profit that my will, considered absolutely and according to its own nature, has freedom to read or not to read tomorrow, if, with the knowledge of God concerning tomorrow's future reading supposed, it cannot not read, but is totally determined to read? Since in truth, according to this sense, the will never uses its freedom, and consequently no effect is free. To explain, therefore, in what sense it must be taken that that consequent is necessary in the composite sense, it is to be noted that just as the knowledge of God, as we have said, has necessity both in the account of knowledge precisely and also in the account of cause, so the thing known has some necessity both in the account of known object and in the account of effect through order to the very knowledge of God. And indeed the necessity which the thing known has in the account of known object is nothing other than the complete infallibility which it has insofar as it is an object known by the knowledge of God, which infallibility does not come from the divine knowledge impressing something upon the thing known. For, as St. Thomas most well says ad tertium, just as from my knowing Peter nothing real is placed in Peter, so from God's knowing that Antichrist will be future no real disposition comes to Antichrist himself. Therefore that infallibility comes from the divine knowledge attaining its object insofar as it is actually present in eternity, existing outside its causes, e.g. just as from my seeing you actually writing, although from my vision no necessity comes to you to write infallibly, yet from this alone, that my vision is terminated at you insofar as you actually write, it is infallible, indeed even necessary from supposition: since while a thing actually is, it is necessary that it be. So, since the cognition of God is terminated at Antichrist insofar as he is actually present in eternity, it is infallible and necessary from supposition that Antichrist will be future for that time for which he is already known as present in eternity; read Albert Pighius, lib. 8, De libero arbitrio, c. 1. But it is to be noted that the necessary and the infallible are distinguished in this way, that the necessary, speaking per se, does not import a respect to something extrinsic, but rather an intrinsic disposition of the thing: the infallible, however, formally imports a respect to the cognitive power; for the infallible imports that the cognitive power not be deceived concerning that object.

From this it follows that this proposition, Antichrist will be, without any distinction or supposition must be called infallible: since from the formal signification of that term infallible, this proposition makes the composite sense, and is taken insofar as it is subject to the infallible cognition of God. But this proposition must not absolutely be called necessary: since necessary does not import the composite sense unless it be formally explained, so that we say that proposition to be necessary in the composite sense.

So far we have explained the necessity which that consequent, Antichrist will be, has through order to the divine knowledge, in the account of knowledge. Henceforth we must explain the necessity which it has in order to the same knowledge insofar as it is a cause. And this necessity is taken from the most efficacious power of the first cause, which so determines all second causes to produce their effects that no second cause can depart from its determination. Regarding which note that the concurrence of the first cause is so efficacious in determining second causes that at once it is sweet, conforming itself to the nature of the second causes, so that with a necessary cause it effects necessarily, and with a contingent one contingently. And of this there is a twofold cause. First, since God is the author of the whole of nature: and therefore He can move any nature according to its mode, so that at once the efficacy of the first cause is preserved, and the proper mode of operating of the second cause. The second cause is that which St. Thomas assigns below, q. 19, art. 8, namely the highest efficacy of the first cause, which can produce not only the effect it intends as to its substance, but also as to every mode in which it wills to produce, namely necessarily or contingently. Thus the first cause determines my will to read, not in any way whatever, but to read freely. From this it follows that it is as necessary in the composite sense that I now read freely as that I read absolutely; since each falls under the determination of the most efficacious first cause determining my will to will to read freely. This teaching is gathered from the cited article 8, ad secundum.

