Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. The argument is in the Summa. For God is supremely immaterial: and immateriality is the ground of knowing.

COMMENTARY.

ON the matter of this question there is dispute among the scholastics in the First Book, dist. 35. It must be noted first in this article that its conclusion is certain according to faith, and is found everywhere in the Sacred Scriptures. Let the two testimonies cited by St. Thomas suffice for us: one in the argument On the contrary, and the other in the solution to the second. All serious philosophers taught this sentence, enlightened by the light of reason, especially Aristotle in book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 36 and following; and in book 10 of the Ethics, ch. 8. And indeed this name God is derived from the Greek verb Theaste, which has the same force as to consider and to know, as Damascene observes in book 2 On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 11. From which it is gathered that it was a common conception of mind among all peoples that God is of a cognitive nature. See the arguments for this conclusion in St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 44. The weightiest argument is the one found in this article, which St. Thomas took from Aristotle in book 2 On the Soul, texts 27 and 124. In which argument two notable propositions are contained: the one is: immateriality is the ground of knowability. And it is to be understood in this sense, that immateriality is the ground for some thing to be intelligible, and also intellective. Thus every immaterial nature, by the sole fact that it is immaterial, has both: both that it be passively intelligible, and that it be intellective. The other proposition is that the knower differs from the non-knower chiefly in this, that a non-knowing thing is confined and limited to its own form, and cannot receive into itself the form of another thing: but the knower is by nature apt to have in itself the form of another thing. The first proposition is attacked by Gabriel in the distinction cited, q. 1, and by Aureolus in the same distinction, in Capreolus, q. un.; and it is argued against it as follows. From it follows that intellectual accidents are actively intellective; the consequent is utterly false: therefore. The consequence is plain: since they are immaterial.

Secondly. Matter is not an impediment to knowledge: therefore immateriality is not the ground of knowability. The antecedent is proved: the rational soul, while it exists in the body, understands more perfectly; or at least equally perfectly as when it is separated from the body: therefore matter does not impede knowledge.

Thirdly. God could make some immaterial creature which would not be cognitive; and likewise he could make a material creature which would be cognitive: therefore immateriality is not the adequate ground of knowability. It is answered, however, that that first proposition of St. Thomas is taken from Aristotle in book 2 On the Soul, in the place cited above; and it is received by all philosophers and theologians. Nor can any other ground of knowability be assigned besides immateriality.

Hence to the first argument it is answered that that reasoning holds in substantial natures only, as regards active knowability. For since to know is a perfect operation, it can belong only to a subsistent.

To the second, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, first I say it is false that the rational soul understands equally perfectly in this state as in the state of separation from the body. About which matter there is dispute below, q. 89. Secondly I say that the soul in this state does not depend on the body in the operation of the intellect as on an effective instrument of intellection, but depends on the body only as on an object. Hence the body is not an impediment to it, speaking per se, for having the operation of the intellect.

To the third it is answered that, at present, St. Thomas is speaking not in relation to the absolute power of God, but attending to the natures of things. Secondly I say each is impossible according to every power: both that some material creature be cognitive, and that an immaterial creature not be, from its own nature, cognitive. Concerning the second proposition it must be noted first that St. Thomas does not say it is necessary for knowledge that the knower receive into itself the form of the thing known; for certainly this would be false. For God, who is supremely cognitive, receives no form into himself. But St. Thomas deliberately said it is necessary that the knower have in itself the form of the thing known. And this proposition, explained in this sense, is founded on that sentence of Aristotle, 5 On the Soul, that the intellect in act is the understood in act, that is, the thing understood. Thus, according to Aristotle, knowledge consists in this, that the intellect in act be formally the very thing understood in intelligible to-be: if indeed the intellect be in first act, it suffices that it be the thing understood also in first act, that is, according to the intelligible likeness. But if it be in second act, it is required that it be the thing understood in ultimate act, consummated through the express likeness of the thing known, which we call the word or concept. But it must be observed that the knower can have in itself the form of the thing known in three ways. First, through the formal identity of the knower with the form of the thing known in intelligible to-be. And in this way God has in himself the form of all knowable things. For the divine intellect formally is the same as the divine Essence in intelligible to-be, that is, insofar as the essence is the express likeness of all knowable things. In the second way the knower can have the form of the thing known from the fact that it is actuated by it, not indeed through inherence or true information, but insofar as by it, taken in intelligible to-be, it is determined and constituted in act for intellection, and the form itself is the specifying principle of intellection. In this way the divine Essence is in the intellect of one seeing God. And likewise the essence of an angel, taken in intelligible to-be, actuates the intellect of the angel itself for the knowledge which the angel has of itself. About which matter there will be fuller dispute below, q. 55, art. 1.

