Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Domingo Báñez (1528–1604)
First published 1584
Dominicus Báñez, O.P.'s Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae is a Salamanca-school commentary on the opening part of Aquinas's Summa. The first printing appeared at Salamanca in 1584, after Báñez's teaching at the Dominican studium and University of Salamanca; later editions and editorial continuations helped make the work a major witness to late sixteenth-century Thomism. Its close exegesis of Aquinas intersects the debates over divine grace, human freedom, predestination, and physical premotion that defined the de auxiliis controversy. Schola presents the Latin text from a 1934 Urbano edition; the catalogue's 1584 year identifies the original work, not the modern reprint.
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Prologus auctoris ad lectorem
In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio
Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat
Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia
Commentarium
THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.
First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (pars prior)
Dubium 1 (continuatio)
Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica
Commentarium
Dubium 1: Objectiones
Dubium 1: Commentarium
Dubium 1: Responsiones
Articulus V: Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis
Commentarium
Dubium 1 (textus Latinus sine versione Hispanica)
Dubium 1
Articulus VI: Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia
Commentarium
Dubium I
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae
Commentarium
Dubium I
Textus Augustini ante articulum 8
Articulus VIII: Utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Articulus IX: Utrum Sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris
Commentarium
Commentarium; Dubium I
Articulus X: Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus
Commentarium
Dubium 1
Dubium 2
Dubium 3
Dubium 4
Dubium 5
Dubium 6
Dubium 7
Dubium 8
Dubium 9
Quaestio II: De Deo, an Deus sit
Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Articulus II: Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit
Quaestio III: De Dei simplicitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit corpus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae
Articulus III: Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura
Articulus IV: Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse
Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo
Articulus VI: Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia
Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex
Articulus VIII: Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat
Quaestio IV: De Dei perfectione
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit perfectus
Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum
Articulus III: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo
Quaestio V: De bono in communi
Articulus I: Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente
Articulus II: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens
Articulus III: Utrum omne ens sit bonum
Articulus IV: Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis
Articulus V: Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine
Articulus VI: Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile
Quaestio VI: De bonitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum esse bonum Deo conveniat
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit summum bonum
Articulus III: Utrum esse bonum per essentiam sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum omnia sit bona bonitate divina
Quaestio VII: De Infinitate Dei
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit infinitus
Articulus II: Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam
Articulus III: Utrum possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem
Articulus IV: Utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem
Quaestio VIII: De existentia Dei in rebus
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit ubique
Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam
Articulus IV: Utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei
Quaestio IX: De Dei immutabilitate
Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis
Articulus II: Utrum esse inmutabile sit Dei proprium
Quaestio X: De Dei Aeternitate
Articulus I: Utrum convenienter definiatur aeternitas, quod est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio
Articulus II: Utrum Deus sit aeternus
Articulus III: Utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei
Articulus IV: Utrum aeternitas differat a tempore
Articulus V: De differentia aevi et temporis
Articulus VI: Utrum sit unum aevum tantum
SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.
The CONCLUSION is affirmative.
COMMENTARY.
IT IS DOUBTED first whether the conclusion of this article is true. It is proved that it is not. First, a measure ought to be known to him who is measured and uses it; but to a lower angel his own duration is better known than the duration of the highest angel: therefore his duration is the measure, and not the duration of the highest angel, and consequently there is not a single aevum, but many. Second, according to the probable opinion of St. Gregory, Lucifer was the highest angel; but it is absurd to say that Lucifer is the measure of the soul of Christ and of the blessed Angels: therefore. It is confirmed: the Angels who fell remained intact in their natural endowments; but Lucifer was the highest angel in natural endowments, according to that opinion: therefore he is the measure, which seems absurd. Third. A lower angel is infinite in duration: therefore he is not measurable by any measure, at least extrinsic. The consequence is plain, for the infinite is not measurable, especially by an extrinsic measure. Fourth. If aevum is placed in the highest angel, it follows that aevum is a being of reason; the consequent is false, therefore. The consequence is proved. That which can come to a subject without change of the subject is a being of reason, for a real being, if it comes, changes the subject. But if aevum is placed in the highest angel, it can come without change of the subject, for if God were now to annihilate the highest angel, the aevum will be in another angel, and yet through the mere annihilation of the other without change of itself: therefore. Likewise, if God were to create another higher one, the aevum would cease to be in the lower one, through the mere creation of the other without change of the lower one: therefore it is a being of reason. Fifth. in the same cases it follows that there is not one aevum only, but many; this is false: therefore. The consequence is proved. The aevum which was in the lower angel is identified with his duration in to-be; therefore it cannot be the same aevum as that which is now in the newly created angel, for the aevum which is now in such an angel is identified with his duration in his own to-be; but the duration of one angel in to-be and the duration of another are distinguished as thing from thing. It is confirmed and explained. The to-be of a newly created angel and the to-be of the angel who was previously highest are distinguished as thing from thing: therefore the durations in to-be are distinguished as thing from thing: therefore they cannot be identified with one aevum.
