Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: God, according to Himself, is supremely knowable. The ground is that God is supremely being in act, since He is pure act.

Second conclusion: God, as regards us, is not supremely knowable. The ground is that He is a disproportionate object, on account of the defect of our intellect.

Third conclusion: A created intellect can see God through His essence. The ground is that otherwise man would never obtain beatitude, or his beatitude would consist in something other than God; which is foreign to faith, and beside reason.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING this article it is to be noted that the vision of God is taken in many ways in Sacred Scripture. First, for the vision by which God is seen in some likeness. And in this way, God was most often seen by the Fathers of the Old Testament. In the second way it is taken for the vision by which God is seen in some creature, which is an image or vestige of God. And in this way Paul says 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a mirror in enigma. And Rom. 1: The invisible things of God, from the creature of the world, understood through the things that are made, are beheld, etc. In the third way it is taken for the vision by which God is seen in an assumed nature. And in this way it is said John 1: We have seen His glory etc. In the fourth way it is taken for the vision by which God is seen through His essence and intuitively, yet not comprehended. And of this St. Thomas disputes in the present question.

IT IS DOUBTED in this article concerning the third conclusion of St. Thomas whether it is true? It is argued first for the negative side. The sense of the power of sight cannot reach, by the absolute power of God, to knowledge of a spiritual thing: therefore neither can a created intellect know God intuitively. The antecedent is known. The consequence is proved; for a created intellect is more distant from God Himself than the power of sight is from a spiritual thing.

Second. God clearly seen is not contained within the latitude of the object of a created intellect; therefore He cannot be seen by a created intellect. The consequence is proved. The power of sight cannot see an angel, since it is not contained within the latitude of its object; therefore if God clearly seen is not contained within the latitude of the object of a created intellect, it will not be able to see God through His essence. But the antecedent is proved. For if God clearly seen were contained within the latitude of the object of a created intellect, then a created intellect would be inclined to it naturally, as it is a beatific and supernatural object; which is impossible. The consequence is proved; for if God clearly seen, as He belongs to the supernatural order, were contained within the specific account of the object of a created intellect, since every power is naturally inclined to its object, it follows that a created intellect would naturally be inclined to a supernatural vision. This is confirmed and explained. Altogether the same formal account is found in God clearly seen, as He is a supernatural object, as is found in any other natural thing; but a created intellect is naturally inclined to knowing a natural thing: therefore it is also naturally inclined to knowing God clearly seen, as He is a supernatural object. The consequence is plain: for the formal account is the same in both. It is confirmed secondly. The power of sight is naturally inclined to every account of the colored wherever it may be, since there is one formal objective account: but the object of a created intellect has one formal account, therefore it is inclined to it naturally wherever it may be; but in God clearly seen, as He is a supernatural object, the formal account of the object of a created intellect is found: therefore a created intellect is inclined to it naturally.

Third. A created intellect has no proportion with God clearly seen; therefore a created intellect cannot reach to God clearly seen. The consequence is good: for between the knower and the thing known there must be proportion. But the antecedent is proved: for God clearly seen is infinite and of a higher order, but a created intellect, even illumined by the light of glory, is finite and limited: therefore.

Fourth. In Sacred Scripture it is signified that it is impossible for anyone to see God, as is plain in John: No one has ever seen God. And 1 Timothy 1 God is called invisible. And 1 Timothy 6 it is said: He dwells in inaccessible light, whom no man has seen, nor can see: therefore.

Fifth. The first part of the argument of St. Thomas is null: therefore his conclusion is false. The antecedent is proved. For the argument of St. Thomas for the first part presupposes that the beatitude of man consists in an operation of the intellect; but many theologians hold that the beatitude of man consists in an operation of the will: therefore that argument is null.

Last. If the second part of the argument of St. Thomas concluded anything, this would be because God clearly seen would be our natural end; but this is impossible: therefore. The antecedent is proved. God clearly seen is of a supernatural and divine order: therefore it is impossible for Him to be our natural end.