Thirdly, finally, the form of the thing known can be in the knower through true information and inherence, in the way things known by us are in our intellect through intelligible likenesses. In the first and second way the knower in act is the known in act through the identity of the thing known. But in the third way it is the known in act through its formal likeness, which is its intentional likeness. But it must be observed, from St. Thomas in Quodlib. 8, art. 4, and q. 2 On Truth, art. 2, that the likeness of the thing known is the same form as the one which the thing known has outside the intellect, although it has another to-be. For the form outside the intellect has natural to-be, but within the intellect it has intentional to-be. Thus the likeness of a stone is the same form as the natural form which the stone has, differing from it only in the mode of being. From which it follows that just as one having the form of a stone in natural to-be is a natural stone, so the intellect having the likeness of a stone is a stone in intentional to-be.

Secondly, it must be noted concerning the same proposition that some form can be received in an extraneous subject in two ways: first according to natural to-be, as heat is received in water; and this mode of reception does not serve for knowledge, for a sensible object placed upon the sense does not cause sensation, as is found in book 2 On the Soul. Secondly it can be received according to intentional to-be, that is, according to representative to-be, in the way a likeness is received in a cognitive power; and this mode of reception serves for knowledge.

It must be noted, thirdly, that a subject can receive intentional forms in two ways: in one way per se, and on account of the proper operation of the recipient, as sight receives visible likenesses on account of vision, which is the proper operation of sight; in the other way per accidens and on account of another, that is, on account of the operation of another subject: and in this way the transparent medium receives visible likenesses as a medium carrying them to the visual power.

The first mode of reception manifestly shows that the recipient is of a cognitive nature.

The second mode of reception, however, does not show that the recipient has a cognitive nature.

Fourthly, it must be noted that between the reception of a form which is received according to natural to-be and the reception of an intentional form in a cognitive power there is chiefly this difference, that from the former reception there results a certain third composite, distinct from recipient and received, e.g. in the substantial composition from matter and form there results a substantial composite which really differs from each component part. Likewise in the accidental composition of whiteness with a body there results a white thing, which really differs from the body and the whiteness. But in the intentional composition which comes to be from a cognitive power and a likeness, no third thing results, but the power becomes the very thing known. Thus one component becomes the other: e.g. from intellect and the likeness of a stone results that the intellect be a stone in intentional to-be; and for this reason Averroes, in book 3 On the Soul, text 5, and book 12 of the Metaphysics, text 59, says that from intellect and the intelligible likeness comes to be more one thing than from matter and substantial form. Since matter does not become the form itself, but the intellect becomes the very thing understood in intentional to-be.

But someone will argue: the intellect does not become the intentional likeness: therefore one component does not become the other, but some third thing results from intellect and likeness.

It is answered to this that the intellect does not become the likeness itself, but becomes the thing understood in intentional to-be. And since the likeness, as I have said, is the same form as the form of the thing understood, hence it is that from that composition properly no third thing results, but one component simply becomes the other.

But it is proved a posteriori that from intellect and likeness no third thing results: for otherwise it would follow that knowledge, speaking formally, would not be the act of the intellect, but of that third thing resulting from intellect and likeness; the consequent is utterly false: therefore.

The consequence is proved: knowledge proceeds from the intellect insofar as it is in act through the likeness: therefore if the intellect, insofar as it is in act, is some third thing resulting from intellect and likeness, knowledge, speaking formally, does not proceed from the intellect, but from that third thing.

Therefore, that we may save these two things, namely both that knowledge proceed formally from the intellect and that the intellect know insofar as it is in act through the likeness, we must necessarily say that from likeness and intellect no third thing results, but there results that the intellect become the very thing known in act, in intelligible to-be. Thus the proximate principle of knowledge is the intellect insofar as it is the thing understood in act in first act.

Concerning the solution to the first there is a doubt: whether the knowledge of God is propter quid? The negative part is proved. Propter quid knowledge is that by which an effect is known through its proper and adequate cause; but God does not know creatures through proper and adequate causes, but through a most universal and inadequate cause, namely through his Essence: therefore the knowledge of creatures in God is not propter quid knowledge. In this doubt Durandus, in the distinction cited, q. 4, says two things. The first is that the knowledge of God which he has of himself is not propter quid, since he does not know himself through any cause. The second is that the knowledge which God has of creatures can in some way be called propter quid knowledge, yet not simply. It is proved: since God knows creatures through a universal and equivocal cause of them, namely through his Essence, but not through adequate and proper causes: therefore in some way his knowledge is propter quid, and not simply.

Let the first conclusion be: the knowledge which God has of himself can not improperly be called propter quid. It is proved: for although among the divine attributes one is not the cause of another, yet one is the ground of another: e.g. the immutability of God is not the cause of eternity, since they are one most simple perfection of God, yet it is its ground, so that God is eternal because he is immutable. And if, per impossibile, immutability and eternity were really distinguished, immutability would be the cause of eternity: therefore the knowledge of God, insofar as it knows one attribute to be the ground of another, can be called propter quid. The consequence is proved: since it is knowledge of a thing through its ground.

