Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: The aeon differs from eternity and time; thus it is a mean between eternity and time.

SECOND conclusion: The aeon has no before and after, but is all at once; yet before and after can be joined to it.

THIRD conclusion, in the reply to the first: The natural to-be of the angel is measured by the aeon.

FOURTH conclusion, in the same reply: The operations of the angel, which have succession, are measured by time.

LAST conclusion, in the same reply: The beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. For the reasons for the aforesaid conclusions, see in the article.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED first concerning these articles, whether it is necessary to posit this measure which is called aeon? And it seems not. First. A measure ought to be known, for it is that by which we know the duration of a thing; but the aeon is not anything known to us, as is evident, and we know the duration of the angel through time: therefore it is not necessary to posit this measure. Second. If God were to annihilate the angel, it would not be measured by the aeon: therefore neither is it now measured. The consequence is proved: for the angel's being annihilated is impertinent to the account of a measure. The antecedent is proved: things which are changed from to-be to non-to-be are not measured by the aeon, but by time; but the annihilated angel is changed from to-be to non-to-be: therefore it is not measured by the aeon, but by time, and consequently it will not be necessary to posit such a measure. Third. The reason why St. Thomas posits this measure is that angels have their whole to-be at once; but corruptible things also have their whole to-be at once, as is evident, and nevertheless are measured by time: therefore there is no need to posit the aeon. Fourth. In the duration of the angel there is long and brief; but these are properties of time; therefore the angel is measured by time, not by the aeon. The consequence is good, and the minor true. The major is proved: for if God were to create one angel before the others, the duration of the former would be greater than that of the others. Fifth. The aeon is neither the angelic to-be itself, nor some accidental respect: therefore it is not to be posited. The consequence is good. The antecedent is proved: for a measure ought to be distinguished from the thing measured. Also, that respect is wholly unknown: therefore it cannot have the character of a measure.

On account of these arguments, Gabriel, in 2, dist. 2, q. 1, thinks that it is not necessary to posit such a measure, distinct from time.

For the explanation of this question note that the aeon is taken in many ways: but as far as our purpose goes, the aeon is nothing but a certain measure by which we know the duration of a thing in to-be invariable in substance, yet variable in operation. For time measures the duration of a wholly variable thing, for it measures corruptible things, which are in perpetual flux and corruption; eternity, however, measures the duration of a wholly invariable thing, both in substance and in operation. The aeon, however, holds itself in a middle way, for it measures invariable to-be, while admitting variation in operation.

Hence let the first conclusion be: It is necessary to posit this measure. This conclusion is St. Augustine's, book 33 of the Questions, q. 72; and it is proved by reason. The to-be of the angel is of an order inferior to the divine to-be, and of an order superior to the to-be of all corruptible things: therefore a certain measure must necessarily be posited which measures the angelic to-be. The consequence is plain: for between measure and measured there ought to be proportion, as Aristotle says, 10 Met., text 4. It is proved second. The angel does not know its duration through time; for in order for it to know its duration, it need not have recourse to time; therefore it must use another rule; there is none but the aeon: therefore. It is confirmed: even if there were no time, the angel could know its duration: therefore it has some other measure distinct from time by which it can know its duration; but it cannot be eternity, since that is of a higher order: therefore it is necessary to constitute the aeon.

The second conclusion, which is gathered from the preceding: The aeon is a measure distinct from eternity and time. It is gathered thus: for through eternity we measure wholly invariable to-be, through time wholly variable to-be is measured; therefore a distinct measure must necessarily be posited,

which measures to-be invariable in substance, yet variable in operation. And thus St. Thomas, art. 5, to 2, says that the aeon is all at once, as is angelic to-be; yet it admits variation and succession, in operation.

