Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: No created intellect seeing God through His Essence sees in Him all things that God does and can do.

Second conclusion: Of those things which God does or can do, the created intellect knows so many more, the more perfectly it sees God.

Third conclusion, to the fourth: Each Blessed sees in the Divine Essence all the species, all the genera of created things, and their accounts.

Fourth conclusion, to the "how many": No Blessed sees in the Divine Essence all individuals, all their thoughts, and all things that have not been made but yet can be made.

COMMENTARY.

In this article it is to be noted that St. Thomas, as is clear from the letter, does not speak of the perfections which are in God formally, but only of those which are in God eminently: and of this kind are the perfections which belong to creatures.

There is a grave doubt in this article: Whether the Blessed sees some creatures in the Divine Essence, and whether he sees all, even possibles? On the matter of this doubt, the Scholastics dispute in 4, d. 49, and some in 3, d. 14. And on this matter four opinions are current. The first opinion asserts that the Blessed, in the Divine Essence, sees no creature; but the knowledge of creatures is had by the Blessed outside the Word, through likenesses implanted by God. Whence this opinion infers that when the Holy Fathers and the gravest Theologians teach that the Blessed see creatures in the Word, the sense in this expression is not formal but causal, that is, that from the fact that the Blessed gaze upon the Word there result in them implanted likenesses representing creatures in their proper genus. This opinion is taught by Gabriel in 3, dist. 14, q. unica, and Major in 4, d. 49, q. 3, and Ockham in the same dist., q. 15. This opinion is proved first. The blessed vision is an intuitive cognition clearly and distinctly representing its object; but what represents the Divine Essence cannot clearly and distinctly represent a creature: therefore the Blessed, in the divine and beatific Vision, knows no creature through the Divine Essence. The minor is proved. Every distinct and express representation must come about through the proper likeness of the thing represented; but the Divine Essence is not the proper likeness of any creature: therefore. And it is confirmed: the Divine Essence does not represent creatures according to the mode which the creatures themselves have; therefore it does not represent them distinctly and clearly. The antecedent is proved: creatures have in themselves a potential mode of being; but the Divine Essence represents as pure act having no potentiality: therefore it does not represent them as they are. It is confirmed, second: the knowledge of a thing which is had in the image or in the effective cause of the thing itself is not a clear and intuitive knowledge of that thing, because through that knowledge the thing is not known in itself but in another: therefore the knowledge of creatures which would be had in the Divine Essence would not be an intuitive knowledge of them. The consequence is proved: because creatures would be known not in themselves but in their image and effective cause. It is proved second: that the Blessed gazes upon some creatures in the Divine Essence does not follow necessarily from the fact that he sees the Divine Essence itself: therefore it is gratuitously asserted that each Blessed sees some creatures in the Divine Essence. The consequence is manifest, but the antecedent is proved. In the Divine Essence no creature can be known unless the Divine Essence itself is seen by the created intellect as it bespeaks a respect to creatures, and insofar as it is the idea, exemplar, and effective cause of them: but from the fact that the Divine Essence is seen according to itself, it is not necessary that it be seen as it bespeaks a respect to creatures, and as it is the exemplar and cause of them: therefore. The major is manifest: since the Divine Essence is not the ground of knowing creatures except as it is the exemplar and cause of them. The minor was proved above, in the preceding article, doubt one, conclusion two. And it is confirmed first, by the argument used by Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 6, art. 4, who perhaps was the first author of this opinion. If the Divine Essence is known by the created intellect as it is the exemplar and cause of creatures, it follows that the created intellect knows all the creatures that God can produce; the consequent is impossible, since this would be to comprehend the divine power; therefore. The consequence is proved. The Divine Essence, known intuitively as it is the exemplar and cause of creatures, equally represents all possible creatures: therefore the created intellect, by the ground by which it knows some creatures in the Divine Essence, can also know all. It is confirmed second. The Divine Essence, as it is the idea of creatures, is a form conceived by the divine intellect, as we shall say below in q. 15: therefore from the fact that the Blessed gazes upon the Divine Essence itself it does not follow necessarily that he knows it as it is the idea of creatures, and so it is not necessary that he know some creatures in it. It is confirmed third. For if from the nature of the Beatific Vision it followed necessarily that the Blessed knows some creatures in the Divine Essence, and that he knows the Essence itself as it is the idea and exemplar of creatures, it would follow that by absolute power it could not come about that the Blessed gaze upon the Divine Essence without knowing some creatures; but the consequent appears most false; therefore. The consequence is proved. By absolute power it cannot come about that the Blessed gaze upon the Divine Essence without seeing some formal attribute, for the reason that it is of the intrinsic account of the Beatific Vision that, the Essence being seen, all its formal attributes are seen; therefore the account is the same in our case. Other arguments for this opinion can be seen in Gabriel, ubi supra; and in Durandus, in 4, dist. 49, quaest. 5.