The second conclusion: the knowledge which God has of creatures is propter quid. It is proved: for God knows, on the part of the thing known, one creature through another as through a cause, e.g. he knows that man is capable of laughter because he is discursive: therefore such knowledge is propter quid knowledge. I said on the part of the thing known deliberately, for on the part of the knower God does not know one creature through another, so as to have one knowledge of the cause and another knowledge of the effect, but by one most simple knowledge he knows in his essence all creatures: yet for the account of propter quid knowledge it suffices that there come to be, on the part of the thing known, an apt knowledge of causes and effects. To the argument, therefore, it is easily answered that God knows creatures not only through a universal and inadequate cause, but also through proper and adequate causes on the part of the thing known, as we have explained concerning the second statement.

Concerning the solution to the third there is a doubt whether the knowledge of God is to be called universal or particular? Durandus, in the place above, q. 4, holds the affirmative part. And he proves: God knows the natures of things according to their universal and common accounts: therefore his knowledge is universal. Moreover, he knows all the singular accounts which are found in creatures: therefore his knowledge is singular.

To this doubt I say first that the knowledge of God simply and properly is neither universal nor particular, but eminently each. This is the sentence of St. Thomas in this solution to the third, and it is proved: the primary object of the knowledge of God, namely the divine Essence, is neither universal nor particular, but eminently each: therefore the knowledge also is eminently each. The antecedent is manifest. The consequence is proved: for the proper account of knowledge is to be weighed from its primary object. Secondly I say, if we attend to the secondary object of the divine knowledge, namely to creatures, the knowledge of God is properly neither universal nor particular. It is proved: for universal knowledge, properly speaking, is that which considers the universal account of its object without descending to its particular accounts. Likewise, particular knowledge properly is that which considers particular accounts, and not universal and common ones, but the knowledge of God considers all things, both universal and particular, concerning creatures: therefore. Thirdly I say: secundum quid the knowledge of God, in relation to its secondary object, can be called both universal and particular, according to the reasoning given by Durandus.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: God knows himself through himself. The ground is: since God is pure act, intellect and the understood must be the same in him.

COMMENTARY.

In this article, what we said in the preceding article, in the first notable point, concerning the second proposition, must be recalled. Next there is a brief doubt concerning that proof of the text by which St. Thomas proves that God is pure act in intelligible to-be, which is of this sort. The divine intellect never lacks an intelligible likeness, and the intelligible likeness is the very divine substance of the intellect; therefore the divine intellect is pure act. Against this ground it is argued: the intellect of the angel, with respect to knowledge of the angel himself, never lacks an intelligible likeness; for the angel knows himself through his own essence, and the intelligible likeness is the same as the substance of the angel's intellect, for as I have said, it is the very essence of the angel, and yet the intellect of the angel with respect to knowledge of himself is not pure act; therefore that ground of St. Thomas is invalid. Cajetan, on this article, answers that St. Thomas in that ground is not speaking of the likeness which is the principle of knowledge, but of the likeness which is the expressed likeness, and is the formal term of knowledge, which we call verbum. On this supposition, he says that in the angel such a likeness, even in knowledge of himself, is really distinct from the substance of the angelic intellect; since the angel in knowledge of himself forms a verbum, which is the formal term of that knowledge, and really differs from the intellect. This solution of Cajetan, however, does not seem to be to the mind of St. Thomas, and besides it supposes one very doubtful point. For it is disputed in the opinion of the Thomists whether the angel in knowledge of himself forms a verbum or not? Wherefore it is answered otherwise, that St. Thomas is speaking of the intelligible likeness which is the principle of knowledge. And to the argument it is denied that the essence of the angel, which is the likeness in that knowledge, is really formally the same as the intellect of the angel. Concerning this matter see below, q. 54, art. 3, where St. Thomas teaches that the intellect of the angel is really distinguished from the essence of the angel. But in God the divine Essence, which is the intelligible likeness, is formally one with the divine intellect, even in intelligible to-be.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. The account is: because God knows himself as perfectly as he is perfectly knowable. For the power of God in knowing is as great as his actuality is in existing.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: because, otherwise, something else would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, in respect of which the substance itself would stand as potency to act.

COMMENTARY.

