Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The FIRST conclusion is affirmative. The reason is: because everything that is raised to something which exceeds its nature must be disposed by some disposition which is above its nature; but when any created intellect sees God, it is raised to so great a sublimity that the divine Essence itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect; therefore it must be disposed by some disposition above nature, which is indeed an increase of the power of understanding, and this increase of power we call illumination. And the reason can be taken from the conclusion of the preceding article. The intellect cannot by its natural powers see God; therefore it needs some disposition above its own nature.

But it should be noted that, because this reason could be dissolved if one were to say that the intellect is raised by the concurrence of God alone, just as water is raised to the sanctification of the soul, therefore there is need for us to use the preceding reason together with this one.

The Second conclusion, to the first: such created light is not necessary for the Divine Essence to become intelligible, but for the intellect to become able to understand, just as a power becomes more powerful through a habit.

The Third conclusion, to the second: this light is not required for seeing the Essence of God as a likeness in which God is seen, but as a perfection strengthening the intellect for seeing God.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED first, concerning the first conclusion, whether it is certain according to faith? It is argued first, for the affirmative side. For in the said Clementine Ad nostrum, the error of those saying that the soul does not need the light of glory for seeing God and blessedly enjoying Him is condemned: therefore.

Second. According to faith it is certain that the blessed Vision is a certain action of the intellect which it cannot exercise by the powers of nature; therefore some superadded power is necessary for the intellect to be properly said to see God. The consequence seems manifest by natural light. For it belongs to the intrinsic account of a vital action that it proceed from an intrinsic and proportionate principle, through which the agent is in act for acting, not only as an instrument but as a principal agent: but unless we posit in the intellect some supernatural quality, the blessed cannot be in proportionate act so as to have such an action of seeing, as a principal agent: therefore it is an error in faith, at least secondarily, to deny such a superadded quality, because it immediately follows that the Blessed themselves do not see God with a proper vision.

Hence also concerning this difficulty there are various ways of speaking. For Cajetan, here, and Ferrariensis in 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 53, and Capreolus in 4 d. 49 q. 4 concl. 2 judge the conclusion of St. Thomas to be certain after the Council of Vienne, according to Catholic faith, where it is said in the condemnation of the fifth error of the Beghards: "Whoever shall have said that man does not need the light of glory raising the intellect to see God, passes judgment even on God, is a heretic." Aureolus, however, in Capreolus, in the same place, says that the Council determines something other there than what St. Thomas teaches: for he himself says that a habitual light is required, while the Council says only that a raising light is required, whether it be habitual or actual, as the vision itself is. But this solution clashes with the Council, which asserts that a light raising to the vision itself is required: therefore the vision is not sufficiently posited to be the light of which the Council speaks. For this reason Master Soto, in 4 d. 49 q. 2 art. 4, says the Council is to be understood otherwise, so that the sense is that a light is required which is either a habit disposing the intellect or a special help raising the power to see. Thus the conclusion of St. Thomas, which speaks of a habitual light, or a certain quality inhering in the intellect, is not certain according to faith, although it is very consonant with the manner of speaking of Sacred Scripture and of the Councils. This opinion of Master Soto is commonly accepted by the moderns.