There is a second opinion, which at the other extreme says that each Blessed gazes in the Divine Essence upon all possible creatures and their accounts, both as to their essences and as to their actual existences. This opinion is reported among the authors named by St. Thomas in q. 8 De Verit., art. 4, and Durandus, ubi supra. It is proved first. The intellect can know, by a single intellection, all those things that are represented to it through a single likeness; but to the blessed intellect there are represented through a single likeness, namely through the Divine Essence united in the account of a likeness, all things that God does and can do, and their accounts: therefore, by a single Beatific Vision, it knows all these. It is proved second. That the Divine Essence represents to the blessed intellect some creatures and does not represent others does not come from the Will of God alone, nor from the Divine Essence united in the account of a likeness, nor from the light of glory: therefore the Blessed knows all creatures, even possibles, without any limitation.

The antecedent is proved. And first, that it does not come from the Will of God alone is manifestly clear: since besides the divine Will there must be constituted some intrinsic ground of the Beatific Vision through which that limitation to representing certain creatures comes about. That it does not come from the Divine Essence is proved: for the Divine Essence is equally disposed to representing all creatures, both created and possible: therefore. That it does not come from the light of glory is proved: for the light of glory of itself primarily elevates the intellect to seeing the Essence of God; but as it were secondarily to seeing creatures, as they are represented in the Divine Essence: therefore, if on the part of the Divine Essence all creatures are equally represented, the light of glory causes no determination to knowing certain and determinate creatures. To this argument some Theologians answer that the determination to knowing certain creatures in the Divine Essence is taken from the actual existence of the creatures themselves, within the order of the Universe. Thus the Divine Essence represents first the existing creatures, and of the non-existing it represents to some Blessed those creatures which have greater similitude and affinity with the existing creatures. This solution seems not to have displeased St. Thomas, q. 8 De Veritate, art. 4, ad 12. But against it is argued: the Divine Essence and the Divine Power is in no way determined or changed by the actual production of things ad extra: therefore, by the actual existence of things, it is not determined to representing existing creatures rather than non-existing. And it is confirmed: for from this solution it will follow that each Blessed would gaze in the Divine Essence upon all individuals and singulars which exist a parte rei, or will exist at some difference of time; the consequent is false, and against St. Thomas in this art., ad 4. Second, the same solution is attacked. For from it follows that two Blessed in an equal degree of beatitude would of necessity see in the Divine Essence exactly the same creatures. But the consequent is false; since it can happen that some creatures pertain to the state of one Blessed and not to the state of another, e.g. Blessed Dominic and Blessed Francis are perhaps equal in Beatitude, and yet Blessed Dominic sees some things in the Word, and Blessed Francis others: since Blessed Dominic sees those things that regard the Dominican family; Blessed Francis, indeed, sees those that pertain to the religious order instituted by him. Third, it is proved, and at the same time the argument is refuted by which St. Thomas in this article proves the first conclusion. From the fact that the Blessed knows in the Word all the effects producible by God, it does not follow that he comprehends the Divine Essence: therefore there is no repugnance in the Blessed knowing all things in the Word. The antecedent is proved. For the comprehension of the Divine Essence, an infinite knowledge extensive of all those things that are in God eminently does not suffice; but there is required an infinite knowledge of them intensive, that is, by which they are known in every mode in which they are knowable; but from infinite knowledge extensive there does not necessarily follow infinite knowledge intensive: therefore. The minor is proved: all the formal Attributes of God are known by the Blessed with infinite knowledge extensive: since all are known, which are infinite, and yet they are not known infinitely intensive: therefore. And it is confirmed first: from the fact that the Blessed knows one effect it does not follow that he comprehends the Divine Essence as it is the cause of that effect: therefore from the fact that he sees all effects universally it does not follow that he comprehends the Divine Essence as it is the cause of them all.