To the first it is answered that it is not necessary for this measure to be known to us; but it suffices that it be known to the angels, who use it. It is also to be noted that from our knowing other measures, through comparison to our time, and likewise the durations of higher things, it is not thence gathered that our time measures higher things, for our intellect knows higher things imperfectly and through comparison to lower things. To the second it is answered that the angel is measured by the aeon, since from its nature it is invariable and incorruptible in substance; but its being annihilated is above nature and miraculous. And so, from the nature of the thing, the angel is not changed from to-be to non-to-be; hence it is not measured by time, but is measured by the aeon, which has proportion with this to-be. To the third it is answered that angelic to-be is all at once, having no succession, since it is invariable and immutable in substance; but the to-be of corruptible things is not all at once, but has succession, since it is in perpetual flux and corruption, and always tends toward non-to-be. To the fourth it is answered that if some angel were created before another, such an angel would not have a longer duration in itself, since the duration of the angel is all at once, having no succession; and thus just as eternity is not now longer than in Adam's time, since it is all at once, so is the aeon. It is true that in comparison to our time, that angel would be said to endure through a longer duration, not in itself, but because the aeon coexists with our time. Also, because the aeon contains time in a certain eminent way, and thus contains succession virtually and in a certain excellence. Second it is answered that the creation and annihilation of the angel are certain changes measured by the now of discrete time, not by the aeon; and since the conservation of the angel depends on its creation, thence it is that, by reason of creation and annihilation, the duration of the angel can be called longer or briefer, since these changes are not measured by the aeon; yet speaking formally, one angel does not have a longer duration than another. To the fifth it is answered that the aeon is not distinguished really from the duration of the angel itself; yet it is distinguished by reasoned reason. Thus, just as eternity is the same really and formally as the duration of the divine To-Be, so the aeon is the same really and formally as the duration of angelic to-be. It is to be noted, however, that in God eternity is the same really and formally as the divine Essence, since in God to-be and essence are not distinguished; and thus duration in to-be is the same as the divine Essence. But in angels, although the aeon is identified and is the same formally as duration in angelic to-be, it is nevertheless not the same, at least formally, as the essence of the angel: since in angels, to-be and essence are distinguished formally at least, and from the nature of the thing. Second it is answered to be probable that the aeon is distinguished formally, from the nature of the thing, from the duration of angelic to-be, as time is formally distinguished from the motion of the first movable. For the aeon bespeaks the uniformity of angelic to-be, invariable and immutable; but the thing measured is the duration of the angel, in substantial to-be.

A SECOND DOUBT: Whether the aeon has succession, or is all at once? And it seems to have succession. It is argued first. For Jerome seems so to say in the letter to Marcella, where he says that eternity alone is all at once, having no succession: therefore. Second. The angel is conserved in to-be in this instant, and is conserved in another distinct instant: therefore it has succession, and does not have its whole to-be at once. Third. If the aeon is all at once having no succession, it follows that it eminently contains time, as does eternity: the consequent is false: therefore. The consequence is proved: for it is something indivisible, all at once coexisting with all our time. The minor is proved: for otherwise, the angel would know future contingents, for future time coexists with the aeon; therefore it is now in the aeon, and consequently can be known by the angel. It is confirmed and explained. For this reason God knows future contingents, since in comparison to eternity they are, for eternity is an indivisible measure, and having its whole to-be at once, so perfect that it surrounds and embraces the aeon and all time; but the aeon is not a successive measure, but rather coexists all at once with all time: therefore. Fourth. If the angelic measure is something indivisible, having no succession, it follows that God cannot annihilate the angel; the consequent is false: therefore. The consequence is proved: it has its to-be all at once in something indivisible; therefore it cannot cease to be in that indivisible. The consequence is plain: for if a thing is in something indivisible, it cannot cease to be in that indivisible. Whence arose that proverb: A thing, when it is, must necessarily be. And in the same instant in which God produces any thing, He cannot annihilate it. It is confirmed and explained: An annihilated angel either had the duration its nature demands, or not; if the first, then it was variable and corruptible from its own nature, and was not annihilated; if the second, then something of its duration remains, and consequently its duration has succession. It is confirmed second. Supposing God produces something indivisible, it cannot but endure through the duration owed and possible to it; but the duration of the angel is indivisible and all at once: therefore supposing God produces the angel, He cannot annihilate it.

On account of these arguments, Gabriel, in 2, d. 2, q. 1, holds that the aeon is something successive; and St. Bonaventure holds the same, and explains this succession through comparison to divine conservation. For some things are conserved by God successively, without innovation and change; others, however, are conserved with innovation and change, and he adds the example: light, which is in the air, is conserved successively, and yet without any innovation and change; but a stream is conserved by its source with innovation and change. Thus he says that incorruptible things are successively conserved by God, and yet without immutation and innovation; corruptible things, however, are conserved successively by God, and yet with innovation and succession. St. Thomas reports this opinion in the article, and disproves it.

