Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First Conclusion: We can impose names on God taken from creatures. The reason is: for God is known by us from creatures, according to the relation of principle and by way of eminence and removal.

Second Conclusion: Names of this kind do not signify the Divine Essence as it is. The reason is: for the Divine Essence is not known by us as it is.

COMMENTARY.

On the matter of this question the School disputes with the Master, in book 1, dist. 22; and St. Dionysius published an entire book De Divinis Nominibus. For how the ancient philosophers named God, see Augustine of Gubbio in book 3 De perenni Philosophia.

Concerning the first conclusion, it is to be noted, first, that it is not to be understood as though the names of God were proper to creatures, or common to God and creatures. But its sense is that from knowledge of creatures we ascend to some knowledge of God: either by way of the principle and end of creatures, considering Him as the efficient and final principle of creatures; or by way of eminence, transferring to Him all the perfections of creatures, according to a most eminent mode; or finally by way of removal, taking away from Him all the imperfections which we find in creatures. And thus, knowing God, we impose names on Him which immediately represent Him, but with a relation to creatures. Second, it is to be noted that this knowledge of God is without doubt produced through likenesses which are gathered from the phantasms of creatures. But it can be understood in two ways that this knowledge is produced: first, through the very likenesses of creatures, so that they primarily and immediately represent God; second, that it is produced through a likeness which the intellect, actuated by the likenesses of creatures, forms in itself, immediately representing God Himself, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in the preceding question, art. 9, in reply to the second. Each of these ways is probable; but the first seems to me more likely, since I do not fully grasp how that likeness, gathered from the likenesses of creatures, would immediately represent God Himself. It is true, however, that since that likeness (if it is given) must represent God through respect to creatures, from the fact that it depends of itself on the phantasms of creatures, it is not improbable that there be given a likeness of this kind immediately representing God.

There is a doubt concerning the second conclusion, whether any divine names represent God as He is? And the affirmative side is proved, first: this name Deus represents God immediately, without relation to creatures; therefore it represents Him as He is. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved: it is an absolute and non-connotative name of God; therefore it represents without relation to creatures; therefore it represents Him as He is. And it is confirmed: that ineffable name of God which the Greeks display under the name Tetragrammaton, and in Hebrew is called Iehova, signifies the Essence of God as it is, as the Rabbis say, and as may be seen in Abulensis on chap. 6 of Exodus, q. 1; therefore. Second. Once the properties of natural things are known, even if we are ignorant of their essential differences, we impose names which signify the essences of those things: e.g., once the property of the lion is known, that it roars, we impose this word lion, which signifies the essence of the lion. For, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics 4, text 7, what the name signifies is the definition of the thing; but through creatures we know certain properties of God; therefore, although we are ignorant of the quiddity of God Himself, we can impose names which signify His Essence. Third. The theologian and the metaphysician, presupposing knowledge of God, proceed to investigate the properties of God; therefore this name Deus signifies to the theologian and metaphysician the Essence and quiddity of God. The consequence is proved: for if the essence of a thing is not known, we cannot investigate the properties of that thing.

On this doubt Scotus, in the cited distinction, in the single question — whom Gabriel follows there — says three things. The first is: although we cannot in this life know God as He is, but through respect to creatures, we can nevertheless impose names which signify Him as He is. Hence Scotus says that a name sometimes represents a thing more distinctly and perfectly than it was known by the imposer of the name. Scotus proves this dictum by the second argument made above. He says, second: whatever be the case concerning the imposition of names, by accommodation of use, however, we employ certain names of God to signify the Essence of God without relation to creatures. He proves this by the first argument made above. Third, he says: although we in this life cannot impose names on God which represent Him as He is, God Himself can bring this about, indeed any blessed one can; for they know God as He is. And Scotus thinks that the name Iehova was instituted immediately by God, and represents God Himself as He is.

For the resolution, let the first Conclusion be: We cannot in this life impose names on God which represent Him as He is. Nor can we even, by accommodation of use, employ the names of God insofar as they so represent God. This Conclusion is asserted against the first and second statements of Scotus. But it is proved, as regards each part, by the argument of St. Thomas in this article, which is most efficacious. In this life we cannot know God as He is, but through relation to creatures; therefore neither can we impose names on Him which signify Him as He is, nor employ them insofar as they so signify. The antecedent is most certain and is asserted by St. Paul, 1 Cor. 13: «We see now through a mirror in an enigma»; and in Rom. 1: «The invisible things of God are seen, being understood through the things that are made». The consequence is proved: we cannot name anything except insofar as we know it, since words signify things through the mediation of the concepts of those things; therefore. From this Cajetan gathers that if ever someone, upon hearing a word, has perceived its meaning more distinctly and perfectly than it was known by the imposer of the word, this will not have come from the force of the word itself, but from the force of the one hearing the word.

Second Conclusion: No name, whether imposed by God or by a blessed angel, can represent God Himself to us as He is. This Conclusion is set down against the third dictum of Scotus, and against certain Thomists who agree with the third dictum of Scotus; but it is the opinion of Cajetan on this article, and it is proved. We cannot in this life know God as He is; therefore no name, even imposed by God Himself, can represent God to us as He is. From this it follows that as a matter of fact there is no name imposed either by God or by the blessed angels to signify God to us as He is, since such an imposition would be superfluous; indeed I would believe, against certain Thomists — among whom Ferrara seems to be, in book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chap. 51 — that with every power it is impossible that there be any name, even imposed by God, which represents God as He is, either to us wayfarers or to angels and blessed men. It is proved: that some name signifies God as He is consists in this, that it be representative of God Himself to some power, so that some power, by force of that name, could know God as He is; but a representation of this kind is impossible for any name; therefore. The major is most certain, and the minor is proved. Knowledge of God as He is cannot be had through any created likeness, nor can it be abstractive, but it must necessarily be intuitive cognition, produced through the Divine Essence itself; but intuitive cognition of God of this kind cannot be had by virtue of any name, as is most manifest; therefore. It is true, however, that the imposition of a name of this kind is not repugnant on account of a defect of knowledge on the part of the imposer, but from the fact that God as He is is not knowable by virtue of any created sign. But someone argues against this from that text of Zechariah, last chapter: «In that day God shall be one, and His name one»; and the Prophet was speaking there of the beatific state; therefore in that beatific state they will name God with a name signifying Him as He is. I answer, first, that the Prophet there in the literal sense was not speaking of the beatific state, but of the state of the Church militant. And he means that in the Church not many gods will be worshipped, but there will be one God, and as one He will be invoked by all. For this is what the one name designates. I answer, second, that if that testimony is understood of the beatific state, the name there designates the Divine Word, in whom all the blessed will see God as He is. Thus is St. Thomas to be explained in book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chap. 31, at the end.