It is confirmed second: if the created intellect knew all the effects producible by God in themselves, it would not comprehend the divine power: therefore if it knows them all in the Divine Essence it does not comprehend the divine power. The antecedent is proved. All producible effects, if they were in fact produced per impossibile, would not equal the divine power, since the whole of created being does not equal the perfection of uncreated being: therefore the knowledge of them all does not equal the perfection of the divine power, and, consequently, does not comprehend it.

Fourth, the same opinion is proved. From the fact that the Blessed sees every formal perfection of God it does not follow that he comprehends Him: therefore neither from the fact that he sees all things that are in God eminently. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the preceding article. The consequence is proved. If two perfections belong to the same subject in a certain order, and one is the total ground on account of which the other belongs to that subject, if from the knowledge of the former the comprehension of the thing does not follow, much less from the knowledge of the latter; but the formal perfection of God is the whole ground on account of which all creatures are eminently in God: therefore if from the knowledge of the formal divine perfection the comprehension of God does not follow, neither does it follow from the knowledge of all creatures which are eminently in God.

It is proved last: the Divine Essence represents all creatures universally, as a voluntary mirror, as St. Augustine teaches in the Letter to Paulina; but, the mirror having been seen, all those things that are represented in it are necessarily seen: therefore.

The third opinion is, and consists in two points. The first is. Each Blessed gazes in the Word upon all creatures, both produced and producible, as to their essences and essential accounts. It is proved: all creatures are represented naturally in the Word as to their proper essences and essential accounts: therefore. The second is: no Blessed knows necessarily and from the nature of the beatific Vision any creature as to its actual existence; but the knowledge of the actual existence of any creature whatever depends on the disposition of the divine will. This is proved: no creature is represented naturally in the Word as to its actual existence: since the actual existence of creatures depends on the divine and free will of God: therefore. The consequence is proved: since those things alone are necessarily seen by the beatific Vision which are represented naturally in the Divine Essence. This opinion is taught by Godfrey, cited by Cajetan and by Capreolus, in 4, dist. 49, quaest. 6; Durandus, in the dist. just cited, quaest. 2.

The fourth and last opinion is the one St. Thomas teaches in this article, and it is to be explained by us. Deliberately, in this place, I pass over the opinion of Scotus in 5, dist. 14, quaest. 2, since there will again be occasion to speak of his opinion in art. 10 following. For the resolution of this doubt it is to be noted that this question can be disputed in a twofold sense. One is de facto, namely whether all the Blessed see in the Word all creatures universally. The other sense is de possibili, namely whether by the absolute power of God it can come about that some created intellect sees in the Word all things that are eminently contained in God; and in each sense this question is to be resolved by us.

