Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First Conclusion: We can impose names on God taken from creatures. The reason is: for God is known by us from creatures, according to the relation of principle and by way of eminence and removal.

Second Conclusion: Names of this kind do not signify the Divine Essence as it is. The reason is: for the Divine Essence is not known by us as it is.

COMMENTARY.

On the matter of this question the School disputes with the Master, in book 1, dist. 22; and St. Dionysius published an entire book De Divinis Nominibus. For how the ancient philosophers named God, see Augustine of Gubbio in book 3 De perenni Philosophia.

Concerning the first conclusion, it is to be noted, first, that it is not to be understood as though the names of God were proper to creatures, or common to God and creatures. But its sense is that from knowledge of creatures we ascend to some knowledge of God: either by way of the principle and end of creatures, considering Him as the efficient and final principle of creatures; or by way of eminence, transferring to Him all the perfections of creatures, according to a most eminent mode; or finally by way of removal, taking away from Him all the imperfections which we find in creatures. And thus, knowing God, we impose names on Him which immediately represent Him, but with a relation to creatures. Second, it is to be noted that this knowledge of God is without doubt produced through likenesses which are gathered from the phantasms of creatures. But it can be understood in two ways that this knowledge is produced: first, through the very likenesses of creatures, so that they primarily and immediately represent God; second, that it is produced through a likeness which the intellect, actuated by the likenesses of creatures, forms in itself, immediately representing God Himself, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in the preceding question, art. 9, in reply to the second. Each of these ways is probable; but the first seems to me more likely, since I do not fully grasp how that likeness, gathered from the likenesses of creatures, would immediately represent God Himself. It is true, however, that since that likeness (if it is given) must represent God through respect to creatures, from the fact that it depends of itself on the phantasms of creatures, it is not improbable that there be given a likeness of this kind immediately representing God.

There is a doubt concerning the second conclusion, whether any divine names represent God as He is? And the affirmative side is proved, first: this name Deus represents God immediately, without relation to creatures; therefore it represents Him as He is. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved: it is an absolute and non-connotative name of God; therefore it represents without relation to creatures; therefore it represents Him as He is. And it is confirmed: that ineffable name of God which the Greeks display under the name Tetragrammaton, and in Hebrew is called Iehova, signifies the Essence of God as it is, as the Rabbis say, and as may be seen in Abulensis on chap. 6 of Exodus, q. 1; therefore. Second. Once the properties of natural things are known, even if we are ignorant of their essential differences, we impose names which signify the essences of those things: e.g., once the property of the lion is known, that it roars, we impose this word lion, which signifies the essence of the lion. For, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics 4, text 7, what the name signifies is the definition of the thing; but through creatures we know certain properties of God; therefore, although we are ignorant of the quiddity of God Himself, we can impose names which signify His Essence. Third. The theologian and the metaphysician, presupposing knowledge of God, proceed to investigate the properties of God; therefore this name Deus signifies to the theologian and metaphysician the Essence and quiddity of God. The consequence is proved: for if the essence of a thing is not known, we cannot investigate the properties of that thing.

On this doubt Scotus, in the cited distinction, in the single question — whom Gabriel follows there — says three things. The first is: although we cannot in this life know God as He is, but through respect to creatures, we can nevertheless impose names which signify Him as He is. Hence Scotus says that a name sometimes represents a thing more distinctly and perfectly than it was known by the imposer of the name. Scotus proves this dictum by the second argument made above. He says, second: whatever be the case concerning the imposition of names, by accommodation of use, however, we employ certain names of God to signify the Essence of God without relation to creatures. He proves this by the first argument made above. Third, he says: although we in this life cannot impose names on God which represent Him as He is, God Himself can bring this about, indeed any blessed one can; for they know God as He is. And Scotus thinks that the name Iehova was instituted immediately by God, and represents God Himself as He is.

For the resolution, let the first Conclusion be: We cannot in this life impose names on God which represent Him as He is. Nor can we even, by accommodation of use, employ the names of God insofar as they so represent God. This Conclusion is asserted against the first and second statements of Scotus. But it is proved, as regards each part, by the argument of St. Thomas in this article, which is most efficacious. In this life we cannot know God as He is, but through relation to creatures; therefore neither can we impose names on Him which signify Him as He is, nor employ them insofar as they so signify. The antecedent is most certain and is asserted by St. Paul, 1 Cor. 13: «We see now through a mirror in an enigma»; and in Rom. 1: «The invisible things of God are seen, being understood through the things that are made». The consequence is proved: we cannot name anything except insofar as we know it, since words signify things through the mediation of the concepts of those things; therefore. From this Cajetan gathers that if ever someone, upon hearing a word, has perceived its meaning more distinctly and perfectly than it was known by the imposer of the word, this will not have come from the force of the word itself, but from the force of the one hearing the word.

