Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. The argument is in the Summa. For God is supremely immaterial: and immateriality is the ground of knowing.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this question there is dispute among the scholastics in the First Book, dist. 35. It must be noted first in this article that its conclusion is certain according to faith, and is found everywhere in the Sacred Scriptures. Let the two testimonies cited by St. Thomas suffice for us: one in the argument On the contrary, and the other in the solution to the second. All serious philosophers taught this sentence, enlightened by the light of reason, especially Aristotle in book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 36 and following; and in book 10 of the Ethics, ch. 8. And indeed this name God is derived from the Greek verb Theaste, which has the same force as to consider and to know, as Damascene observes in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 11. From which it is gathered that it was a common conception of mind among all peoples that God is of a cognitive nature. See the arguments for this conclusion in St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 44. The weightiest argument is the one found in this article, which St. Thomas took from Aristotle in book 2 On the Soul, texts 27 and 124. In which argument two notable propositions are contained: the one is: immateriality is the ground of knowability. And it is to be understood in this sense, that immateriality is the ground for some thing to be intelligible, and also intellective. Thus every immaterial nature, by the sole fact that it is immaterial, has both: both that it be passively intelligible, and that it be intellective. The other proposition is that the knower differs from the non-knower chiefly in this, that a non-knowing thing is confined and limited to its own form, and cannot receive into itself the form of another thing: but the knower is by nature apt to have in itself the form of another thing. The first proposition is attacked by Gabriel in the distinction cited, q. 1, and by Aureolus in the same distinction, in Capreolus, q. un.; and it is argued against it as follows. From it follows that intellectual accidents are actively intellective; the consequent is utterly false: therefore. The consequence is plain: since they are immaterial.

Secondly. Matter is not an impediment to knowledge: therefore immateriality is not the ground of knowability. The antecedent is proved: the rational soul, while it exists in the body, understands more perfectly; or at least equally perfectly as when it is separated from the body: therefore matter does not impede knowledge.

Thirdly. God could make some immaterial creature which would not be cognitive; and likewise he could make a material creature which would be cognitive: therefore immateriality is not the adequate ground of knowability. It is answered, however, that that first proposition of St. Thomas is taken from Aristotle in book 2 On the Soul, in the place cited above; and it is received by all philosophers and theologians. Nor can any other ground of knowability be assigned besides immateriality.

Hence to the first argument it is answered that that reasoning holds in substantial natures only, as regards active knowability. For since to know is a perfect operation, it can belong only to a subsistent.

To the second, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, first I say it is false that the rational soul understands equally perfectly in this state as in the state of separation from the body. About which matter there is dispute below, q. 89. Secondly I say that the soul in this state does not depend on the body in the operation of the intellect as on an effective instrument of intellection, but depends on the body only as on an object. Hence the body is not an impediment to it, speaking per se, for having the operation of the intellect.

To the third it is answered that, at present, St. Thomas is speaking not in relation to the absolute power of God, but attending to the natures of things. Secondly I say each is impossible according to every power: both that some material creature be cognitive, and that an immaterial creature not be, from its own nature, cognitive. Concerning the second proposition it must be noted first that St. Thomas does not say it is necessary for knowledge that the knower receive into itself the form of the thing known; for certainly this would be false. For God, who is supremely cognitive, receives no form into himself. But St. Thomas deliberately said it is necessary that the knower have in itself the form of the thing known. And this proposition, explained in this sense, is founded on that sentence of Aristotle, 5 On the Soul, that the intellect in act is the understood in act, that is, the thing understood. Thus, according to Aristotle, knowledge consists in this, that the intellect in act be formally the very thing understood in intelligible to-be: if indeed the intellect be in first act, it suffices that it be the thing understood also in first act, that is, according to the intelligible likeness. But if it be in second act, it is required that it be the thing understood in ultimate act, consummated through the express likeness of the thing known, which we call the word or concept. But it must be observed that the knower can have in itself the form of the thing known in three ways. First, through the formal identity of the knower with the form of the thing known in intelligible to-be. And in this way God has in himself the form of all knowable things. For the divine intellect formally is the same as the divine Essence in intelligible to-be, that is, insofar as the essence is the express likeness of all knowable things. In the second way the knower can have the form of the thing known from the fact that it is actuated by it, not indeed through inherence or true information, but insofar as by it, taken in intelligible to-be, it is determined and constituted in act for intellection, and the form itself is the specifying principle of intellection. In this way the divine Essence is in the intellect of one seeing God. And likewise the essence of an angel, taken in intelligible to-be, actuates the intellect of the angel itself for the knowledge which the angel has of itself. About which matter there will be fuller dispute below, q. 55, art. 1.