Let the first conclusion be: No Blessed sees in the Word all things that God does and can do, nor can this come about by the absolute power of God. This conclusion is the express opinion of St. Thomas in this article, and in 4, dist. 49, quaest. 2, art. 5, and wherever he speaks of this matter. But he proves it elegantly, 3 Contra Gent., cap. 56. St. Thomas is followed by the gravest men, St. Bonaventure, Marfil., and other Scholastics, besides the authors cited in the preceding opinions. And as to the first part, which speaks de facto, it is so certain that the opposite is either heresy or proximate to heresy. And it is proved first. From the Sacred Scriptures it is most openly established that the blessed Angels do not see in the Word all the mysteries of grace, and the account is entirely the same for the other Blessed: therefore. The major is proved from that of Isaiah, 63: Who is this, that comes from Edom? etc. With this testimony another of Psalm 23 agrees: "Who is this king of glory? etc." These testimonies the Holy Fathers interpret of the interrogation of the Angels doubting concerning some mysteries pertaining to Christ the Lord and to the reparation of the human race. So interpret St. Ambrose in the book On the Institution of the Virgin, chapter 5; St. Dionysius, in the chapter on the Celestial Hierarchy; St. Jerome on this place of Isaiah, and on those words of Paul to the Ephesians, 3: "That there may be made known to the principalities and powers through the Church the manifold wisdom of God." This testimony strongly confirms our conclusion, especially according to the interpretation of Jerome and Chrysostom. And the preceding words are to be weighed, namely, What is the dispensation of the sacrament hidden for ages in God, who created all things. Further, according to faith it must be confessed that the blessed Angels do not know the last day of Judgment, according to that of Mark, 13: "Of that day no one knows, not even the angels of God": therefore. Further, third: the blessed Angels do not fully know all the thoughts of God, nor all those mysteries that depend on the free dispensation of the divine will: therefore. The antecedent is proved from that of Paul, 1 Corinthians, 2: "The things that are God's no one has known but the Spirit of God." In which place, as is clearly gathered from the context, Paul was speaking of the thoughts and counsels of God. The second part of the conclusion, which proceeds de possibili, is not as certain as the preceding; and so its opposite could be affirmed without error. But still our conclusion is much more in agreement both with the Sacred Letter and with the testimonies of the Holy Fathers, which seem to proceed even de possibili. And it is proved, together with the first part of the conclusion. If the Blessed knew all things that God does and can do, he would comprehend the Divine Essence; but the consequent is impossible, and contrary to faith: therefore. The consequence is proved: he would know the whole that is in God both formally and eminently: therefore he would comprehend God. Someone will say that although he sees the whole, still he does not see it wholly, and so does not comprehend. Against: no perfection of God would be hidden from him, nor any mode of the divine perfection: therefore he would see God wholly, which is on the part of the object. I said, which is on the part of the object, for what is on the part of the seeing power he would not see wholly, since the divine intellect sees more clearly and perfectly. But this does not remove comprehension. For indeed the angel comprehends the nature of the ant, since he sees it wholly on the part of the object, although on the part of the power he does not see it wholly, since the divine intellect gazes upon it more clearly and distinctly. Second, the same part of the conclusion is proved. Whoever knows the total and adequate effect of some power comprehends it in the account of a power, but whoever knew all being creatable by God would know the adequate effect of the divine power: therefore he would comprehend it. The minor is evident. The major is proved: the whole strength of a power is explicated in the total and adequate effect of the power: therefore. To this argument can be reduced the argument of St. Thomas in the body of the article. But concerning it, it is to be observed that when St. Thomas says that the more effects of some cause the intellect knows, the more perfectly it knows the cause itself, he does not mean, as Scotus falsely opines ubi supra, that the more perfect knowledge of the cause depends per se on the more perfect knowledge of the effects: but St. Thomas intends only this, that the more perfect knowledge of the effects which is had in the cause presupposes the more perfect knowledge of the cause itself.