Third Conclusion: There are certain Divine names which signify God absolutely and not connotatively, so that, speaking in the manner of the dialecticians, they are absolute terms. This Conclusion is set down against certain disciples of St. Thomas, who teach that all divine names are connotative. But our Conclusion pleases others, even the gravest Thomists. It is proved, first, by the authority of St. Thomas in this question, art. 8, where he says that this name Deus, although it was imposed with respect to creatures, nevertheless signifies the absolute nature of God; and in art. 11, in reply to the third, he says that it is not necessary that all the names of God import a respect to creatures. It is proved, second: there are certain names common to God and creatures which nevertheless are not connotative, as being, substance; therefore nothing forbids that certain names proper to God be absolute and not connotative. The consequence is clear: for the account is the same, as regards this, for all divine names. It is proved, third: the personal Divine names, e.g. Father, Son, do not import, in point of formal meaning, a respect to creatures, for they import a personal respect ad intra; therefore those names are not called connotative from the fact that they import a respect to creatures. But someone will say: This third Conclusion openly seems to clash with the first Conclusion, in which it was asserted that all Divine names are said of God through respect to creatures; from which it is inferred that all Divine names are connotative, which is against the third Conclusion. I answer, first, that all Divine names do indeed import a respect to creatures, but in different ways. For some import this respect as the formal account signified, and hence are connotative, as creator, governor, etc. But some import this respect not as the formal account signified, but as a certain mode, obliquely, and consequently are not connotative. Just as this name, knowledge, is not connotative, although it imports a respect to its object, from the fact that it imports it obliquely, and not as the account signified: names of this kind are Deus, Adonai, etc. I answer, second, that there are certain divine names which, taken in a certain confused signification, state no respect to creatures even obliquely, but signify the very substance of God; which Cajetan here readily grants to Scotus. But nevertheless, if the signification of these names is unfolded more explicitly, and the confused concepts to which they are subordinated, they must of necessity be unfolded through respect to creatures, since respect to the creature is intrinsically enclosed in the concepts to which those names are subordinated: just as this word man is subordinated to the confused concept of man. But nevertheless in that concept there is intrinsically enclosed rational animal, so that if that concept of man is unfolded, it must of necessity be unfolded through two concepts, namely of animal and of rational. So this name Deus, in its confused concept, states no respect to creatures. If, however, this confused concept is resolved and unfolded, it will necessarily have to be unfolded through a relation to creatures. The first Conclusion of this doubt, therefore, proceeds in this sense, that all Divine names import a relation to creatures, if their concepts are unfolded distinctly. But the third Conclusion proceeds in another sense, namely, that certain Divine names in the confused concept to which they are immediately subordinated state no respect to creatures, but signify the Divine nature alone: and in this second sense St. Thomas speaks in arts. 2, 8, and 11, in reply to the third, of this question.

To the arguments to the contrary, I answer. And the first remains already solved from the Conclusions laid down. To the confirmation I answer that the name Iehova has a confused mode of signifying the divine nature, as we said of the name Deus. It is called ineffable, however, not because it signifies God as He is, but because, as St. Thomas says in art. 9 of this question, this name signifies God in the manner of a subsistent, and hence incommunicable ad extra: so that this word could on no account be accommodated to creatures, as this word Deus is commonly accommodated; thus Iehova signifies not God absolutely, but this God, as is said in Exod. 15: He is my God. To the second, one could answer, first, that no name, even of the lowest creature, represents to us, speaking simply, quidditatively, so as to represent the quiddity of the signified thing as it is; but every name signifies to us connotatively, with respect and relation to accidents, as we said of the names of God, concerning the third Conclusion. Second, it is answered, and better, by denying the consequence. The reason for the difference is: that the names of creatures are imposed once the properties of those things are known, which are properties adequate to the natures of those things; and hence, once those properties are known, the quiddities of those things are known virtually. But divine names are imposed from knowledge of the properties of God, which do not equal the quiddity of God: for properties of this divine kind are not known by us as they are in God, but as they shine forth in creatures; and consequently, in knowledge of them, quidditative knowledge of God is not virtually included. This solution is gathered from St. Thomas below, art. 8, in reply to the second. To the third argument I answer that the theologian and the metaphysician do not establish any divine properties a priori, but a posteriori, from created effects, and thus it is not necessary that they presuppose quidditative knowledge of God, but it suffices that they presuppose that God exists.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Those names which import negation in God or relation to creatures are not said of God substantially. This conclusion is not proved by St. Thomas, but is left as manifest.

Second conclusion: Those names which are predicated of God positively and absolutely are said of Him substantially.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning this article, read St. Augustine, books 5 and 7 On the Trinity, in which through many chapters he shows that those names, good, wise and the like, are said of God essentially, and do not import any accident.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: If we attend to the thing signified the conclusion is affirmative.

Second conclusion: If we attend to the mode of signifying, the conclusion is negative. These conclusions are evident in the article.

COMMENTARY.

ON this article read Durandus in the cited d. 22, q. 1; and for knowing which names are said properly of God, and which metaphorically, the reply to the first argument of this article is to be noted.

Concerning the replies to the arguments it is to be noted that the imperfection which is found in the divine names consists in the mode of signifying: either in this, that they signify after the mode of a nature composed with a supposit, and of this kind are concrete substantial names, e.g. God; or in this, that they signify after the mode of what inheres in another, of which kind are the names that convey the divine attributes in the concrete, as wise, just, etc.; or finally in this, that they signify after the mode of an incomplete form, and these are abstract names, as goodness etc. But it is to be noted that this imperfection holds entirely on the side of the signifying term, and not on the side of the thing signified: and therefore it is to be granted without qualification that these names are said properly of God.