In this article it must be noted first, that the formal account of the intelligible likeness does not consist in this, that the likeness be substance or accident, for either belongs to it as it were on the side of its material element; but in this, that it be a representative form constituting the intellect in act for knowing, and in this sense St. Thomas was speaking of the likeness in art. 1 of this question, that the likeness of the stone is the same form as the real form of the stone, and that the likeness constitutes the intellect one with the thing understood. From this it follows that the ultimate complement and ultimate actuality of the likeness is not to-be, but to understand, and this is what St. Thomas says in this art., that just as to-be follows upon form, so to understand follows upon the likeness. By these words he does not intend to teach that to understand proceeds from the likeness in the same way as to-be proceeds from form (in explaining which matter Cajetan perhaps labours here without cause; for this business is not of the present article). But St. Thomas intends only this, that just as to-be is the ultimate complement of the essence which the substantial form formally constitutes, so to understand is the ultimate complement of the intellect constituted in act through the intelligible likeness. Second, it must be noted that the Divine Essence, on account of its infinity, both is a form belonging to the genus of being and to the genus of the intelligible. Thus it formally gives entitative to-be and intelligible to-be. And just as, if it is considered in the genus of being, in that it is pure act, it is its own to-be: so, if it is considered in the intelligible genus, it is its own understanding. And just as the Divine Essence, insofar as it is an entitative form, formally includes itself insofar as it is an intelligible form, so the entitative to-be of the Divine Essence formally includes understanding. Thus the to-be which is the ultimate complement of form in the genus of being is formally to understand in God, which is the ultimate complement of the intelligible form, in that the intelligible form in God and the entitative form formally are one thing. This teaching must be noted for the following article, and see Ferrara, book 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 50, on the second argument.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The First conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: because, since God knows himself perfectly, it is necessary that he know his power perfectly: therefore he knows the things to which the divine power extends.

The Second conclusion: God knows creatures not in themselves, but in God himself. The reason for this is: because God sees himself in himself through his own essence, in which are contained the likenesses of the other things from himself.

COMMENTARY.

In this article note that the first conclusion is certain according to faith. It is proved first from the testimony adduced in the argument On the contrary and Rom. 4: «He calls the things that are not as those that are»; Gen. 1: «God saw all the things that he had made, etc.»; Jer. 23: «Shall a man be hidden, and I not see him?» The reasons for this conclusion are to be drawn from the Providence of God which he has over creatures, from the Government of them, and from Creation. For knowledge of creatures in God is necessary for all these things. See St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, chs. 29 and 50. Concerning the second conclusion we shall speak in the following article.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: God knows all creatures, with proper knowledge. And the reason is: because whatever of perfection is in any creature whatever, the whole pre-exists and is contained in God, according to a most excellent mode.

COMMENTARY.

In this article it is to be noted first, that the sense of the conclusion is not this, namely, that God knows creatures through distinct knowledges, so that he would know each creature by a distinct knowledge adequate to the creature itself. For this sense would be most false: since God by one most simple knowledge understands himself and all possible creatures. But the sense of the conclusion is that that one knowledge of God attains all the essential and accidental predicates which belong to creatures. And so it is a distinct knowledge of creatures, not on the part of the knower, but on the part of the known object. Second, it is to be noted that that opinion reported by St. Thomas at the beginning of the article, which asserts that God does not know creatures distinctly, was the opinion of Averroes, 12 Metaphysics, tex. 51; and some theologians, among whom is Gregory of Rimini in d. 35, fasten that opinion upon Aristotle, because he said, 12 Metaphysics, tex. 51, that the divine intellect would be most vile if it knew the minutest things which are in this world. But this opinion is falsely attributed to Aristotle, for he himself, 3 On the Soul, tex. 80, and 3 Metaphysics, tex. 15, reckons it a great absurdity against Empedocles that God would not know the elements and the things composed of elements. For he says that God would be the most foolish of all if he were ignorant of those things which men perceive by sight. And in that passage cited from 12 Metaphysics Aristotle only means to say that God does not go outside himself to know the things which are in this universe; for if he knew in that way, his intellect would be debased, since it would receive likenesses from these inferior things, but he knows all things in himself through his own Essence. So does St. Thomas interpret Aristotle in that passage. But whatever may be the case concerning the opinion of Aristotle, the conclusion of this article is to be held according to faith, which is gathered from the testimonies cited in the preceding article. And it is chiefly confirmed from that passage, Heb. 4: For the word of God is living and efficacious etc., which is cited in the argument On the contrary. Likewise Ecclus. 23: «Brighter are his eyes than the sun etc.»; and Ps. 7: «God, searching hearts and reins», that is, all things, even the least thoughts. The truth of this conclusion is reduced by St. Thomas to the article of faith of Creation, in 2-2, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2. See the reasons for this conclusion, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 47, 48, 49, and 50.

