Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: To see God, some likeness of God is required, on the part of the seeing power.

Second conclusion: On the part of the thing seen, which must be united to the seer, the essence of God can be seen through no created likeness.

Third conclusion, to the third: The divine essence is united to the created intellect as understood in act, making the intellect in act through itself, that is, it actuates the intellective power. For to see the divine essence clearly, it is required that the divine essence itself be intimately united to the created intellect as a form constituting the intellect in act.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning the first conclusion there is no special difficulty in this article, but it will be examined in the fifth article. Now it is to be noted, concerning the ground of the conclusion, that the likeness which is on the part of the seeing power for seeing God is highly analogous with respect to its cause, to which it is assimilated only in this, that it makes the power able to see, that is, to produce the vision of God; yet it stands far from the perfection of the divine intellect, which comprehends the divine Essence and infinitely sees what is infinite; but the created intellect, however elevated by the likeness of the light of glory, sees finitely and in a limited way what is infinite, although it sees it as it is.

There is a DOUBT concerning the second conclusion of St. Thomas whether it is true? For the negative side it is argued first with the argument of Aureolus, in Capreolus, in 4 Sent. d. 49, q. 5, art. 2, who holds against St. Thomas; and he first destroys his foundations. It is therefore of this kind. For the reasons of St. Thomas are weak: for all are easily dissolved if it be said that the intelligible likeness can be taken in two ways: first in its to-be, as to its real to-be which it has, in another way in its representing: in the first way indeed there is no need that the intelligible likeness be of the same order as the thing which it represents, nor that it have as much perfection in its to-be as the thing represented has; for it is agreed that the intelligible likeness, which is an accident inhering in a subject, represents a substance, which is a being through itself. But in the second way there can well be (says Aureolus) a created likeness which is of the same order objectively as the divine Essence represented. Behold, therefore, how all the reasons of St. Thomas are dissolved through this distinction.

Secondly. The vision by which the Blessed see God is a natural and expressed likeness of God representing Him as He is, because it is a cognition; but cognition is a natural likeness of the thing, and yet it is something created: therefore there will be able to be given an impressed intelligible likeness representative of God as He is. The consequence is plain: for the account is the same, since vision is something created. But the antecedent is proved: first because it is an actual likeness of God. Secondly from Augustine, book 9 de Trin. ch. 11, where he says that cognition has a likeness to him whose cognition it is. Likewise in book 14 ch. 6 he says that the thought of the mind by which it thinks itself is an image of the mind itself, and ch. 17 he says that a full likeness is then made in us when we shall have perceived His full vision. It is confirmed from that place, 1 John ch. 13: "When He shall appear we shall be like Him etc." Thirdly. There can be given a mental word representing God as He is: therefore much more will there be given an intelligible likeness. The consequence is seen to be clear, for a mental word is an expressed image of the thing which it represents: therefore if an expressed image is given, much more will there be given an impressed and as it were implicit image, such as an intelligible likeness is. But the antecedent is proved, besides that it is of St. Aug. in many places, by the reason of St. Thomas below, q. 27, art. 1, and q. 9 De poten., art. 3, where he says that of the account of one understanding it is to produce a word through understanding, because the action of the intellect must have a produced and intrinsic term at which it is terminated: therefore the intellectual vision of the Blessed, which is most perfect, produces a word, which yet would be created: therefore etc. Fourthly. To understand, as also to sense, is a certain undergoing, as Aristotle says, 2 De Anima ch. 4. But it is verified to be a certain undergoing for no other reason except inasmuch as the intellect receives an impressed intelligible likeness; but this cannot be the divine Essence, therefore a created likeness. Fifthly. The Blessed see God finitely with a certain finite vision, for although they see the infinite, yet they see finitely, and the things which they see in God are also finite: therefore an infinite likeness need not be given for this, but a finite likeness and created species suffices for such an action. Sixthly. There is given a created light concurring efficiently to beatific vision: therefore there can be given an intelligible likeness. The consequence is proved: for an intelligible likeness is posited that it be an effective formal principle proportioned with the action itself concerning such an object. Seventhly. The lower angel knows the highest through an intelligible likeness less immaterial, distinctly and intuitively, than the highest angel is, and through a likeness lower than the one known, and though a likeness, since it is an accident, represents a substance: therefore it is not unfitting that God also be seen through some created supernatural likeness.