Thirdly, finally, the form of the thing known can be in the knower through true information and inherence, in the way things known by us are in our intellect through intelligible likenesses. In the first and second way the knower in act is the known in act through the identity of the thing known. But in the third way it is the known in act through its formal likeness, which is its intentional likeness. But it must be observed, from St. Thomas in Quodlib. 8, art. 4, and q. 2 On Truth, art. 2, that the likeness of the thing known is the same form as the one which the thing known has outside the intellect, although it has another to-be. For the form outside the intellect has natural to-be, but within the intellect it has intentional to-be. Thus the likeness of a stone is the same form as the natural form which the stone has, differing from it only in the mode of being. From which it follows that just as one having the form of a stone in natural to-be is a natural stone, so the intellect having the likeness of a stone is a stone in intentional to-be.

Secondly, it must be noted concerning the same proposition that some form can be received in an extraneous subject in two ways: first according to natural to-be, as heat is received in water; and this mode of reception does not serve for knowledge, for a sensible object placed upon the sense does not cause sensation, as is found in book 2 On the Soul. Secondly it can be received according to intentional to-be, that is, according to representative to-be, in the way a likeness is received in a cognitive power; and this mode of reception serves for knowledge.

It must be noted, thirdly, that a subject can receive intentional forms in two ways: in one way per se, and on account of the proper operation of the recipient, as sight receives visible likenesses on account of vision, which is the proper operation of sight; in the other way per accidens and on account of another, that is, on account of the operation of another subject: and in this way the transparent medium receives visible likenesses as a medium carrying them to the visual power.

The first mode of reception manifestly shows that the recipient is of a cognitive nature.

The second mode of reception, however, does not show that the recipient has a cognitive nature.

Fourthly, it must be noted that between the reception of a form which is received according to natural to-be and the reception of an intentional form in a cognitive power there is chiefly this difference, that from the former reception there results a certain third composite, distinct from recipient and received, e.g. in the substantial composition from matter and form there results a substantial composite which really differs from each component part. Likewise in the accidental composition of whiteness with a body there results a white thing, which really differs from the body and the whiteness. But in the intentional composition which comes to be from a cognitive power and a likeness, no third thing results, but the power becomes the very thing known. Thus one component becomes the other: e.g. from intellect and the likeness of a stone results that the intellect be a stone in intentional to-be; and for this reason Averroes, in book 3 On the Soul, text 5, and book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 59, says that from intellect and the intelligible likeness comes to be more one thing than from matter and substantial form. Since matter does not become the form itself, but the intellect becomes the very thing understood in intentional to-be.

But someone will argue: the intellect does not become the intentional likeness: therefore one component does not become the other, but some third thing results from intellect and likeness.

It is answered to this that the intellect does not become the likeness itself, but becomes the thing understood in intentional to-be. And since the likeness, as I have said, is the same form as the form of the thing understood, hence it is that from that composition properly no third thing results, but one component simply becomes the other.

But it is proved a posteriori that from intellect and likeness no third thing results: for otherwise it would follow that knowledge, speaking formally, would not be the act of the intellect, but of that third thing resulting from intellect and likeness; the consequent is utterly false: therefore.