On account of these arguments there were certain heretics who said it is impossible for us to know God clearly and intuitively. Of these mention is made among the Parisian articles. The Armenians followed this error, who say that the Blessed do not see the Divine Essence itself intuitively, but a certain brightness diffused from God. Abelard followed the same error, as St. Bernard reports in Letter 190.

Nevertheless the conclusion of St. Thomas is certain according to faith. So St. Augustine says and proves, Letters 11 and 112, where he adduces many testimonies of Sacred Scripture and of the Saints. And it is proved manifestly. For 1 John 3 it is said: We shall see Him as He is. And 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a mirror in enigma, but then face to face». And Matt. 5: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. And ch. 18: Their angels always see the face of My Father, who is in heaven. But the argument of St. Thomas is excellent, and will be explained afterwards.

To the first argument it is answered that when the defect comes from the side of the action, since the action cannot be about such an object, such a defect cannot be supplied by God, from a defect of the object. As St. Thomas says, the action of a creature, by the absolute power of God, cannot reach to nothing, from defect of the object: and therefore it cannot be assumed by God as an instrument for creating. But if the defect comes from weakness of the power, not from defect of the object, God can supply that defect by strengthening the power and elevating it so that it reaches that object. And so God can bring it about that a man who is at Salamanca sees a thing existing at Rome, since there is weakness on the side of the power, not defect on the side of the object. For the colored is contained within the latitude of the power of sight, wherever it may be. To the point at issue, therefore, it must be said that a spiritual thing is not contained within the latitude of the object of the power of sight; and therefore the defect is on the side of the object: since a bodily action cannot be about spirit, by seeing it. But God clearly seen is contained within the latitude of the object of a created intellect. And therefore the defect is not on the side of the object, but from weakness of the power. And this defect God can supply by strengthening the power and elevating it, so that it reaches the most excellent object. As He can strengthen the power of sight of the night-owl so that it sees the sun. And although there is greater proportion in the account of being between the power of sight and a created spirit than between a created intellect and God, yet not in the account of power and object. For spirit is not contained within the object of the power of sight; but God is contained within the latitude of the object of a created intellect, which is being. A sign of this is that our intellect naturally knows God, although imperfectly; but unless God were contained under the account of the object, He could not even imperfectly be reached by the intellect of a creature.

To the second it is answered by noting that the object of the intellect is twofold. One is adequate, to which the power can extend itself. The other is proportionate, which has proportion with the intellect itself. As the quiddity of a material thing is the proportionate object of our intellect; but the adequate object is being inasmuch as it is being. With this foundation supposed, the first solution is that God clearly seen, as He is something supernatural, is contained within the adequate object of a created intellect, yet is greatly exceeding; and therefore the intellect is not inclined to it. As the sun is supremely visible, and of the same account as other visible things; and yet the power of sight of the night-owl cannot reach to it, since it greatly exceeds. So they say in the point at issue that God clearly seen is contained in the specific account of the object of a created intellect; yet a created intellect cannot reach to Him, since He greatly exceeds the intellect. But this solution is null. For from it follows that a created intellect would have a natural inclination to knowing God intuitively, as He is a supernatural object, although the attainment would be supernatural on account of the defect of the power. For the power of sight is naturally inclined to everything visible, although some power cannot attain everything visible naturally.

The second solution is that God clearly seen, as He is something supernatural, is not contained within the latitude of the object of a created intellect, but the adequate object is natural being. Nevertheless a created intellect can know supernatural being through its order to natural being. As the object of our intellect is real being; nevertheless we can know a being of reason through its order to real being. This solution does not please me. For in the homeland the Blessed know God intuitively, without order to natural being, through Himself immediately; therefore a created intellect can know God intuitively without order to natural being. The last solution is that the adequate object of our intellect is being in confusion, as it abstracts from natural and supernatural being. But afterwards, when we divide being into natural and supernatural, we explain two accounts first diverse not only in the account of being, but also in the account of knowability. For the proper object of the divine intellect is supernatural being. And so a created intellect, by a certain participation, can reach to knowledge of supernatural being, since it is made a sharer in the divine intellect. And so natural being is known by a natural power, supernatural being by a supernatural power, with the proportion of object to power preserved. And so God clearly seen is called the extensive object of a created intellect, since it can be extended to Him by participation. But threefold is the ground of this extension. The first is on the side of the power, since the power is spiritual, and so is capable of spiritual perfection, and can be a sharer in divine knowledge. The second is on the side of the object, since natural and supernatural being have the same mode of moving the intellect, namely, through a likeness separated from all matter. The third ground is on the side of both, since supernatural being is contained under the account of being, which is the specifying account of the intellect. The whole difficulty, therefore, is how a created intellect is not naturally inclined to supernatural being and to God clearly seen, when in these is found the specific formal account of its object? For as this colored thing and that can differ in species in the account of being, yet in the account of the visible are individuals of the same species: so natural and supernatural being, although they differ in species in the genus of being, yet in the account of knowability have the same specific account, and differ only in number. Therefore, if a created intellect is naturally inclined to the one, it is naturally inclined to the other.

