Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST CONCLUSION: Some names of this kind belong to God in time.

Second Conclusion, in the solution to the third: Names which import a respect to creatures, consequent upon an action of the divine intellect or will, belong to God from eternity. The reason is: because the operation of the divine intellect or will is eternal.

COMMENTARY.

IN this article it must be noted first, that its matter is disputed by the Theologians in 1, d. 30, and its question was quite celebrated among the most ancient authors. St. Augustine, bk. 5 On the Trinity, ch. 16, openly teaches that this name, Lord, belongs to God in time: but in bk. 12 On the City of God, ch. 15, he does not dare to define whether God is called Lord from eternity, or rather in time. Second, it must be noted that two things could stand in the way of these names belonging to God in time. The first, because they import a real relation; the second, because they import a relation of reason, which could not come to God without His change: yet each difficulty is removed by St. Thomas in this article. For he defines that those names do not import a real relation to creatures, but a relation of reason, and that this relation of reason requires indeed a real change on the part of creatures, but not on the part of God.

IT IS DOUBTED first concerning the truth of the first conclusion, namely, whether these names belong to God in time, and import a relation of reason to creatures, or rather a real relation? And on this matter three opinions are current. The first asserts that these names belong to God in time, and further says that they import real relations in God to creatures, which relations also come to God in time. Gabriel teaches this opinion in the cited dist., q. 5; and Gregory of Ariminum in 1, d. 22; Marfil in 1, q. 32, judges this opinion very probable. And it is proved first: a real relation can come to a subject without its change: therefore there is nothing unfitting in there being in God a real relation coming in time. The antecedent is asserted by Aristotle, 5 Physics, and is clear: for Peter, being white, is rendered like without change of himself from the sole fact that Paul is born white, therefore. Second, it is proved: to create, to justify, etc. are real actions in God, and yet they belong to Him in time: therefore the same can be said of relations to creatures. Third and last, it is proved: God is the real cause of creatures; but a real cause is really referred to its effect, therefore.

The second opinion is that of Scotus in the cited dist., q. 1, who asserts two things: one is that in God no real relation to creatures is found; the other is that God is denominated not by some real relation or relation of reason which is in Him, but by the real relation which is in the creature. Thus God is called Lord by the relation which is in the subjected creature. Just as a work made by man is called human not by the humanity which is in the work itself, but by the humanity which is in the man effecting such a work. This opinion is proved, first, from the testimony of the Master of the Sentences in the cited dist., asserting that God is called Lord not by a relation which is in Him. And the Master confirms this opinion from St. Augustine, 5 On the Trinity, last chapter, where he has the same words. Second, it is proved: God is really Lord; therefore He is called Lord by a real relation. The consequence is clear: because a relation of reason cannot bestow a real denomination; further, but He is not denominated by a real relation which is in God: therefore by the real relation which is in the creature. And it is confirmed from St. Thomas, in this article, asserting that God is called Lord by the real subjection which the creature has to Him.

Third, it is proved: the knowable is referred to knowledge not by a relation which is in the knowable itself, but by the relation by which in knowledge it is really referred to the knowable itself: therefore it can likewise be said that God is really referred to the creature by the relation by which the creature is really referred to God Himself. The consequence is clear: because the relation which is found between God and creatures is of the same genus as the relation which is found between knowledge and the knowable. The antecedent, indeed, is proved from Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 20, where he says that the knowable is relative not because it is itself referred to knowledge, but because knowledge is referred to it.

The third opinion is that which is gathered from St. Thomas in this article, and is expressly asserted by him, 2nd book Contra Gentiles, ch. 12 and 13, which consists in two points; the first is: there is no real relation in God to creatures. The other is: in God there are some relations of reason by which He is referred to creatures. Thus God is called Lord not by the real relation which is in the subjected creature, but by the relation of lordship, which is a relation of reason in God.

