Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Being and the one are really the same. Second conclusion: The one adds upon being undivision. From these St. Thomas infers the corollary that every being is one.

COMMENTARY.

There is a DOUBT concerning this article: Whether the one bespeaks formally entity and perfection, or undivision and privation? Cajetan here teaches that it bespeaks formally undivision: and he proves this opinion first from St. Thomas, above, q. 6, art. 3, to the first, where he expressly says that the one bespeaks not perfection but undivision. Second it is proved from the reasoning of St. Thomas here. The one is nothing other than undivided being; therefore it bespeaks formally undivision, and materially being. Third: the one adds something formal upon being; for it is distinguished at least in reason from being, and nothing else can be understood to be added except undivision, for through this it is distinguished from being: therefore.

Scotus, 4 Metaphysics, q. 2, thinks that the one bespeaks formally entity and perfection, so that the one as such is being and perfection. St. Thomas seems to hold the same opinion, 10 Metaphysics, lect. 4. This opinion is proved first: the one is a real passion of being: therefore it bespeaks formally not undivision but perfection. The consequence is clear; for a being of reason cannot be a passion of real being. It is confirmed: this passion is proved by the Metaphysician through the principles of real being: therefore it is not formally a being of reason. The consequence is clear: for a being of reason does not arise from the intrinsic principles of real being. Lastly: God is simply one; therefore the one bespeaks perfection. The consequence is clear: for the things said of God simply bespeak perfection.

First conclusion. The one adds something upon being, not only by way of explication, but by a true and proper addition. The first part is proved. This addition, One being, is not negative, therefore. The consequence and the antecedent are clear. The second part is proved: the Metaphysician truly demonstrates the one of being: therefore the one truly and properly adds something upon being, for the same is not demonstrated of itself. Note however that the one adds upon being privation and undivision: for the true and the good bespeak and add a relation of reason, but the one privation.

Second conclusion. The one does not bespeak undivision formally in recto, but undivision is the intrinsic and necessary mode of unity. St. Thomas holds this conclusion in the place just cited. And it is proved: for otherwise the passion of being would formally be a being of reason. See what we said above, q. 10, art. 1.

Third conclusion. The one does not bespeak formally entity, but unity, which is nothing other than entity determined through an intrinsic mode: and by reason of that intrinsic mode the one signifies something diverse from being. For the exposition of this matter, note that a diverse intrinsic mode suffices to make a distinct object and formal significate, and just as Cajetan says in art. 1 of the First Part, a diverse mode of proceeding in habits causes a formal distinction in objects, so that it is impossible that habits which differ from the mode of proceeding should not have a formal distinction in their object: so I say that these diverse intrinsic modes cause a formal distinction in the object and in the significate. This conclusion so explained is proved. Being and the one are distinct signs, therefore they are formally distinct signates. It is confirmed; this term, one, does not bespeak formally undivision: for this is signified through this term undivision, or undivided: therefore it formally imports something else, and consequently it does not signify privation: the same must be said of all the passions of being. From these conclusions it everywhere follows that the one formally signifies real entity and perfection. And from what has been said the answer to the arguments for either side is clear.