For the explanation of this difficulty, suppose two things, about which there is customarily dispute in 1. 2. p. 3. art. 2. The first is that our supernatural beatitude consists essentially in an operation of the soul, whether that be principally of the intellect, as pleases St. Thomas; or of the will, as Scotus holds; or of both powers, as other Doctors think. This assertion is against Henry of Ghent, in Quodlib. 3 q. 12, where he says that Catholic faith places beatitude not in an operation of the soul but in the very essence of the soul; and this beatitude consists in a certain inward inflowing of God into the soul. But this opinion is not only false and dangerous and rash, but perhaps erroneous, because in Sacred Scripture the beatitude which is promised to us as our reward is called and is a certain operation, as Matthew 5: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God"; and 1 John 3: "We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." And 1 Cor. 13: "When that which is perfect comes, that which is in part shall be done away." And explaining what this perfect thing is, the Apostle says: "Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known." And certainly the holy Doctors, when speaking of our Beatitude, always make mention of our operation, namely vision or fruition; and so all the Scholastics, in 4 d. 49, think. The second thing to be supposed is that the blessed Vision is a certain vital action elicited by the powers of the soul of the Blessed himself. This is against the opinion of certain men asserting that this Vision is effected by God alone, with the intellect of the Blessed disposed merely passively. So holds Marsilius, in 3 q. 10; and Ockham in 1 d. 1 and Paludanus, in 4 d. 49 quaest. 1 artic. 2; Scotus too in 4 dist. 49 q. 2 is not far from this opinion. Buridan likewise in book 10 and here, q. 5, reckons it very probable. Nevertheless this opinion seems to us false and dangerous. It is proved: because according to Catholic faith, the Blessed sees God as He is; but to see, according to true philosophy, is a vital action: therefore the Blessed effects that immanent action. It is confirmed: because otherwise the Blessed would improperly be said to see God, just as a man would improperly be said to run who does not by his own power swiftly move his feet, but were drilled and moved by some extrinsic agent. Likewise, in the cited Clementine, light is posited for raising the intellect to see God: therefore it is posited as a power of the intellect for the action of seeing. Likewise, it would follow that the act of fruition is effectively from God alone. The consequence is clear, because the account is the same; but the consequent is false, because the charity of the way, which is a habit for eliciting that fruition, is the same in the way and in the fatherland; but in the way it effectively concurs toward the love of God and desire: therefore in the fatherland it effectively concurs toward love and fruition. And finally, these Doctors do not place our beatitude in our operation, or at any rate they must deny that vision is beatitude or a part of beatitude. And finally, these Doctors seem excused from error against faith by ignorance of philosophy.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: Saving Catholic faith, it can be denied that the light of faith is an infused habit superadded to the power. This is proved: because, as Master Soto says in the place cited, the Council and Sacred Scripture are sufficiently explained concerning an actual illumination which is a special help of God, strengthening the intellect by Himself for that action of seeing. Likewise, because many learned men in our times so opine and teach that it is not necessary according to Catholic faith to posit that light by way of habit; indeed, not even the opinion of Scotus, in the place cited, and of Durandus q. 2, denying the conclusion of St. Thomas, is marked with any grave censure. Finally, the mind of the Council of Vienne was to condemn the error of the Beghards asserting that God can be seen by the powers of nature alone: therefore whoever posits a supernatural help of God, and says this help is the light of which the Council speaks, asserts nothing against faith.

The Second conclusion. Nevertheless, in our judgment, what is defined by the Council can hardly be understood unless, besides the help and special concurrence of God, some quality is posited as the form and principle of seeing. This conclusion will be proved in the explanation of the following doubts; but now it is proved by the second argument made for the affirmative side. It is confirmed: because one who sees God as He is holds himself as a cause, and not as an instrument, of seeing: therefore the concurrence of God the supreme agent does not suffice, but some form in the second cause is also required, so that the effect is proportioned to the second cause itself: therefore the light which the Council asserts to be necessary for raising the intellect is not only the help of God and an actual concurrence, but also something by way of a form received in the intellect; otherwise the action of seeing God as He is would be attributed to the Blessed himself only perhaps as to an instrument; and then that action of seeing would denominate God as the principal agent, and God would see Himself through the Blessed as through an instrument: which is absurd. And through this, the answer to the arguments is clear.

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the light of glory is deservedly and reasonably posited by way of a certain habit infused in the intellect of the Blessed? It is argued first, for the negative side, by the argument of Ockham, in the place cited. If the light of glory is necessary, it is most of all that the intellect may produce vision; but this is not so: therefore. The minor is proved: because vision is produced effectively by God alone: therefore not by the intellect. The antecedent is proved: because vision is our reward: therefore it comes effectively from God alone. The consequence is clear: because merit comes effectively only from the one meriting: therefore reward is from the rewarder, precisely as from an efficient cause. It is confirmed: because otherwise the creature would beatify itself effectively, nor would vision be altogether supernatural, if indeed it were produced by a natural power.