It is answered, however, that natural and supernatural being differ in species, even in the account of knowability, indeed in genus; and nevertheless they can specify one power. For the exposition of this it is to be noted that the intellect and the will, since they are the most universal powers, can be specified by some analogous, non-univocal account, even in the account of specifying. As some say that the intellect is specified by being, as it abstracts from real being and being of reason, and yet real being and being of reason do not agree univocally in the account of knowability. For a being of reason is known dependently on real being. Likewise, the object of the will is the good, as it abstracts from the true good or the apparent: yet the apparent good does not have the account of good together with the true good, but the account of good is analogous to both. The ground is: for this is proper to a form, that it makes an effect which it does not have in itself; for whiteness makes a thing white, and yet in itself is not white. And since an object holds itself with respect to a power and a habit as an extrinsic form; therefore an analogous object, which in itself does not have complete unity, can make one power in species. And so master Cajetan in the opusculum On the Analogy of Names ch. 10, and Soncinas 4 Metaph. q. 10 at the fifth, say that metaphysics, which is one science in species, can be specified by one analogous object, namely by the account of being, as it abstracts from God and creatures, from substance and accident. Likewise, it is a probable opinion that the concept of being is one not only in species, but even in number, and yet its object is analogous. So, in the point at issue, the intellect and the will have one specific account of power, and yet their object, even in the account of object, is not one in species, but has an analogous account: whence natural and supernatural being, even in the account of knowability, do not have the same specific account, but differ in genus. And so it is no wonder that a created intellect is inclined in diverse ways to natural being and to supernatural being, to natural being naturally, to supernatural being supernaturally. For the account of knowability is participated unequally by both.

But if anyone should object that a created intellect, in its essence and nature, includes an order to its object; but its object is being, as it abstracts from natural and supernatural being: therefore to both it bespeaks an order naturally. It must be said that a created intellect in its nature and essence includes that it be a certain vital principle which, made in act, can go forth into act with respect to its object. But it is made in act with respect to natural being naturally; with respect to supernatural being, and especially God clearly seen, it is put in act supernaturally.

And for greater explanation it is to be noted that a created intellect, with respect to the beatific vision, is apt naturally, and has obediential potency, so that it can be elevated to it, yet not so that the intellect holds itself merely passively with respect to such a vision. For it has active force so that it can elicit the beatific vision, if only it is first made in act by the light of glory, as Cajetan says below, in q. 79 art. 2, that the intellect, stripped of every intelligible likeness, is a vital principle and a certain animal force which has active force, if only it is made in act through an intelligible likeness. So in the point at issue, a created intellect has force for eliciting a clear vision of God, if only it is made in act. From what has been said the answer to the second argument and its confirmations is plain.

To the third it is answered that a created intellect, even with the divine Essence united to it in the account of a likeness, remains disproportionate in the account of being, yet not in the account of power and object. For an intellect illumined by the light of glory is made powerful for producing an act concerning the divine Essence; but proportion in the account of being is not necessary, otherwise a created intellect could not naturally know God as He is the author of nature. For God, even as He is the author of nature, is infinite, but a created intellect finite. Secondly it is answered, and it can very probably be said, that there is also some proportion in the account of being. For an intellect informed and illumined by the light of glory and actuated by the divine Essence in the account of an intelligible likeness has a certain infinity and is made divine and of the divine order; but God as He is seen by the Blessed is infinite, yet He is not seen infinitely and totally. For to this it is required that the intellect be infinite simply and absolutely.