Second Conclusion: No name, whether imposed by God or by a blessed angel, can represent God Himself to us as He is. This Conclusion is set down against the third dictum of Scotus, and against certain Thomists who agree with the third dictum of Scotus; but it is the opinion of Cajetan on this article, and it is proved. We cannot in this life know God as He is; therefore no name, even imposed by God Himself, can represent God to us as He is. From this it follows that as a matter of fact there is no name imposed either by God or by the blessed angels to signify God to us as He is, since such an imposition would be superfluous; indeed I would believe, against certain Thomists — among whom Ferrara seems to be, in book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chap. 51 — that with every power it is impossible that there be any name, even imposed by God, which represents God as He is, either to us wayfarers or to angels and blessed men. It is proved: that some name signifies God as He is consists in this, that it be representative of God Himself to some power, so that some power, by force of that name, could know God as He is; but a representation of this kind is impossible for any name; therefore. The major is most certain, and the minor is proved. Knowledge of God as He is cannot be had through any created likeness, nor can it be abstractive, but it must necessarily be intuitive cognition, produced through the Divine Essence itself; but intuitive cognition of God of this kind cannot be had by virtue of any name, as is most manifest; therefore. It is true, however, that the imposition of a name of this kind is not repugnant on account of a defect of knowledge on the part of the imposer, but from the fact that God as He is is not knowable by virtue of any created sign. But someone argues against this from that text of Zechariah, last chapter: «In that day God shall be one, and His name one»; and the Prophet was speaking there of the beatific state; therefore in that beatific state they will name God with a name signifying Him as He is. I answer, first, that the Prophet there in the literal sense was not speaking of the beatific state, but of the state of the Church militant. And he means that in the Church not many gods will be worshipped, but there will be one God, and as one He will be invoked by all. For this is what the one name designates. I answer, second, that if that testimony is understood of the beatific state, the name there designates the Divine Word, in whom all the blessed will see God as He is. Thus is St. Thomas to be explained in book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chap. 31, at the end.

Third Conclusion: There are certain Divine names which signify God absolutely and not connotatively, so that, speaking in the manner of the dialecticians, they are absolute terms. This Conclusion is set down against certain disciples of St. Thomas, who teach that all divine names are connotative. But our Conclusion pleases others, even the gravest Thomists. It is proved, first, by the authority of St. Thomas in this question, art. 8, where he says that this name Deus, although it was imposed with respect to creatures, nevertheless signifies the absolute nature of God; and in art. 11, in reply to the third, he says that it is not necessary that all the names of God import a respect to creatures. It is proved, second: there are certain names common to God and creatures which nevertheless are not connotative, as being, substance; therefore nothing forbids that certain names proper to God be absolute and not connotative. The consequence is clear: for the account is the same, as regards this, for all divine names. It is proved, third: the personal Divine names, e.g. Father, Son, do not import, in point of formal meaning, a respect to creatures, for they import a personal respect ad intra; therefore those names are not called connotative from the fact that they import a respect to creatures. But someone will say: This third Conclusion openly seems to clash with the first Conclusion, in which it was asserted that all Divine names are said of God through respect to creatures; from which it is inferred that all Divine names are connotative, which is against the third Conclusion. I answer, first, that all Divine names do indeed import a respect to creatures, but in different ways. For some import this respect as the formal account signified, and hence are connotative, as creator, governor, etc. But some import this respect not as the formal account signified, but as a certain mode, obliquely, and consequently are not connotative. Just as this name, knowledge, is not connotative, although it imports a respect to its object, from the fact that it imports it obliquely, and not as the account signified: names of this kind are Deus, Adonai, etc. I answer, second, that there are certain divine names which, taken in a certain confused signification, state no respect to creatures even obliquely, but signify the very substance of God; which Cajetan here readily grants to Scotus. But nevertheless, if the signification of these names is unfolded more explicitly, and the confused concepts to which they are subordinated, they must of necessity be unfolded through respect to creatures, since respect to the creature is intrinsically enclosed in the concepts to which those names are subordinated: just as this word man is subordinated to the confused concept of man. But nevertheless in that concept there is intrinsically enclosed rational animal, so that if that concept of man is unfolded, it must of necessity be unfolded through two concepts, namely of animal and of rational. So this name Deus, in its confused concept, states no respect to creatures. If, however, this confused concept is resolved and unfolded, it will necessarily have to be unfolded through a relation to creatures. The first Conclusion of this doubt, therefore, proceeds in this sense, that all Divine names import a relation to creatures, if their concepts are unfolded distinctly. But the third Conclusion proceeds in another sense, namely, that certain Divine names in the confused concept to which they are immediately subordinated state no respect to creatures, but signify the Divine nature alone: and in this second sense St. Thomas speaks in arts. 2, 8, and 11, in reply to the third, of this question.

To the arguments to the contrary, I answer. And the first remains already solved from the Conclusions laid down. To the confirmation I answer that the name Iehova has a confused mode of signifying the divine nature, as we said of the name Deus. It is called ineffable, however, not because it signifies God as He is, but because, as St. Thomas says in art. 9 of this question, this name signifies God in the manner of a subsistent, and hence incommunicable ad extra: so that this word could on no account be accommodated to creatures, as this word Deus is commonly accommodated; thus Iehova signifies not God absolutely, but this God, as is said in Exod. 15: He is my God. To the second, one could answer, first, that no name, even of the lowest creature, represents to us, speaking simply, quidditatively, so as to represent the quiddity of the signified thing as it is; but every name signifies to us connotatively, with respect and relation to accidents, as we said of the names of God, concerning the third Conclusion. Second, it is answered, and better, by denying the consequence. The reason for the difference is: that the names of creatures are imposed once the properties of those things are known, which are properties adequate to the natures of those things; and hence, once those properties are known, the quiddities of those things are known virtually. But divine names are imposed from knowledge of the properties of God, which do not equal the quiddity of God: for properties of this divine kind are not known by us as they are in God, but as they shine forth in creatures; and consequently, in knowledge of them, quidditative knowledge of God is not virtually included. This solution is gathered from St. Thomas below, art. 8, in reply to the second. To the third argument I answer that the theologian and the metaphysician do not establish any divine properties a priori, but a posteriori, from created effects, and thus it is not necessary that they presuppose quidditative knowledge of God, but it suffices that they presuppose that God exists.