On account of these arguments, certain Scholastics follow the side contrary to St. Thomas, asserting that God can be represented distinctly and quidditatively through some created likeness of a supernatural order.

For the resolution, it is to be noted that the likeness on the part of the thing seen or known is threefold: one is called the objective likeness, which instrumentally, through the cognition of itself, represents another thing, to which the movement of the intellect is principally terminated: e.g. the bodily image of Peter is a certain likeness, from the cognition of which the intellect rises to the cognition of Peter; and every creature is a certain imperfect likeness for knowing the Creator. The second is the likeness impressed in the cognitive power, by union with which the power is actuated and proportioned to knowing the thing whose representative likeness it is. The third likeness is a certain concept of the mind, or mental word, which is produced through understanding, as a formal and expressed image, in which the thing is seen or known. Secondly it is to be noted that one thing can represent another either by imposition as a term, and such representation puts no greater perfection in the representer from the greater perfection of the object represented, as the word Deus, the word formica are equal in the account of sign. In another way from its own nature, as a natural likeness and image of it, and such representation, the more perfect the object it is of, puts the greater perfection in the representer, and of this kind are likenesses.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: There can be no likeness of God of the first kind, namely objective, through which He may be seen, through the cognition of which God is seen as He is. This conclusion is common to all Theologians; indeed there are those who judge the second conclusion of St. Thomas to be understood of such an objective likeness; and so they explain the testimony of St. Augustine cited in the argument On the contrary, which is had in book 15 de Trinit. ch. 9, and the testimony of St. Denis cited in the article, and the reasons of St. Thomas teach this conclusion, especially in that wherein he says that to say God is seen through a likeness is to say the divine essence is not seen; as if he said that to see God by seeing some likeness distinct from God is just as denying the divine essence to be seen: for in this way the Fathers were said to see God, in certain images and figures: and yet Moses after such visions urgently begged of God in prayers, show me thy face, as is read in Exod. 33.

Second conclusion: To the truth of the second conclusion of St. Thomas it does not suffice to deny that such an objective likeness is possible, but further one must deny every created likeness in the second way to be possible through which God may be seen as He is. This conclusion is proved from the first foundation of the article, where he plainly speaks of the form impressed in the cognitive power; and from the solution to the third argument, where he teaches the divine Essence to be united through itself to the intellect in the manner of an intelligible form. He teaches the same in book 3 Contra Gent., ch. 49, most of all with the 4th and 5th reasons. Likewise the reasons of the article, if they avail anything, proceed concerning all likenesses even created, however spiritual they be; and the testimony of St. Augustine speaks of any likeness whatever.

Third conclusion: Speaking absolutely, and not only according to the opinion of St. Thomas, one must deny that any created intelligible likeness is possible which would represent God quidditatively and as He is. This conclusion is proved. Every distinct and intuitive cognition of a thing comes about through a likeness of the thing more immaterial, or not less immaterial, than the thing known is: but there cannot be given a created intelligible likeness equally immaterial with the intelligible divine Essence: therefore etc. The major is plain inductively even in sensitive cognition: for sense is, as Aristotle says in book 2 De Anima, text 121 and text 138, perceptive of likenesses without matter, as wax receives a figure without the matter of iron; e.g. for touch to sense cold distinctly, it does not suffice that my flesh be affected with cold, but it is necessary that the sensorium receive a certain immaterial likeness, that it may sense cold. And hence it is that Arist. said, in the place above, text 95, that the sensible placed upon the sense does not make sensation, because such union is highly material; and so consequently and proportionally in the other higher senses it is agreed that sensation comes about through an immaterial likeness of the material object; and that sense is more excellent which receives a purer likeness in a more immaterial way: e.g. smell is more perfect than touch and taste, because it receives the likeness of the smellable with less alteration; for it is not necessary that the organ of sense be altered, indeed perhaps not even the medium. For vultures scent corpses from a very great distance.

