Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)
First published 1584
Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.
✦ This work is being completed — add a section.
Prologus auctoris ad lectorem
In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio
Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat
Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia
Commentarium
THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.
First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (pars prior)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica
Commentarium
Dubium 1: Objectiones
Dubium 1: Commentarium
Dubium 1: Responsiones
Articulus V: Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (textus Latinus sine versione Hispanica)
Dubium 1
Articulus VI: Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia
Commentarium
Dubium I
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae
Commentarium
Dubium I
Textus Augustini ante articulum 8
Articulus VIII: Utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Articulus IX: Utrum Sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris
Commentarium
Commentarium; Dubium I
Articulus X: Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Dubium 7
Dubium 8
Dubium 9
Quaestio II: De Deo, an Deus sit
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Articulus II: Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit
Quaestio III: De Dei simplicitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit corpus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae
Articulus III: Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura
Articulus IV: Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse
Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo
Articulus VI: Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex
Articulus VIII: Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat
Quaestio IV: De Dei perfectione
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit perfectus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum
Articulus III: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo
Quaestio V: De bono in communi
Articulus I: Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente
Articulus II: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens
Articulus III: Utrum omne ens sit bonum
Articulus IV: Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis
Articulus V: Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine
Articulus VI: Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile
Quaestio VI: De bonitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum esse bonum Deo conveniat
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit summum bonum
Articulus III: Utrum esse bonum per essentiam sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sit bona bonitate divina
Quaestio VII: De Infinitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit infinitus
Articulus II: Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam
Articulus III: Utrum possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem
Articulus IV: Utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem
Quaestio VIII: De existentia Dei in rebus
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit ubique
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam
Articulus IV: Utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei
Quaestio IX: De Dei immutabilitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis
Articulus II: Utrum esse inmutabile sit Dei proprium
Quaestio X: De Dei Aeternitate
Articulus I: Utrum convenienter definiatur aeternitas, quod est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit aeternus
Articulus III: Utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum aeternitas differat a tempore
Articulus V: De differentia aevi et temporis
Articulus VI: Utrum sit unum aevum tantum
Quaestio XI: De unitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens
Articulus II: Utrum unum et multa opponantur
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit unus
Articulus IV: Utrum Deus sit maxime unus
Quaestio XII: Quomodo Deus cognoscatur a nobis
Articulus I: Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam
Articulus II: Utrum essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur
Articulus III: Utrum Essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus
Articulus IV: Utrum aliquis intellectus per sua naturalia Divinam Essentiam videre possit
Articulus V: Utrum intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei Essentiam aliquo creato lumine indigeat
Articulus VI: Utrum videntium Dei Essentiam unus alio perfectius videat
SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.
The FIRST Conclusion is affirmative.
Second Conclusion: That one sees more perfectly than another will not be through any more perfect likeness of God in one than in another.
Third Conclusion: That difference of vision will be through this, that the intellect of one has a greater faculty and power for seeing God, not from its own nature, but through the light of glory.
Fourth Conclusion: He will share more in the light of glory who has had more charity in the present life.
COMMENTARY.
CONCERNING this article, note that the first conclusion is certain according to the Catholic faith and defined in the Church. For there was once the heretic Jovinian, asserting that all the Blessed will be equal in the future, as St. Jerome reports in the Exposition of the Symbol to Damasus, vol. 2, 57, and the reason of this heretic was that he held with the Stoics that all vices are equal, and likewise that virtues are equal, as St. Augustine reports in On Heresies to Quodvultdeus, heresy 42. Luther also held the same error, not because he thought sins to be equal or virtues, but because he held that all those justified from sin are justified by the sole justice of Christ imputed to them; and since it is one single justice, all were equally just, and consequently all equally Blessed. This error was once condemned at Rome through the efforts of Victorinus and Pamachius, as St. Jerome reports, bk. 2 against Jovinian. It was condemned also in the Council of Aquileia, assembled at Aprica by order of Pope Siricius. It was condemned also in the Council of Florence in the Letters of union, where it is said: «Those who depart this life wholly cleansed of sin are at once received into heaven, where they see God as He is, but according to diversity of merits one more perfectly than another». Likewise in Sacred Scripture the conclusion is proved from that passage John 14: «In my Father's house there are many mansions». Which all the Holy Doctors explain of the diversity of degrees in beatitude: so Anselm, St. Thomas on that passage, St. Augustine in the book On Holy Virginity, ch. 26, and St. Jerome in the place above, St. Gregory Nazianzen in bk. 1 of his Theology, and St. Gregory in bk. 4 of the Morals, ch. 42, St. Bernard in the Letter to Abbot William, first part, at the end.
It should be noted however that, for this conclusion to be of faith, it makes no difference whether beatitude essentially consists in vision or in love itself and fruition. For all theologians agree in this, that these three stand proportionately to one another, namely vision, love, and fruition: for he who enjoys more, loves more, and he who loves more sees more perfectly; wherefore in whatever act beatitude consists, it will not be equal in all. But the heretic Jovinian objected that in the parable found in Matt. 20, of the laborers in the vineyard, it is said that an equal reward was bestowed on those laboring unequally. To which however it must be said, with St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1, and 3 Contra Gentiles, ch. 53, that by the denarius given to the laborers is understood the very object of beatitude, which is one; but by the diverse mansions are understood diverse degrees of attaining that object. And this is the common explanation of the Scholastics in 4, dist. 49; and it is that of St. Augustine and Jerome in the places cited.