Second, it is argued by the argument of Scotus. Because if the light of glory is posited, it would follow that an angel can see God through the very essence of the angel himself. The consequence is proved: because an essence, which is a spiritual substance, is much more perfect than the light of glory, which is an accident: therefore if through the light of glory the Blessed see God, much more clearly will the angel see through his own essence, which more clearly represents God.

Third. Because, with the light of glory posited in the intellect, it follows that the vision of God is natural to some creature. The consequence is proved: because now through the created light of glory the intellect is rendered proportionate to such an action: therefore vision is natural to it, just as if a blind man were supernaturally illuminated, vision is nevertheless natural to him.

Fourth. What was more to be posited is not posited: therefore what was less to be posited ought not to be posited. The major is explained: because an intelligible likeness of the Godhead was more to be posited, and it is not posited: for a likeness perfects the intellect in first act, while light perfects it in second act; therefore an intelligible likeness was more to be posited than light: therefore whoever does not posit an intelligible likeness ought not to posit light.

Fifth, from Durandus, in the place cited: because this light, which is posited by St. Thomas for strengthening the power, either strengthens the power by intensifying the very force of the power, just as the heat of water is intensified by the heat of fire, or strengthens it as a partial agent, just as two men carrying a stone help one another, or just as two lamps intensify the light of the diaphanous: but strengthening does not occur in the first way, because the intellect is not a quality capable of intensity or remission; and even if it were intensible, it could not be intensified by a light of a higher order; for what is formally intensified by something is of the same species as it. But neither can it occur in the second way: because the intellect would have in itself power for effecting a supernatural act, like the power of another partial and supernatural agent: and thus the intellect and the light would be of the same order, since they mutually help one another.

Sixth. A power by itself tends toward its object present to it, as sight at once sees a present color; but God is the object of our intellect, since He is contained under being, which is the adequate object: therefore the intellect by itself, without supernatural light, will be able to see God present.

Seventh. Such light is posited by St. Thomas so that the intellect be proportionate to that union of the Divine Essence in the account of an intelligible likeness; but with light still posited, the intellect remains disproportionate to the union of such an infinite form, since it remains finite: therefore it is posited in vain.

Last. Because the vision itself, for which light is posited, is supernatural; but again the light itself is also supernatural: therefore for receiving it, some supernatural disposition must be posited, and so there will be a process to infinity: therefore.

For the decision, let there be a single conclusion: Very reasonably is the infused light of glory posited, by way of habit, as a legitimate disposition of the power for seeing God as He is. It is proved first; because we must philosophize about divine things proportionally to what is naturally known; but nature has so ordained it that every natural agent has a formal and proportionate principle for exercising its action: therefore one acting supernaturally must necessarily have a proportionate and formal and supernatural principle for exercising a supernatural action. This minor can be proved inductively, without any exception, if we speak of agents concurring not instrumentally but as principal causes. The consequence, indeed, is very reasonable, as is clear from the major. It is proved likewise by the second argument made for the affirmative side in the first doubt. Besides, it is strange that for the action of believing from Catholic faith an infused habit of faith is posited for making proportion with such an act, and that for seeing God as He is the intellect should lack a habit, and nevertheless the action be proportionate to the power. See on this conclusion St. Thomas 3 Against the Gentiles ch. 53 where he proves it with many reasons; and ch. 54 he dissolves the contrary objections.