But someone argues: there seems a manifest implication in my at once reading freely and reading necessarily. To this I answer from St. Thomas, in the reply to the third of this article, and more clearly, q. 6, De Verit., art. 3, ad 7 and 8, that both these modes, namely of necessity and of contingency, can at once belong to one and the same thing. But the one, namely the mode of contingency, belongs to it without qualification, that is, from within and from its own nature. The other, namely the mode of necessity, belongs with qualification, that is, through respect to something extrinsic. And indeed there is no incongruity in some effect being contingent without qualification and necessary with qualification: just as a man can at once be black without qualification and white with qualification. So in the present case I say that this proposition, Antichrist will be, speaking without qualification, is contingent, since this effect from its own nature and from its proximate causes has intrinsic contingency. But that proposition is necessary with qualification, that is, through respect to the disposition of the divine knowledge and the determination of the divine will, which efficaciously, although sweetly, as I have explained, determines all second causes to their effects. Thus that mode of necessity which belongs to the effect through order to the first cause is compatible with the mode of contingency which belongs to the effect from within and from its proximate causes. And although we cannot fully explain a priori in what way the concurrence of the first cause is efficacious and necessary, and at once is conformed to the nature of the contingent and free cause, yet a posteriori this is established to us as most certain. Since if the concurrence of the first cause were not efficacious in determining all second causes, no second cause would operate its effect: for no second cause can operate unless it be efficaciously determined by the first. If, however, the concurrence of the first cause were efficacious in such a way as not to be accommodated to the natures of the inferior causes, the concurrence of the first cause would take all freedom and contingency away from second causes. Wherefore let us say that of Wisd. 8: God reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.

To the second argument, therefore, I answer that, with the foreknowledge concerning the future Antichrist standing, this proposition, Antichrist will be, remains without qualification contingent: since the divine knowledge does not take away the contingency of the causes through which Antichrist is to be produced in the world. But nevertheless that proposition is necessary with qualification, that is, in the composite sense, insofar as it is subject to the divine knowledge. I mean that this proposition, Antichrist will be, taken solitarily, whether the divine knowledge concerning Antichrist stand or not, is contingent, nor is any necessity found in it. But if this proposition be inferred from that one, God knew that Antichrist would be future, it puts on a certain mode of necessity, insofar as it is subject to the knowledge of God, and insofar as it is inferred from that antecedent. And since this second consideration of this proposition is with qualification, therefore this proposition is without qualification contingent and with qualification necessary. In other words these things are customarily explained, namely that this proposition, Antichrist will be, is necessary with the necessity of the consequence, but not with the necessity of the consequent: but this way of speaking coincides with the former concerning the divided and composite sense. From this the reply to the argument is clear. For the antecedent is denied; and indeed for the goodness of a consequence it is not required that the consequent, speaking absolutely, be as necessary as the antecedent. But it suffices that in no case in which the antecedent is true can it be rendered false. And so it happens in our consequence on account of the necessity which the consequent has in the composite sense. To the confirmation, it is clear from what has been said. But vulgar men rise up in this place with this argument: whatever be the case concerning necessity and contingency in the composite or divided sense, this at least is true, that whatever has been foreknown or disposed by God will come infallibly and necessarily, with the necessity of the consequence, as has been said: therefore, supposing that God knows that I shall sin tomorrow, whatever I do, in the end I shall infallibly sin. Further, therefore the knowledge of God takes away the necessity of the precepts and counsels of God, which call us back from sins and induce us to operate well; and likewise it takes away all human solicitude and industry concerning future contingents. This vulgar argumentation will be more efficaciously confuted in q. 19, art. 8, but it is briefly shown now how it is of no moment. For if per impossibile God had no knowledge of future contingents, this argumentation would have the same force: since, with these two contradictories given, Peter will sin tomorrow, Peter will not sin tomorrow, one of them will in fact be true: therefore from eternity it was true: since a proposition concerning the future which is once true was always true: therefore whatever Peter does, in fact he will sin tomorrow, given that it must be true: therefore the knowledge of God places no greater difficulty in that argumentation than if there were no knowledge of future contingents. But, with the knowledge of God removed, no one would say that care and diligence concerning future contingents is not to be applied, nor that precepts or counsels concerning works of virtue to be done are not to be laid down: therefore neither, with the knowledge of God standing, must this be said. To the arguments, therefore, it is said that the knowledge of God induces no necessity in second causes, but they remain as free or contingent concerning the producing of their effects as if there were no knowledge of God. And so the knowledge of God takes away no precepts, laws or counsels, nor human solicitude and industry.