On account of these arguments Durandus in 2, d. 2, q. 5, holds that there is not one aevum only, but there are as many aeva as there are angels. Aegidius Romanus holds the same opinion, and Capreolus reports it in the same distinction and question. Nevertheless the conclusion of St. Thomas is most certain, and is that of all the Theologians. And it is proved by reason. First, in each genus there is a cause and measure of the rest, as Aristotle teaches in 10 Metaph., text 2: but the highest angel is first in that genus: therefore he is the measure of all the others. It is confirmed: the highest angel is the simplest and most uniform in duration and operation: therefore he is the measure of the others. The consequence is plain: for a measure is reduced to unity. Second, the motion of the first movable is the measure of the rest, since it is most regular and most uniform; but the highest angel is most regular and has the greatest uniformity: therefore.
To the first argument it is answered that for the character of a measure it suffices that it be better known according to its own nature, but it need not be better known to him who uses it. For as far as we are concerned, the motions of these lower bodies are better known than the motion of the first movable; and yet the motion of the first movable is our measure. It suffices, therefore, for the character of a measure that it be known to him who uses it, and that it be the most perfect rule in that genus, in relation to which the perfection of the others is derived. To the second it is said that Lucifer, although he remained intact in natural endowments, yet was in some way changed in them through sin, because he is affected by sin. And thus the Saints say that he did not remain as regular and uniform and invariable as before. Second, it is said that if before the aevum was in the sinning Angel, I judge that after the sin it remained in him, for uniformity in duration was not changed through sin; but he remained as uniform in to-be as before. Likewise, he was the highest species of the Angels, and through sin the species was not taken away: therefore he remained the measure of the others in to-be. It is confirmed. Man, although he has sin, is always the measure of the other animals, since he is the most perfect species: therefore the same will hold of the highest Angel. Nor is it unfitting to say that Lucifer is the measure of the soul of Christ and of the other blessed Angels, as regards duration in natural to-be. And through this the answer to the confirmation is plain. To the third it is answered that even if an Angel is infinite in duration, he can be measured by a measure which has infinity; but whether that measure is intrinsic or extrinsic is irrelevant. To the fourth it is said that there are some beings of so slight an entity, especially relative ones, which can come to a subject and cease to be in a subject without change of the subject through relation to something extrinsic; just as the same external act is called good and bad through relation to an extrinsic law, without change of the act itself, so it is to be said of aevum. To the last, I say first that this is not against the conclusion of St. Thomas, for St. Thomas only says that there is only a single aevum, and it is always true that there is a single aevum; for even if a more perfect angel is created, there will be only a single aevum in him. Second, it is answered that it is probable that if God were to create another higher angel, or annihilate the highest, the same aevum would always remain. For that variation would be material, not formal, because the formal subject of aevum is the most regular and most uniform to-be: but this always remains the subject of aevum, though it is varied materially, since this most uniform to-be is now in one angel, afterwards in another. Just as the same place in number exists whether it has the surface of water or of air: since that variation of surfaces is material, not formal, and the same formal subject always remains, namely the surface at such a distance; and just as it is not unfitting that the same place in number be identified now with the surface of water, and afterwards with the surface of air, so it is not unfitting that the same aevum in number be identified now with the to-be of one angel, and afterwards with the to-be of another. And through this the answer to the confirmation is plain.