The second conclusion: no Blessed knows in the Word all producible effects, as to their essences. This conclusion is asserted against the third opinion; and although its opposite is not an error certain in faith, it is still proximate to error, if we speak de facto. It is proved first. Since it is opposed to the common opinion of all Theologians, and does not agree well with the Sacred Letter and the testimonies of the Holy Fathers cited in the first conclusion. It is proved second. Whoever thus saw in the Word all producible creatures would comprehend the omnipotence of God, speaking simply; but this is opposed to faith: therefore. The major is proved: he would designate by the intellect something beyond which the omnipotence of God could not extend itself: therefore. And it is confirmed: the Angel would comprehend the whole strength and power of human nature, since he knows all effects as to their essences to which the strength of human nature can extend itself, although he does not know the actual existence of them all; since their actual existence depends on the free will of man. Likewise, whoever knew all the effects of a craftsman to which the art of some craftsman could extend itself, although he did not know when the craftsman would produce effects of this kind, would comprehend the art of that craftsman: therefore, for comprehending some power, speaking simply, it suffices to know every possible effect of it as to essence, although one does not know it as to actual existence. It is proved third: if God from eternity had decreed to produce no creature, whoever knew all possible effects as to their essences would comprehend the omnipotence of God: therefore whoever now has a like knowledge of possible effects would comprehend the omnipotence of God. The antecedent is clear: since he knows in God the whole that is knowable in Him. But the consequence is proved: the omnipotence of God is not increased from the fact that God decreed to produce creatures ad extra: therefore that knowledge of God which then would be the comprehension of the divine power, also now would be its comprehension. Fourth and last it is proved. The Divine Essence as naturally represents all the possible existences of things as their essences: therefore just as the blessed intellect, according to the opinion of Durandus, knows all the essences of things, by the same account it would also know all their possible existences: and so it comprehends the whole power of God. It is true, however, that the existences of things as they actually exercise the office of existence are not represented naturally in the Divine Essence; since, as to this actual office, they depend on the free will of God, but as is established from the preceding arguments, for comprehending the divine power it is not necessary to know the existences of things in this way.

The third conclusion: Each Blessed in the Divine Essence sees some creatures. This conclusion is asserted against the first opinion, but it is taught not only by St. Thomas in this article, but by the whole school of the ancients. It is proved first from St. Augustine, book 4 On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 23, and in the following, where he distinguishes a twofold knowledge of creatures in the blessed Angels. One by which they know them in the Word, and this he calls morning; and the other by which they know the same creatures in their proper genus, and this he calls evening; but the account is the same for the other Blessed: therefore all contemplate some creatures in the Word. It is proved second: all the mysteries of faith which in the way we know through faith, each Blessed gazes upon in the Divine Essence; but many mysteries of faith pertain to created effects, of which kind are all the mysteries of the Incarnation of the Lord and of the reparation of the human race: therefore. The major is proved in two ways. First from that of Paul, 1 Corinthians, 13: "We see now through a mirror in enigma, but then face to face." This testimony is much more fittingly and more according to the mind of St. Paul explained of all the mysteries of faith universally than of the Unity of the Divine Essence alone and the Trinity of Persons. Second, that major is proved. The facial vision of God, according to the common doctrine of the Theologians, in 4, dist. 49, is the dowry answering to faith: therefore that vision extends itself to manifesting all the mysteries of faith universally. Third, the conclusion is proved. The soul of Christ the Lord sees all things that God knows with the knowledge of Vision, as is explained in 3 pars, quaest. 10, art. 2, ad secundum; but it cannot easily be understood in what way the soul of Christ knows all these through proper likenesses, since they are infinite: therefore it knows them in the Word. It is proved fourth: God in His Essence clearly and distinctly knows all creatures universally: therefore the created intellect also will be able clearly and distinctly to know some creatures in the Divine Essence. It is proved last. If the Blessed do not gaze upon some creatures in the Word, it follows that there are not diverse degrees in essential beatitude, but that all the Blessed have an equal degree of essential beatitude; the consequent is opposed to faith, as is established from what was said above in this question: therefore. The consequence is proved. The diversity of degrees of essential Beatitude can consist in this alone, that one Blessed knows more creatures in the Word than another: therefore, with the knowledge of creatures removed, there is no diversity of degree in essential Beatitude. On account of these arguments some most grave men teach that the first opinion opposed to this is a manifest error in faith. But I would believe this censure to be very rigid, since all the arguments set forth have an apparent solution. But nevertheless that opinion, besides being opposed to the common doctrine of the ancient Theologians, is not very agreeable to faith, and so is to be avoided.

