Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: It is impossible for a created intellect to comprehend God.

Second conclusion, to the first: By imperfect comprehension as it is opposed to pursuit, the blessed will comprehend God, according to that 1 Cor. ch. 9: «So run, that you may comprehend.»

Third conclusion, to the second: God is not called incomprehensible for this reason, as though there were something of Him which is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is visible.

Fourth conclusion, to the third: When it is said that the blessed sees God as He is totally, there is signified not the mode of knowledge, but of the object known.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article, note that the first conclusion is certain according to the Catholic faith, if we speak of comprehension, as much as is knowable from its nature. It is proved from that Jer. 32: «Great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought»; and Job 11: «Shall you comprehend the footsteps of God, or find out the Almighty unto perfection? He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? He is deeper than hell, and whence shall you know?»; likewise 1 Tim. 6: «Who alone has immortality and dwells in inaccessible light». Which is certainly understood as regards comprehension, not as regards vision. Rom. 11: «O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are His judgments and unsearchable His ways!» This conclusion was denied by certain heretics, the Annomeans or Annomians, who lived about the year of the Lord 358, whose leader was the heretic Eunomius, who said that they comprehend God, even in this life, as they do themselves. Against them Chrysostom writes five homilies on the incomprehensible nature of God: see Theophylact ch. 3, on Ephesians, and St. Augustine Epist. 112 ch. 9, Epiphanius bk. 3 On Heresies, heresy 76. The same error was followed by a certain Augustine of Rome, as regards the soul of Christ, of which he said that it comprehends God. That error was condemned in the Council of Basel, Session 22, and in the Lateran under Innocent III, whose words are had in ch. Firmiter, where are also reported the words of Clement I in Epist. 1 to James the brother of the Lord, where he says: «God is altogether simple and incorporeal and incomprehensible by us». From what has been said it follows that when St. Augustine, in the place above, says that that is comprehended, nothing of which is hidden from the seer, it must be explained from St. Thomas, to the second, through the third conclusion posited, as can also be gathered from the same Augustine bk. 12 On the City ch. 18 where he says, «that that is comprehended which is bounded by the knowledge of the knower», that is, when the knowledge of the knower is equated to the knowability of the thing. But against this way of explaining the incomprehensibility of God, there is an argument. No creature, even an ant, can be known by a created intellect as much as it is knowable: therefore no creature is comprehended except by God alone. The antecedent is proved, for however perfectly an ant is known by a perfect Seraph, it is more perfectly knowable by God; therefore it is known by no creature as much as it is knowable. On account of this argument Ockham, in 4, q. 13, said, «that God alone can comprehend a creature». But this is absurd. For it would not be proper to God to be incomprehensible to knowledge. It is answered, therefore, that for a creature to be more knowable can come about from a twofold source. In one way from the quiddity of the creature, which is the ground of knowability; in another way from the perfection of the knower, through a more excellent light and a more immaterial intelligible likeness. It must be said, therefore, that for the account of comprehension it is not required that a thing be known in this second way, as much as it is knowable on the part of the knower; but it suffices that in the first way it be known as much as it is knowable on the part of its quiddity and its properties: whence man comprehends a triangle through knowledge of its definition, although an angel knows a triangle in a more perfect mode, on the part of the knower, not on the part of the thing known. But on the contrary, it follows that each blessed comprehends God. The consequence is proved, for each blessed knows distinctly the quiddity of God: therefore on the part of the thing known each knows Him as much as He is knowable. It is confirmed. Each knows through an infinite intelligible form: therefore he sees infinitely. The consequence is proved: for operation is proportioned to the form, which is the principle of operation. But the antecedent is proved: for each blessed sees, as through a principle, through the Divine Essence, through which he is made to be in act for that Vision. To this argument, according to our opinion — we who hold that the Divine Essence in the account of an intelligible likeness does not concur effectively unto Vision — it is easily answered that vision, as regards the perfection of its intensity, is not measured from the perfection of the quiddity known, or of the intelligible likeness united on the part of the object, but only from the quantity of the effective and proximate principle, which is the intellect as informed by the beatific light. Second it is answered, according to the opinion of those asserting that the Divine Essence in the account of an intelligible likeness concurs effectively unto Vision, that the measure of intensity is considered not only on the part of the likeness, but at the same time on the part of the light, which is finite, and determines the infinity of the intelligible likeness, as regards the effect of Vision, which likeness from its nature would be sufficient for infinite Vision. It must be said therefore to the principal argument that although all the blessed see the quiddity of God, yet, on the part of the quiddity itself, they do not see as much as it is visible. And the ground is: for the quiddity of God is itself subsistent and infinite to-be, which is the ground of knowability, and therefore the quiddity of God is not known on its own part as much as it is knowable. But the quiddity of a creature is finite in many ways, whence on its own part it can be known by a finite intellect as much as it is knowable.