The second opinion is common among the Theologians, that the aeon is all at once, having no succession. St. Thomas holds this, here; Durandus in 2, d. 2, q. 3; Scotus, q. 1. This opinion is proved, and the foundation of the contrary disproved at once. The conservation of the angel is taken either for active or for passive conservation. If the first, then it is all at once having no succession: for it is a divine action. If the second, it is the angelic to-be itself, invariable and immutable: therefore it has no succession. It is confirmed. Conservation cannot have change and innovation unless the thing conserved has innovation and change; but the thing conserved, namely the angel, has no innovation and change: therefore. Second. Time has succession, and is not all at once, for this reason: that motion, which is measured by time, has before and after, and is not all at once; but angelic to-be, which is measured by the aeon, has no succession, but is all at once: therefore the aeon has no succession, but is all at once. The consequence is plain: for a measure ought to be proportioned to the thing measured. To the first argument it is answered that Jerome and the Saints say that this is proper to eternity, to have no succession, since eternity neither has succession in itself, nor admits of succession. Time, however, has succession in itself. The aeon is a certain mean participating in both extremes; and thus, although it has no succession in itself, it can yet be joined to it, since it has variation and succession, in operation. To the second it is answered that, just as angelic to-be is wholly invariable and all at once, so is conservation; and there are not distinct conservations, but one and the same most simple one. We say, however, that it is conserved in this instant and in another instant, through comparison to our time: for although the aeon, since it is all at once, coexists nevertheless with all instants of time, and has succession virtually and equivalently; just as divine to-be is in this instant and in another, without succession ta...

...that, since it is equivalent to one hour or day, it seems that a future contingent coexists with it in that hour or day; it is answered likewise that the instant measuring the angel's cognition contains no time eminently: hence future contingents do not coexist with that instant, unless when they exist in their proper measure and time. Through this, the reply to the confirmation is plain. To the fourth it is answered that the indivisible which is all at once is of two kinds: one is what has no succession, neither formally nor virtually, like the now of time; and if God produces something in that indivisible, it implies a contradiction for it to cease to be in that indivisible, otherwise it would at once be and not be. The other is an indivisible of a higher and more perfect order, which indeed has no succession formally, yet has it virtually and equivalently; and thus it has past and future virtually, and in this indivisible something can be and be annihilated; and an indivisible of this kind is the aeon. To the first confirmation it is answered that the annihilated angel had the duration of the aeon all at once, yet ceases to be, since that duration, although it has no succession formally, has it nevertheless virtually and equivalently. To the second confirmation it is answered that it concludes concerning the indivisible of the first kind, but is false concerning the indivisible of the second kind, since it has succession virtually.

A THIRD DOUBT: whether the operations of the angel are measured by the aeon. It is argued for the affirmative side: first, because the operation of the angel is of the same order as the substance of the angel: therefore. Second. The operation of the angel is not measured by eternity, since it is of an inferior order, nor by time, since it is of a superior order; therefore it is measured by the aeon. Third. St. Augustine, book On Faith to Peter, ch. 18, says that the beatific vision is measured by the aeon, since it is indivisible and all at once; but the operation of the angel is indivisible, and all at once: therefore.

On account of these arguments, Scotus in 2, d. 2, q. 4, holds that these operations are measured by the aeon. For explanation, note that here we speak of natural operation, which is of the same order as the angelic substance; for supernatural operations are of a more divine order. Note second that the operation of the angel is twofold: one immanent, which remains in the angel itself, as understanding and willing, another is transient, as the motion of the heavens; and although this operation in strictness is perhaps not transient, it is nevertheless transient as to effect and virtually. Note last that immanent operation is twofold: one connatural to it, as knowledge of self and of God as author of nature, and love of self and of God; another is a free operation which can be corrupted, as knowledge and love of some particular thing.

First conclusion: the transient operation of the angel is measured by our time. This is St. Thomas's, Opusc. 36, second-to-last chapter: and it is proved by reason. Transient operation is of the same order as our operations, and is corruptible; therefore it is measured by our time. It is confirmed: such action is a true motion of an inferior order; therefore it is measured by the measure of these inferior motions.

Second conclusion: the operations of the angel connatural to it are measured by the aeon. This is St. Thomas's, Quodlib. 5, art. 7; and it is proved by reason. These operations are of the same order and account as the substance of the angel; and they are invariable and immutable as is the angel itself: therefore they are measured by the aeon, as is the angel. It is confirmed: the operation of God is measured by eternity, since it is invariable as is God; but the operation of the angel has the same immutability as the angel, as the Theologians say, below, q. 57: therefore.