Concerning the reply to the second note that St. Augustine is to be expounded with the same understanding with which St. Thomas expounds St. Dionysius, book 5, On the Trinity, ch. 10, at the end, where he suggests that no name is said properly of God. Finally note that that testimony of St. Ambrose cited in the On the contrary argument is not found in book 2 On Faith as it is reported by St. Thomas and by the Master of the Sentences in the cited dist. 22; but it is found in book 2 On the Trinity, in the Preface, which book was perhaps called On Faith by the Master and by St. Thomas because it is entitled by St. Ambrose On the Faith of the Trinity.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is negative. The reason is: for our intellect, for knowing God, forms distinct conceptions proportioned to the perfections which proceed from God into creatures: whereas synonymity is considered with respect to the conception of the intellect.

COMMENTARY.

On this article it is to be noted that its conclusion is commonly received by the Theologians. But in assigning its reason not all agree. Scotus, in 1, dist. 23, q. 1, at the beginning, assigns as reason, «for, he says, all the divine attributes are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing».

This doctrine of Scotus, however, is altogether false, about which there is no dispute to be held at present. St. Thomas assigns as reason, in this article, that the divine names signify under diverse concepts the properties of God. And this reason is quite efficacious. But the disciples of St. Thomas interpret it in a twofold sense. For some think that the divine properties are distinguished among themselves by reason, and are known through diverse concepts, because our intellect knows divine things, not as they are in themselves, but according as they are represented in creatures: in creatures, however, they are not represented by way of simplicity, but by way of diversity; and thus they are conceived by us by diverse concepts. This reason, without doubt, is according to the mind of St. Thomas in this article. Cajetan, on this article, says that the divine attributes are therefore conceived by diverse concepts, and consequently are distinguished by reason, because in God they have a most eminent account, on account of which eminence, although they are one most simple essence, they can correspond to diverse concepts, and also on account of the finite and limited power of any created intellect, which cannot form a single concept of the whole divine perfection. This reason of Cajetan, although it does not please some, is nevertheless quite suitable. But it is argued against it: It follows from it that the Blessed in the Fatherland cannot know all the divine attributes through a single concept; but the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved: The intellect of any Blessed whatsoever has a finite and limited power; therefore. It is answered by denying the sequel. For the Blessed in the Fatherland do not form a word in which they know the divine attributes, but they behold all those things in the Divine Word Himself, who is the infinite concept; and consequently, by way of simplicity, He represents all the divine attributes, whereas no created concept could effect this.

Concerning the solution to the first note that the major of the argument is altogether to be denied, namely, that that is maximally one which is one in reality and in account; indeed, on the contrary, it must be said that that which is maximally one on account of its infinity and eminence can be the object of diverse concepts in a finite intellect, and consequently is manifold in account. Thus diversity according to account detracts nothing from the unity and simplicity of the thing.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: Such names are not said of God and creatures univocally. The reason is: because every effect, not equalling the power of the agent cause, receives the likeness of the agent not according to the same account, but deficiently.

SECOND conclusion: These names are not said purely equivocally of God and creatures. The reason is: because, otherwise, nothing could be known or demonstrated about God from creatures, since the fallacy of equivocation would occur.

THIRD conclusion: These names are said analogically of God and creatures. The reason is: because whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some order of the creature to God.

COMMENTARY.

IN this article, concerning the first conclusion, Scotus, in 1, d. 3, q. 2 and d. 8, qq. 2 and 3, forms a great many arguments. But still he accomplishes nothing: since all his arguments only prove that the names which are properly said of God and creatures are not purely equivocal, but are subordinated to the same formal concept, which St. Thomas grants in the second conclusion; they do not, however, prove that they are not analogical. See the arguments of Scotus in Cajetan on this article, and Master Soto, in the antepredicaments, q. 1.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning the reason of St. Thomas for the first conclusion. And first an argument is made against that proposition on which the whole procedure of St. Thomas seems to rest: when an effect does not equal the power of the cause, the name common to cause and effect is not said of them univocally. Against this it is argued: for light is said univocally of the light of the sun and of the light which is in the transparent medium, and yet the light of the medium is an effect of the light of the sun, not equalling its power: therefore the proposition is false. The same argument can be made about body, as it is said of the heavenly body and the corruptible body, for the corruptible body is an effect of the heavenly body, not equalling its power. And it is confirmed: there is univocal predication of the truth of the first conclusion, which is gathered from some principle, and of the truth of the second conclusion, which is inferred from the same principle; and yet the truth of the second conclusion cannot attain to the perfection of the truth of the first conclusion: therefore. Second, against the second reason of St. Thomas, which runs as follows: the divine perfection, e.g. wisdom, contains in the mode of simplicity every perfection, e.g. wisdom, justice, mercy, etc., while created wisdom is a limited perfection distinct from all other perfections: therefore this name wisdom does not convey one and the same account of created and uncreated wisdom, and consequently is not said univocally. Against this reason I argue as follows: that divine wisdom in reality is every perfection — justice, mercy, etc. — while created wisdom in reality is a limited perfection distinct from the others, holds itself accidentally and materially with respect to the signification of this word wisdom: therefore, on that score, St. Thomas wrongly infers the equivocation of the name. The antecedent is proved: this word wisdom conveys in its formal concept the account of wisdom as it abstracts from created and uncreated wisdom, and does not convey that that perfection be limited or unlimited: therefore with respect to the signification of this word it is accidental that uncreated wisdom is an unlimited perfection embracing every perfection, while created wisdom is a limited perfection. And it is confirmed: this word soul is said univocally of the rational soul and of the soul of a brute animal; and yet the rational soul, in reality, in the mode of simplicity and eminence, contains every perfection of soul — namely the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational — while the soul of a brute contains a limited and determinate perfection of soul: therefore.

For the resolution of this doubt, it must be noted that we can speak of equivocation and univocation either in the physical manner or in the logical and metaphysical manner. For the physicist considers univocation or equivocation in things as they are on the side of reality. Hence that account which in reality is participated in many things according to unequal degrees of perfection is equivocal in the judgment of the physicist. And therefore Aristotle said in Physics 7 that equivocations lie hidden in the genus, since the account of the genus is participated in the species according to diverse degrees of perfection, on account of the specific differences. The logician and metaphysician, by contrast, considers things by order to the concept of the mind; so that in the judgment of the logician and metaphysician that account is deemed equivocal which does not correspond to a single simple concept equally representing that account in all the individuals. Conversely, that account is univocal simpliciter which corresponds to a concept of the mind which simpliciter is one, that is, which signifies one formal account equally participated in all the things signified, without dependence of one upon another. Hence this word animal is univocal in the judgment of the logician and metaphysician: because the account of animal, as it corresponds to the concept of the mind, is equally participated in all the species, that is, without dependence of one upon another.