Further, hearing is more spiritual, because without any alteration of the object or of the medium, but through a certain local motion, a certain spiritual likeness of sound is perceived in hearing. Sight, finally, is the most perfect sense among the five, because without any mutation of the object or of the medium or of the organ, but intentionally it is moved by the object.

Proportionally in the common sense likenesses more abstracted from matter are received: and at length in the intellect intelligible likenesses abstracted from phantasms are received by the power of the light of the agent intellect, representing in common, yet immaterially, the quiddity of the material thing. But with respect to an altogether immaterial object, such as separate substances are, there cannot be in us likenesses representing immaterial objects as they are: for every intelligible likeness of ours has a certain materiality, because it is abstracted from phantasms, and through conversion to the phantasm it represents. From what has been said the truth of that proposition will be gathered. But the minor is proved: for God is infinitely immaterial even in the account of intelligible, but no created likeness can have infinite immateriality even in representing: therefore the minor is true. But that second minor is proved: for the more perfect the thing represented is, the more perfect the likeness ought to be which naturally represents that thing; but God is infinitely perfect: therefore the intelligible likeness which would naturally represent Him as He is ought to be infinitely perfect according to the immateriality of its natural representation. It is confirmed: for every likeness which naturally represents a more perfect object has in its to-be a greater perfection than another likeness which represents a less perfect object: therefore what naturally represents an infinitely perfect object must have infinite perfection in its real to-be; for this representation is not by imposition, but natural, which is founded on the perfections of the very to-be of the representing likeness. On this matter see St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 8, art. 1, where he makes very many arguments in confirmation of this truth, and in III Contra Gentes, ch. 49.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.49

For the solution of the arguments, it is to be noted with Caietanus, in this place, that the intelligible likenesses of which we speak do not have per se that they be accidents or substance, yet it belongs to them per se that they be representative not in the manner of a sign by imposition, but in the manner of a natural likeness: for all cognition comes about through assimilation; and the likeness ought to be the more perfect in this to-be, the more perfect the thing it represents.

To the first argument it is answered that, although that distinction of the intelligible likeness in its to-be and in its representing is rightly admitted, yet because the perfection of the likeness in representing is a perfection naturally according to a certain real to-be, it is plainly gathered that if the thing which is represented evidently and as it is is infinite, then the likeness itself representing also has infinite real perfection and infinite immateriality. With this, however, it stands in truth that the intelligible likeness, which is an accident, can perfectly represent a created substance, because in the account of representing there can be proportion in the likeness of an accident with a substance of finite perfection. Just as accidents contribute and conduce greatly to investigating the what-it-is, and reach even to the production of substance in the power of the substance whose accidents they are, so too the intelligible likeness, although it be an accident, will be able to reach to the perfect cognition of substance and its representation, in the power of the substance which the likeness itself uses, and in the power of the substance whose the likeness itself is. But with respect to God, there can be no effect which represents God as He is, because it can have no proportion in the account of representing: for since such representation ought to be natural, it must be founded on some real perfection and immateriality of the thing, which ought to be of the same genus as that which is represented. Hence there is no consequence that if the intelligible likeness, which is an accident, can represent a created substance as it is, that there can possibly be given also an intelligible likeness which represents God as He is.