TO the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, I deny the minor. To the proof, I deny the antecedent; and again to the proof of the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For it does not pertain intrinsically to the account of a reward that it be effectively from the rewarder, or even precisely from him, for even among men coins are customarily the reward of the hireling, and they are not effectively from the rewarder. And likewise there could be a reward among men in one enjoying for his labor the fruits of a tree: and yet neither the fruits nor the enjoyment is effectively from the rewarder: therefore for God to be called the rewarder it is not required that He alone effect the vision, which is beatitude: but it suffices that He Himself be the Author of the light of glory, and effectively concur with me, so that I effect the vision. Indeed, even in this life merit is not precisely from the one meriting effectively, but also from God, who wills our merits to be ours, which are His gifts. To the confirmation it is answered that the creature does not beatify itself, although it effectively concurs toward the Vision, which is beatitude. And the reason is that the principle of that action is the light which is efficiently produced by God alone: but to beatify oneself implies conferring on oneself what is necessary for beatitude. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that in some way the creature beatifies itself: either because it merits beatitude, or because it also efficiently concurs toward the Vision itself. As for what is inferred in the same place, that the blessed Vision would not be purely supernatural, if this is understood to mean that in every respect it has a supernatural principle, I grant the consequence: for indeed the natural power concurs effectively, and is the subject of that action. But an action is called supernatural without qualification which is of a supernatural object, and under a supernaturally formal account.

To the second, I deny the consequence: because although the essence of an angel is a spiritual substance, and the light of glory is an accident, yet the light of glory is of a higher order; hence it can reach an action of a higher order, which the essence of the angel cannot reach.

To the third, I grant that the blessed vision is connatural to the intellect illumined by the light of glory: but this is not to be natural without qualification, but to be of a higher nature.

To the fourth it is answered that although a likeness was more to be posited than light, yet not a created likeness. For the rest, because a likeness holds itself on the side of the object, God can by Himself supply the place of an intelligible likeness; yet He cannot by Himself supply the place of light: because light holds itself on the side of the power as its own principle subordinated to the operator, just as the power itself, on whose side light holds itself.

To the fifth it is answered that light is posited for neither of those, but is posited as a form superadded to the power, and as the ground of producing vision, just as heat is posited in water as necessary for water to heat.

To the sixth it is answered that the presence of the object does not suffice for the power to operate concerning it, if the power does not have a principle proportionate to action concerning such an object. Second it is answered that God is not present in the account of an object or intelligible likeness except to one having the light of glory.

To the seventh, I deny the minor: because although the intellect with the light of glory still remains finite, yet it remains proportionate, because through that light it is made of the divine order and connatural to God: hence it will be able to produce a finite action concerning an infinite object. And this is the proportion of the power with its proper action and with the object, insofar as it is finitely visible by the created intellect.

To the last it is answered that for the ultimate form in each order a disposition is required, but for a disposition no disposition is required. But the ultimate and as it were formal thing to which the intellect of the Blessed is ordered is the union of the Divine Essence in the account of an intelligible form: hence for this a disposition is required, but not for the light, which is a disposition toward the union of such a form.

IT IS DOUBTED third: Whether by the absolute power of God it can come about that a created intellect see God without the infused light of glory? It is argued first, for the affirmative side. Whatever God can do with a second cause, He can do by Himself alone: but through the light of glory, as through an effective principle, He produces Vision: therefore by Himself alone without light He can bring it about that the intellect see God.

Second. Light is posited by St. Thomas as a disposition of the intellect toward the union of the Divine Essence in the account of an intelligible likeness; but God can unite any other form whatever to a subject without a disposition: therefore He will be able to unite Himself in the account of an intelligible form without any disposition of the intellect.

Third. In fact, the water of Baptism is raised by God to concur efficiently toward the sanctification of the soul, without any power which is in the water as its form or disposition; but by the divine concurrence alone the water attains so great an effect: therefore God will be able, by His special and supernatural help alone, to raise the intellect to see God as He is.

Fourth. God can by absolute power bring it about that the Blessed love Him in the fatherland without the habit of charity: therefore that he see without the habit of light. The consequence seems good: because neither power is naturally proportionate to such an action. The antecedent is proved: because according to the common opinion, even in the way, a man can without the habit of charity have an act of charity with a special help alone, and even with efficacious love attain a supernatural end: therefore much more will this be possible in the fatherland, because there it is easier to love God clearly seen than here, obscurely known.