IT IS DOUBTED first, concerning the solution of the second argument, and the third conclusion: Whether each blessed sees all the attributes and all the perfections which are formally in God? It is argued first, for the negative side. If the blessed sees all attributes of this kind, it follows that his vision is infinite. The consequence is proved: for to see one perfection of God a certain perfection of the intellect is required; and to see another, a greater perfection: therefore to see the infinite perfections of God, an infinite power of the intellect is required. Second. He who would know distinctly all the quidditative predicates of man would comprehend man: therefore he who knows all the essential and quidditative perfections of God comprehends God. Third. If the blessed sees all the perfections which are formally in God, he sees for this reason, because he sees the Essence of God itself, which he sees distinctly: but this ground does not suffice: therefore. The minor is proved: for the counsels of God and the providence of future things are the Divine Essence itself, and yet they are not seen, from the very fact that someone is blessed; otherwise the blessed would see all future contingents, and the thoughts of hearts, and the day of judgment: therefore. Fourth it is argued from Augustine in the book On Seeing God, where he says that God is a voluntary mirror: therefore He shows in Himself what He wills, and to hide what He wills, He can, that is, to manifest certain attributes, and to hide certain ones. Fifth. No blessed sees all the ideas of possible things, and yet the ideas are attributes which are formally in God: therefore none sees all the attributes. The major is proved: for the ideas are infinite in respect of the infinite possible species of creatures. The minor is proved: for naturally there are in God exemplars of created and possible things: since indeed the Father begets the Son from knowledge of Himself and of creatures, even possible ones: therefore naturally there are in God exemplars of this kind, since indeed the generation of the Son is natural. Sixth. One of the divine attributes is omnipotence, but this none can know distinctly, therefore nor see. The minor is proved. No power is known distinctly, except through respect to the things which it can do, but none knows distinctly the respects to all the things which God can do: otherwise, he would comprehend the omnipotence of God: therefore none of the blessed knows the omnipotence of God distinctly.

For the decision of this difficulty it is to be noted that this question can have a twofold sense. One is, whether by ordinary power, and in fact, every blessed sees all the things which are formally in God. The other sense is, whether by absolute power it can come about that a blessed sees the Divine Essence, and does not see all the attributes which are formally in God, or all the personal properties. In the first sense the dispute is now. Ferrara, bk. 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 56, near the end says that the blessed do not see distinctly all the divine perfections, which are infinite, although they see that most simple Essence immediately containing infinite perfections unitedly and simply without any distinction. M. Vittoria is said to have held the same opinion.

But the opposite opinion is that of St. Thomas in this article, to the second, where he says that God is not called incomprehensible for this reason, as though there were something which is not seen: therefore all the divine perfections are seen by the blessed; and in the 3rd part, q. 10, art. 1, to the second, he teaches the same of the soul of Christ the Lord. And this opinion is common among theologians. See Capreolus in 4, dist. 49, q. 6, and Durandus q. 5. But Master Cano, because he held that all the divine perfections are finite in number, namely, three relative and one absolute, easily granted that all the divine perfections are seen by the blessed, for all see God three and one.

Let the first conclusion be: Every blessed sees all the things which are formally God Himself. This conclusion seems to certain moderns to be held according to the Catholic faith. And it is proved first from that 1 John 3: «When He shall appear, we shall see Him as He is»: but he who would see God wise, and would not see another attribute, namely of mercy, or of justice, would not see God as He is; therefore the conclusion is certain according to faith from that testimony. Second. The vision of God is a clear and distinct cognition: but he who does not see all the essential perfections does not see the thing clearly and distinctly: therefore he who does not see all the attributes which are formally in God does not see God clearly and distinctly. The consequence is plain. The major is of faith, the minor is known by natural light: therefore the opposite of the conclusion is error against faith. To me, however, it seems a very grave censure to condemn the opposite of the conclusion as error: for although it would be error to deny that the mystery of the Trinity is seen clearly by all the blessed, and all the other attributes, of which we have cognition in the way, from divine effects natural and supernatural, of which we have a fuller and evident cognition in the fatherland: yet if someone says that it is possible for some attribute formally to be attributed to the Divine Essence, which has not yet been attributed by the blessed, I do not see how he errs against faith. For that testimony, We shall see Him etc., does not prove that all the attributes, which the infinite Divine Essence can found, are known distinctly by the blessed, but it suffices to say that that vision will be manifest, in respect of the Divine Essence and of certain attributes, which the intellect of the blessed attributes and distinguishes, which are formally in God Himself. And although all the attributes are the Divine Essence itself formally, yet, on account of its eminence and infinity, it is not visible by a creature according to all the things which can be attributed to it distinctly, whose number is infinite syncategorematically. Nor does the second argument prove the conclusion to be of faith, for the minor can be distinguished: for if it is understood of the perfections which are distinguished by reason alone, since they are one and most simple and infinite perfection, it is false. For even if the blessed does not see how that simple perfection founds the infinite perfections which can be attributed to it by a created intellect on account of its eminent infinity, yet he knows that one perfection distinctly, as it is in itself, subsistent and illimited to-be itself. The probability of this opinion can also be aided by the arguments for the negative side, especially the fifth argument. For the ideas are multiplied in God and are formally divine perfections: for the Divine Essence itself has the account of several ideas, so that this is true, The idea of man is not the idea of a horse, which ideas nevertheless, since they are infinite, are not known distinctly by any creature: therefore it is not error to deny that all the perfections which are formally in God are known distinctly by the blessed.