Let the first Conclusion be: No real relation to creatures is found in God. This conclusion is asserted against the first opinion. And it is the common opinion of the Theologians following the Master in the cited d. 30, and it is so certain that the opposite is judged by the gravest men not only rash, but even close to error. It is proved first from St. Augustine, bk. 4 On the Trinity, last chapter, where he says that just as a coin is constituted the price without any reality coming to it, so God in time becomes Lord of creatures. And in the same book, ch. 4 and 5, he says that to God nothing, neither absolute nor relative, comes in time. Gregory of Ariminum answers that nothing real comes to God which is really distinguished as thing from thing from Him. But against this is the argument. First, because it is still under judgment and in doubt whether a relation is really distinguished as thing from thing from its foundation. And perhaps the affirmative opinion is more probable. Second. A real relation at least formally is really distinguished from its foundation: therefore if a real relation comes to God in time, some real form newly belongs to God: but this is against Augustine in the place above; and against the truth, because we would then be positing some real change formally in God. And it is confirmed: every real form newly coming to a subject confers upon it some real to-be: therefore if a real relation is a form newly coming to God, it confers upon Him some real to-be, and consequently causes some real change in God, at least formal. Third, it is proved: that real relation posited in God, formally speaking, is either an accident or a substance; it can be neither: therefore. That it is not an accident is clear from what was said by St. Thomas above, q. 3, art. 6, where he most effectively proves that no accident can be found in God. That it is not substantial is proved: no substantial account can come to God in time, for otherwise God would be changed substantially: therefore. And it is confirmed: that substance would be relative, therefore its whole to-be would be toward another, namely toward the creature; but it is impossible that the whole to-be of the divine substance be toward the creature, because this would be a great imperfection in the divine substance: therefore.

Second Conclusion: God is referred to creatures not by the relations which are in the creatures themselves, but by relations of reason which are in God Himself. This conclusion is set down against Scotus, but it is the common opinion among Theologians, and it is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas, 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 13: Relations which are in diverse extremes are opposed: therefore one extreme cannot be denominated by the relation which is in the other extreme, e.g. the son is not denominated by the relation which is in the father: therefore God cannot be denominated by the relation which is in the creature. And it is confirmed: the relation of the creature to God, as it is presupposed in God Himself, is a relation of servitude and not of lordship; therefore, if God were denominated by that relation, He would be denominated not Lord but servant.

Third Conclusion: Many relations belong to God in time. This conclusion is gathered from the two preceding ones, and is sufficiently proved and explained by St. Thomas in the letter of the article.

To the arguments of the first opinion, it is answered. To the first I say that Aristotle, 5 Physics, teaches that a relation comes to a subject without its real change absolutely; yet a real relation does not come without a real relative change: for the subject is really changed, with a new relation coming, from not-being-referred to being-referred. But such a real relative change is in no way to be posited in God.

Ferrara solves this argument otherwise, bk. 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 12, near the fourth reason. To the second, certain grave Theologians say that to create, to justify, etc. import divine perfections, yet not belonging to God in time, but from eternity. Since, they say, to create and to justify are immanent actions of God, which are therefore intrinsic perfections of God Himself, not distinct from His Essence. Thus creation, according to this opinion, is nothing else than the volition of the divine Will by which He willed from eternity to create things outside Himself in such a time. Other Theologians, on the contrary, teach that to create and to justify denote transeunt actions: and therefore posit no real perfection in God, but only a respect of reason to creatures. This difficulty is not of this place, but belongs to question 25, art. 1. See there the lord Cajetan, and Ferrara, 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 1, 9 and 16. For now it is briefly answered that to create and to justify etc. either do not import any perfection in God, but only a respect of reason, or if they import a perfection in God, it does not belong to God in time, but from eternity: and thus that argument proves nothing for our purpose. To the third, the consequence is denied; and to the proof it is answered from St. Thomas, in the body of the article, that for a mutual real relation it is required that the extremes be of the same account. But we must explain in what it consists that the extremes be of the same account. I say briefly that it consists in this, that in each extreme there be the same ground of founding the relation: the same, I say, specifically or quasi-specifically. This is explained, and first in relatives of the first genus, which are founded on quantity, the matter is manifest: for equality is founded on quantity, which is formally found in each extreme. In relatives of the second genus, which are founded on action and passion, this is explained; for the relation which is of the agent to the patient is founded on action, which is the perfection of both, both of the agent and of the patient. For every created agent is perfected and actuated by its action. Likewise, the patient is perfected by the action, insofar as by force of the action proceeding from the agent it receives in itself some perfection. In relatives of the third genus, however, which are founded on measure, the same ground of founding is not found in each extreme. Since the ground which founds the relation is a real perfection of one extreme and not of the other; e.g. the relation which is found between knowledge and the knowable is founded on the measuring by which knowledge is measured by the knowable: but this measuring, in knowledge, is a real perfection of knowledge itself, for it is its formal specification. But in the measuring knowable it posits no perfection. From this it follows, first, that in relatives of the third genus there cannot be a mutual real relation in each extreme; but on the part of one extreme it is real, on the part of the other it is a relation of reason. Thus knowledge is really referred to the knowable; the knowable, however, is referred to knowledge only by a relation of reason. Second, that the relation of creatures to God is a real relation: but that of God to creatures is a relation of reason, since there is not the same ground of founding in each extreme, namely in God and in creatures. For the ground of founding in creatures is a real perfection of them; in God, however, it posits no perfection, e.g. creation, by which creatures are produced into to-be, is a great perfection of creatures, but not of God Himself. Hence the relation which is founded on creation will be real on the part of the creature, but of reason on the part of God.