To the fourth it is answered that those places of Sacred Scripture must be understood in four ways. First of bodily vision. Second of comprehensive vision; for no creature can comprehend God. Third of vision to be had in this life. Fourth of vision to be had by nature; for no one can see God from the forces of nature. And in all these ways God is called invisible in Sacred Scripture. Yet He can be seen by grace.

To the fifth it is answered that the argument of St. Thomas is a theological demonstration, constant from one principle of faith and another known by the light of nature. But the force of the argument of St. Thomas is this: it is of faith that man can attain beatitude; but the beatitude of man consists in the most perfect conjunction with his principle; and this conjunction is made through the intellect: therefore. For the explanation of this it is to be noted that the most perfect conjunction of a rational creature with God is made through the intellect, whether essential beatitude consists in an act of the intellect or in an act of the will. For if essential beatitude consists in an act of the will and in conjunction through love, this conjunction intrinsically presupposes conjunction through the intellect. For nothing is willed unless first known. Whence St. Thomas most rightly gathers that, if beatitude is possible, as faith teaches, conjunction through the intellect must be possible, since it is essential beatitude or something necessary for beatitude. Secondly it is to be noted that that sentence of St. Thomas which asserts that the most perfect operation of man is the operation of the intellect concerning the noblest object is most certain in moral philosophy. For the object of the intellect is something simpler and more abstract, and therefore more perfect. For it considers being inasmuch as being, under this abstraction. But the will has for its object determinate and concrete being, namely the good. Concerning this matter see St. Thomas in 1-2 q. 3 art. 4 and 5, and below q. 82 art. 3, where he disputes concerning the perfection of the intellect. Lastly it is to be noted that the perfection of any creature consists in conjunction with its principle. For a hot thing is then perfect when it is conjoined to fire. For what is to a thing the cause of being is also the cause of its ultimate perfection. And he who gives the form also gives the consequences of the form. But God is the cause of being of a spiritual creature, and so in conjunction with God Himself consists the ultimate perfection of such a creature.

To the last it is answered that St. Thomas does not wish to demonstrate that in man there is a natural desire of seeing God; but with faith proposed, which says the beatific vision is possible, he shows that it is supremely consonant with a created intellect. For it is familiar to St. Thomas to adduce congruous natural grounds to show that the mysteries of faith are supremely consonant with nature and do not conflict with it. And so in 3 p. q. 1 art. 1, from the goodness of God, and since the good is diffusive of itself, which is constant from the light of nature, he infers that

The mystery of the Incarnation is not dissonant from nature, nor does it conflict with it. And in 4 Cont. Gent. ch. 79 he proves that the resurrection of the dead is possible, because the soul is naturally inclined to the body. But this argument does not prove that the resurrection is supremely consonant with nature and does not conflict with it. But this St. Thomas does not prove evidently, but probably and topically. Secondly it is answered that in a spiritual creature there is a certain velleity and a certain imperfect desire of seeing God. From this St. Thomas gathers probably that the beatific vision is possible, lest such a natural desire be frustrated. But whether God clearly seen is our natural end is customarily disputed in 1-2 questions 3 art. 6, 7 and 8; by some it is also customarily disputed in this 1 p. question 1 art. 1. But I confess that the lawful place of this disputation is in the cited place, in 1-2. Nevertheless I shall now briefly set forth what I opine concerning this difficulty.