Let the first conclusion be: The names which are said of God and creatures are said equivocally, at least with physical equivocation. This conclusion is manifest to all; the reason of St. Thomas in the article at least proves it effectively, and it is expressly gathered from the foundation laid down.

SECOND conclusion: Such names, said equivocally of God and creatures, are so even with logical and metaphysical equivocation. This conclusion is so common among the theologians, in 1, d. 3 and 8, that Scotus hardly dares to depart from it; and this conclusion agrees with St. Augustine, bk. 1 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and St. Jerome on Ephesians 3, on those words: From whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named; and St. Dionysius, ch. 5 of the Heavenly Hierarchy. And it is proved first: Every created perfection in comparison with uncreated perfection is as it were depicted and shadowy: therefore no name can be predicated univocally of created and uncreated perfection. Just as this word Man cannot be said univocally of a true man and a painted one, and of a living man and a dead one. The antecedent is proved, Is. 40: All nations are as if they were not, so they are before him, and as nothingness and vanity they are reputed; and Jn. 1: What was made in him was life, as if to say, everything that was made in God is the divine life, but in itself is as it were dead.

It is proved second. Wisdom in God is wisdom through essence, that is, in the formal account of wisdom it includes every account of wisdom, while created wisdom is wisdom through participation: therefore it is impossible that one common account of wisdom be abstracted from created and uncreated wisdom, common to each wisdom. The antecedent is manifest; the consequence is proved. Divine wisdom contains formally and essentially every account of wisdom: therefore there cannot be any one account superior to that wisdom: for otherwise divine wisdom would not essentially be every account of wisdom. But someone will say: this name of wisdom conveys a common account for created and uncreated wisdom: therefore one common account for each wisdom can be abstracted. It is answered from the teaching of Cajetan in the work On Analogy, ch. 5, that this name wisdom conveys a common account of created and uncreated wisdom, not one simpliciter, but in a qualified sense. I mean that there is not one account abstracted from each wisdom, as animal conveys one account abstracted from man and horse, in which neither man nor horse is included; but it conveys one account which does not abstract simpliciter from created and uncreated wisdom — indeed it includes both, though in a confused manner. Just as the concept of being does not abstract simpliciter from substance and accident, but includes both, though in confusion. Hence just as the concept of being does not convey one account simpliciter superior to substance and accident, so wisdom does not convey one account simpliciter superior to created and uncreated wisdom, but one in a qualified sense, that is, one by confusion. It is proved third. Created wisdom in the formal account of wisdom depends intrinsically on uncreated wisdom, much more than an accident in the account of being depends on substance: therefore wisdom is said equivocally of them, as being of substance and accident. The antecedent is proved. Created wisdom in the account of wisdom is a participation of uncreated wisdom; thus the formal account of created wisdom consists in this, that it be a participation of uncreated wisdom: therefore. It is proved fourth. It is a certain property of analogates that, taken by themselves, they stand for the more famous meaning; but these divine names, taken by themselves however often, are taken for the divine perfections as for the more famous meanings: therefore they are analogical. The minor is proved. Exod. 3: I am who am, and below: He who is has sent me to you; and Lk. 18: No one is good but God; Mt. 23: One is your master, who is in heaven. THIRD conclusion. These divine names are said of God and creatures with a single concept. This conclusion is gathered from the second conclusion of the article, and is proved most effectively by the reason of St. Thomas in the article. FOURTH and last conclusion. These names are said analogically of God and creatures. This conclusion is sufficiently proved by St. Thomas in this article and the next. See, concerning these conclusions, St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, chs. 32, 33, and 34, and Pico Mirandola in the book On the One and Being.

TO the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first it is said that the proposition assumed in the argument is not the one by which St. Thomas proves the first conclusion. But the proposition on which the whole reason of St. Thomas rests is this: when an account belongs to the effect in a limited way, but to the cause in an unlimited way, so that in the effect there is conveyed a certain peculiar account distinct from all other perfections, while in the cause that account intrinsically and formally encloses every other perfection, then the name conveying such an account is said equivocally of cause and effect. And this reason is manifest in favor of the first conclusion of St. Thomas. For then the name does not convey the same account of cause and effect: because an unlimited account is formally distinguished from any account which of itself is limited. According to this interpretation of the reason of St. Thomas, the first argument with its confirmation does not go through. Second, it is answered that an effect may equal the perfection of the cause in two ways: first, as to specific or generic perfection; second, as to every perfection, not only generic and specific but also gradual and intensive. Then I say that for the univocation of a name said of cause and effect the latter equality is not necessary, but the former suffices. And this former equality is found between the light of the transparent medium and the light of the sun, and between the corruptible and the heavenly body, and between the truth of the second conclusion and of the first. To the second, Cajetan applies an excellent teaching in this commentary, but it is more necessary for that question, whether the divine attributes are distinguished by nature of the thing and formally, than for the solution of this argument. Hence, for the solution, note first that the argument supposes something false, since the reason attacked by this argument is not the second reason of St. Thomas, but is the explanation of that proposition dealt with in the preceding argument. Note second that for the account of analogy it is not necessary that the analogous name explicitly convey the dependence or proportion found in the analogates; it suffices that the account formally signified by that name belong to the analogates themselves with a dependence or proportion of one to another — e.g. being does not explicitly convey the dependence which an accident has in the account of being upon substance, yet it is analogical, from the fact that the formal account of being belongs to an accident only dependently upon substance, so that an accident in the account of being depends on substance. With these suppositions I say that wisdom is said analogically of created and uncreated wisdom because uncreated wisdom in the formal account of wisdom is an unlimited perfection, while created wisdom in the formal account of wisdom is a limited perfection and a certain participation of uncreated wisdom. To the argument, therefore, the antecedent is denied. To the confirmation it is answered first that the rational soul does not include the sensitive and vegetative formally in its own account, but only virtually. Which does not suffice to remove univocation: for number is said univocally of three and of two, although the number three virtually includes two. For the rest, divine wisdom formally includes all other perfections; hence the consequence is denied. Second, it is answered that the rational soul includes the sensitive and vegetative, not as soul, but as rational. But divine wisdom as wisdom formally includes every perfection intrinsically. Hence the account of soul can be univocal to every soul, but the account of wisdom cannot be to created and uncreated.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST Conclusion: Names which are said of God through metaphor are said of creatures before they are said of God. The reason is: because, when said of God, they signify nothing else than likenesses.