Hence let the second conclusion be: The blessed do not know, indeed nor can they know distinctly all the perfections which are formally in God, which import a relation of reason to possible creatures; on which account, the first conclusion must be limited by this one. This conclusion is proved: for the blessed do not know the Divine Essence, as it is distinctly referred to the single species of possible creatures: therefore. The antecedent is proved, for relations of reason of this kind are infinite, according to the infinite multitude of possible creatures; and thus infinite ideas in God are distinguished by theologians; therefore they cannot be known distinctly by a created intellect. And if someone says that the ideas are not several attributes which belong to God formally, it is answered that the formal definition of attribute belongs to an idea. For God is not only eminently, but formally, the idea of man, as He is formally wise. Since therefore several ideas are distinguished in God, it must be said that they are several attributes of ideas. And finally it is confirmed: for every distinction of these attributes is taken from distinct relations to possible creatures, but these are infinite, and consequently attributes of this kind; therefore they cannot be known distinctly by the blessed. But how the divine attributes are distinguished among themselves, whether by reasoning reason or by reasoned reason, will be said below, q. 28, art. 2.

To the first it is answered that the attributes which are formally in God not importing relations to creatures are not infinite in number: e.g. that God is understanding, wise, eternal, and the like; but those which are distinguished by relations of reason in order to possible creatures are infinite. Wherefore not all those are known distinctly, but more or fewer according as one is more or less blessed. But the other attributes are all known distinctly, the Divine Essence being known, nor is greater power required to see all those attributes than to see two or three. For, as Christ says, John 14, He who sees me, sees the Father also, because the ground of knowing is the same, namely, the Divine Essence itself. All the blessed nevertheless agree in this, that they know all the divine attributes which bespeak relation to the species of things which have already been made according to the order of nature, and according to the common order of grace, as will be explained more fully in the following article. To the second, the consequence is denied. And the ground of the difference is, for whatever predicate of a creature is finite; but the things said of God essentially are each infinite, so that the chief ground of incomprehensibility is taken not from the infinity of the attributes, according to multitude, but from the fact that each one is infinite, e.g. infinite wisdom, infinite power: which infinity is none other than what is understood in this, that the divine to-be is its essence and subsistent, and consequently whatever God is, is infinite. To the third it is answered that the major is true, if we speak of the attributes which do not import relation to creatures. Whence the minor is denied, for the counsels of God and the providence of future things import relation to creatures, and through such relation they are distinguished. Wherefore it is not needful that all things of this kind be seen, the Divine Essence being seen, but it suffices that of these those be seen which regard the beatitude of each one, as will be said in the following article. To the fourth, it is answered that God is called a voluntary mirror in two ways: first, because He manifests Himself to whom He wills to manifest Himself through His grace; second, because after He has manifested Himself, still more or fewer of future contingents He manifests to the blessed according to His free will: yet He is not called a voluntary mirror because, in manifesting His essence, He can hide His wisdom, and other attributes of this kind, which do not bespeak relations to creatures. To the fifth, it is already plain from the second conclusion. For the Divine Essence does not have the account of several ideas, except as it is comparable to several species of creatures, and because infinite are possible, that is, not so many but that there may be more, therefore theologians posit infinite ideas in God, which nevertheless are all the Divine Essence itself, which is one and most simple perfection. To the sixth, the minor is denied, and to the proof it is answered that just as for the manifest knowledge of some finite power, it suffices to know the respect which the power has to its formal object, even if all the things which can fall under that account are not known distinctly: e.g. an angel knows distinctly and comprehends the art of some artificer, and yet does not know distinctly all the species of figures which can be introduced through matter, since they are infinite; but it suffices to know that the same is the account of the art for introducing this figure and infinite others. So therefore, and much more in respect of the divine power, which is not specified by some extrinsic object, it is true that the blessed know the divine power and art clearly, knowing the Divine Essence to be one and infinite certain account and perfection, in which is the power for producing infinite species of things, although the infinite producible species of things are not known distinctly: for this would be to comprehend the Divine Essence, if all those things were known distinctly, as will be plain in the following article.