IT IS DOUBTED therefore, secondly, whether man has a natural appetite for seeing God as He is, and whether God so clearly seen is his natural end? Cajetan in this place and above, q. 1 art. 1, denies that there is an absolute natural appetite in a rational or intellectual creature for seeing God as He is in Himself. And when St. Thomas says, there is in man a natural desire, he speaks of man not considered absolutely according to his nature, but as ordered to eternal life. And in the same way he understands the arguments which St. Thomas makes in book 3 Cont. Gent. ch. 50, where he proves that the natural desire of the angels does not rest in natural knowledge. But Scotus in q. 1 of the prologue on the 1 Sent., and in 4 d. 49 q. 9, says that natural desire is borne to seeing God. For this opinion Durandus is adduced in 4 Sent. d. 49 q. 8. But certainly Durandus only says that there is in man a natural and necessary appetite as an inclination without elicited act toward beatitude in common; yet nowhere does he say that there is such a natural appetite in man with respect to beatitude which is the vision of God in particular. Master Soto, book 1 On Nature and Grace ch. 4 and in 4 Sent. d. 49 q. 2, says three things which bear on the present matter. First he says man has a natural appetite for true beatitude, which consists in the vision of God. He says secondly that this end is simply natural to man. He says thirdly that no one can naturally appetite that true beatitude by an elicited act. And he notes for the explanation of his opinion that a natural appetite is spoken of in two ways. In one way as it is an act elicited by the appetitive power, e.g. all men naturally desire to know. In another way a natural appetite is called the very inclination of nature and propensity to some end, e.g. a stone has a natural appetite for the centre, not through some elicited vital act, but is determined to that place by its gravity. So therefore, in this second way he says there is in man a natural appetite for seeing God. He proves his opinion first from St. Thomas, in many places; in the Prologue on the 1 Sent. he says: Each thing is sweetly disposed when it is placed in its end, which it naturally desires. And this has been conferred on us through Christ, when He led us into eternal glory: therefore man naturally desires that glory. Likewise in this article St. Thomas says: There is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause, the effect being seen. Nor can it be explained in this place of knowledge of the cause as it is known, but not according to its quiddity, as Cajetan seems to insinuate in this place. For St. Thomas immediately infers: It must be granted, then, that they see the essence of God. And certainly he speaks of this mode of knowing in the article, and in book 3 Cont. Gent. ch. 50 he makes the same argument concerning the substance of God Himself, and not as cause. There is likewise another place in 1-2 q. 3 art. 8 where he says: From knowledge of the effects of God there remains in man a natural desire of knowing what the cause itself is.

Secondly, he proves from St. Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints ch. 5, vol. 7, where he says: To be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of men; but to have grace belongs to the faithful.

Thirdly he proves by argument: the appetite of man is either natural or violent or neither; but the appetite of man for seeing God is not violent or neither; therefore it is natural. It is the argument of Scotus, which Soto uses.

Fourthly he proves, because that man is the image of God is natural to man; for when God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, He signified that man according to his nature is to the image, and not only according to grace; but everything like naturally appetites its like: therefore etc. And it is confirmed: because the appetite of man rests in no worldly thing, according to that of Aug. book 1 Confess. ch. 1: Thou hast made us, Lord, for Thee, and our heart is restless until it comes to Thee.

Fifthly he argues: each thing has a determinate natural end to which it is borne by its own nature, as fire upward, earth downward; but no other natural end in which he may rest can be assigned to man except God seen: therefore God clearly seen is his natural end.

FOR the solution of this difficulty, let the first conclusion be: The vision of God according to His essence is not the natural end of man. This conclusion is proved. That, simply speaking, is a supernatural end: therefore it is not

natural. Secondly it is proved. A natural end is that to which a thing can naturally attain, as is plain inductively: for a stone is borne naturally to the centre by reason of its gravity, and fire is borne upward by reason of its lightness. Whence Arist. 2 Heavens, text 50, says that if the stars had progressive motion, nature would have conferred on them instruments by which they would be moved with progressive motion. But man cannot naturally attain to God clearly seen: therefore the vision of God according to His essence is not the natural end of man. Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas 1-2 q. 109 art. 3, where he says that eternal life is not the connatural end of man. And nowhere in St. Thomas is it found that that vision of God is the natural end of man.