Fifth. God could bring it about that our intellect, without the habit of first principles, assent to first principles, with only the likenesses of the things themselves remaining: therefore He will be able to bring it about that a created intellect, without the habit of light, see God united in the account of an intelligible form.

Sixth. It is a most probable opinion that Paul and Moses in this life saw the Divine Essence, and yet they did not have the habit of the light of glory: therefore God can do this.

Last, because nothing is to be denied to the divine power as possible, except what implies contradiction; but in this, that a created intellect see God aided by supernatural help, there is no implication of contradiction: therefore.

Concerning this difficulty, there are various opinions of the Doctors in 4 d. 40, where Scotus and Durandus say that, even without a habit and without special help, a created intellect can see God by this alone, that God make Himself present to the intellect in the account of an object. The opinion of these men Master Soto explains, in the place cited. Yet this opinion, if it speaks of what is fact, is erroneous and against the definition of the cited Clementine. If, however, it speaks of the absolute power of God, it is false, because the presence of the object does not suffice, if it is above the powers of the natural power, for having action concerning it: therefore, just as when the object is natural the power cannot without the general concurrence of God attain that object; so when the object is supernatural the power will not be able, without the supernatural help of God, to have action concerning it. Likewise, that presence of the object which these Doctors imagine is in reality not presence of the object in the account of an object, but in the account of a thing, in the way God is present in all things: therefore just as the light of the sun is not present to the eyes of the night-owl in the account of a visible object, much less will God be present to the created intellect in the account of an object, unless the intellect is illumined and strengthened by supernatural light or help. The second opinion is that God by absolute power cannot bring it about that a created intellect see the Divine Essence without some infused light superadded to the power. So hold Cajetan, here, and Ferrara 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 54 and Capreolus in 4 dist. 49 and Soto q. 2 artic. 4 although he once held the opposite. The third opinion is a middle one, of certain moderns, namely that a created intellect, with the supernatural help of God alone, will be able without the light of glory to be raised to see the Divine Essence, yet not so that this vision be connatural and proportionate to the created intellect; but only belong to it in the account of an instrument moved by God. But this opinion, in my judgment, does not penetrate the account of a vital act, of whose intrinsic definition it is that whoever receives denomination from it necessarily have in himself a formal and proportionate principle with the act itself. And the reason is that a vital act is one which proceeds from an intrinsic principle of the living thing and remains in it. It is confirmed: because if the Blessed concurs only instrumentally toward that vision, it is necessary to posit some seer as principal cause; but this can be none but God Himself: therefore God sees through that Vision as principal cause, which is absurd. To us, therefore, the second opinion is pleasing: wherefore we posit a single conclusion.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE for a creature to see God unless it have a supernatural light proportionate to the action of seeing. It is proved: because it belongs to the account of an efficient cause universally that it act insofar as it is in act, as Aristotle said in 5 Physics; but no creature, without that light, is in act so as to be able to be the efficient cause of Vision: therefore without it it cannot see God. This reason is to me a demonstration, if we speak of a cause that is not instrumental, as indeed the Blessed is not instrumental with respect to that vital action of seeing God. Nor does it avail to say that through the natural intellect the creature is in act toward the vital action of understanding, but yet by the concurrence of God it can be raised to such a vital action of seeing God. This answer, I say, does not avail, because toward the action itself of seeing the Blessed also holds himself as principal cause: therefore with respect to it he must have some formal principle through which he is in act. It is confirmed: because it is most received that the effect must be so proportioned to its cause that it not exceed its power, but it need not be proportioned to the instrument: therefore if the Blessed does not hold himself as an instrument of seeing, it is necessary that he have proportion with that action; otherwise it will be the same to say that he has no proportion with the action of seeing and that he does not see as a cause of seeing. Besides, it cannot come about through any power that water heat as principal cause unless it have heat or some more eminent form: therefore neither will any creature be able to see God without infused light, which makes proportion in the seer with the action itself. Finally, this conclusion is proved by the arguments made for the conclusion of the preceding doubt.