The fourth conclusion: each Blessed sees in the Divine Essence all the genera, all the species of produced creatures, their accounts, the whole order of the universe, all the mysteries which of themselves regard faith: and finally all things universally which regard the proper state of the Blessed. This conclusion is asserted by St. Thomas in this art., ad 4, and 3 Cont. Gent., c. 59, and is the common opinion of the Theologians. It is proved: the Beatific Vision satiates every reasonable and just desire, but all those things universally which we have set in the conclusion fall under the reasonable and just desire of those who are beatified: therefore. The minor is proved. First: the genera and species of creatures, and the whole order of the universe, fall under the natural desire of the rational creature. For of these things is verified that of Aristotle at the beginning of the Metaphysics, Every man by nature desires to know. Then the mysteries of faith also pertain to just desire. For all the faithful reasonably desire, with a certain supernatural desire, to know clearly and evidently in the Fatherland those things which in the way they believe through obscure faith; and this desire is very agreeable to the nature of our intellect, since it is naturally inclined to having evident knowledge of those things which are proposed to it. Finally, it is a manifest thing that each one reasonably desires perfect knowledge of those things which regard his proper state. But which are those things that pertain to the state of each Blessed, we shall explain in art. 10 following.

The fifth conclusion: by the absolute power of God it can come about that some Blessed clearly gazes upon the Divine Essence and knows no creature in it. Durandus teaches this opinion ubi supra, and it is commonly received by almost all the disciples of St. Thomas. See Cajetan below, q. 57, art. ult., at the end of the Commentary. But it is proved: there is no implication in some knowledge attaining the primary object of itself and not attaining the secondary object; but the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Beatific Vision, while creatures pertain to the secondary object: therefore. And it is confirmed: that the blessed intellect sees in the Word more or fewer creatures comes from the greater or lesser intensity of the light of glory: therefore the light of glory can be so remiss as only to show the Divine Essence, which is the primary object, and no creature. This conclusion is to be understood of the particular and distinct knowledge of creatures. For in common and in a certain generality it is necessary that everyone who clearly sees the Essence of God know all creatures, even possibles, as was explained above in the preceding article, doubt 1, to the last argument.

