Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First conclusion: Being and the one are really the same. Second conclusion: The one adds upon being undivision. From these St. Thomas infers the corollary that every being is one.

COMMENTARY.

There is a DOUBT concerning this article: Whether the one bespeaks formally entity and perfection, or undivision and privation? Cajetan here teaches that it bespeaks formally undivision: and he proves this opinion first from St. Thomas, above, q. 6, art. 3, to the first, where he expressly says that the one bespeaks not perfection but undivision. Second it is proved from the reasoning of St. Thomas here. The one is nothing other than undivided being; therefore it bespeaks formally undivision, and materially being. Third: the one adds something formal upon being; for it is distinguished at least in reason from being, and nothing else can be understood to be added except undivision, for through this it is distinguished from being: therefore.

Scotus, 4 Metaphysics, q. 2, thinks that the one bespeaks formally entity and perfection, so that the one as such is being and perfection. St. Thomas seems to hold the same opinion, 10 Metaphysics, lect. 4. This opinion is proved first: the one is a real passion of being: therefore it bespeaks formally not undivision but perfection. The consequence is clear; for a being of reason cannot be a passion of real being. It is confirmed: this passion is proved by the Metaphysician through the principles of real being: therefore it is not formally a being of reason. The consequence is clear: for a being of reason does not arise from the intrinsic principles of real being. Lastly: God is simply one; therefore the one bespeaks perfection. The consequence is clear: for the things said of God simply bespeak perfection.

First conclusion. The one adds something upon being, not only by way of explication, but by a true and proper addition. The first part is proved. This addition, One being, is not negative, therefore. The consequence and the antecedent are clear. The second part is proved: the Metaphysician truly demonstrates the one of being: therefore the one truly and properly adds something upon being, for the same is not demonstrated of itself. Note however that the one adds upon being privation and undivision: for the true and the good bespeak and add a relation of reason, but the one privation.

Second conclusion. The one does not bespeak undivision formally in recto, but undivision is the intrinsic and necessary mode of unity. St. Thomas holds this conclusion in the place just cited. And it is proved: for otherwise the passion of being would formally be a being of reason. See what we said above, q. 10, art. 1.

Third conclusion. The one does not bespeak formally entity, but unity, which is nothing other than entity determined through an intrinsic mode: and by reason of that intrinsic mode the one signifies something diverse from being. For the exposition of this matter, note that a diverse intrinsic mode suffices to make a distinct object and formal significate, and just as Cajetan says in art. 1 of the First Part, a diverse mode of proceeding in habits causes a formal distinction in objects, so that it is impossible that habits which differ from the mode of proceeding should not have a formal distinction in their object: so I say that these diverse intrinsic modes cause a formal distinction in the object and in the significate. This conclusion so explained is proved. Being and the one are distinct signs, therefore they are formally distinct signates. It is confirmed; this term, one, does not bespeak formally undivision: for this is signified through this term undivision, or undivided: therefore it formally imports something else, and consequently it does not signify privation: the same must be said of all the passions of being. From these conclusions it everywhere follows that the one formally signifies real entity and perfection. And from what has been said the answer to the arguments for either side is clear.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The first Conclusion is affirmative. The second Conclusion: the one and the many are opposed privatively.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative.

COMMENTARY.

This Conclusion of St. Thomas is certain according to faith, as is clear from 1 Cor. 8: «But to us there is one God»; and Gal. 5, Eph. 4; the same is found also in Exod. 20, Deut. 6, and in many other places. The same is defined in the chapter Firmiter on the supreme Trinity, and in the Nicene Creed; and in all the Councils in the Confession of faith. This truth is also established by natural reason and is demonstrated by St. Thomas, here, and in 1 Con. Gent., c. 42; and by Aristotle, 12 Metaph.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative.

COMMENTARY.

In this article it must especially be noted that Peter of Ailly, in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 5, in the solution to the first, against the third conclusion, holds that the divine Person is more one than the divine Nature: since the divine Nature is communicable to many, and in some way divisible: for it belongs to the Father, and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. The divine Person, however, is incommunicable and indivisible: therefore the Person is more one than the Nature. This opinion, however, is false, for although the divine Nature is communicable to the three Persons, it is nevertheless supremely indivisible and most simple; and that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son, and the Son from the Father, intrinsically includes the numerically same most simple Godhead. Nor is the divine Nature divided into the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For this God is altogether the same in the three Persons: so that if the argument concludes anything, it is that the divine Person is one by more titles than the divine Nature, yet is not more one. Note the solution to the first, in which St. Thomas says that privation, by reason of its foundation, can admit of more and less. On which see St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 75, art. 2. And let these things said concerning this q. 11 suffice.