Second conclusion: Man can have a natural appetite, that is, elicited from the forces of nature, namely a certain conditional and inefficacious desire of seeing God. It is proved by that argument of St. Thomas in this article: There is in man a natural desire, etc. Which argument he explains more in book 3 Cont. Gent. ch. 49 and 50. But to say that St. Thomas speaks not of an elicited act but of that weight which Soto imagines would have no weight in this argument. For to what end would he say, it is a natural desire in man, the effect being seen, to see the cause? But if he spoke of that weight, it would incline even the effect not being seen. Likewise what he says 3 Cont. Gent. ch. 50: From knowledge of effects a desire is naturally excited to seeing the cause. Likewise some opined that the first created intelligence sees God — so opined Avicenna: therefore it could have a desire of seeing God. It is confirmed: man naturally desires to know that of which he knows he has ignorance; but man can naturally know that God is pure act, is superexcellent: therefore also desire to know what He is and how He is. And Soto himself in 4, where above, says there is no mortal of any sect who, if asked whether he desires to see God, does not answer that he desires it. And it is strange that he adduces this argument to prove there is a natural appetite, and not as an elicited act, although he who says he desires signifies an act of desire. But we have said in this second conclusion that man can have such a desire, because not all have it, as neither do all know God. I have said conditional, because from the forces of nature it cannot be certain to man that such a good is possible; therefore such a desire is conditional, if it were possible: e.g. man can desire and will never to die, if it were possible. And although such a condition is not explicit in the mind, yet it is implicitly contained in the object, which it represents as good and not as possible. But someone will say: What if one thinks it possible, will he then not be able to desire absolutely? It is answered that if one thinks it possible through the forces of nature, he will indeed be able to do those things which he judges necessary for the end. But from 1-2 q. 5 art. 8 at 2 it is said that not everything is a natural desire which can be had from the forces of nature out of an apprehension of reason. For so the appetite of flying (if one thought it possible to fly) would be natural: but a natural appetite is from the natural light, as to good in common, to one's proper good. Moreover, that man so desires out of ignorance, and so acts. Wherefore from this it is not gathered that it is his natural end. As if one prepared medicines by which he thinks to escape death, desiring to live forever. But if a man judges it possible to see God through the grace of God, and so desires absolutely, or has some will of the end and of the means, this is now from grace, and not from the forces of nature.

Third conclusion: Man or angel, from his nature, properly speaking, neither has weight nor inclination nor natural appetite, nor natural potency for a clear vision of God. It is proved first. Whatever belongs to a thing from its proper nature, as a principle of some motion or operation, can be reduced to act by a natural agent: e.g. a stone has a natural weight to downward motion; matter has a natural aptitude only with respect to natural forms, as St. Thomas says 1 p. q. 7 art. 2 at the third: but man cannot arrive at that end through the whole forces of nature, nor through the help of God as He is author of nature only, but as He is author of grace: therefore man has no natural weight. It is confirmed: for otherwise an angel could naturally know it is possible to see God, its own nature being distinctly known. It is confirmed secondly. Man has no natural aptitude in the body for the glory of the body; therefore neither is the aptitude of the soul natural for the glory of the soul. Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas 3 p. q. 4 art. 1, where he says that the aptitude which is taken according to natural passive potency does not extend to what transcends the natural order; therefore in man there is not that natural passive potency for seeing God. But no one posits in man a natural active potency for seeing God; otherwise man could see God through the light of nature: therefore, as he cannot naturally see God, so he has no natural potency for seeing God.

Let the fourth conclusion be: In man there is a capacity of nature and an aptitude according to obediential potency so that he may be elevated to

see God. It is proved first. A stone cannot be elevated to such an operation, nor any irrational creature, but man can; therefore in man there is a natural capacity of this dignity which is not in other creatures. Secondly it is proved from St. Thomas 1-2 q. 113 art. 10, where he says: Since the soul is made to the image of God, it is naturally capable of grace. And it is to be noted that sometimes St. Thomas asserts that beatitude to be according to the nature of man by reason of this capacity: e.g. 3 p. q. 9 art. 2 at the third, he says: Vision or blessed knowledge is above the nature of the rational soul, because it cannot arrive at it by its proper force. In another way it is according to its nature, inasmuch as according to its nature it is capable of it, insofar as it is made to the image of God.