To the second argument, Master Soto in 4, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 5, grants vision to be a likeness of God; indeed he says that for this reason a likeness is required which is a likeness of the object in the manner of a habit, that the intellect may be able to produce the cognition which is the actual image of the same object, and so he understands St. Augustine in the place cited. And this vision, he says, St. Thomas calls a participation of the light of glory.

Hence it is answered to the argument that the impressed likeness is a likeness representing the object itself in another way than vision is: for for a likeness to represent is to effect the cognition of the thing, but the mode of representing of a cognition is not to effect, but to be the cognition and representation formally. The first of these it is impossible to attribute to a creature, for God alone is the efficient cause of beatitude.

But yet this doctrine does not agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For he himself in the article does not deny a created intelligible likeness to be possible for seeing God because it would be the effective principle of vision, but because it is repugnant that a created form be a natural likeness of God representing Him as He is. Likewise, St. Thomas puts light on the part of the seeing power, by which the intellect is made effective for seeing God; but he puts the intelligible likeness on the part of the thing seen, that the object be united in some way to the seer; to represent, therefore, is not for a likeness to effect, and even if it were to effect, it would not for that reason be not possible for seeing God, for even the light of glory itself concurs efficiently for seeing God, and nevertheless is a certain likeness of God on the part of the seeing power, as St. Thomas says in the first conclusion. To the argument, therefore, the antecedent is denied: but vision is a vital action proceeding from the intellect illumined by the light of glory concerning the divine object united to the intellect.

To the first and second testimony of St. Augustine it is answered that by the name of cognition is understood the intrinsic term of the thought itself or of the cognition, which is the expressed image of the object, which is formed in us in the natural cognition of the intellect.

To the third testimony, where St. Augustine speaks of beatific vision, it is to be noted that the Blessed are like God in this that they are seeing God as He is, and enjoy Him, as God Himself is blessed because He sees Himself and enjoys Himself, yet there is not made in the Blessed a likeness formally representing God as He is: for the divine Essence supplies this through itself. We shall therefore be perfectly like God inasmuch as we shall have the action of seeing the same object which God sees, and so St. Augustine is explained.

To the third argument, Ferrariensis, book I Cont. Gent., ch. 55|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.55, says problematically that it can be defended that the Blessed form a word even in the doctrine of St. Thomas. For the affirmative side can be proved by the third argument. Nor does it stand in the way that the divine Essence can be represented through no created likeness as He is. For it will be said that this is true of the likeness which is the likeness of the intellect, and of the likeness which is the conception produced from a created likeness, but not of the expressed likeness which is from an uncreated infinite form, such as the divine Essence is, by whose power, just as the Blessed produce vision, so also a word. Nor does the other argument stand in the way, that beatific vision ought to be immediately of the divine Essence, but a word is a certain medium in which the thing known is seen, therefore the divine Essence will not be able to be seen immediately and in a created word. For it is said to this argument that an intrinsic medium to the knower and to the cognition, as it were completive of it, does not hinder the thing from being known in itself, and of this kind is the word which the Blessed produce by their understanding, but it is not a word in which they know God and see Him as in His image.

But that the negative side can be sustained is proved. For just as the Blessed see the divine Essence through no other intelligible likeness than through the essence itself, so through no other word do they see, but the divine Essence itself stands as the immediate term of understanding.

It remains, therefore, to answer to the third argument that St. Thomas speaks of the understanding of a created nature and naturally befitting it, but he does not speak of the understanding of our intellect through a supernatural and infinite form. And Caietanus follows this sentence here. For all the reasons of St. Thomas in the article proceed much more concerning the expressed than the impressed likeness, which is the intelligible likeness. But what the opposite opinion says, that a word is posited in the Blessed not that in it the divine Essence is seen but that it be the intrinsic term completing the understanding as a point terminates a line, does not fully satisfy the difficulty, for still that word ought to be a natural and expressed likeness of God representing Him as He is, which is impossible for a creature. Likewise, according to this way of speaking, in every sensitive and exterior cognition one must oppose an intrinsic term to sensation completive of it, e.g. when a wall is seen, there must be in use not only vision but also as it were a word and expressed idol of the object itself.