TO the first argument it is answered that it is one thing for God to effect some effect by Himself alone, and another for Him to bring it about that another second cause effect without a principle and without an efficient form: this second implies contradiction, for it would be to say that something is a cause and is not a cause. Then that maxim, to be universally true, is to be understood of substantial effects and of accidents which do not in their definition include actually proceeding from some created power: e.g. sensation intrinsically implies being an action of sense. Hence it implies that God by Himself alone effect sensation, unless perhaps, as some say, sensation is considered as it is a certain accident, and not in the account of sensation; and so they say that God could take that accident which is now sensation away from its subject and place it in a stone; but then neither would the stone sense, nor would it properly be sensation.

To the second, I deny the consequence. And the reason is that the union of other substantial forms, as such, primarily regards matter as its proper and natural subject: for accidents, which are dispositions, are not subjected in matter itself immediately, but in the whole composite; but the Divine Essence is united to the intellect in no other way than in the account of an intelligible form: hence for its intelligible presence light is required on the side of the power. For the rest, the Divine Essence in the account of a thing and in the account of an efficient cause conserving to-be is intimately in all things and much more in the intellect.

To the third, I deny the consequence: because the water of Baptism concurs merely instrumentally toward the sanctification of the soul, while God alone concurs as principal cause of grace; but the Blessed with respect to vision is not an instrument of God seeing, but is a principal cause which sees God; hence he must have in himself a formal principle of seeing.

To the fourth, I deny the antecedent first: on the contrary the will of the Blessed needs some principle raising it to so sublime a love of God and of a higher order, which from its own nature it cannot have; and just as we have said that divine help does not suffice for beatific Vision without infused light, so it does not suffice for that love with respect to the will, unless the will receive some infused quality so as to be in act toward an action so sublime as supernatural love is. Second it is answered by denying the consequence. Because the will, since from its own nature it is an inclination to a known good, will now, with the intellect raised through the light of glory, be able to tend toward God clearly seen with supernatural help alone, in such a way indeed that the Blessed is a proportionate cause toward such love in the account of a principle which formally is in the intellect, and is the root of proportioning the act of the will. For the rest, whether in the way the will can without the habit of charity have an act of love of the same species as the act which proceeds from the infused habit is a dispute among Theologians which belongs more to the matter of the virtues. To us, however, the negative side has always pleased more. Of this the reason, for now, let the same proportionally suffice which has been rendered by us for the conclusion of the present doubt. For the power of a principal cause must be proportioned to the very action of the power; hence since the will, from its own nature, is not proportionate to tend efficaciously toward God as toward a supernatural end, it is necessary that it be perfected through some form raising the power to such an end: for infused virtues are not to be judged conferred on us so that we may better exercise acts of believing, hoping and loving God, as a supernatural object and Author of grace and glory, but are given so that we may without qualification exercise such acts; hence in the doctrine of St. Thomas infused virtues have also the account of supernatural powers, and not only of habits.

To the fifth, some grant the antecedent, but I judge it to imply contradiction. Because our intellect, without some light perfecting the power itself, is not proportionate to judge of first principles, although it have the simple likenesses of the things themselves which it now has. For the rest, whether that light is given by way of a permanent habit or by way of a passing disposition makes no difference with respect to the divine and absolute Power. And through this the answer to the sixth is clear, for if Paul and Moses saw the Divine Essence, they had the light of glory by way of a passing disposition, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2. q. 175 artic. 3, to the third.

To the last it is answered that it implies contradiction for any creature to see God and not to have a proportionate principle for seeing. Because, as has been said, the creature seeing does not concur as an instrument toward that vital and immanent action.