Third conclusion: corruptible free operations are measured by the discrete time of the angels. It is proved: these operations are not measured by our time, since they are of a higher order; and they are not measured by eternity, nor by the aeon, since they are corruptible: therefore they are measured by the discrete time of the angels. This time regards the number of the cogitations and operations of the angels, of which we shall say more below, q. 53.

To the arguments: to the first it is said to be of the same account as the angel in something, since they stand as subject and operation; yet they are not of the same account as to immutability. To the second, it is plain from the conclusions posited. To the third, it is answered first that that opinion is not found in St. Augustine. Second it is answered that if it be found, by the name aeon is understood participated eternity.

A FOURTH DOUBT: Whether the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. Scotus in 4, d. 49, q. 6, holds that the beatific vision is measured by the aeon. And this opinion is proved. First. The beatific vision is not more perfect than the essence of the angel, for it is its accident; but the essence of the angel is measured by the aeon, and not by participated eternity: therefore neither is the beatific vision. Second. The beatific vision is not more immutable than the essence of the angel, which is measured by the aeon: therefore. The antecedent is proved: the essence of the angel is wholly immutable, for the angel is incorruptible in substance; therefore the beatific vision

is not more immutable. Third. The things measured by eternity are wholly immutable and invariable; but the beatific vision is not wholly invariable and immutable, for it is a creature that can be reduced to nothing: therefore. Fourth. The vision of St. Paul, by which he saw the divine Essence, is of the same species and order as the vision of the blessed, for it is terminated at the same object; and it comes about through the same likeness, namely the divine Essence; but Paul's vision is not measured by eternity: therefore neither is the vision of the other Blessed. The minor is proved. Paul's vision was variable and changeable, and ceases to be; therefore it is not measured by eternity. Fifth. The charity of heaven is not measured by eternity: therefore neither is the beatific vision. The consequence is plain; for charity and the beatific vision are of the same order and account. The antecedent is proved: the charity of the way and of heaven is the same in number, but the charity of the way is not measured by eternity, for it is corrupted and ceases to be; therefore the charity of heaven is not measured by eternity, otherwise the same thing in number would be measured by different measures. It is confirmed: for all supernatural goods are of the same order and account as the beatific vision; but goods of this kind are not measured by eternity, as is manifestly plain concerning Grace, Faith, Hope and Charity, which are had in this life: therefore. Last. The beatific vision has something natural, therefore it cannot be measured by eternity. The consequence is proved: for eternity measures only those things which exceed the whole of nature. The antecedent is proved: the beatific vision is a vital act proceeding from a naturally vital power; therefore it has something natural. The consequence is plain, otherwise a naturally vital power would do nothing. But the antecedent is plain. Against is the opinion of St. Thomas, to the first.

First conclusion: the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. This conclusion is proved first. The beatific vision is more immutable than the substance of the angel: therefore it is measured by a more perfect measure, and consequently is not measured by the aeon, but by participated eternity. The consequence is plain: the antecedent is proved first. Since the beatific vision proceeds from an intellect informed by the divine Essence as by an intelligible likeness: therefore from its principle it has utter immutability. Second the antecedent is proved: the essence of the angel is varied in accidents, for it receives variable accidents, although it is not varied in substance; but the beatific vision is in no way varied: therefore. Second the conclusion is proved. The beatific vision is of the divine order, and is a certain participation of the divine vision, according to 1 John 3: When he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is; but God is immutable in substance and in operation: therefore the beatific vision is wholly immutable. Third. The beatific vision is not measured by time, since it has no succession or variation; nor by the aeon, for the aeon measures those things which belong to the order of nature, but the beatific vision belongs to the supernatural order: therefore it is measured by participated eternity.