To the arguments of the second opinion, it is answered. To the first it is answered that the Master of the Sentences and St. Augustine teach nothing else than that in God no real relations to creatures are found; but they do not deny that relations of reason are found in God. To solve the second and third arguments, we must briefly explain that question which Scotus disputes in the place above, whether one relative is referred to another taken formally in relative to-be or rather in absolute to-be. Thus the doubt is whether knowledge is referred to the knowable so that the knowable terminates the relation of knowledge by something absolute or rather by something respective? And likewise, whether God terminates the relation of servitude by the absolute to-be of God Himself or rather by the respective to-be of the Lord Himself? On this matter Scotus teaches, in the place above, that He terminates according to absolute to-be, and Scotus seems to speak of all relatives. Cajetan, on the contrary, in this article teaches that in every genus of relation the term of the relation formally is not something absolute, but respective. Thus the father terminates the relation of the son under the relative account of paternity; and likewise God terminates the relation of servitude of creatures under the formal respective account of lordship, that is, insofar as He is Lord. Ferrara, book 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11, teaches that the term of the relation in itself is something absolute, and this especially in relatives of the third genus. But yet the term of some relation cannot be explained by us unless it is explained under respective to-be. Thus God, according to His absolute to-be, terminates the relation of servitude, but it cannot be explained by us how He terminates that relation unless we consider God Himself insofar as He is formally Lord.

On this matter, briefly, let the first Conclusion be. In relatives according to expression the opinion of Ferrara is most true; e.g. potency regards act according to the absolute account of act. The Conclusion is proved: a relative according to expression properly and formally is something absolute. For the transcendental relation which it intrinsically imports is not simply a relation: therefore such a relative regards the term according to the absolute to-be of the term itself.

Second Conclusion: In relatives according to to-be of the first and second genus, the relative regards the term formally according to respective to-be, e.g. the father is referred to the son under the formal account of filiation, and the opposite of this opinion is improbable. It is proved first: in such relatives there is the same ground of founding the relation in each extreme: therefore these relatives mutually regard each other according to the formal account of the relation. It is proved second: the Father is referred to the divine Son under the formal account of filiation; but the account is altogether the same in this respect in created relations: therefore. The major is proved: according as the Father is referred to the Son, the Son is really referred by the Father; but He is not distinguished from the Father according to His absolute to-be, but only according to respective to-be: therefore.

Third Conclusion: In relatives of the third genus, the term, formally speaking, is something respective and not absolute. This conclusion is set down against the opinion of Scotus and Ferrara; but it is the doctrine of Cajetan in this article. It is proved: the relative, according as it is referred to the term, is opposed to the term itself by relative opposition; but the relative and the term are not opposed by relative opposition according to absolute to-be: therefore the term, in the formal account of term, is not something absolute, but respective: the Major, in every genus of relation, is manifest. The minor is proved: the creature, as it has the relation of servitude, is not opposed to God, considering God Himself in substantial to-be, but only considering Him in the to-be of Lord, which to-be is respective. Read the other arguments in this commentary of Cajetan. Against this conclusion, however, two testimonies contend. One is Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 20, where he says that the knowable is not referred to knowledge except because knowledge is referred to it. From this testimony it is openly gathered that in the knowable there is no relation by which it formally terminates the relation of knowledge to it; and consequently it terminates according to absolute to-be. The other testimony is St. Thomas, q. 7 On Power, art. 10, ad 4, where he says that in God three things are found for Him to be called Lord: coercive Power over creatures, the order of lordship to the creatures themselves, and to terminate the subjection and relation of servitude of creatures.