Second Conclusion: Names which are properly predicated of God are said of God first, if we attend to the thing signified; but they are said of creatures first, if we attend to the imposition of the names.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article, there is a doubt about the first conclusion. It is proved to be false. First, from St. Thomas, q. 2 On Truth, art. 11, ad 6, where he says that it is not necessary for the principal analogate to be placed in the definition of the less principal analogate. Behold, St. Thomas openly contradicts himself. Second. Created wisdom is most excellently defined as the contemplation of things through the highest causes: therefore it is not necessary for uncreated wisdom, which is the more principal analogate, to be placed in its definition. And it is confirmed: the principal analogate does not have the character of genus or difference with respect to the less principal analogate: therefore it is not to be placed in its definition, since it would be an essential predicate. And it is confirmed secondly: because the quidditative definition of a thing consists only of genus and difference. To the first argument, he will answer from the doctrine of Cajetan, in the opusculum On Analogy, ch. 7, that the conclusion of this article holds true in analogates of proportion, which are said through metaphor, and in analogates of attribution, since such analogates are said of one analogate through order to another, which is the more principal one; e.g., laughing is said of the flowering meadow through order to the laughter of man. Being too is said of accident through order from substance. But in analogates of proportionality, which are properly said of all the analogates, it is not necessary for one analogate to be placed in the definition of another; e.g., principle is said analogically of the heart of an animal and of the foundation of a house, and yet one analogate is not placed in the definition of the other, since such analogates are not said of one through respect to another, but proportionally of both. And it is of these analogates that St. Thomas speaks in the place cited in the argument. To the second argument: St. Thomas in the cited q. 2 On Truth seems to teach that wisdom, and the other names which are properly said of God, are analogates by the analogy of proportionality, and not of attribution. Whence, according to the doctrine handed down in the preceding solution, it is not necessary for the principal analogate, e.g. uncreated wisdom, to be placed in the definition of the less principal analogate, namely created wisdom. But in this article and the preceding one he teaches most openly that such names are analogates of attribution. Which opinion is most true. Nor does the reason stand in the way which St. Thomas uses in that q. 2 On Truth, which consists in this: for the analogy of attribution a determinate distance is required between the analogates themselves; but between God and creatures there is no determinate distance, since God exceeds every creature to infinity: therefore. This reason, I say, does not stand in the way: for a finite distance on the side of the less principal analogate suffices for the analogy of attribution. And so it is in our case. For on the side of creatures there is a determinate distance with respect to God. For one creature is more distant from God than another by as much as it has a more imperfect nature; e.g., an ant is more distant from God than an angel by as much as the angelic nature is more perfect than the nature of the ant. This solution, therefore, having been rejected, it must be noted first that these names are said of God and creatures by a twofold analogy, as Master Soto notes in his Antepraedicamenta. One is that of proportionality, which consists in this, that as the divine perfection, e.g. wisdom, is related to God, so the created perfection is related to the creature. The other is that of attribution, through order to one exemplar, to one efficient cause, and to one end. Secondly, it must be noted that among analogates of attribution, some import formal relations to the one: as healthy, as said of urine and medicine, imports diverse relations formally to the health which is in the animal. But others do not import formal relations of one analogate to another, but fundamental ones; that is, they import a form which befits the less principal analogate through a relation to the more principal analogate. These analogates of the second kind are all those which are formally predicated of all the analogates, of which sort are all the names which are properly said of God and creatures.

These things supposed, let the first Conclusion to the argument be that these names, insofar as they are analogates by the analogy of proportionality, do not require the principal analogate to be placed in the definition of the less principal analogate. And in this sense proceeds the doctrine of St. Thomas in the cited q. 2 On Truth. Second Conclusion: among analogates which import a formal relation to the principal analogate, it is necessary for the principal analogate to be placed in the definition of the less principal analogate. And in this sense St. Thomas speaks in this article.

Third Conclusion: among analogates of attribution which do not import a formal relation to the one, but only a fundamental one, the principal analogate is not necessarily placed in the definition of the less principal analogate. And of this kind are all the names which are properly said of God and creatures. But it must be noted that this third statement must be limited to the definition which is given through the immediate genus and difference. For if these less principal analogates are defined most exactly from the first potency to the ultimate act, it is altogether necessary for the principal analogate to be placed in their definition. For example, one can define whiteness through its immediate genus, namely: it is a color disgregative of sight. In which definition substance is not placed. But if the whole nature of whiteness is explained, substance must necessarily be placed in its definition, up to the character of accident, which cannot be explained except through order to substance. So likewise must it be said of the other names of God. Ferr., bk. 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 34, solves this argument otherwise; but our solution is that of Cajetan, on this article. To the confirmation it is answered that, just as one correlative is placed in the definition of another, not as genus or difference, but as a necessary addition: so in the definition of the less principal analogate the principal analogate is placed, not as genus or difference, but as a necessary addition, without which the nature of the less principal analogate cannot be perfectly explained.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST CONCLUSION: Some names of this kind belong to God in time.

Second Conclusion, in the solution to the third: Names which import a respect to creatures, consequent upon an action of the divine intellect or will, belong to God from eternity. The reason is: because the operation of the divine intellect or will is eternal.

COMMENTARY.

IN this article it must be noted first, that its matter is disputed by the Theologians in 1, d. 30, and its question was quite celebrated among the most ancient authors. St. Augustine, bk. 5 On the Trinity, ch. 16, openly teaches that this name, Lord, belongs to God in time: but in bk. 12 On the City of God, ch. 15, he does not dare to define whether God is called Lord from eternity, or rather in time. Second, it must be noted that two things could stand in the way of these names belonging to God in time. The first, because they import a real relation; the second, because they import a relation of reason, which could not come to God without His change: yet each difficulty is removed by St. Thomas in this article. For he defines that those names do not import a real relation to creatures, but a relation of reason, and that this relation of reason requires indeed a real change on the part of creatures, but not on the part of God.