But Capreolus, in I Sent. dist. 27, q. 2, says that beatific vision is terminated to a single word had of the beatific object essentially and in act; but the blessed one has several words habitually concerning the attributes and concerning the creatures seen in God. Whence sometimes he forms several, sometimes fewer words. But yet, in 4 Sent., dist. 49, q. 5, he says it is commonly held that the Blessed have no other word than the divine Word on account of His intimate presence to the blessed intellect.

But then the former opinion of Capreolus seems altogether false, for concerning the divine attributes there is a single account of knowing, namely the divine Essence itself. Whence one attribute cannot be seen without another, just as neither can one person be seen without another, and the same single essence is the account of knowing those things which are seen in the word, and not through a proper likeness, wherefore neither concerning the attributes nor concerning the creatures seen in God do they form several words, even if it be added that they produce a word. Yet there pleases us more, according to the sentence of St. Thomas, that the Blessed form no word, but beatific vision is altogether and immediately terminated to the divine Essence.

To the fourth argument it is answered that the understanding of which the article speaks is of men, inasmuch as the human intellect, which is called possible, before it understands receives the intelligible likeness from the object, and therefore it is said to be a certain undergoing, because our understanding presupposes a undergoing, that is, the reception of the intelligible likeness.

To the fifth argument it is answered that although the Blessed see the divine Essence finitely, and finite creatures in it, yet because they see the infinite thing as it is, there cannot be given a created likeness sufficient to represent God as He is.

To the sixth argument, the consequence is denied. For the blessed light is posited on the part of the seeing power to elevate and strengthen it, that it may be able to elicit vision concerning such an object, and as the light is finite, so too is vision finite: for it is a certain vital act proceeding from a finite principle. But, because the object is infinite, there cannot be given anything which would supply the union of the intelligible object with the intelligent power. But it is necessary that such an object be united through itself. Whether, however, the divine Essence itself in the account of an intelligible likeness concurs effectively to vision, we shall say in the following doubt.

To the last argument it is answered that the intelligible likeness by which the lower angel knows the higher is of the same order in representative to-be as the object represented: as also the lower angel himself is of the same genus as the higher in the to-be of nature. Nor then does it stand in the way that the angelic intelligible likeness is an accident and lower in the to-be of nature than the substance which is known. The reason is: for the likeness itself is not what understands but concurs effectively to understanding, in the power of the intelligent angelic substance and hypostasis. Whence it comes about that the action can reach to the cognition of things of the same genus and immateriality. But only this is gathered from it, that the lower does not know the higher as perfectly as the higher knows himself or even the lower as to natural to-be, for free thoughts are not known except by him whose they are.

IT IS DOUBTED, secondly, concerning the third conclusion, whether the divine Essence is united to the intellect of the Blessed as form and intelligible likeness?

For the negative side it is argued first. Of the account of an intelligible likeness it is to be received in the intellect informing it and constituting it in act; but the divine Essence cannot be as a form in a subject: therefore etc.

Second argument. It is impossible that any power operate through some formal principle which is not intrinsic to it, as in a subject or as a part of the operator itself; but the intelligible form is posited as a formal principle of the intellective power through which it operates proportionately to the to-be which it has: therefore if the divine Essence is an intelligible likeness, it is necessary that it be received as a form actuating the intellect.

Third argument. Of the account of an intelligible likeness it is that it formally assimilate the intellective power to the intelligible object, for all cognition comes about through assimilation; but it implies a contradiction that the divine Essence be the formal likeness of the creature to God: therefore it cannot be an intelligible likeness.

Fourth argument. Of the account of an intelligible likeness it is that it constitute one thing with the intellect in intelligible to-be. Whence likeness and intellect stand as matter and form, as Caietanus says in this article; but this is repugnant to the divine Essence, for if the divine Essence were a form informing and bestowing some formal to-be on the creature distinct from the essence itself.