There is a doubt concerning the truth of the conclusion. It is proved false: God knows creatures not in themselves, but in God himself; therefore he does not know them distinctly. The antecedent is the second conclusion of the preceding article. The consequence is proved: creatures in God are not distinct according to their proper accounts; but they are in God one most simple essence: therefore if they are known as they are in God, they are not known distinctly. Someone will say to this argument that God does not for that reason know creatures in themselves, because he does not know through adequate likenesses of them, but through an inadequate and most universal likeness, such as the Divine Essence is, which immediately represents itself, but creatures mediately. But since the Divine Essence most exactly and most perfectly represents creatures, although mediately, God knows the creatures themselves most distinctly. Against this solution I argue thus: it follows that the angel, especially the highest, does not know creatures in themselves; the consequent is admitted by no theologian: therefore. The consequence is proved: the highest angel knows things through an inadequate and universal likeness; and so he knows man and horse through one likeness, which inadequately represents each, as will be explained below in the treatise on the angels: therefore. And it is confirmed: just as the Divine Essence does not immediately represent creatures, but itself, so the likeness of the highest angel does not immediately represent man and horse and the other specific natures, but the nature of animal in common; therefore, according to the assigned solution, the angel does not know through that likeness man and horse in themselves, but in another, namely, in the common nature of animal. But the consequent is most absurd. And it is confirmed secondly. The first is the opinion of Scotus, in 1, d. 35 and 36, where he says that God knows creatures both in himself and in the creatures themselves. Cajetan here expounds the opinion of Scotus, with an example adduced. Just as, he says, if someone saw Peter in himself, and at the same time beheld Peter in a mirror which was placed beside him; so likewise God beholds creatures in themselves and in his Essence as in a mirror. I do not, however, find in Scotus that God knows creatures in his Essence, but only in themselves. Scotus expounds his opinion in this way: for he imagines two instants of origin in the divine knowledge. In the first God knows his essence without order to creatures. And this knowledge, he says, is not altogether perfect, because it does not extend to creatures. In the second instant God produces creatures from eternity in a certain intelligible to-be, which to-be is neither purely real being, nor purely a being of reason, but a mean between each; but creatures so produced God knows in the same second instant, and thus he knows them in themselves. This opinion of Scotus is chimerical, and little in agreement with faith. And first, that it does not agree with faith is proved: for from it it would follow that creatures were created from eternity; the consequent is heretical: therefore. The consequence is proved: the creatures produced by God in intelligible being, imagined by Scotus, have participated to-be from eternity: therefore they have to-be created by God. The consequence is proved: for everything which is participated being outside God is created by God himself. And it is confirmed: the creatures in that intelligible to-be are in themselves; but they are not the Creator, therefore they are creatures. And it is confirmed, moreover: for in the Council of Sens was condemned the error of Peter Abelard, asserting that there is something outside God which was neither Creator nor creature. In which error the opinion of Scotus seems to lie. Furthermore, it is argued secondly. It is a most absurd saying that the divine Science is perfected from the knowledge of creatures in themselves; but this absurdity is openly granted by the opinion of Scotus, therefore. Likewise it is confirmed: the knowledge which God has in the first instant of origin, imagined by Scotus, is comprehensive knowledge of the Divine Essence: therefore through that knowledge God knows every possible creature in the Divine Essence itself; and consequently it is a mere fiction to imagine a second instant in which creatures are known in themselves. The consequence is evident: because comprehensive knowledge of the Divine Essence extends to every possible effect of the divine Power, as is established from what was said above, q. 12, art. 8. The antecedent is now proved: because the knowledge which God has in the second instant is not knowledge of the Divine Essence, but of creatures in themselves: therefore if the knowledge which God has in the first instant is not comprehensive of the Divine Essence, God has no comprehensive knowledge of his Essence, which is absurd to say.

There is a second opinion, of Aureolus, in Capreolus, in the cited distinction, concerning the second conclusion, who asserts two things. The one is that God does not know creatures in themselves, but in his essence. The other is that God does not know, even mediately, creatures according to the to-be which they have in themselves, but only according to the to-be which they have in the Divine Essence. And so, in the opinion of Aureolus, the creature is neither the immediate and primary object of the divine knowledge, nor even the mediate and secondary; but the divine knowledge has only one object, namely the Divine Essence. The weightiest arguments of Aureolus for this second dictum are found in St. Thomas, art. 5 of this question: but the lesser ones Capreolus dissolves.

There is a third opinion, of St. Thomas, in these two articles 5 and 6, and it consists in two propositions.

The first is: God knows creatures according to the to-be which they have in themselves, not immediately, but through the mediation of the knowledge of his essence. And so creatures have the character of a secondary and mediate object. That conclusion is first explained. For it is understood that creatures are known according as they are in themselves, not on the part of the knower. For in this way God knows all creatures according to the mode of being which they have in God himself. But they are known according as they are in themselves, on the part of the known thing, that is, they are known as to all, both substantial and accidental, things which are found in the creatures themselves. This supposed, the conclusion is proved.