IT IS DOUBTED first concerning the truth of the first conclusion, namely, whether these names belong to God in time, and import a relation of reason to creatures, or rather a real relation? And on this matter three opinions are current. The first asserts that these names belong to God in time, and further says that they import real relations in God to creatures, which relations also come to God in time. Gabriel teaches this opinion in the cited dist., q. 5; and Gregory of Ariminum in 1, d. 22; Marfil in 1, q. 32, judges this opinion very probable. And it is proved first: a real relation can come to a subject without its change: therefore there is nothing unfitting in there being in God a real relation coming in time. The antecedent is asserted by Aristotle, 5 Physics, and is clear: for Peter, being white, is rendered like without change of himself from the sole fact that Paul is born white, therefore. Second, it is proved: to create, to justify, etc. are real actions in God, and yet they belong to Him in time: therefore the same can be said of relations to creatures. Third and last, it is proved: God is the real cause of creatures; but a real cause is really referred to its effect, therefore.

The second opinion is that of Scotus in the cited dist., q. 1, who asserts two things: one is that in God no real relation to creatures is found; the other is that God is denominated not by some real relation or relation of reason which is in Him, but by the real relation which is in the creature. Thus God is called Lord by the relation which is in the subjected creature. Just as a work made by man is called human not by the humanity which is in the work itself, but by the humanity which is in the man effecting such a work. This opinion is proved, first, from the testimony of the Master of the Sentences in the cited dist., asserting that God is called Lord not by a relation which is in Him. And the Master confirms this opinion from St. Augustine, 5 On the Trinity, last chapter, where he has the same words. Second, it is proved: God is really Lord; therefore He is called Lord by a real relation. The consequence is clear: because a relation of reason cannot bestow a real denomination; further, but He is not denominated by a real relation which is in God: therefore by the real relation which is in the creature. And it is confirmed from St. Thomas, in this article, asserting that God is called Lord by the real subjection which the creature has to Him.

Third, it is proved: the knowable is referred to knowledge not by a relation which is in the knowable itself, but by the relation by which in knowledge it is really referred to the knowable itself: therefore it can likewise be said that God is really referred to the creature by the relation by which the creature is really referred to God Himself. The consequence is clear: because the relation which is found between God and creatures is of the same genus as the relation which is found between knowledge and the knowable. The antecedent, indeed, is proved from Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 20, where he says that the knowable is relative not because it is itself referred to knowledge, but because knowledge is referred to it.

The third opinion is that which is gathered from St. Thomas in this article, and is expressly asserted by him, 2nd book Contra Gentiles, ch. 12 and 13, which consists in two points; the first is: there is no real relation in God to creatures. The other is: in God there are some relations of reason by which He is referred to creatures. Thus God is called Lord not by the real relation which is in the subjected creature, but by the relation of lordship, which is a relation of reason in God.

Let the first Conclusion be: No real relation to creatures is found in God. This conclusion is asserted against the first opinion. And it is the common opinion of the Theologians following the Master in the cited d. 30, and it is so certain that the opposite is judged by the gravest men not only rash, but even close to error. It is proved first from St. Augustine, bk. 4 On the Trinity, last chapter, where he says that just as a coin is constituted the price without any reality coming to it, so God in time becomes Lord of creatures. And in the same book, ch. 4 and 5, he says that to God nothing, neither absolute nor relative, comes in time. Gregory of Ariminum answers that nothing real comes to God which is really distinguished as thing from thing from Him. But against this is the argument. First, because it is still under judgment and in doubt whether a relation is really distinguished as thing from thing from its foundation. And perhaps the affirmative opinion is more probable. Second. A real relation at least formally is really distinguished from its foundation: therefore if a real relation comes to God in time, some real form newly belongs to God: but this is against Augustine in the place above; and against the truth, because we would then be positing some real change formally in God. And it is confirmed: every real form newly coming to a subject confers upon it some real to-be: therefore if a real relation is a form newly coming to God, it confers upon Him some real to-be, and consequently causes some real change in God, at least formal. Third, it is proved: that real relation posited in God, formally speaking, is either an accident or a substance; it can be neither: therefore. That it is not an accident is clear from what was said by St. Thomas above, q. 3, art. 6, where he most effectively proves that no accident can be found in God. That it is not substantial is proved: no substantial account can come to God in time, for otherwise God would be changed substantially: therefore. And it is confirmed: that substance would be relative, therefore its whole to-be would be toward another, namely toward the creature; but it is impossible that the whole to-be of the divine substance be toward the creature, because this would be a great imperfection in the divine substance: therefore.

Second Conclusion: God is referred to creatures not by the relations which are in the creatures themselves, but by relations of reason which are in God Himself. This conclusion is set down against Scotus, but it is the common opinion among Theologians, and it is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas, 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 13: Relations which are in diverse extremes are opposed: therefore one extreme cannot be denominated by the relation which is in the other extreme, e.g. the son is not denominated by the relation which is in the father: therefore God cannot be denominated by the relation which is in the creature. And it is confirmed: the relation of the creature to God, as it is presupposed in God Himself, is a relation of servitude and not of lordship; therefore, if God were denominated by that relation, He would be denominated not Lord but servant.

Third Conclusion: Many relations belong to God in time. This conclusion is gathered from the two preceding ones, and is sufficiently proved and explained by St. Thomas in the letter of the article.

To the arguments of the first opinion, it is answered. To the first I say that Aristotle, 5 Physics, teaches that a relation comes to a subject without its real change absolutely; yet a real relation does not come without a real relative change: for the subject is really changed, with a new relation coming, from not-being-referred to being-referred. But such a real relative change is in no way to be posited in God.

