Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: Such names are not said of God and creatures univocally. The reason is: because every effect, not equalling the power of the agent cause, receives the likeness of the agent not according to the same account, but deficiently.

SECOND conclusion: These names are not said purely equivocally of God and creatures. The reason is: because, otherwise, nothing could be known or demonstrated about God from creatures, since the fallacy of equivocation would occur.

THIRD conclusion: These names are said analogically of God and creatures. The reason is: because whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some order of the creature to God.

COMMENTARY.

IN this article, concerning the first conclusion, Scotus, in 1, d. 3, q. 2 and d. 8, qq. 2 and 3, forms a great many arguments. But still he accomplishes nothing: since all his arguments only prove that the names which are properly said of God and creatures are not purely equivocal, but are subordinated to the same formal concept, which St. Thomas grants in the second conclusion; they do not, however, prove that they are not analogical. See the arguments of Scotus in Cajetan on this article, and Master Soto, in the antepredicaments, q. 1.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning the reason of St. Thomas for the first conclusion. And first an argument is made against that proposition on which the whole procedure of St. Thomas seems to rest: when an effect does not equal the power of the cause, the name common to cause and effect is not said of them univocally. Against this it is argued: for light is said univocally of the light of the sun and of the light which is in the transparent medium, and yet the light of the medium is an effect of the light of the sun, not equalling its power: therefore the proposition is false. The same argument can be made about body, as it is said of the heavenly body and the corruptible body, for the corruptible body is an effect of the heavenly body, not equalling its power. And it is confirmed: there is univocal predication of the truth of the first conclusion, which is gathered from some principle, and of the truth of the second conclusion, which is inferred from the same principle; and yet the truth of the second conclusion cannot attain to the perfection of the truth of the first conclusion: therefore. Second, against the second reason of St. Thomas, which runs as follows: the divine perfection, e.g. wisdom, contains in the mode of simplicity every perfection, e.g. wisdom, justice, mercy, etc., while created wisdom is a limited perfection distinct from all other perfections: therefore this name wisdom does not convey one and the same account of created and uncreated wisdom, and consequently is not said univocally. Against this reason I argue as follows: that divine wisdom in reality is every perfection — justice, mercy, etc. — while created wisdom in reality is a limited perfection distinct from the others, holds itself accidentally and materially with respect to the signification of this word wisdom: therefore, on that score, St. Thomas wrongly infers the equivocation of the name. The antecedent is proved: this word wisdom conveys in its formal concept the account of wisdom as it abstracts from created and uncreated wisdom, and does not convey that that perfection be limited or unlimited: therefore with respect to the signification of this word it is accidental that uncreated wisdom is an unlimited perfection embracing every perfection, while created wisdom is a limited perfection. And it is confirmed: this word soul is said univocally of the rational soul and of the soul of a brute animal; and yet the rational soul, in reality, in the mode of simplicity and eminence, contains every perfection of soul — namely the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational — while the soul of a brute contains a limited and determinate perfection of soul: therefore.

For the resolution of this doubt, it must be noted that we can speak of equivocation and univocation either in the physical manner or in the logical and metaphysical manner. For the physicist considers univocation or equivocation in things as they are on the side of reality. Hence that account which in reality is participated in many things according to unequal degrees of perfection is equivocal in the judgment of the physicist. And therefore Aristotle said in Physics 7 that equivocations lie hidden in the genus, since the account of the genus is participated in the species according to diverse degrees of perfection, on account of the specific differences. The logician and metaphysician, by contrast, considers things by order to the concept of the mind; so that in the judgment of the logician and metaphysician that account is deemed equivocal which does not correspond to a single simple concept equally representing that account in all the individuals. Conversely, that account is univocal simpliciter which corresponds to a concept of the mind which simpliciter is one, that is, which signifies one formal account equally participated in all the things signified, without dependence of one upon another. Hence this word animal is univocal in the judgment of the logician and metaphysician: because the account of animal, as it corresponds to the concept of the mind, is equally participated in all the species, that is, without dependence of one upon another.

Let the first conclusion be: The names which are said of God and creatures are said equivocally, at least with physical equivocation. This conclusion is manifest to all; the reason of St. Thomas in the article at least proves it effectively, and it is expressly gathered from the foundation laid down.

SECOND conclusion: Such names, said equivocally of God and creatures, are so even with logical and metaphysical equivocation. This conclusion is so common among the theologians, in 1, d. 3 and 8, that Scotus hardly dares to depart from it; and this conclusion agrees with St. Augustine, bk. 1 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and St. Jerome on Ephesians 3, on those words: From whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named; and St. Dionysius, ch. 5 of the Heavenly Hierarchy. And it is proved first: Every created perfection in comparison with uncreated perfection is as it were depicted and shadowy: therefore no name can be predicated univocally of created and uncreated perfection. Just as this word Man cannot be said univocally of a true man and a painted one, and of a living man and a dead one. The antecedent is proved, Is. 40: All nations are as if they were not, so they are before him, and as nothingness and vanity they are reputed; and Jn. 1: What was made in him was life, as if to say, everything that was made in God is the divine life, but in itself is as it were dead.

