Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is negative. The reason is: for our intellect, for knowing God, forms distinct conceptions proportioned to the perfections which proceed from God into creatures: whereas synonymity is considered with respect to the conception of the intellect.

COMMENTARY.

On this article it is to be noted that its conclusion is commonly received by the Theologians. But in assigning its reason not all agree. Scotus, in 1, dist. 23, q. 1, at the beginning, assigns as reason, «for, he says, all the divine attributes are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing».

This doctrine of Scotus, however, is altogether false, about which there is no dispute to be held at present. St. Thomas assigns as reason, in this article, that the divine names signify under diverse concepts the properties of God. And this reason is quite efficacious. But the disciples of St. Thomas interpret it in a twofold sense. For some think that the divine properties are distinguished among themselves by reason, and are known through diverse concepts, because our intellect knows divine things, not as they are in themselves, but according as they are represented in creatures: in creatures, however, they are not represented by way of simplicity, but by way of diversity; and thus they are conceived by us by diverse concepts. This reason, without doubt, is according to the mind of St. Thomas in this article. Cajetan, on this article, says that the divine attributes are therefore conceived by diverse concepts, and consequently are distinguished by reason, because in God they have a most eminent account, on account of which eminence, although they are one most simple essence, they can correspond to diverse concepts, and also on account of the finite and limited power of any created intellect, which cannot form a single concept of the whole divine perfection. This reason of Cajetan, although it does not please some, is nevertheless quite suitable. But it is argued against it: It follows from it that the Blessed in the Fatherland cannot know all the divine attributes through a single concept; but the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved: The intellect of any Blessed whatsoever has a finite and limited power; therefore. It is answered by denying the sequel. For the Blessed in the Fatherland do not form a word in which they know the divine attributes, but they behold all those things in the Divine Word Himself, who is the infinite concept; and consequently, by way of simplicity, He represents all the divine attributes, whereas no created concept could effect this.

Concerning the solution to the first note that the major of the argument is altogether to be denied, namely, that that is maximally one which is one in reality and in account; indeed, on the contrary, it must be said that that which is maximally one on account of its infinity and eminence can be the object of diverse concepts in a finite intellect, and consequently is manifold in account. Thus diversity according to account detracts nothing from the unity and simplicity of the thing.