The consequence is proved: knowledge proceeds from the intellect insofar as it is in act through the likeness: therefore if the intellect, insofar as it is in act, is some third thing resulting from intellect and likeness, knowledge, speaking formally, does not proceed from the intellect, but from that third thing.

Therefore, that we may save these two things, namely both that knowledge proceed formally from the intellect and that the intellect know insofar as it is in act through the likeness, we must necessarily say that from likeness and intellect no third thing results, but there results that the intellect become the very thing known in act, in intelligible to-be. Thus the proximate principle of knowledge is the intellect insofar as it is the thing understood in act in first act.

Concerning the solution to the first there is a doubt: whether the knowledge of God is propter quid? The negative part is proved. Propter quid knowledge is that by which an effect is known through its proper and adequate cause; but God does not know creatures through proper and adequate causes, but through a most universal and inadequate cause, namely through his Essence: therefore the knowledge of creatures in God is not propter quid knowledge. In this doubt Durandus, in the distinction cited, q. 4, says two things. The first is that the knowledge of God which he has of himself is not propter quid, since he does not know himself through any cause. The second is that the knowledge which God has of creatures can in some way be called propter quid knowledge, yet not simply. It is proved: since God knows creatures through a universal and equivocal cause of them, namely through his Essence, but not through adequate and proper causes: therefore in some way his knowledge is propter quid, and not simply.

Let the first conclusion be: the knowledge which God has of himself can not improperly be called propter quid. It is proved: for although among the divine attributes one is not the cause of another, yet one is the ground of another: e.g. the immutability of God is not the cause of eternity, since they are one most simple perfection of God, yet it is its ground, so that God is eternal because he is immutable. And if, per impossibile, immutability and eternity were really distinguished, immutability would be the cause of eternity: therefore the knowledge of God, insofar as it knows one attribute to be the ground of another, can be called propter quid. The consequence is proved: since it is knowledge of a thing through its ground.

The second conclusion: the knowledge which God has of creatures is propter quid. It is proved: for God knows, on the part of the thing known, one creature through another as through a cause, e.g. he knows that man is capable of laughter because he is discursive: therefore such knowledge is propter quid knowledge. I said on the part of the thing known deliberately, for on the part of the knower God does not know one creature through another, so as to have one knowledge of the cause and another knowledge of the effect, but by one most simple knowledge he knows in his essence all creatures: yet for the account of propter quid knowledge it suffices that there come to be, on the part of the thing known, an apt knowledge of causes and effects. To the argument, therefore, it is easily answered that God knows creatures not only through a universal and inadequate cause, but also through proper and adequate causes on the part of the thing known, as we have explained concerning the second statement.

Concerning the solution to the third there is a doubt whether the knowledge of God is to be called universal or particular? Durandus, in the place above, q. 4, holds the affirmative part. And he proves: God knows the natures of things according to their universal and common accounts: therefore his knowledge is universal. Moreover, he knows all the singular accounts which are found in creatures: therefore his knowledge is singular.

To this doubt I say first that the knowledge of God simply and properly is neither universal nor particular, but eminently each. This is the sentence of St. Thomas in this solution to the third, and it is proved: the primary object of the knowledge of God, namely the divine Essence, is neither universal nor particular, but eminently each: therefore the knowledge also is eminently each. The antecedent is manifest. The consequence is proved: for the proper account of knowledge is to be weighed from its primary object. Secondly I say, if we attend to the secondary object of the divine knowledge, namely to creatures, the knowledge of God is properly neither universal nor particular. It is proved: for universal knowledge, properly speaking, is that which considers the universal account of its object without descending to its particular accounts. Likewise, particular knowledge properly is that which considers particular accounts, and not universal and common ones, but the knowledge of God considers all things, both universal and particular, concerning creatures: therefore. Thirdly I say: secundum quid the knowledge of God, in relation to its secondary object, can be called both universal and particular, according to the reasoning given by Durandus.