Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: God knows all creatures, with proper knowledge. And the reason is: because whatever of perfection is in any creature whatever, the whole pre-exists and is contained in God, according to a most excellent mode.

COMMENTARY.

In this article it is to be noted first, that the sense of the conclusion is not this, namely, that God knows creatures through distinct knowledges, so that he would know each creature by a distinct knowledge adequate to the creature itself. For this sense would be most false: since God by one most simple knowledge understands himself and all possible creatures. But the sense of the conclusion is that that one knowledge of God attains all the essential and accidental predicates which belong to creatures. And so it is a distinct knowledge of creatures, not on the part of the knower, but on the part of the known object. Second, it is to be noted that that opinion reported by St. Thomas at the beginning of the article, which asserts that God does not know creatures distinctly, was the opinion of Averroes, 12 Metaphysics, tex. 51; and some theologians, among whom is Gregory of Rimini in d. 35, fasten that opinion upon Aristotle, because he said, 12 Metaphysics, tex. 51, that the divine intellect would be most vile if it knew the minutest things which are in this world. But this opinion is falsely attributed to Aristotle, for he himself, 3 On the Soul, tex. 80, and 3 Metaphysics, tex. 15, reckons it a great absurdity against Empedocles that God would not know the elements and the things composed of elements. For he says that God would be the most foolish of all if he were ignorant of those things which men perceive by sight. And in that passage cited from 12 Metaphysics Aristotle only means to say that God does not go outside himself to know the things which are in this universe; for if he knew in that way, his intellect would be debased, since it would receive likenesses from these inferior things, but he knows all things in himself through his own Essence. So does St. Thomas interpret Aristotle in that passage. But whatever may be the case concerning the opinion of Aristotle, the conclusion of this article is to be held according to faith, which is gathered from the testimonies cited in the preceding article. And it is chiefly confirmed from that passage, Heb. 4: For the word of God is living and efficacious etc., which is cited in the argument On the contrary. Likewise Ecclus. 23: «Brighter are his eyes than the sun etc.»; and Ps. 7: «God, searching hearts and reins», that is, all things, even the least thoughts. The truth of this conclusion is reduced by St. Thomas to the article of faith of Creation, in 2-2, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2. See the reasons for this conclusion, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 47, 48, 49, and 50.

There is a doubt concerning the truth of the conclusion. It is proved false: God knows creatures not in themselves, but in God himself; therefore he does not know them distinctly. The antecedent is the second conclusion of the preceding article. The consequence is proved: creatures in God are not distinct according to their proper accounts; but they are in God one most simple essence: therefore if they are known as they are in God, they are not known distinctly. Someone will say to this argument that God does not for that reason know creatures in themselves, because he does not know through adequate likenesses of them, but through an inadequate and most universal likeness, such as the Divine Essence is, which immediately represents itself, but creatures mediately. But since the Divine Essence most exactly and most perfectly represents creatures, although mediately, God knows the creatures themselves most distinctly. Against this solution I argue thus: it follows that the angel, especially the highest, does not know creatures in themselves; the consequent is admitted by no theologian: therefore. The consequence is proved: the highest angel knows things through an inadequate and universal likeness; and so he knows man and horse through one likeness, which inadequately represents each, as will be explained below in the treatise on the angels: therefore. And it is confirmed: just as the Divine Essence does not immediately represent creatures, but itself, so the likeness of the highest angel does not immediately represent man and horse and the other specific natures, but the nature of animal in common; therefore, according to the assigned solution, the angel does not know through that likeness man and horse in themselves, but in another, namely, in the common nature of animal. But the consequent is most absurd. And it is confirmed secondly. The first is the opinion of Scotus, in 1, d. 35 and 36, where he says that God knows creatures both in himself and in the creatures themselves. Cajetan here expounds the opinion of Scotus, with an example adduced. Just as, he says, if someone saw Peter in himself, and at the same time beheld Peter in a mirror which was placed beside him; so likewise God beholds creatures in themselves and in his Essence as in a mirror. I do not, however, find in Scotus that God knows creatures in his Essence, but only in themselves. Scotus expounds his opinion in this way: for he imagines two instants of origin in the divine knowledge. In the first God knows his essence without order to creatures. And this knowledge, he says, is not altogether perfect, because it does not extend to creatures. In the second instant God produces creatures from eternity in a certain intelligible to-be, which to-be is neither purely real being, nor purely a being of reason, but a mean between each; but creatures so produced God knows in the same second instant, and thus he knows them in themselves. This opinion of Scotus is chimerical, and little in agreement with faith. And first, that it does not agree with faith is proved: for from it it would follow that creatures were created from eternity; the consequent is heretical: therefore. The consequence is proved: the creatures produced by God in intelligible being, imagined by Scotus, have participated to-be from eternity: therefore they have to-be created by God. The consequence is proved: for everything which is participated being outside God is created by God himself. And it is confirmed: the creatures in that intelligible to-be are in themselves; but they are not the Creator, therefore they are creatures. And it is confirmed, moreover: for in the Council of Sens was condemned the error of Peter Abelard, asserting that there is something outside God which was neither Creator nor creature. In which error the opinion of Scotus seems to lie. Furthermore, it is argued secondly. It is a most absurd saying that the divine Science is perfected from the knowledge of creatures in themselves; but this absurdity is openly granted by the opinion of Scotus, therefore. Likewise it is confirmed: the knowledge which God has in the first instant of origin, imagined by Scotus, is comprehensive knowledge of the Divine Essence: therefore through that knowledge God knows every possible creature in the Divine Essence itself; and consequently it is a mere fiction to imagine a second instant in which creatures are known in themselves. The consequence is evident: because comprehensive knowledge of the Divine Essence extends to every possible effect of the divine Power, as is established from what was said above, q. 12, art. 8. The antecedent is now proved: because the knowledge which God has in the second instant is not knowledge of the Divine Essence, but of creatures in themselves: therefore if the knowledge which God has in the first instant is not comprehensive of the Divine Essence, God has no comprehensive knowledge of his Essence, which is absurd to say.