The second DOUBT is, whether by the absolute power of God some blessed can see the Divine Essence not seeing the attributes, of which it was spoken in the first conclusion of the preceding doubt, or even the distinction of the Persons of the Trinity? Scotus, in 1, d. 1, q. 2, art. 2, says that each is possible. And it is proved first. For God can bring about that the intellect of the blessed abstract the concept of the essence from the concept of the person. Which is proved: for everything prior can be abstracted from its posterior; but the essence is formally prior than the persons are: therefore the essence can be seen, the persons not seen. Second. The intellect of the blessed can be quieted in the vision of the Divine Essence alone: therefore it will be able not to see the other attributes. The antecedent is proved: for the whole ground of beatitude, on the part of the object, is the essence, since it is the whole ground of perfection. Third. The Divine Essence can be seen, the Holy Spirit not seen: therefore also the Father or the Son not seen. The consequence is plain: for the ground is the same concerning one Person and concerning another. The antecedent is proved: for the Son can be seen, the Holy Spirit not seen, since they are not said relatively to each other: therefore.

But in opposition is the common opinion of theologians. Concerning which see Cajetan, 2. 2, q. 2, art. 8, where he excellently impugns the opinion of Scotus. First: for the vision of God is of Him as He is; but the Divine Essence so exists on the part of the thing that it is in three Persons: therefore he who sees the Divine Essence, as it is, sees it as it is in three Persons. It is confirmed: if the Divine Essence existed only in one supposit, it could not be seen as it is, unless that supposit were seen: therefore since it really exists in three supposits, it is necessary that the three supposits be seen, that it be verified that God is seen, as He is. Second. An essence being seen, unless the complement of it in which it is sustained as in a subject, or supposit, be seen, the intellect is still unquiet; since therefore the Divine Essence is sustained in three supposits, the intellect does not rest until it sees them. Third. Whatever is naturally in God is the Essence of God itself, really and formally and quidditatively; therefore if the Divine Essence is seen, it is necessary that all things with their properties be seen. The antecedent is proved: for if the opposite is wanting, it would follow that something would be accidental to God, and that He would not be most simple: since indeed there would be something in the Divine Essence which is not itself formally. And finally it is proved: for God, by His nature, is three in Persons: therefore intrinsically, in His quidditative definition, the three Persons are included: and consequently the Divine Essence cannot be seen, unless the three Persons are seen.

To the first argument of Scotus it is answered that it is impossible that one seeing the Divine Essence abstract the concept of the essence from the concepts of the persons. First, indeed, because through that vision of God as He is, no concept is formed. Then, because the Persons themselves are intrinsically included in the concept of the Divine Essence. Likewise, third, because the Divine Essence is not prior, except only in respect of our imperfect and obscure knowledge. But Scotus urges against this solution. The Divine Essence is something absolute, but a Person is something relative; but the absolute, from its nature, is prior intelligible than the relative: therefore the Divine Essence, through intuitive cognition, can be known prior than the Person. It is answered that the Divine Essence on account of its infinity contains most simply the absolute and the relative, so that the absolute is of the intrinsic account of the relative, and the relative of the intrinsic account of the absolute, and so through intuitive cognition neither can the absolute be known in abstraction from the relative, nor the converse, but both must be known at the same time by one and the same cognition. Relatives also, if compared among themselves, must be known by the same intuitive cognition, both because they are in the intrinsic account of the Divine Essence, and so by a single intuitive concept it is necessary that they be known at the same time with the essence, and also because they are mutually referred. From these, the solution to the second is plain. To the third it is answered, I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is denied that the Son can be known, by intuitive cognition, the Holy Spirit not known, on account of a twofold ground. The first is, because the Holy Spirit is of the intrinsic account of the Divine Essence. The second, because, by intuitive cognition, the Son is known, as He is, naturally on the part of the thing: but the Son naturally is spirating on the part of the thing: therefore He must be known as spirating, and consequently the Holy Spirit must be known at the same time, who is the term to which the Son is referred, as He is spirating. But concerning the absolute divine perfections it is plain from what has been said that one divine perfection cannot be known, the others not known, by intuitive cognition.