TO the arguments of Master Soto it is answered. To the first, from the prologue of St. Thomas, I say first that he understands concerning a natural desire, whether absolute or conditioned and inefficacious, and so man naturally desires to see God. I say secondly that because the natural desire of man is borne to beatitude in common, but this account of good in common is not found totally in anything, therefore he says this has been conferred on us through Christ, which we naturally desire, when He led us into eternal life — namely because He placed us in an end having the whole account of good which we naturally desire in common. But in particular we do not simply desire it, because we do not know it to be possible. To the other testimony of St. Thomas, from this article, where he says, there is in man, etc., it is answered that he speaks not of an absolute desire but of a conditioned one. Whence this argument does not demonstrate it to be possible; for it is an article of faith. For in like manner it would demonstrate the resurrection of the dead to be future, because there is in the soul a natural desire for the body: therefore, lest such a desire be vain, man will rise. Likewise you would also prove that prime matter will sometime have every form, because it naturally appetites every form, and its appetite is never sated: therefore, lest the appetite of nature be vain, it will be necessary that such an appetite be fulfilled. And through this the answer to the other place from 1-2 is plain. For we say first that that desire is not absolute. Secondly, even if it be absolute, it is to be understood as natural for knowing the cause as far as is naturally possible. To the second, from Augustine, it is answered that it proves our fourth conclusion. For he speaks of the capacity of the nature of men. To the third it is answered that the appetite, such as it is in man, of seeing God — conditional, namely, if it were possible, as was held in the second conclusion — is natural, that is, from the forces of nature; but from this it is not gathered that there is in man a natural weight and inclination to that beatitude in particular. But if the argument proceeded concerning potency in this way — every potency is either natural etc. — it is answered that man has obediential potency to that end in particular, as wood to a statue. To the fourth it is answered that everything like appetites its like, that is, appetites to be conformed to it insofar as it can: so man is assimilated naturally to God in this, that he operates freely and is lord of his acts. And this is that in which he naturally shows in himself the image of God. To the confirmation it is answered that Augustine speaks of the fact: Thou hast made us, Lord, for Thee — namely through Thy grace Thou hast ordered our nature to Thee. Secondly, Thou hast made us for Thee, that is, capable of Thee, and except in Thee we find no perfect rest. To the fifth argument it is answered that each thing has a determinate end according to the mode of its species, yet not so that every thing wholly rests, its end being had: e.g. the end of a tree is to make fruit; the end of an individual is to preserve the species through generation; the end of living things is some vital operation; and yet in none of these operations does it wholly rest, as is plain inductively. For a tree, after it has made fruit, does not wholly rest, but is still disposed to other fruits. Likewise in all living things, in which the greatest perfection is the operation itself, yet they never have one immutable operation. So also man, if he be considered only according to the natural perfection of his species, has indeed an end determinate by nature, namely to lead a rational life according to the law of nature. But in no operation will he perfectly rest in this life. But if you ask concerning the natural end after this life, it is answered that it belonged to the author of nature, unless he had ordered man from grace to seeing God, that some reward be prepared for the immortal soul, which certainly would consist in the knowledge and contemplation of natural things, but not in God clearly seen. And then I confess the soul would not be perfectly blessed: but it would be blessed as a rational soul could be naturally. Perhaps also such a desire would bring no sadness, because it would not be apprehended as possible or due to it. As now, in fact, less blessed souls do not absolutely desire greater glory but conditionally, if it had been possible, they would desire it: as they desire those to be saved who will be damned. Yet they are not saddened by this, because they do not apprehend it as possible or due to them, except from the grace of God. But they are certain that God has predestined them to such

glory, and not to greater. Wherefore the rest of those souls is not disturbed by such a desire or velleity. From these things it is plainly gathered that when St. Thomas in 1-2 q. 3 art. 8 shows that the beatitude of man consists in the vision of God, he speaks of beatitude simply perfect, not of natural beatitude. Nor do I say, however, that he speaks expressly of the supernatural, but of beatitude perfect according to the capacity of a rational creature. And the weightiest argument of St. Thomas is this: because the will of a rational creature is borne to good in universal, as to its natural object. But because every account of universal good is not together in anything other than God, hence it is that it cannot be perfectly blessed except by seeing God. Yet it does not follow that it would not in its own way have a natural beatitude, which is an imperfect beatitude, if God had not ordered man to a supernatural eternal life, which consists in the vision of God Himself as He is.