There is a second opinion, of Aureolus, in Capreolus, in the cited distinction, concerning the second conclusion, who asserts two things. The one is that God does not know creatures in themselves, but in his essence. The other is that God does not know, even mediately, creatures according to the to-be which they have in themselves, but only according to the to-be which they have in the Divine Essence. And so, in the opinion of Aureolus, the creature is neither the immediate and primary object of the divine knowledge, nor even the mediate and secondary; but the divine knowledge has only one object, namely the Divine Essence. The weightiest arguments of Aureolus for this second dictum are found in St. Thomas, art. 5 of this question: but the lesser ones Capreolus dissolves.

There is a third opinion, of St. Thomas, in these two articles 5 and 6, and it consists in two propositions.

The first is: God knows creatures according to the to-be which they have in themselves, not immediately, but through the mediation of the knowledge of his essence. And so creatures have the character of a secondary and mediate object. That conclusion is first explained. For it is understood that creatures are known according as they are in themselves, not on the part of the knower. For in this way God knows all creatures according to the mode of being which they have in God himself. But they are known according as they are in themselves, on the part of the known thing, that is, they are known as to all, both substantial and accidental, things which are found in the creatures themselves. This supposed, the conclusion is proved.

First. God knows comprehensively his Essence and Power: therefore he knows comprehensively, most perfectly and most distinctly, all possible effects of the divine Power, as to all their accounts. All these things are manifest. Second it is proved: if God knows creatures according to the mode which they have in God on the part of the object, and not according to the mode which they have in themselves, as Aureolus opines, it follows that God knows no creature, speaking simply; the consequent is heretical and opposed to faith, according to which it must be confessed that God knows all creatures, however minute: therefore. The consequence is proved: creatures according to the mode which they have in God are God himself, according to that passage, John 1: What was made, in him was life: therefore. From these things it follows that the opinion of Aureolus, unless it be explained in a very pious way, is against faith. But in this place it is to be noted that Gabriel errs basely when he asserts, in the cited distinction, q. 5, that it could not be shown by natural reason that God knows creatures according to the to-be which they have in themselves on the part of the object, as he explains: nay, innumerable are the demonstrations which openly show this thing, taken from the Providence which God has over creatures, from the Creation and Government of them. See St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, where above.

Second conclusion: God does not know creatures immediately and in themselves, but in his own Essence. This conclusion is proved. God knows creatures through the Divine Essence, as through an intelligible likeness, and not otherwise: therefore he knows them mediately and not in themselves, but in the Divine Essence. The antecedent is most certain, and is asserted by St. Augustine, in the book 83 Questions, q. 46, where he says that it is sacrilege to assert that God goes outside himself to know anything. The consequence is proved. The divine Essence, as a likeness, does not immediately represent creatures, but itself: therefore through that divine likeness God does not know creatures immediately, but mediately in the Divine Essence itself. But someone will say: we do not know God immediately through the likenesses of creatures, although those likenesses do not immediately represent God, but creatures: therefore, although the Divine Essence, as a likeness, immediately represents God and not creatures, it is not thence gathered that God does not know creatures immediately. To this argument, the consequence is denied. The ground of the difference is twofold. First: because the divine intellect cannot turn away thought from the object immediately represented through its essence as a likeness. Whence the divine knowledge of necessity must be borne to the Divine Essence, as to its immediate object; but to creatures, as to a mediate object. But our intellect can turn away thought from the creature, which is the immediate object of the created likeness, and transfer it to God, who is the mediate and secondary object of the created likeness. Whence its knowledge can be borne immediately to God. The second difference is that the Divine Essence, which is the primary object of the divine likeness, is according to itself the most exact exemplar of creatures. Whence the same knowledge which is immediately terminated at the Essence of God is terminated secondarily at creatures: but in creatures God is not immediately represented, but we know him from creatures through a certain removal and in the manner of a certain eminence. Wherefore we do not know God himself by the same knowledge by which we know creatures; but one is the knowledge which is immediately terminated at creatures, and another which is immediately terminated at God. From this it follows that the Divine Essence is not only the ground of knowing creatures to the divine intellect, in the manner of an intelligible likeness, but also in the manner of an idea, that is, in the manner of an understood form. Second, the conclusion is proved. If the creature is the immediate object of the divine knowledge, it follows that the divine knowledge takes its perfection and specific character from the creature; the consequent is most absurd: therefore. The consequence is proved: for knowledge takes its perfection and specific character from its immediate object. Lastly it is proved. Creatures, as we said above, q. 12, art. 8, are not represented in the Divine Essence as in a mirror in the manner of distinction; but they are represented as in an efficient and exemplary cause, in the manner of simplicity: therefore they cannot be known immediately through the Divine Essence, but of necessity must be known in the Divine Essence itself, as in their immediate object.

To the arguments it must be answered. And the first has now been dissolved most well in the course of arguing. And that solution coincides with the solution to the first of this sixth article. To the rejoinder with its confirmation, with other things passed over, it is answered that the account immediately represented through the likenesses of the angels is in reality not distinguished from the singular things mediately represented through that likeness: e.g. the common account of animal, which is immediately represented through the likeness of the higher angel, is not in reality distinguished from man and horse. Wherefore the angel through that likeness knows man and horse immediately, and in themselves. But the account immediately represented through the divine likeness is really distinguished from creatures, which are the mediate objects. Whence the knowledge of God, since it is terminated immediately at that account, which is the immediate object of the divine likeness, cannot be borne to creatures in themselves.