The first and the third, says St. Thomas, are really in God. But the second, namely the order of lordship, is not in God except through the operation of the intellect. From this testimony I argue thus: to terminate the relation of servitude is really found in God; but the order of lordship is not found really in God: therefore God terminates the relation of servitude according to His absolute real to-be which He has, and not according to the respective to-be of lordship. To the first testimony, it is answered that Aristotle in that place does not intend to teach, as Scotus falsely thought, that the knowable is referred to knowledge by the same relation by which knowledge is referred to the knowable itself. Nor does he intend to teach, as Ferrara thought, that the knowable is for that reason referred to knowledge because knowledge is referred to it: so that the proximate foundation of the relation of the knowable to knowledge be the relation of knowledge to the knowable. The true understanding of Aristotle in that place, therefore, is one of two: The first is that of Cajetan in this place, that the relation of the knowable to knowledge has, that it is real, from this alone, that knowledge is really referred to the knowable. For the understanding of this it is to be noted that the relation of the knowable can be considered in two ways: first in itself, insofar as it is a relative form by which the knowable is referred to knowledge; second as it constitutes the knowable itself not in the account of a relative, but in the account of the term terminating the relation of knowledge. If it is considered in the first way, it is altogether a relation of reason, and in no way belongs to any real predicament. If, however, it is considered in the second way, it is indeed, simply speaking, a relation of reason, but yet it is founded in a real predicament, because the term of each thing is reductively placed in that predicament to which the terminated thing belongs; e.g. the point of a line is reductively placed in the predicament of quantity. From this, therefore, it follows that the relation of the knowable, although simply it is a relation of reason, yet insofar as it is the relative form by which the knowable terminates the relation of knowledge to it, is reduced to the real predicament of relation, and this is what Aristotle taught in that cited place. The second understanding of that place is that the relation of the knowable to knowledge is founded on the same foundation on which the relation of knowledge to the knowable is founded. Thus the specification or measuring by which knowledge is specified by the knowable is the proximate foundation of the twin relation, of which one is real and the other of reason; and this is what Aristotle intends insinuating in those words, that the whole ground of founding each relation is found really in knowledge and not in the knowable: since the specification of knowledge posits nothing real in the specifying knowable. What we have said of the relation which is between knowledge and the knowable is to be said proportionally of the relations of God to creatures. For the whole ground of founding is found really in creatures and not in God. To the second testimony of St. Thomas, first it is answered with St. Cajetan in this article that St. Thomas in that place was speaking of the term of the relation of servitude not formally, but fundamentally. Thus he wishes to say that in God, really speaking, is found the foundation of that relation of reason by which He formally terminates the relation of servitude. Second, it is answered that the relation of lordship, insofar as it constitutes God in the account of the term terminating the relation of servitude, belongs reductively to the real predicament; and denominates God really Lord, although in itself, and simply speaking, it is a mere relation of reason. St. Thomas wishes therefore to say that the relation of lordship in God is a relation of reason, belonging to Him through the operation of the intellect. But insofar as it constitutes God in the account of the term really terminating the real relation of servitude, it belongs to the real predicament, and He is denominated really Lord. But there is an argument: God, before the operation of the intellect, terminates the relation of servitude; but the relation of lordship does not belong to God before the operation of the intellect: therefore He does not terminate formally under the account of lordship. The minor is proved. Since a relation of reason is not before the operation of the intellect. It is answered that there are some beings of reason which have outside the intellect each foundation, both remote and proximate. Of this kind are privations, such as blindness; and these relations, and beings of reason of this kind which belong to God in time, simply have to-be in their genus before the operation of the intellect. Since the whole to-be of a being of reason consists in this, that it have objective to-be of the intellect; but these beings of reason, which have their proximate foundation in reality, have objective to-be of the intellect before the operation of the intellect itself, not indeed in complete act, but in proximate potency, which suffices for a being of reason to be said to be simply in its genus. Just as the Metaphysicians say that the universal comes to be through abstraction, so that before the actual comparison of the nature to its individuals it is said to be universal from the fact that its proximate foundation is already posited, namely the abstraction of the nature from singular conditions. So therefore I say in the present case that the relation of lordship, from the fact that it has its proximate foundation in reality, simply has to-be in its genus before the intellect compares God to the subjected creatures. Hence the minor is denied. From these things the answer to the second and third arguments of Scotus must be given. And indeed the third argument remains solved from that explanation applied to the testimony of Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 20. To the second it is answered that servitude, which really denominates the creature servant by intrinsic denomination, denominates God really Lord by extrinsic denomination, not indeed immediately, as Scotus thought, but through the mediation of the relation of lordship which holds itself on the part of God. Thus in the denomination of lordship we understand two things: one is the formal denomination itself by which God is called Lord; and this is not by the relation of servitude, but by the relation of lordship. The other is the reality of this denomination, and this is not by the account of lordship, but is wholly taken from the relation of servitude, which is a real relation in the creature. Read the lord Cajetan on the solution to the fourth in this article.