It is proved second. Wisdom in God is wisdom through essence, that is, in the formal account of wisdom it includes every account of wisdom, while created wisdom is wisdom through participation: therefore it is impossible that one common account of wisdom be abstracted from created and uncreated wisdom, common to each wisdom. The antecedent is manifest; the consequence is proved. Divine wisdom contains formally and essentially every account of wisdom: therefore there cannot be any one account superior to that wisdom: for otherwise divine wisdom would not essentially be every account of wisdom. But someone will say: this name of wisdom conveys a common account for created and uncreated wisdom: therefore one common account for each wisdom can be abstracted. It is answered from the teaching of Cajetan in the work On Analogy, ch. 5, that this name wisdom conveys a common account of created and uncreated wisdom, not one simpliciter, but in a qualified sense. I mean that there is not one account abstracted from each wisdom, as animal conveys one account abstracted from man and horse, in which neither man nor horse is included; but it conveys one account which does not abstract simpliciter from created and uncreated wisdom — indeed it includes both, though in a confused manner. Just as the concept of being does not abstract simpliciter from substance and accident, but includes both, though in confusion. Hence just as the concept of being does not convey one account simpliciter superior to substance and accident, so wisdom does not convey one account simpliciter superior to created and uncreated wisdom, but one in a qualified sense, that is, one by confusion. It is proved third. Created wisdom in the formal account of wisdom depends intrinsically on uncreated wisdom, much more than an accident in the account of being depends on substance: therefore wisdom is said equivocally of them, as being of substance and accident. The antecedent is proved. Created wisdom in the account of wisdom is a participation of uncreated wisdom; thus the formal account of created wisdom consists in this, that it be a participation of uncreated wisdom: therefore. It is proved fourth. It is a certain property of analogates that, taken by themselves, they stand for the more famous meaning; but these divine names, taken by themselves however often, are taken for the divine perfections as for the more famous meanings: therefore they are analogical. The minor is proved. Exod. 3: I am who am, and below: He who is has sent me to you; and Lk. 18: No one is good but God; Mt. 23: One is your master, who is in heaven. THIRD conclusion. These divine names are said of God and creatures with a single concept. This conclusion is gathered from the second conclusion of the article, and is proved most effectively by the reason of St. Thomas in the article. FOURTH and last conclusion. These names are said analogically of God and creatures. This conclusion is sufficiently proved by St. Thomas in this article and the next. See, concerning these conclusions, St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, chs. 32, 33, and 34, and Pico Mirandola in the book On the One and Being.

TO the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first it is said that the proposition assumed in the argument is not the one by which St. Thomas proves the first conclusion. But the proposition on which the whole reason of St. Thomas rests is this: when an account belongs to the effect in a limited way, but to the cause in an unlimited way, so that in the effect there is conveyed a certain peculiar account distinct from all other perfections, while in the cause that account intrinsically and formally encloses every other perfection, then the name conveying such an account is said equivocally of cause and effect. And this reason is manifest in favor of the first conclusion of St. Thomas. For then the name does not convey the same account of cause and effect: because an unlimited account is formally distinguished from any account which of itself is limited. According to this interpretation of the reason of St. Thomas, the first argument with its confirmation does not go through. Second, it is answered that an effect may equal the perfection of the cause in two ways: first, as to specific or generic perfection; second, as to every perfection, not only generic and specific but also gradual and intensive. Then I say that for the univocation of a name said of cause and effect the latter equality is not necessary, but the former suffices. And this former equality is found between the light of the transparent medium and the light of the sun, and between the corruptible and the heavenly body, and between the truth of the second conclusion and of the first. To the second, Cajetan applies an excellent teaching in this commentary, but it is more necessary for that question, whether the divine attributes are distinguished by nature of the thing and formally, than for the solution of this argument. Hence, for the solution, note first that the argument supposes something false, since the reason attacked by this argument is not the second reason of St. Thomas, but is the explanation of that proposition dealt with in the preceding argument. Note second that for the account of analogy it is not necessary that the analogous name explicitly convey the dependence or proportion found in the analogates; it suffices that the account formally signified by that name belong to the analogates themselves with a dependence or proportion of one to another — e.g. being does not explicitly convey the dependence which an accident has in the account of being upon substance, yet it is analogical, from the fact that the formal account of being belongs to an accident only dependently upon substance, so that an accident in the account of being depends on substance. With these suppositions I say that wisdom is said analogically of created and uncreated wisdom because uncreated wisdom in the formal account of wisdom is an unlimited perfection, while created wisdom in the formal account of wisdom is a limited perfection and a certain participation of uncreated wisdom. To the argument, therefore, the antecedent is denied. To the confirmation it is answered first that the rational soul does not include the sensitive and vegetative formally in its own account, but only virtually. Which does not suffice to remove univocation: for number is said univocally of three and of two, although the number three virtually includes two. For the rest, divine wisdom formally includes all other perfections; hence the consequence is denied. Second, it is answered that the rational soul includes the sensitive and vegetative, not as soul, but as rational. But divine wisdom as wisdom formally includes every perfection intrinsically. Hence the account of soul can be univocal to every soul, but the account of wisdom cannot be to created and uncreated.