Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)
First published 1584
Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.
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Prologus auctoris ad lectorem
In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio
Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat
Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia
Commentarium
THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.
First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (pars prior)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica
Commentarium
Dubium 1: Objectiones
Dubium 1: Commentarium
Dubium 1: Responsiones
Articulus V: Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (textus Latinus sine versione Hispanica)
Dubium 1
Articulus VI: Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia
Commentarium
Dubium I
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae
Commentarium
Dubium I
Textus Augustini ante articulum 8
Articulus VIII: Utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Articulus IX: Utrum Sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris
Commentarium
Commentarium; Dubium I
Articulus X: Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Dubium 7
Dubium 8
Dubium 9
Quaestio II: De Deo, an Deus sit
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Articulus II: Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit
Quaestio III: De Dei simplicitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit corpus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae
Articulus III: Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura
Articulus IV: Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse
Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo
Articulus VI: Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex
Articulus VIII: Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat
Quaestio IV: De Dei perfectione
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit perfectus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum
Articulus III: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo
Quaestio V: De bono in communi
Articulus I: Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente
Articulus II: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens
Articulus III: Utrum omne ens sit bonum
Articulus IV: Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis
Articulus V: Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine
Articulus VI: Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile
Quaestio VI: De bonitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum esse bonum Deo conveniat
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit summum bonum
Articulus III: Utrum esse bonum per essentiam sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sit bona bonitate divina
Quaestio VII: De Infinitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit infinitus
Articulus II: Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam
Articulus III: Utrum possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem
Articulus IV: Utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem
Quaestio VIII: De existentia Dei in rebus
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit ubique
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam
Articulus IV: Utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei
Quaestio IX: De Dei immutabilitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis
Articulus II: Utrum esse inmutabile sit Dei proprium
Quaestio X: De Dei Aeternitate
Articulus I: Utrum convenienter definiatur aeternitas, quod est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit aeternus
Articulus III: Utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum aeternitas differat a tempore
Articulus V: De differentia aevi et temporis
Articulus VI: Utrum sit unum aevum tantum
Quaestio XI: De unitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens
Articulus II: Utrum unum et multa opponantur
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit unus
Articulus IV: Utrum Deus sit maxime unus
Quaestio XII: Quomodo Deus cognoscatur a nobis
Articulus I: Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam
Articulus II: Utrum essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur
Articulus III: Utrum Essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus
Articulus IV: Utrum aliquis intellectus per sua naturalia Divinam Essentiam videre possit
Articulus V: Utrum intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei Essentiam aliquo creato lumine indigeat
Articulus VI: Utrum videntium Dei Essentiam unus alio perfectius videat
Articulus VII: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, ipsum comprehendant
Articulus VIII: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, omnia in Deo videant
Articulus IX: Utrum ea quae videntur in Deo a videntibus Divinam Essentiam, videantur per aliquas similitudines creatas
Articulus X: Utrum videntes Deum per Essentiam, simul videant omnia quae in ipso vident
SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.
The Conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: because the things seen in God are seen through a single intelligible likeness, which is the Divine Essence.
COMMENTARY.