Ferrara solves this argument otherwise, bk. 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 12, near the fourth reason. To the second, certain grave Theologians say that to create, to justify, etc. import divine perfections, yet not belonging to God in time, but from eternity. Since, they say, to create and to justify are immanent actions of God, which are therefore intrinsic perfections of God Himself, not distinct from His Essence. Thus creation, according to this opinion, is nothing else than the volition of the divine Will by which He willed from eternity to create things outside Himself in such a time. Other Theologians, on the contrary, teach that to create and to justify denote transeunt actions: and therefore posit no real perfection in God, but only a respect of reason to creatures. This difficulty is not of this place, but belongs to question 25, art. 1. See there the lord Cajetan, and Ferrara, 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 1, 9 and 16. For now it is briefly answered that to create and to justify etc. either do not import any perfection in God, but only a respect of reason, or if they import a perfection in God, it does not belong to God in time, but from eternity: and thus that argument proves nothing for our purpose. To the third, the consequence is denied; and to the proof it is answered from St. Thomas, in the body of the article, that for a mutual real relation it is required that the extremes be of the same account. But we must explain in what it consists that the extremes be of the same account. I say briefly that it consists in this, that in each extreme there be the same ground of founding the relation: the same, I say, specifically or quasi-specifically. This is explained, and first in relatives of the first genus, which are founded on quantity, the matter is manifest: for equality is founded on quantity, which is formally found in each extreme. In relatives of the second genus, which are founded on action and passion, this is explained; for the relation which is of the agent to the patient is founded on action, which is the perfection of both, both of the agent and of the patient. For every created agent is perfected and actuated by its action. Likewise, the patient is perfected by the action, insofar as by force of the action proceeding from the agent it receives in itself some perfection. In relatives of the third genus, however, which are founded on measure, the same ground of founding is not found in each extreme. Since the ground which founds the relation is a real perfection of one extreme and not of the other; e.g. the relation which is found between knowledge and the knowable is founded on the measuring by which knowledge is measured by the knowable: but this measuring, in knowledge, is a real perfection of knowledge itself, for it is its formal specification. But in the measuring knowable it posits no perfection. From this it follows, first, that in relatives of the third genus there cannot be a mutual real relation in each extreme; but on the part of one extreme it is real, on the part of the other it is a relation of reason. Thus knowledge is really referred to the knowable; the knowable, however, is referred to knowledge only by a relation of reason. Second, that the relation of creatures to God is a real relation: but that of God to creatures is a relation of reason, since there is not the same ground of founding in each extreme, namely in God and in creatures. For the ground of founding in creatures is a real perfection of them; in God, however, it posits no perfection, e.g. creation, by which creatures are produced into to-be, is a great perfection of creatures, but not of God Himself. Hence the relation which is founded on creation will be real on the part of the creature, but of reason on the part of God.

To the arguments of the second opinion, it is answered. To the first it is answered that the Master of the Sentences and St. Augustine teach nothing else than that in God no real relations to creatures are found; but they do not deny that relations of reason are found in God. To solve the second and third arguments, we must briefly explain that question which Scotus disputes in the place above, whether one relative is referred to another taken formally in relative to-be or rather in absolute to-be. Thus the doubt is whether knowledge is referred to the knowable so that the knowable terminates the relation of knowledge by something absolute or rather by something respective? And likewise, whether God terminates the relation of servitude by the absolute to-be of God Himself or rather by the respective to-be of the Lord Himself? On this matter Scotus teaches, in the place above, that He terminates according to absolute to-be, and Scotus seems to speak of all relatives. Cajetan, on the contrary, in this article teaches that in every genus of relation the term of the relation formally is not something absolute, but respective. Thus the father terminates the relation of the son under the relative account of paternity; and likewise God terminates the relation of servitude of creatures under the formal respective account of lordship, that is, insofar as He is Lord. Ferrara, book 2 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11, teaches that the term of the relation in itself is something absolute, and this especially in relatives of the third genus. But yet the term of some relation cannot be explained by us unless it is explained under respective to-be. Thus God, according to His absolute to-be, terminates the relation of servitude, but it cannot be explained by us how He terminates that relation unless we consider God Himself insofar as He is formally Lord.

On this matter, briefly, let the first Conclusion be. In relatives according to expression the opinion of Ferrara is most true; e.g. potency regards act according to the absolute account of act. The Conclusion is proved: a relative according to expression properly and formally is something absolute. For the transcendental relation which it intrinsically imports is not simply a relation: therefore such a relative regards the term according to the absolute to-be of the term itself.

Second Conclusion: In relatives according to to-be of the first and second genus, the relative regards the term formally according to respective to-be, e.g. the father is referred to the son under the formal account of filiation, and the opposite of this opinion is improbable. It is proved first: in such relatives there is the same ground of founding the relation in each extreme: therefore these relatives mutually regard each other according to the formal account of the relation. It is proved second: the Father is referred to the divine Son under the formal account of filiation; but the account is altogether the same in this respect in created relations: therefore. The major is proved: according as the Father is referred to the Son, the Son is really referred by the Father; but He is not distinguished from the Father according to His absolute to-be, but only according to respective to-be: therefore.

Third Conclusion: In relatives of the third genus, the term, formally speaking, is something respective and not absolute. This conclusion is set down against the opinion of Scotus and Ferrara; but it is the doctrine of Cajetan in this article. It is proved: the relative, according as it is referred to the term, is opposed to the term itself by relative opposition; but the relative and the term are not opposed by relative opposition according to absolute to-be: therefore the term, in the formal account of term, is not something absolute, but respective: the Major, in every genus of relation, is manifest. The minor is proved: the creature, as it has the relation of servitude, is not opposed to God, considering God Himself in substantial to-be, but only considering Him in the to-be of Lord, which to-be is respective. Read the other arguments in this commentary of Cajetan. Against this conclusion, however, two testimonies contend. One is Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 20, where he says that the knowable is not referred to knowledge except because knowledge is referred to it. From this testimony it is openly gathered that in the knowable there is no relation by which it formally terminates the relation of knowledge to it; and consequently it terminates according to absolute to-be. The other testimony is St. Thomas, q. 7 On Power, art. 10, ad 4, where he says that in God three things are found for Him to be called Lord: coercive Power over creatures, the order of lordship to the creatures themselves, and to terminate the subjection and relation of servitude of creatures.