Arg. 5. Of the account of an intelligible likeness there is some potentiality: therefore it cannot belong to the divine Essence. The antecedent is proved: for of the account of an intelligible likeness it is to constitute the intellect in first act; but such constitution still remains in potency to second act; therefore the form constituting the intellect in first act has something of potentiality, otherwise it would also constitute it in perfect second act.

Lastly. Of the account of an intelligible likeness it is that it be the form by which and the principle by which the intelligent brings about the vital action of knowing; but it implies a contradiction that the divine Essence be the principle by which a created power operates: therefore etc. The minor is proved: for otherwise the divine Essence would be a principle subordinated to the created principal agent. The consequence is proved; for every formal principle by which an agent operates is something subordinated to the agent, which operates as principal agent and subsisting through itself; and so the Blessed would use the divine Essence as it were as an instrument and principle for the vital action, which is the beatific vision itself. Caietanus strives to explain that to the account of an intelligible likeness, speaking absolutely, it does not belong that it constitute the intellect in act or in habit, but that it constitute the intellect in complete second act: for to this the intelligible likeness as such is posited, that the intelligent be the understood in complete act, and as form is the principle of the existing of matter, so the intelligible likeness stands as the principle of understanding, not that it be the act itself of understanding, but that it stand to second act as form stands to the to-be itself which is communicated to matter; and therefore, although in some way the intelligible likeness is active with respect to understanding, yet its better and stronger proportion is formal than active with respect to understanding. Yet this sentence seems obscure, nor fully satisfying the argument to the opposite. Wherefore the whole difficulty seems to us to be posited in explaining of what kind the union of the divine Essence with the blessed intellect is, in the account of an intelligible likeness.

FOR the explanation, let the first conclusion be: It is certain that the divine Essence is immediately united to the intellect of the Blessed as the principal agent of Vision, on which Vision depends in its becoming and in its being conserved as on a supernatural agent and the special author of grace and glory. This conclusion is demonstrated with a universal reason from those things which were said in q. 5 concerning the immediate existence of God in all things. With the immediacy of power and of supposit, that God intimately gives to-be to all things.

Second conclusion: It is certain also to be the doctrine of St. Thomas that the intelligible likeness, which is a certain quality inhering in the intellect, concurs effectively together with the intellect to understanding. This conclusion is plain from St. Thomas, book 1 Cont. Gent. ch. 53|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.53, where he says that such a likeness is in our intellect, through which as through its proper form it understands the thing itself and by whose power it forms in itself the intention of the thing understood, which we call a word. And the reason is: for as each thing is, such things it works. Whence the intellect must first be made in act through the intelligible form before it produce the expressed image of the thing itself. Likewise it is proved inductively, for every form of an agent, to which the effect is assimilated per se, concurs effectively as its effective principle, as is plain, whether it be a substantial or an accidental form; e.g. the soul of man is the effective principle of the begotten, because the begotten is assimilated per se to the begetter animated with a rational soul; and likewise the generative power itself is an effective principle, to which the begotten is assimilated per se: likewise fire, through the medium of form and heat, efficiently generates fire and the hot.