IN this article there is a doubt concerning the truth of the conclusion. And it is proved false. First. If the Blessed see at once in the Word all the things that concern their state, it follows that their knowledge is very imperfect; the consequent is not to be admitted: therefore. The consequence is proved from that common principle, intent on many things, sense is less toward each single thing: therefore the intellect of the Blessed, if it knows many things at once in the Word, contemplates them imperfectly and faintly. Second. If the soul of Christ the Lord beholds at once in the Word all things that concern its state, it follows that its beatific vision is infinitely more perfect than the vision of any other Blessed. The consequent is not to be admitted: therefore. The consequence is proved. The soul of Christ the Lord sees in the Word all the things that God knows by the knowledge of Vision, as is said in the 3rd part, q. 10, art. 2, ad secundum; De Veritate, q. 8, art. 4; but these are infinite, as is explained in the same place: therefore if it sees all things at once, its Vision exceeds in infinity the vision of any other Blessed. The consequence is clear: for every other Blessed sees finite things in the Word. Third. Each Blessed knows all singulars and individuals of each created specific nature; but he does not know them at once: therefore. The antecedent is proved. The natural knowledge of an Angel extends itself to all individuals and singulars of each specific nature; but the blessed vision is more perfect than any natural knowledge: therefore it too extends itself to singular individuals. And it is confirmed. Knowledge of singulars belongs to the perfection of the intellect: therefore the beatific vision extends itself to all singulars. The consequence is proved. Because the blessed vision confers every perfection on the intellect. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, below, q. 14, art. 11. Further, it is proved by reason. To know future contingents and the thoughts of hearts is a great perfection of the intellect, and so knowledge of them is attributed to the divine intellect alone; but these are certain singulars: therefore. Further, prudential knowledge greatly perfects the intellect, but this knowledge is concerned with singulars: therefore. The minor is proved, namely, that all these singulars cannot be known at once. Singulars are not known except when they actually exist; but they do not all exist at once: therefore. The major is asserted by St. Thomas below, q. 89, art. 8, where he says that each Blessed knows in the Word the things done among us, and in the 3rd Contra Gentes, c. 59|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.59, he says that the Blessed know all singulars existing under species: therefore, according to St. Thomas, the Blessed know only existing singulars. Fourth. Each Blessed knows in the Word all things that concern his state, but he cannot know these at once, but successively: therefore. The minor is proved: the things that pertain to the state of the Blessed are not all at once when the Blessed begins to see God, but happen successively afterwards: e.g., it belongs to the state of Blessed Dominic to know the things done in the Dominican Order, but these happen in succession of time: therefore. And it is confirmed: it belongs to the state of any Blessed whatever to know the prayers and petitions poured forth to him; but he does not know these at once, but knows each prayer when it is sent forth to him: therefore. It is confirmed secondly: it belongs to the state of the Angels to know all the things committed to their care and governance; but the Angels do not know these at once, but successively: therefore. The minor is proved from what is read in Daniel 10, that the angels to whom was committed the governance of the Israelite people and the Persian kingdom did not know what was to be done concerning the departure of the Israelite people from the Persian kingdom. In this doubt, Scotus in the 3rd book, d. 14, q. 2, speaking specially of the soul of Christ, says that the soul of Christ sees in the Word all the things that God knows by the knowledge of vision, yet not actually but habitually; that is, the actual vision of the Word is a habitual knowledge of creatures, so that successively the soul of Christ the Lord can now know some one creature in the Word, and afterwards another, and so successively of all. Major in the 4th book, d. 49, q. 5, holds this opinion probable, and each hints that the same is to be said of the other Blessed. But notwithstanding these, the opinion of St. Thomas contained in the conclusion of the article, which excludes all succession from the Beatific Vision of any Blessed whatever, is to be held as most certain. And the opposite, though it is not an error in faith, is nevertheless improbable. It is proved first from St. Augustine, in the 15th De Trinit., c. 16, the passage cited by St. Thomas in the argument On the contrary, and in book 83 of the Quaestionum, q. 25, where he says that the soul of any Blessed whatever, and his wisdom, are measured by participated eternity, and by the name of wisdom Augustine understands the Vision of the Divine Essence; but the things measured by participated eternity are wholly at once, nor do they admit any succession: therefore the blessed Vision is wholly at once according to Augustine. Second it is proved by reason. All the principles of the blessed Vision remain unvaried through all eternity: therefore in the beatific Vision there will be no change nor variation, and so it is wholly at once. The consequence appears good; the antecedent is proved. The light of glory will neither grow nor diminish through all eternity; the Divine Essence will always be united in the same way to the blessed intellect in the account of intelligible likeness, and these are all the principles of the beatific Vision: therefore. And it is confirmed. The Blessed knows creatures in the Divine Essence, according as they are represented in it; but creatures are represented in the Divine Essence in the same way through all eternity: therefore they are always known in the Divine Essence in the same way. This reason, with its confirmation, proceeds a priori, and is most efficacious. See the other reasons in this article, and in the 3rd Contra Gentes, chap. 60.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.60