To the arguments of the first opinion it is answered. And to the first, I distinguish the minor: if the adequation is weighed on the part of the likeness, the Divine Essence does not adequately represent any creature, but inadequately rather, since it does not represent precisely one creature, but all as the most universal likeness; but if the adequation is weighed on the part of the thing represented, the Divine Essence adequately represents any creature whatever, that is, it represents any creature whatever according to every account and mode which the creature has a parte rei; and so it represents one creature as exactly and distinctly as if it represented that alone; and this adequate representation on the part of the thing is fully sufficient for the intuitive and clear knowledge of the thing itself. To the first confirmation, I distinguish the antecedent: on the part of the mode of representing, I grant; on the part of the thing represented, I deny that the Divine Essence does not represent the creature according to every mode which the creature itself has. Just as in natural things, the likeness of a stone which is in the eye, on the part of the mode of representing, does not adequately represent the stone, namely on the part of the thing: since the likeness represents in an intentional and immaterial mode, while the stone has a material mode in itself. For the rest, on the part of the thing represented, it represents the stone according to every mode which it has in the thing, so that it represents the very materiality of the stone. To the second confirmation it is answered that it proceeds of the knowledge which is had in an imperfect image. For the knowledge of a thing which is had in an image which is of a higher order and which represents exactly and adequately on the part of the thing represented is the most perfect and intuitive knowledge of the thing represented through the image. To the second argument it is answered that the Divine Essence represents to the blessed intellect only those creatures for representing which it is united to the blessed intellect. Whence the antecedent is distinguished: the knowledge of creatures does not come from the vision of the Divine Essence, seen absolutely and according to itself, I grant; it does not come from the vision of the Divine Essence seen insofar as it is the exemplar of creatures, I deny. And then I say that, as is established from the arguments adduced for the third and fourth conclusions, not gratuitously but reasonably we assert that each Blessed gazes upon the Divine Essence not only according to itself and considered absolutely, but also as it is the exemplar of creatures. To the first confirmation it is answered that no created intellect can see the Divine Essence as it is the exemplar of all creatures; yet it can see it as it is the exemplar of certain creatures. To the second confirmation it is answered that it proves our fifth conclusion, which proceeds of the absolute power of God: yet it does not prove that de facto the Divine Essence is not united to the blessed intellect as it is the exemplar and idea of certain creatures. To the third confirmation, the consequence is denied; and to the proof I say that it is not of the intrinsic account of the Beatific Vision, speaking absolutely, that through it some creatures are known: since creatures pertain to the secondary object of the divine Vision, and the Divine Essence alone is its primary object. To the arguments of the second opinion, it is answered. To the first I say that the Divine Essence according to itself is representative of all creatures; but still it cannot unite itself to any created intellect as it is representative of all creatures, on account of the limitation of the created intellect. And on account of the limitation of the light of glory. And indeed there is no problem in the Divine Essence representing in a limited way with respect to the created intellect; since this limitation is respective and induces no imperfection in the form which is limited. See what was said above in the preceding article, shortly before the first doubt. To the second argument it is answered, and first I say that the solution assigned there is without doubt not sufficient, and is refuted most effectively by the arguments made there. And with other solutions passed over, it is to be noted for the true solution that creatures are in God in a fourfold way. First by mode of simplicity and perfection: thus every perfection and entity of creatures, with imperfections removed, is in God one most simple essence, and is God Himself. In which sense is verified that of John 1: "What was made, in Him was life"; and that common saying of Augustine and the Theologians, The creature in God is the creative Essence; and according to this mode creatures are formally in God. In the second way creatures are in God as an effect in the active cause which has the strength to produce all creatures according to every account and mode of the creatures themselves. In this way creatures are in God not formally but eminently: since they are in God with all their natural imperfections. Thus the stone according to all the materiality which it has a parte rei is contained in God as in the active cause. In the third way creatures are in God as in an inadequate exemplar, inadequate, I say, on the part of the exemplar itself; for on the part of things it is an adequate exemplar, as we explained in the solution of the first argument of the first opinion. Fourth and finally, creatures are in God as in an adequate exemplar, both on the part of the exemplar and on the part of the exemplified. And in this way creatures are in God according to ideal accounts, for indeed the Divine Essence as it is the idea of some creature is its adequate exemplar: e.g. the Divine Essence, as it is the idea of man, is not the idea nor the exemplar of the lion or of another, as will be explained more broadly below, quaest. 15. Second, it is to be noted that if creatures are known in the Divine Essence as they are in it in the first way, they are indeed all known; but this knowledge is not properly of creatures, for creatures insofar as they are thus in God are not creatures but God Himself, as we have said. But if they are known as they are in God in the second and third way, all creatures are indeed known, but still according to the common account of creatable being, and not according to their proper and distinct accounts: since the Divine Essence does not represent creatures, as thus contained in it, according to their distinct accounts, but by mode of unity, and inadequately. For the rest, if they are known as they are in God in the fourth way, they are known distinctly and particularly, according to their proper distinct accounts. This doctrine I seem to myself to gather from St. Thomas, 3 Cont. Gent., cap. 54. From which it follows that creatures cannot be known distinctly in the Divine Essence unless the Divine Essence is known as it is the manifold idea of creatures. These things being posited, it is answered to the argument that the determination of the representation comes from those three principles posited in the argument. And first, from the light of glory comes it that the Divine Essence does not represent to the blessed intellect all possible creatures universally, as I explained in the solution of the preceding argument. But that it represents these and not those comes from the divine Will, by which God wills to unite His Essence to the created intellect as it is representative and the idea of these creatures and not of those; and from the fact that the Divine Essence is not necessarily representative of itself as it is the idea of all creatures. And for this reason it is called by Augustine a voluntary mirror. And when the argument urges that the Divine Essence naturally represents all creatures equally, it is answered by distinguishing: with respect to the divine intellect comprehending its essence, I grant; with respect to the created intellect, I deny. Just as the Divine Essence necessarily and naturally represents to the divine intellect all the thoughts and volitions of God Himself, but to the created intellect it necessarily represents none, but with entirely free will represents those thoughts that it wills. And the a priori ground is: since, as was said in the preceding art., doubt 1, conclusion 2, those formal attributes of God which intrinsically import an actual respect to creatures are not necessarily known when the Divine Essence is seen, but the Divine Essence, as it is the adequate idea and exemplar of any creature whatever, intrinsically imports an actual respect to the creature: therefore it is not necessary that, the Divine Essence being seen according to itself, it also be seen by the created intellect as it is the idea of some creature, but this depends on the free will of God. To the third, the antecedent is denied, for it is sufficiently established from what was said concerning the first conclusion that, for the intellect to know all creatures extensively in the Divine Essence, it must know the Essence itself wholly and totally, as far as is on the part of the thing known; and consequently, that it know it infinitely intensive. To the first confirmation it is answered that the Divine Essence cannot be comprehended by the created intellect, speaking simply, even as it is the cause of some effect in particular: since the created intellect cannot attain every account and mode which can belong to some creature as it is subject to Divine Providence. It is true, however, that just as the created intellect can know every account and mode which belongs to the creature according to its natural power: so it can comprehend the Divine Essence as it is the natural cause of some creature; but this is comprehension secundum quid. To the second confirmation, first the consequence is denied, since from the fact that the intellect sees all creatures in the Divine Essence it manifestly follows that it knows all things that are in the Divine Essence, both formally and eminently, but this does not follow from the knowledge of all creatures in themselves. Second it is answered, distinguishing the antecedent: they do not comprehend the divine Power entitatively and according to the perfection which it has in itself, I grant; and this the argument by which the antecedent was proved effectively proves; for the rest, extensively and as the divine power is explicable in its total and adequate effect, I deny. To the fourth, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that the maxim of Scotus has truth only in those things which are in the subject in the same mode, but in the present case the formal perfection is formally in God, while creatures are eminently in God. To the last, it is answered with Cajetan, in this art., that as is gathered from St. Thomas, q. 8 De Veritate, art. 4 and q. 12, art. 6, the Divine Essence, properly speaking, is not the mirror of creatures, nor are creatures contained in it as in a mirror. Since it is of the account of a mirror that it represent through distinct likenesses received from the very things represented. Creatures are contained, therefore, in the Divine Essence, properly speaking, as in the effective and exemplary cause, and so they are contained by mode of unity, and in the same mode they are represented. And consequently it is not necessary that, the Divine Essence having been seen, all creatures be known distinctly in it. But the Divine Essence is called a mirror metaphorically, for the reason that it most clearly represents all creatures. And with these things said, the argument of Durandus remains solved.