There is however a DOUBT concerning the third conclusion: whether a more perfect intellect according to its own nature, with an equal light of glory, sees God more perfectly and intensely than another intellect naturally less perfect, with the same light nonetheless?
For the affirmative side, it is argued first: for a sharper bodily sight sees more perfectly than another less sharp with equal light: therefore proportionately it will be so in the spiritual eye. Second: the natural intellect concurs actively in the Vision of God, as the elicitive principle of the vital action: therefore, other things being equal, the more perfect intellect acts more perfectly and will see God. Third: the Blessed produce the Vision with their whole effort; but the more perfect intellect strives more vehemently: therefore with equal light it will see more perfectly. Lastly it is argued from St. Thomas, 3rd part, q. 10, art. 4, ad 2, where he says that the degrees of intensity of beatitude are taken more from the order of grace than from the order of nature: therefore in some way they are considered from the order of nature.
In this difficulty Cajetan, in the 3rd part in the place above, on account of the arguments made holds the affirmative side. But for the decision of this question note that one must beware of the error of some who assert that a more imperfect intellect can never attain the degree of perfection in beatitude which a more perfect intellect has: e.g. that a man through grace can never attain to the perfection of the degree of beatitude of the lowest angel. St. Thomas refutes this error, 3 Contra Gentiles, ch. 57, from that passage Matt. 22: They shall be as the angels of God. But most of all from that passage ch. 10 of the Apocalypse: «The measure of man and of angel shall be the same!» And it is the common consensus of the Church that the Blessed Virgin has been exalted above the choirs of angels in beatitude. It is true however that among the angels themselves, according to the common opinion of the Scholastics, the comparison of grace to grace and of nature to nature holds proportionately, so that those more excellent in nature received more excellent grace and glory, etc.
This supposed, let the conclusion be: the least intellect, as far as lies on the side of its own nature, will see God more perfectly if it has been illumined by a more perfect light of glory, and will see equally if it has been illumined by an equal light as even the most perfect angel. And so the whole ground of the measure of the perfection of beatitude must be considered precisely from the quantity of the light of glory. It is proved first from St. Thomas in this article, ad 3, where he says that the diversity of seeing will be through a diverse faculty of the intellect, not indeed natural but glorious. Likewise in the Council of Florence in the place above: «the diversity of degrees of the beatific Vision is reduced to the diversity of merits». And it is confirmed: for from Cajetan's view it follows that if some man should merit by equal merits as much as another, if he be of more perfect intellect, he will be more blessed. It is proved: because he will receive an equal supernatural light as the reward of equal merits. But to say that he receives less light so that a proportion of quality may come about in the blessed Vision — this is utterly unfitting: because hence it would follow that some degree of essential beatitude would not be radically from grace or from merits, but rather from nature itself; and consequently would not be from the merits of Christ. Third it is proved: for from Cajetan's view it would follow that one having less light of glory could see God more perfectly than another who has more intense light of glory. The consequence is proved: suppose, e.g., an angel who with a light of glory as six sees God with an intensity as eight on account of the vivacity of his intellect; and suppose likewise an archangel who with an equal light as six will see God more intensely than the angel, e.g. as ten: then if some supreme Seraph had had an equal light with the angel and the archangel, he would exceed notably in intensity of vision, e.g. as sixteen. Whence it is gathered that the supreme Seraph, with less light, would see more intensely than the angel, because nature supplies what is less in light. Fourth it is proved: the natural intellect and the light of glory are not of the same order: therefore they cannot concur to increase the intensity of one species, namely of the divine order; but rather the whole ground of intensity must be taken from the side of the light elevating the intellect above its own nature, and consequently to a supernatural operation: therefore if it elevates to that more perfect operation, it is necessary that the intellect be more perfectly elevated by a more perfect light, according to that maxim: as the unqualified stands to the unqualified, so the more stands to the more.
To the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, the consequence is denied. The ground of the difference is that bodily sight has a natural power for seeing color, and is of the same order as the visible object: but God, as He is in Himself, has no connaturality with the created intellect. Hence the natural power of the intellect makes no difference to a more perfect vision. To the second, the consequence is denied: because the intellect is elevated to concur actively in that vision by the light of glory alone; and so the quantity of activity arises from the quantity of the light, since that action is entirely of a higher order. To the third, the minor is denied: because the greater effort does not arise from perfection of nature, but only from the supernatural faculty. To the last it is answered that that particle «more» is not taken there comparatively, but rather adversatively, as if he said that it is considered from the order of grace, and not from nature itself. It must be noted here however that if anyone holds that view that by God's absolute power the created intellect can see God by a mere supernatural aid, without any infused light, he will scarcely be able to reduce the intensity of the Vision to any cause. For if he reduces it to a greater aid of God, it does not seem intelligible how that aid is greater or less except in some effect, since in God Himself there is nothing greater or less. But to distinguish that greater or less on the side of the effect will be, according to this opinion, just the same as saying that this vision is more intense because it is more intense: the consequence is clear, since there is there no other effect to which that greater and less is reduced, except only the vision itself.