To the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, the consequence is denied. And to the proof I say that the axiom, Intent on many things, etc., has truth only when many things are known in the manner of many; but in the blessed Vision many creatures are known not in the manner of many, but in the manner of one; for they are known through a single likeness, and insofar as they come together under one formal and primary object, which is the Divine Essence. To the second, it is briefly answered that the blessed Vision of the soul of Christ is more perfect than any other blessed Vision, indeed infinitely, but not infinitely simply, but in a certain respect: because the soul of Christ sees infinite creatures, not simply infinite, but in a certain genus. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ is disputed at length in the 3rd part, quaest. 10. To the third, it is answered first: with the major granted, I deny the minor. To the proof it is to be answered that those testimonies of St. Thomas are to be taken in this sense, that each Blessed will see from the first instant of his Beatitude all singulars that will have existence in some difference of time, excepting however thoughts and volitions. For these singulars the soul of Christ alone beholds in the Word: because knowledge of them belongs to its state. Ferrara, in the 3rd Cont. Gent., chap. 59|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.59, thinks it can probably be said that the Blessed, in the first instant of his Beatitude, knows in the Word only those singulars which then actually exist, or existed in past time. Future singulars he knows afterwards in the Word, successively according as they come to be and exist. As is commonly said of the knowledge of angels, that the angelic likeness without any change of itself represents singulars to the angel successively, according as they actually exist in the nature of things. But this opinion, though it can in some way be defended, is nevertheless false, and contrary to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in this art. and in the 3rd Cont. Gent., c. 59|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.59, and in q. 8 De Veritate, art. 4: in which places he most openly excludes all succession from the blessed Vision. Further, the likeness which is the principle of the beatific Vision represents all things actually, with all potentiality and succession removed, which is not found in the likenesses of angels: therefore. Second it is answered, as more probable to me, that each Blessed knows in the Word only those singulars that pertain to his state. And it is of these singulars that St. Thomas is to be understood when he asserts that each Blessed sees the things done among us, and sees singulars existing under species. Hence to the argument, the major is denied; for certainly if each Blessed beheld all singulars in the Word, it would be asked in vain by the Theologians whether each Blessed sees in the Word all the things that concern his state. To the proof, with major and minor granted, the consequence is denied. And the reason is: because the likenesses of angels do indeed represent all singulars, but yet successively, according as they come to be in the nature of things. But this succession of representation is unfitting for the beatific Vision. To the confirmation it is answered that we can speak of the intellect in two ways, both as speculative and as practical. If we speak of the intellect as speculative, knowledge of singulars is not its perfection, properly speaking, as Saint Thomas teaches in art. 8 of this question, ad quartum: it is however a sign of perfection, so that a more perfect and more universal knowledge extends itself to more singulars, and in this sense St. Thomas is to be understood below, q. 14, art. 11; and in the same sense it holds true that knowledge of future contingents is a great perfection of the intellect. But if the discussion concerns the intellect as practical, I grant that knowledge of singulars belongs to its perfection, not indeed of all singulars, but of those whose knowledge is required per se for judgments of prudence concerning matters of the moral virtues. And all these singulars each Blessed knows in the Word. To the fourth, Cajetan in the 3rd part, q. 10, art. 2, teaches that each Blessed knows in the Word all the things that pertain to his state for the first instant of his Beatitude; the rest, which in the course of the Beatitude pertain to his state, he knows indeed in the Word, yet not formally but causally, that is, from the vision of the Word there arises that peculiar revelations concerning such things be made to him. From this opinion Durandus in the 4th book, d. 49, q. 3, in the solutions of the arguments of the second and third, does not recede far, an opinion which without doubt is probable, and from it many difficulties commonly raised in this place are solved. But nevertheless it seems to me more probable, with Ferrara in the place cited above, that each Blessed sees in the Word