Third conclusion: The divine Essence, inasmuch as it is united to the intellect as an intelligible form and in the account of an intelligible form, does not concur effectively with the intellect to producing beatific Vision; but the intellect alone with the light of glory elicits beatific vision efficiently. This conclusion, as to its first part, is proved from the proof of the minor made in the last argument. Then it is proved from the doctrine of St. Thomas in this article, where on the part of the seeing power he puts light, by which the power is rendered effective for vision; but on the part of the object, that the object be united to the power, he puts the divine Essence to be united in the account of an intelligible likeness; but this is not to effect: therefore it is not posited for effecting. It is confirmed: for if the divine Essence inasmuch as intelligible likeness, as such, concurred effectively to Vision, it would already stand on the part of the seeing power, inasmuch as through it, namely as through an effective principle, it would produce vision. Then the second part is proved, and the first confirmed, from St. Thomas in Quod. book 7, art. 1, where he teaches expressly that in other understandings not only does light concur effectively, but also the likeness of the object, which is an effective power for the cognition of the same object. But in beatific Vision St. Thomas posits no other effective power with the intellect except the light of glory. And the reason of this difference is assigned by St. Thomas because the divine Essence, which is the object of that vision, is totally intelligible light. Whence the light of glory descending from the divine Essence itself into the intellect does this with respect to the divine Essence in the intellect which the likeness of the thing understood does together with light with respect to other intelligibles which are not light only. He teaches the same to the second and fourth, in the same place.

Fourth conclusion: Nevertheless it must be said that the divine Essence itself is united to the blessed intellect properly in the account of an intelligible likeness, so that Vision depends on the divine Essence not only in the account of a terminative object, but also as on an intelligible likeness, whose proper office is to unite

the object with the power. This conclusion is plainly gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the solution to the third, and wherever he makes mention of this matter, as in 4 Sent. d. 49, q. 2, art. 1, and De Verit. q. 8, art. 1, and book 3 Cont. Gent. ch. 51|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.51, where he says that the divine Essence is what is seen and that by which it is seen. From which place some gather that the divine Essence concurs effectively in the account of an intelligible likeness. But yet the sense of St. Thomas is that the divine Essence is that by which it is seen, as an intelligible form united to the intellect. And the conclusion is proved, moreover, because the intellect of the Blessed cannot see God without an intelligible likeness, but no created likeness can terminate that dependence of the intellect: therefore it is necessary that the divine Essence be united to the intellect in the account of an intelligible likeness. The major is proved: for the intellective power must first be united with the object before it produce Vision concerning it; but this union cannot come about unless the divine Essence be united in the account of an intelligible form: therefore. It is confirmed: for every other union with the intellect is either that of the efficient cause conserving the intellect with the light of glory, or that of the terminative object of Vision; therefore it is necessary to posit another union in the account of an intelligible form. It is confirmed secondly: for the divine Essence is intelligible truth, eminently containing whatever of perfection there is in a created likeness; therefore through itself it will be able to have the proper account of an intelligible likeness, because this includes no imperfection, just as the divine Essence includes the proper account of Wisdom, although wisdom in us is a certain inhering quality. But someone says that it intrinsically includes imperfection to have the account of an intelligible likeness, as was proved in the last argument for the negative side, namely that the divine Essence would be an efficient and elicitive principle subordinated to the created intellect. To this, however, I say that of the proper account of an intelligible likeness, as such, it is not to be an efficient principle of cognition, but only to unite the object with the power in knowable to-be. And the reason is: for that the intelligible likeness be active with respect to cognition rather holds on the part of the power, whose it is to elicit cognition; but of the account of an intelligible likeness as such there is only that which holds on the part of the object: therefore it is not of its proper account that it effect.