First. God knows comprehensively his Essence and Power: therefore he knows comprehensively, most perfectly and most distinctly, all possible effects of the divine Power, as to all their accounts. All these things are manifest. Second it is proved: if God knows creatures according to the mode which they have in God on the part of the object, and not according to the mode which they have in themselves, as Aureolus opines, it follows that God knows no creature, speaking simply; the consequent is heretical and opposed to faith, according to which it must be confessed that God knows all creatures, however minute: therefore. The consequence is proved: creatures according to the mode which they have in God are God himself, according to that passage, John 1: What was made, in him was life: therefore. From these things it follows that the opinion of Aureolus, unless it be explained in a very pious way, is against faith. But in this place it is to be noted that Gabriel errs basely when he asserts, in the cited distinction, q. 5, that it could not be shown by natural reason that God knows creatures according to the to-be which they have in themselves on the part of the object, as he explains: nay, innumerable are the demonstrations which openly show this thing, taken from the Providence which God has over creatures, from the Creation and Government of them. See St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, where above.

Second conclusion: God does not know creatures immediately and in themselves, but in his own Essence. This conclusion is proved. God knows creatures through the Divine Essence, as through an intelligible likeness, and not otherwise: therefore he knows them mediately and not in themselves, but in the Divine Essence. The antecedent is most certain, and is asserted by St. Augustine, in the book 83 Questions, q. 46, where he says that it is sacrilege to assert that God goes outside himself to know anything. The consequence is proved. The divine Essence, as a likeness, does not immediately represent creatures, but itself: therefore through that divine likeness God does not know creatures immediately, but mediately in the Divine Essence itself. But someone will say: we do not know God immediately through the likenesses of creatures, although those likenesses do not immediately represent God, but creatures: therefore, although the Divine Essence, as a likeness, immediately represents God and not creatures, it is not thence gathered that God does not know creatures immediately. To this argument, the consequence is denied. The ground of the difference is twofold. First: because the divine intellect cannot turn away thought from the object immediately represented through its essence as a likeness. Whence the divine knowledge of necessity must be borne to the Divine Essence, as to its immediate object; but to creatures, as to a mediate object. But our intellect can turn away thought from the creature, which is the immediate object of the created likeness, and transfer it to God, who is the mediate and secondary object of the created likeness. Whence its knowledge can be borne immediately to God. The second difference is that the Divine Essence, which is the primary object of the divine likeness, is according to itself the most exact exemplar of creatures. Whence the same knowledge which is immediately terminated at the Essence of God is terminated secondarily at creatures: but in creatures God is not immediately represented, but we know him from creatures through a certain removal and in the manner of a certain eminence. Wherefore we do not know God himself by the same knowledge by which we know creatures; but one is the knowledge which is immediately terminated at creatures, and another which is immediately terminated at God. From this it follows that the Divine Essence is not only the ground of knowing creatures to the divine intellect, in the manner of an intelligible likeness, but also in the manner of an idea, that is, in the manner of an understood form. Second, the conclusion is proved. If the creature is the immediate object of the divine knowledge, it follows that the divine knowledge takes its perfection and specific character from the creature; the consequent is most absurd: therefore. The consequence is proved: for knowledge takes its perfection and specific character from its immediate object. Lastly it is proved. Creatures, as we said above, q. 12, art. 8, are not represented in the Divine Essence as in a mirror in the manner of distinction; but they are represented as in an efficient and exemplary cause, in the manner of simplicity: therefore they cannot be known immediately through the Divine Essence, but of necessity must be known in the Divine Essence itself, as in their immediate object.

To the arguments it must be answered. And the first has now been dissolved most well in the course of arguing. And that solution coincides with the solution to the first of this sixth article. To the rejoinder with its confirmation, with other things passed over, it is answered that the account immediately represented through the likenesses of the angels is in reality not distinguished from the singular things mediately represented through that likeness: e.g. the common account of animal, which is immediately represented through the likeness of the higher angel, is not in reality distinguished from man and horse. Wherefore the angel through that likeness knows man and horse immediately, and in themselves. But the account immediately represented through the divine likeness is really distinguished from creatures, which are the mediate objects. Whence the knowledge of God, since it is terminated immediately at that account, which is the immediate object of the divine likeness, cannot be borne to creatures in themselves.

The Conclusion of the article is negative.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST conclusion is affirmative. The ground is that God's knowledge stands to all things as the knowledge of the craftsman stands to crafted things.

The second conclusion: God's knowledge is the cause of things, yet with the will of God himself joined to it. The ground is: for the intelligible form stands to opposites, since the knowledge of opposites is one and the same: therefore God's knowledge would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing through the will.

The third conclusion: This divine knowledge, which is the cause of things, is customarily called by theologians the knowledge of approbation.

COMMENTARY.