Concerning the solution to the fourth, see St. Thomas, 3 Cont. Gent., cap. 59, in which place he reduces to three those things that the Blessed do not see in the Word. First: no Blessed sees in the Word all producible creatures; he proves from that of Job, 11: "Perhaps you will grasp His footsteps?" that is, creatures. But of these producible creatures which are produced in act, very many of the Blessed, indeed perhaps all, see some in the Word, more or fewer, according to the quantity of the light of glory. Second: no Blessed sees in the Word all the thoughts and volitions of God Himself, but more or fewer according to the quantity of light; St. Thomas proves from that of 1 Cor. 2: "The things that are God's no one knows but the Spirit of God"; the things that are God's, that is, the divine counsels. Third: no Blessed knows all the accounts of created things; he proves from that of Ecclesiastes, 8: "I understood that of all the works of God no one can find the account." But it is to be observed that the accounts of creatures are of a twofold difference: some are those which follow of themselves upon the nature and quiddity of the thing: and all these each Blessed knows in the Word, and of these St. Thomas speaks in this solution to the 4th; but some are those which belong to the created thing as it is subject to the divine Power; and all these no Blessed knows in the Word, but according to the quantity of light, more or fewer. Since these accounts are drawn from the infinite Omnipotence of God, and consequently are infinite, and of these proceeds this third dictum. See Ferrara, 3 Cont. Gent., ubi supra. But whether each Blessed sees in the Word all individuals and singulars of any specific nature whatever will be explained in art. 10 following.