To the third argument the minor is denied. To the first proof I answer that Antichrist, insofar as he is subject to the knowledge of God and is present to God Himself, is also future to us. Whence that consequent, Antichrist will be, renders this sense: Antichrist, insofar as he is the object of the divine knowledge, will be future to us. In this, however, that he is the object of the divine knowledge, it is intrinsically enclosed that he be present to God Himself. To the second proof I answer that St. Thomas does not teach at present that in the consequent the mode which belongs to the thing known on the part of the thing is not imported, but says only this, that the consequent must be taken according to the mode which belongs to the thing known insofar as it is subject to cognition, that is, that it be taken insofar as it is the object terminating cognition. But it is to be observed that in the object terminating cognition two things are found. One is the mode which belongs to the object itself from the extrinsic, namely from the cognition itself, which mode places nothing real in the object; e.g. if I know that man is an animal, in the known object there arises a mode of immateriality, and that the object itself be formally knowable: but this immateriality and knowability places nothing real in man: just as in a wall seen, that it be seen is not something real. The other thing found in the object is the account by which the object terminates cognition. These two, although they sometimes seem opposed, yet truly do not conflict with each other, but belong to the same object taken formally as it is an object, e.g. in that consequence of the argument, I know the stone to be material, therefore the stone is material, to the stone insofar as it is the object of my knowledge belongs the mode of immateriality and of knowability, which places nothing real in the stone, but belongs to it from the extrinsic insofar as it is subject to my knowledge. There is also found in the stone, insofar as it is the object of this cognition, materiality, which is the account by which it terminates this cognition. And materiality and immateriality do not conflict in the stone, but rather belong to it at once insofar as it is the object of this cognition. And the reason is: that materiality belongs to the stone as something intrinsic to it; immateriality, however, places nothing intrinsic and real in the stone, but something of reason. From this it follows that that consequent, the stone is material, is taken there formally insofar as it is the object of my knowledge. And it makes this sense: the stone insofar as it is knowable and immaterial through order to knowledge is material on the part of the thing. Which sense is most true.

To the third argument I answer that that consequent, Antichrist will be, must not be taken absolutely for any future time whatever, but restrictedly for that time for which God knew that Antichrist would be future. Second, I answer that the verb will be can be taken as it were confusedly in the eternity of God. In which sense this proposition, Antichrist will be, is always true.

Concerning the reply to the third it is to be noted that that sentence of St. Thomas, namely that the knowledge of God causes no real disposition in the thing known, can be understood in two ways. First, of the knowledge of God insofar as it is knowledge precisely, or in other words insofar as it is speculative knowledge. Second, it can be understood of the knowledge of God insofar as it is the cause of things, or in other words insofar as it is practical. If it be understood in the first sense, it has no difficulty. For it is a most certain thing that knowledge, whether ours or God's, insofar as it is speculative, causes no real disposition in the thing known. If, however, it be understood in the second sense, that sentence of St. Thomas has difficulty. Since the knowledge of God, insofar as it is the cause of things, really changes things themselves, and causes a real disposition in them. And further, the practical knowledge of God really determines the causes of future contingents in order to those contingent effects themselves, and impresses a real concurrence in them: therefore. To this I answer that as far as pertains to the reply to the argument which St. Thomas here dissolves, the knowledge of God even insofar as it is practical is not deemed to cause any real disposition in the thing known: for St. Thomas does not speak of any real disposition whatever, but only of that which takes away the contingency or freedom belonging to the thing known considered according to its own nature. And indeed the concurrence of the first cause, as we said above, although it really determines contingent and free causes with an efficacious determination, yet determines sweetly and proportionably to the natures of those causes, so that the second cause remains as contingent and free with that determination of the first cause standing as if there were no such determination: and this suffices to dissolve the argument which St. Thomas here intended to dissolve. So much concerning this article.