formally all the things that concern his state in the whole course of the Beatitude, and sees all these from the first moment of his Beatitude without any succession. But it is to be noted that since the beatific state is invariable, all the things that concern the state of each Blessed for the whole progress of the Beatitude pertain to him for the first instant of the Beatitude, at least radically, e.g., to the state of Blessed Dominic pertain all the things of any moment in the Dominican family, and in the first instant of his Beatitude all these pertained to his state radically, because the whole Dominican order itself already then pertained to him. But someone will argue: if each Blessed beholds in the Word formally all things that concern his state, it follows that a less Blessed can see more creatures in the Word than one who is more blessed; the consequent is false: therefore. The consequence is proved. For more things can pertain to the state of one Blessed than to the state of another more Blessed, for example, suppose St. Lawrence is more blessed than Blessed Dominic, it is certain that more things pertain to the state of B. Dominic than to the state of B. Lawrence: because to B. Dominic belong all the things done in his order. To this argument certain Theologians say there is no unfittingness in admitting that a less Blessed sees more singulars in the Word, because knowledge of singulars does not cause greater essential Beatitude. Yet this solution is improbable: because he who knows more singulars in the Divine Essence sees the Divine Essence itself more perfectly, and consequently his beatitude is essentially more perfect. To the argument, therefore, it is answered that the excess of singulars in which the less Blessed exceeds is compensated in the more Blessed through knowledge of other creatures, whether existing or possible, which are seen by the more Blessed in the Divine Essence, and not by the less Blessed. To the first confirmation: Cajetan, in 2nd-2nd, q. 83, art. 4, near the solution ad secundum, thinks that each Blessed beholds in the Word from the first instant of his Beatitude all the prayers to be poured forth to him in the whole course of his Beatitude. And this opinion has some foundation in St. Thomas, in that solution ad secundum. But the truer opinion appears, and one more received by the Theologians, that each Blessed knows all the prayers poured forth to him through special revelations. Thus he knows them in the Word not formally but causally. And this St. Thomas openly teaches in that solution ad secundum, if the words are truly weighed. This therefore supposed, to the confirmation I say that to know the prayers of the faithful does not pertain intrinsically to the state of any Blessed whatever, except only of Christ the Lord. For Christ the Lord, because he is the mediator of God and men, is also our advocate with the Father. And so it belongs to his state to know the prayers of all men to be poured forth to him in all eternity. It is true, however, that as St. Thomas teaches in the place above, in 2nd-2nd, it belongs to the excellence of all the Blessed to know the petitions poured forth to them by wayfarers. This excellence, however, is not intrinsic to the beatific state of any Blessed, Christ excepted, but is per se consequent upon that state. For since all the Blessed are friends and intimates of God, indeed even table-companions, from a natural consequence there arises that they have free faculty of presenting our petitions to God, and of interceding for us. From this it follows that it is not necessary for the Blessed to know our petitions and prayers formally in the Word; yet it is necessary that they know them causally in the Word. To the second confirmation it is similarly answered that it does not pertain per se to the beatific state of the Angels to be deputed to the custody and governance of some province or kingdom, or to be sent to execute some ministry in the Church militant, but this belongs to them not as they are Blessed, but as they are Ministers of God, sent into ministry for those who receive the inheritance of salvation; Heb. 1. It is true that such ministry redounds to their excellence, because to serve God is to reign. Concerning the reason of St. Thomas in this art. it is to be noted first that the opinion of St. Thomas that the intellect cannot be informed at once by many likenesses is to be understood of actual information. Thus there is no unfittingness in the intellect being at once informed by very many likenesses in the manner of a habit: but it cannot at once use many likenesses in the manner of many. This understanding is had expressly in St. Thomas, 1st-2nd, q. 54, art. 1, ad ultimum. Second it is to be noted that this same opinion is to be understood of likenesses of the same order. For there is no unfittingness in the intellect being at once perfectly actuated by many likenesses of diverse order, e.g., the soul of Christ the Lord at once knows through the divine likeness, that is through the Divine Essence, and through a per se infused created likeness, and finally through a per se acquired likeness. And the reason of this is: because a likeness of a higher order eminently contains a likeness of a lower order. Thus the Divine Essence in the account of likeness most eminently contains the infused likeness, and the acquired. Likewise the per se infused likeness eminently contains the per se acquired likeness. Wherefore when the intellect is at once actuated by these three likenesses, it is not reckoned to be actuated by many likenesses speaking simply, but by a single likeness perfectly explicated according to all its power. See Cajetan in this article, near the reason of the article.