IN this article it is to be noted that the first and second conclusions are certain according to faith. It is proved from that text of Ps. 103: «Thou hast made all things in wisdom.» And indeed it is most common in Sacred Scripture that God created all things, that he disposes and governs them in his wisdom. Moreover, at Eph. 1 it is said that God made all things according to the counsel of his will. Behold where St. Paul joins both together in the account of the cause of creatures: both the counsel, which belongs to the intellect, and the good pleasure of the will.

There is a doubt concerning the second conclusion: whether knowledge is a nearer principle in the production of creatures than the will of God? To this it is answered affirmatively, according to the mode of our cognition. For the will itself and God's knowledge are in no way distinguished. This conclusion is first proved. God's knowledge has the account of art with respect to producing creatures; but in a crafted effect the nearer principle is not the will of the craftsman but art itself: therefore. And it is confirmed: God produces creatures immediately through command, as is gathered from that text of Gen. 1: «Let there be light, and light was made». But command is the work of practical knowledge: therefore. But someone argues: the nearer principle of the produced effect is the power that executes the command, and not the command itself; but the executive power in God is not the intellect but the will: therefore the will is the nearer principle of creatures. The major is clear; the minor is proved. The intellect, as intellect, is not a motive or executive power, but only directive; but the will by its own account is a motive power: therefore. To this it is answered that, as is said in 2-2, q. 27, the command of practical reason has motive force insofar as it shares in the determination of the will. And so that very command moves efficaciously and immediately to use: so in the present case I say that, although the divine will is formally the executive and as it were motive power, nevertheless the execution and motion itself takes place immediately through the divine command, insofar as God's practical knowledge is determined through the will to such a command. And so the command moves and executes itself in virtue of the divine will. In this sense St. Thomas is to be understood below in q. 25, art. 1, ad 4; see Ferrara, book 2 Against the Gentiles, chap. 1. From this it follows that God's knowledge, simply speaking, concurs toward the effect both more nearly and more principally than the divine will. And that it concurs more nearly is established from what has been said. But that it concurs more principally is proved: for the art of the craftsman concurs more principally toward the crafted effect than his will. For the form and account of the produced effect does not correspond, formally speaking, to the will of the craftsman but to his art; but God's knowledge, as we have said, has the account of art with respect to the effects produced: therefore.

CONCERNING the argument of this article, it is first to be noted that the whole of it consists in this: the divine understanding is the divine to-be; therefore God works all things through his intellect. Secondly it is to be noted that this argument presupposes two things. The first is that God works immediately through his essence and through his to-be. In this he differs very greatly from the creature, which works immediately not through its essence but through an accidental power. The second is that the operation which takes place in the mode of intellect is more excellent than all other operations. With these presuppositions, the whole argument of St. Thomas is reduced to this: that God works through his essence insofar as it is the divine intellect and the divine intelligible.

CONCERNING this proposition, which St. Thomas often repeats in this question and elsewhere, namely that the divine understanding is the divine to-be, the things we said in art. 4 of this question are presupposed. It is to be noted that the divine understanding can be compared to the essence of God, which embraces the whole to-be, both entitative and intelligible; and it can be compared precisely to the divine entitative to-be: if it is compared to the whole essence of God, this proposition is most formal, and formal in our mode of understanding, beyond these propositions, Justice in God is the divine to-be, Mercy is the divine to-be, and the like. The ground is: for justice and mercy and the other attributes of God belong to the divine essence as certain particular quidditative predicates. But understanding imports a certain account of being, namely the whole genus of intelligible being, which account belongs immediately to the divine essence. For the divine essence, since it is most formally the whole of being, is as it were immediately integrated from this twofold account of being, namely the entitative and the intelligible. But if understanding is compared to the entitative to-be, this predication, the divine understanding is the divine to-be, is in our mode of understanding not as formal and quidditative as this one, God's justice is the divine to-be. The ground is: for justice and the other attributes are as it were certain essential parts of the divine entitative to-be. But understanding stands as it were as a property of the divine entitative to-be; for as immutability in God is the ground of eternity, and thus, in our mode of understanding, eternity is compared to immutability as its property, so the divine entitative to-be is in God the ground of the divine intelligible to-be; and thus, in our mode of understanding, the whole genus of intelligible being in God is as it were a property of the genus of entitative being. The proposition of St. Thomas, therefore, is to be taken in the first sense.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST conclusion is affirmative, and is of faith, as is clear in the argument On the contrary. The ground is: for those things which are not in act are in the potency of God himself or of the creature: therefore God, perfectly knowing himself, has knowledge also of those things which are not.

The second conclusion: Those things which are, or were, or at some time will be, are known by God through the knowledge of vision. The ground is: for the understanding of God is measured by eternity; therefore it is borne toward all things which are in any time whatever, as toward things presently subject to itself.

The third conclusion: those things which never have had, nor will have, to-be, are known through the knowledge of simple understanding. The ground of this is: for although the understanding of God is measured by eternity, yet those things which are only in the potency of God or of the creature do not have to-be in themselves, whose measure eternity could in any way be.