There is a difficulty, however, whether participated eternity is a measure distinct from eternity in essence. For the understanding of which let there be a second conclusion: it is more probable that participated eternity is not a measure distinct from that by which the divine To-Be is measured, although the opposite is probable. This conclusion has two parts; and for the exposition of the first, note that just as time first and per se adequately measures the most regular motion of the first movable, but secondarily and as if inadequately measures all other inferior motions: so eternity, first and per se and adequately, measures the duration of the divine To-Be and of its operation, which is most regular; but secondarily and inadequately it measures the participation of the divine To-Be and of the divine operation. From which it follows that according to this way of speaking, when we say participated eternity, that term participated does not hold itself on the side of the measure, as if there were some participated measure; but it holds itself on the side of the thing measured. Thus we mean to say that the beatific vision secondarily and participatively is measured by the eternity of God. This part, so explained, is proved; for St. Thomas and all the Theologians posit only three measures, namely time, aeon, eternity; therefore no other measure is to be posited. It is confirmed: for measures are not to be posited without necessity; but one and the same measure can measure the divine operation and the beatific vision, as we said concerning time: therefore. Second. The beatific vision is of the same order and account as the divine operation; therefore it is measured by the same measure. The consequence is good; the antecedent is proved, for it is of divine order and invariable, as is the divine operation. This part is held by St. Thomas in 4, d. 49, q. 1, art. 2, quaestiuncula 3, to 3. And Ferrara, 3 Contra Gent., ch. 61.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.61 The second part is explained: for just as the beatific vision is a certain participation of the divine vision, so that in me there is a vision distinct from the vision by which God sees Himself: so it must be said, according to the probable opinion, that the measure by which the divine operation is measured is one thing, and that by which the beatific vision is measured another, although it be a participation of the former. This opinion is proved: the beatific vision, although of invariable and immutable divine order, yet God and the Blessed differ in their way of having it. For God has it through essence, the creature through participation: therefore the measure by which

the beatific vision is measured is distinct from that by which God and the uncreated vision are measured.

To the first argument it is answered that the substance of the angel and its vision have no comparison between them, for they are of most diverse accounts; but things of diverse account cannot be compared. It is answered second that if they have some comparison in the account of immutability and invariability, the beatific vision is more perfect than the angel, not indeed in itself, for a substance in itself is more perfect than any accident; but it is more perfect in the account of immutability: since the beatific vision is an act proportioned to the divine nature, and the immutability of an act is taken through the order and nature to which that act is proportioned; but the divine nature in the account of immutability exceeds every creature infinitely, as in the account of being, and thus the beatific vision, since it is an act proportioned to the divine nature, exceeds the substance of the angel in immutability. Through this the reply to the second argument is plain. To the third it is answered that the things measured by eternity first and per se ought to be wholly immutable: but the things measured secondarily and participatively need not be wholly invariable, but must participate divine immutability; and of this kind is the beatific vision. To the fourth it is answered first that the vision of Paul and the vision of the other Blessed perhaps differ in species as to mode; for Paul's vision was by way of passage and disposition, but the vision of the Blessed is by way of permanence and habit. And thus they differ on this side as to immutability, and have different measures, for Paul's vision is measured by time. There is an example. The light of the sun and the light of these inferior things differ in species as to mode: since light is in the sun as a proper passion, but in inferior things it is an accident and not a proper passion, and thus the light of the sun is from its own nature incorruptible, and is measured by the aeon, as is the sun itself. But the light of these inferior things is corruptible and is measured by time. Second it is answered that the vision of Paul and of the other Blessed are of the same species, yet it does not thence follow that they are measured by the same measure, for the heavenly bodies and the inferior are of the same species, and differ only accidentally, yet the heavenly are measured by the aeon, the inferior by time; and thus Paul's vision, although it differs only accidentally from the vision of the other Blessed, is measured by time. To the fifth it is answered that although the charity of the way and of heaven are of the same species, the charity of the way is measured by time, but the charity of heaven by eternity. For supernatural acts and forms in this life are imperfect in their genus, since they have no state proportioned to them; and therefore they participate the nature of the subject in which they are, and are transmutable and corruptible on the side of the subject, not on the side of the form itself, which is incorruptible from its own nature. But in heaven, since these forms have a most perfect state proportioned to their nature, they perfect the subject and raise it to immutability, and thus are not corruptible on the side of the subject. And this is what St. Thomas said, 2-2, q. 24, art. 11, that charity in this life is corruptible on the side of the subject, and is had losably, since in this life, having no perfect state, it does not fill the whole capacity of the subject: but in heaven it has a perfect state, and therefore fills the whole capacity of the subject and is had unlosably; and thus on the way it is measured by time, but in heaven by eternity. Through this the reply to the confirmation is plain. To the last it is answered that without doubt the beatific vision, as to substance, proceeds from a naturally intrinsic principle, and has something natural admixed. For by this reason the Theologians say that supernatural acts do not effectively increase habits, since a habit is purely supernatural; but a supernatural act has something natural admixed, namely the substance of the act; for an effective cause ought to have proportion with its effect. Nevertheless the beatific vision is measured by eternity, since that admixed natural element is raised to participate divine immutability. As we said concerning the angel that sees God, which is raised to participate divine immutability.