The first and the third, says St. Thomas, are really in God. But the second, namely the order of lordship, is not in God except through the operation of the intellect. From this testimony I argue thus: to terminate the relation of servitude is really found in God; but the order of lordship is not found really in God: therefore God terminates the relation of servitude according to His absolute real to-be which He has, and not according to the respective to-be of lordship. To the first testimony, it is answered that Aristotle in that place does not intend to teach, as Scotus falsely thought, that the knowable is referred to knowledge by the same relation by which knowledge is referred to the knowable itself. Nor does he intend to teach, as Ferrara thought, that the knowable is for that reason referred to knowledge because knowledge is referred to it: so that the proximate foundation of the relation of the knowable to knowledge be the relation of knowledge to the knowable. The true understanding of Aristotle in that place, therefore, is one of two: The first is that of Cajetan in this place, that the relation of the knowable to knowledge has, that it is real, from this alone, that knowledge is really referred to the knowable. For the understanding of this it is to be noted that the relation of the knowable can be considered in two ways: first in itself, insofar as it is a relative form by which the knowable is referred to knowledge; second as it constitutes the knowable itself not in the account of a relative, but in the account of the term terminating the relation of knowledge. If it is considered in the first way, it is altogether a relation of reason, and in no way belongs to any real predicament. If, however, it is considered in the second way, it is indeed, simply speaking, a relation of reason, but yet it is founded in a real predicament, because the term of each thing is reductively placed in that predicament to which the terminated thing belongs; e.g. the point of a line is reductively placed in the predicament of quantity. From this, therefore, it follows that the relation of the knowable, although simply it is a relation of reason, yet insofar as it is the relative form by which the knowable terminates the relation of knowledge to it, is reduced to the real predicament of relation, and this is what Aristotle taught in that cited place. The second understanding of that place is that the relation of the knowable to knowledge is founded on the same foundation on which the relation of knowledge to the knowable is founded. Thus the specification or measuring by which knowledge is specified by the knowable is the proximate foundation of the twin relation, of which one is real and the other of reason; and this is what Aristotle intends insinuating in those words, that the whole ground of founding each relation is found really in knowledge and not in the knowable: since the specification of knowledge posits nothing real in the specifying knowable. What we have said of the relation which is between knowledge and the knowable is to be said proportionally of the relations of God to creatures. For the whole ground of founding is found really in creatures and not in God. To the second testimony of St. Thomas, first it is answered with St. Cajetan in this article that St. Thomas in that place was speaking of the term of the relation of servitude not formally, but fundamentally. Thus he wishes to say that in God, really speaking, is found the foundation of that relation of reason by which He formally terminates the relation of servitude. Second, it is answered that the relation of lordship, insofar as it constitutes God in the account of the term terminating the relation of servitude, belongs reductively to the real predicament; and denominates God really Lord, although in itself, and simply speaking, it is a mere relation of reason. St. Thomas wishes therefore to say that the relation of lordship in God is a relation of reason, belonging to Him through the operation of the intellect. But insofar as it constitutes God in the account of the term really terminating the real relation of servitude, it belongs to the real predicament, and He is denominated really Lord. But there is an argument: God, before the operation of the intellect, terminates the relation of servitude; but the relation of lordship does not belong to God before the operation of the intellect: therefore He does not terminate formally under the account of lordship. The minor is proved. Since a relation of reason is not before the operation of the intellect. It is answered that there are some beings of reason which have outside the intellect each foundation, both remote and proximate. Of this kind are privations, such as blindness; and these relations, and beings of reason of this kind which belong to God in time, simply have to-be in their genus before the operation of the intellect. Since the whole to-be of a being of reason consists in this, that it have objective to-be of the intellect; but these beings of reason, which have their proximate foundation in reality, have objective to-be of the intellect before the operation of the intellect itself, not indeed in complete act, but in proximate potency, which suffices for a being of reason to be said to be simply in its genus. Just as the Metaphysicians say that the universal comes to be through abstraction, so that before the actual comparison of the nature to its individuals it is said to be universal from the fact that its proximate foundation is already posited, namely the abstraction of the nature from singular conditions. So therefore I say in the present case that the relation of lordship, from the fact that it has its proximate foundation in reality, simply has to-be in its genus before the intellect compares God to the subjected creatures. Hence the minor is denied. From these things the answer to the second and third arguments of Scotus must be given. And indeed the third argument remains solved from that explanation applied to the testimony of Aristotle, 5 Metaphysics, text 20. To the second it is answered that servitude, which really denominates the creature servant by intrinsic denomination, denominates God really Lord by extrinsic denomination, not indeed immediately, as Scotus thought, but through the mediation of the relation of lordship which holds itself on the part of God. Thus in the denomination of lordship we understand two things: one is the formal denomination itself by which God is called Lord; and this is not by the relation of servitude, but by the relation of lordship. The other is the reality of this denomination, and this is not by the account of lordship, but is wholly taken from the relation of servitude, which is a real relation in the creature. Read the lord Cajetan on the solution to the fourth in this article.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: Although this name is imposed from operation, the thing which it signifies is the divine nature.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning this article, see what we said in the first article, in the third and fourth conclusion.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: If we attend to the thing signified, it is incommunicable. The reason is: because the divine substance is altogether incommunicable, namely, ad extra. Second conclusion: On the part of the mode of signifying, and according to a certain likeness, and according to imperfect participation, it is communicable. The reason is: because in creatures there is found some imperfect likeness of the divine substance. Third conclusion: If there were some name of God signifying Him, as He is this something, that is, a subsisting supposit, it would be altogether incommunicable, and of this kind perhaps was that Iehova.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: It is neither univocal nor purely equivocal, but analogical. This is clear from what has been said.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. This conclusion is proved in a threefold way by St. Thomas, as is clear in the letter of the article.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning this article note first, that for this name to-be to be most proper to God is nothing else than for it to be most intrinsic to Him. Second note that Lyra, Burgensis, and Cajetan, on Exod. 3, say that in the Hebrew letter there is not read in the present, He who is, but in the future. One asks. For the rest, in our Vulgate edition, and in the 70, it is had in the present, He who is, and so the Holy Fathers commonly read. See St. Jerome in the letter to Marcella, and chaps. 7 and 32 on Jerem., and St. Augustine, book 8 of The City, chap. 6. Wherefore this reading is to be preferred by us. Third, note the solution to the first of this article and read Cajetan concerning it.