COMMENTARY.

IN this article it is first to be noted, concerning the first conclusion, that God knows chimerical and fictitious things, since they have to-be in our imaginative potency. Concerning the second conclusion there is a doubt: for from it it follows that the knowledge of vision of God could be increased; the consequent is false, therefore. The consequence is proved: God could from eternity have willed to produce many other things, which he is never going to produce: therefore the knowledge of vision could have known many other things, which it now does not know, and consequently the knowledge of vision could have been increased. It is answered with St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 2, art. 13, ad 5, that the knowledge of vision in the divided sense could have known some things, which it now does not know, as the argument proves. But in the composite sense, that is, supposing that God willed to produce these creatures, and not others, the knowledge of vision cannot know others, besides these which it now knows. For otherwise there would be change in God. And since these propositions, The knowledge of vision can be increased, God can know more things through the knowledge of vision make a composite sense, they are to be denied absolutely. That they make a composite sense is clear; for to be increased designates motion from a preexistent diminution to increase. Likewise to know more things presupposes fewer things known.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative, and certain according to faith, as is clear from the testimony adduced in the argument On the contrary, and from that of Ps. 50, "And I have done evil before thee," and from that of the Psalm, "My offences are not hidden from thee." And the reason is: for God knows good things perfectly; therefore he knows the evils that can befall certain good things.

COMMENTARY.

In this article there is a doubt: whether God knows evil through his Divine Essence immediately, or rather through the good to which evil is opposed? Durandus disputes this question in 1, d. 36, q. 1. It is answered briefly that, if speech is of the primary object of the divine knowledge, God knows all things, both good and evil, immediately through his Essence, that is, he knows all things in the Divine Essence as in the formal and immediate object of his knowledge. If, however, speech is of the secondary and mediate object, God knows evil through the particular good to which it is opposed. I mean that the divine knowledge is not terminated at evil unless first, on the side of the object, it is terminated at the good to which the evil is opposed. I said on the side of the object, for on the side of the knower all things are known at once. About the prior part of this assertion there can be no doubt, as is openly clear from what was said above in this question. The latter part, however, is received by all; Durandus nevertheless teaches it where cited above; and it is gathered most openly from this article, especially from the solutions of the third and fourth arguments. And it is proved: evil is not immediately opposed to the Divine Essence, since it is the infinite good, but to a particular good: e.g., blindness is immediately opposed to sight; but every evil is known through the good to which it is immediately opposed: therefore. And it is confirmed: sight is placed in the definition of blindness; but each thing is known through its definition: therefore blindness is immediately known through sight.

There is another doubt: Whether God knows evils through the knowledge of vision? The negative part is proved: evil, speaking formally, is not something existing, but is the privation of good; but only existing things belong to the knowledge of vision: therefore. To this doubt it is answered briefly. The evils that are or were or will be, whether they are evils of punishment or of fault, are known by God through the knowledge of vision. It is proved first concerning evils of fault. God punishes all evils of fault; therefore evils of this kind are present in the eternity of the divine knowledge, and consequently belong to the knowledge of vision, since those things are reckoned to belong to that knowledge which are set before God as present. Then it is proved concerning evils of punishment. All evils of this kind are from God in some way: therefore they are seen by God. The conclusion is further proved: The good to which evil is opposed belongs to the knowledge of vision: therefore so does the evil itself. The consequence is clear: for, as we have just said, evil is known through the good to which it is opposed. To the argument to the opposite it is answered first that evil, at least materially, is something existing, although formally it is a pure privation. Second, it is answered that it is enough for evil to belong to the knowledge of vision that it be opposed to a good belonging to the knowledge of vision.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative: and it is of faith, as is clear from what was said in art. 5 and 6. And the reason is: for to know singular things belongs to our perfection; therefore it is necessary that God know singular things.

COMMENTARY.

Against this conclusion there seems to be a certain testimony of St. Jerome on those words of Hab. 1: "Thy eyes are pure, O Lord, etc.", where he says that those who say that God knows the smallest things of the Universe, e.g. gnats and the like, and has care of them, are flatterers of the divine Providence and do injury to the reason of nature. Aristotle seems to have said something similar, 12 Metaphys., text 51. But the opinion of Aristotle was expounded by us above, art. 6. To St. Jerome it is answered that in this place he taught only what Paul taught to the Romans 9, there, "Doth God take care for oxen?", that is, the principal care and Providence of God in this Universe is not concerned with oxen, but with the rational nature. Jerome teaches the same thing, that God is not so solicitous about the Providence of the smallest things as about that of the rational nature. Second, it is answered that, as he himself confesses writing against Rufinus, in the Commentaries on the Prophets he said many things not from his own opinion, but from that of others.