But observe especially that in the cognition of natural things there is a particular reason why the intelligible likeness concurs effectively, as a form and power inhering in the intellect, namely because the intellect, although it has force and efficacy for eliciting cognition, informed with a lower light, yet does not have a sufficiently determined power for eliciting such a kind of cognition, but this determination comes about with the accession of the intelligible likeness, which constitutes the intellect in first act, that it be effective of such cognition concerning such an object, and this comes from the imperfection of the power and of the light; but the light of glory most sufficiently determines the intellect of the Blessed, that it be effective not only of vision but of such vision, provided the object be united to it, which union is not an action of the intellect or of the object. Whence neither does the intelligible likeness, which per se primo formally makes this union, concur efficiently to Vision: indeed some of the moderns judge that neither do our intelligible likenesses concur efficiently to cognition, but only formally, as to the specification of the act. But yet these are deceived, as we said in the second conclusion. We can also adduce an example to explain the third and fourth conclusion. For it is the common sentence that an angel needs no other intelligible likeness for the cognition of himself than his own essence itself, which is united to the angelic intellect not only in natural to-be, as a subject with its proper accident, but is also united in intelligible to-be. This supposed, it is certain that the essence of the angel concurs effectively to vision, inasmuch as it is the total form of the principal agent, from which the intellect itself flows and has the to-be of inexistence; and in this the intellect is subordinated to the essence as to a stronger principle of operating. But in the account of an intelligible likeness the essence of the angel cannot concur effectively, unless we wish to posit a double efficiency in the essence of the angel, one principal and another subordinated to the intellect, as proceeding from the intelligible likeness elicitively, in the power of the intellect to which it is united, as the likeness which is an accident concurs to understanding: which is not only superfluous but also absurd to attribute to the angelic essence, this subordination in effecting. So we say that the divine Essence concurs to beatific Vision as the principal agent of vision, inasmuch as it is the Author of grace and glory. Whence that other effective concurrence is superfluous, nor befitting the divine Essence, since it suffices that in the account of an intelligible likeness it be united to the intellect through itself, making the object present, in which office no account of effecting is found, but only of terminating the dependence of the intellect and of the light on the presence of the object; and this especially befits the divine Essence, which according to itself is properly a subsistent and intelligible form, eminently containing every perfection of intelligible forms inasmuch as such, as it contains every account of to-be. There is another example to explain this truth. It is certain

indeed that the humanity, in Christ, is united to the personality of the Word, so that not only does the Word with its personality terminate the dependence of the humanity, which is of faith, but also with its proper existence terminate the dependence of the human nature in that which is to exist, so that the soul and humanity of Christ exist through no other created existence, which the common and safer opinion of Theologians holds, whatever Scotus may say. Just as, therefore, God through Himself can supply the account of existing of a created nature, because God is the first to-be subsisting through His essence, so, since He is the first intelligible, He can supply through His essence through Himself the account of an intelligible form, without any injury to the Divine Majesty, through a certain ineffable union with the intellect illumined by the light of glory, in the account of an intelligible likeness, without His being received in the intellect as in a subject in that imperfect way in which our existence is received in our essence.

TO the arguments it is answered. To the first, the major is denied, speaking per se of the intelligible likeness as such, as it is not of the account of wisdom that it be a quality, although this belongs to created wisdom; but to the intelligible likeness as such belongs per se primo that it unite the object with the power. To the second it is answered that it proves the third conclusion: whence I grant the major and the minor, and I deny the consequence: for for the divine Essence to be united to the intellect as an intelligible form is not to be the principle by which the intellect elicitively effects vision, but to be an intelligible form, by which, once united to the intellect, the intellect with light elicits vision. To the third, I grant the minor, if we speak of a created intelligible likeness; and so I grant the minor, and I deny the consequence: for of the account of an intelligible form, speaking absolutely, it is not to be a formal likeness existing and received in the intellect: but it suffices that it be an intelligible form intimately assisting and making the object present. To the fourth it is answered that all those perfections are found in a created intelligible likeness, yet they do not belong per se primo to the intelligible likeness as such. To the fifth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that if to constitute be taken as it says the imperfection of an inhering material or formal cause, it does not belong per se primo to the intelligible likeness to constitute the intellect in first act, although it belongs to a created intelligible likeness. But if to constitute in first act be understood and taken for that which is to supply the place of what constitutes as to the union of the object with the power, so the divine Essence, in the account of an intelligible likeness, constitutes the intellect in first act, inasmuch as it unites the object with the power.

To the last, the major is denied speaking per se primo of the intelligible likeness, whence there is no need that such efficiency in the account of a subordinated principle, by which the creature operates, belong to the divine Essence.