Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: If we speak of eternity, properly and strictly, to be eternal is proper to God. The reason is that God alone is immutable.

Second conclusion: If we speak of eternity, by participation, it also belongs to creatures.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning this article note the answer to the second: for if we speak of time, in rigor, as it is the number of motion etc., it is of faith that after the day of Judgment there will be no time, as is clear from Apoc. 10. The Angel swore by him who lives forever and ever, that time shall be no more. But if we speak of time, in the broad use of the word, as it is opposed to eternity, after the day of Judgment there will be time of another account, as St. Thomas explains.

There is a DOUBT concerning the answer to the third: Whether those complex enunciables, that man is an animal, is risible, are something real from eternity, outside the divine intellect? It is argued first that they are. That man is an animal, is from eternity, and is something real, created and predicamental: therefore something created is from eternity. The consequence and the major are clear; the minor is proved. That man is an animal does not have to-be in the soul, otherwise it would be a being of reason; therefore it has to-be outside the soul, and consequently is a real being. And it is not God, as is agreed. Therefore it is something created from eternity. Secondly. That man is an animal is at some time something real and a being in the nature of things; therefore it was from eternity. The antecedent is clear. The consequence is proved. The antecedent: the to-be of an animal has no efficient cause of itself; therefore if at some time it is, it always was. The antecedent is clear: it has an efficient cause, therefore it has a final one, for the agent acts for the sake of some end; then further, it acts for the sake of some end; therefore it can be demonstrated through the final cause. The consequent is false: for that man is an animal is a first indemonstrable principle; therefore. Thirdly. Sciences are of things real, perpetual and eternal, as is clear; but sciences are of essences and quiddities: therefore quiddities are eternal. It is confirmed: science is really referred to its object, even if it does not exist; therefore things, before they are, have some real quidditative and essential to-be. The consequence is proved: for of being to non-being there is no real relation. The antecedent is proved: for this complex, that man is risible, measures science in the same way, whether man exists or not; therefore. Fourthly. Between the productive and the producible there is a true real relation, for it is founded in a real potency; therefore the producible essence, before it exists, has some real to-be in the nature of things. It is confirmed: the essence, before it exists, is producible; therefore it has some potency, and consequently some real to-be. Lastly. The same in number essence of Peter is, before it exists, and after it exists: therefore before it exists it is not non-being. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent. On account of these arguments some, among whom is Scotus, say that the essences of things, which are signified through complexes of this sort, that man is an animal, etc. have to-be from eternity, not indeed the to-be of existence, but the essential and quidditative to-be. So Sonc. 9 Met., q. 4 reports. And so these authors say that in man, since there is a twofold to-be in him, one essential and quidditative, the other of existence, man is from eternity, as to the essential and quidditative to-be. So that what some say, that God by absolute power can preserve an essence without existence, these say that, as a matter of fact, the essence is from eternity without existence.

For the explanation of the question note with St. Thomas above, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2, that to-be is threefold: one essential and quidditative, another the to-be of existence, and a third which signifies the connection and truth of the proposition: which connection is fundamentally in the thing, formally in the intellect.

Note secondly that the to-be of existence does two things with respect to the to-be of essence. The first is to constitute the to-be of essence in act, which before was in potency: hence man, before he exists, is a potential being and not an actual one. The second thing it does is that it be a created being, for before it exists it is a creatable being, yet not a created being. For creation is terminated to the quiddity under existence, as St. Thomas teaches, De Potentia, q. 3, art. 5, ad 2. Hence real being in the first division is divided into uncreated being, which has to-be through its own essence, and into created being, which has to-be not through its own essence, but through existence, which is accidental to the essence. Note lastly with Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, c. 4, q. 6, that real being is said in two ways: in one way as it is distinguished against being fashioned by the intellect, in the other way it is said as it is distinguished against the non-existent.

First conclusion. The essences of things which are signified through those enunciable complexes are not from eternity, neither as to the to-be of existence, nor as to the quidditative and essential to-be. The first part is manifest, for God alone exists from eternity. The second is proved. First from St. Thomas, in the place cited above, and q. 3 De Potentia, art. 5, ad 2, where he expressly says that essence without existence is nothing. It is proved secondly: that quidditative to-be which they say is from eternity either is produced by God or not. If the first, then it has existence, for the production of God is terminated to the essence under existence. If the second, then some being, which is not God, has no respect to God. Lastly, if this opinion is true it follows that creation is not possible, for creation is the production of the whole being, but things are from eternity as to quidditative to-be: therefore they cannot be produced according to every account of being. See other reasons in Sancin., in the place cited above.

Second conclusion. That man is an animal, is from eternity, if the word, is, expresses the essential to-be and the connection of animal with man. This conclusion is proved, for animal from eternity is of the essence of man. Note, however, that this to-be is not to-be simply with respect to the creature, but in a qualified sense, for it is to-be in potency.

Third conclusion. If the word, is, expresses the truth of the proposition, that man is an animal, it is not from eternity, except in the divine intellect. This is proved: for the true is in the intellect; but from eternity there is no other intellect except the divine; therefore. From these conclusions it follows that the essences of things, before they exist, are real beings, as real being is distinguished against a being of reason or fictitious being; not, however, in the second sense.

To the first argument it is answered that for essences to be constituted in a predicament it is not necessary that they exist, but it suffices that they be finite creatable essences; for the predicament expresses an order of reason, but an order of reason can be before things exist. To the second it is answered that just as an essence has no cause except under existence, for the action of the producer is terminated to the essence under existence, so it has no end, except under existence; and therefore it cannot be demonstrated that animal belongs to man on account of an end, except perhaps insofar as it is under existence. That necessary connection of the extremes is nevertheless not demonstrable: because animal belongs to man immediately and without cause. To the third it is answered that sciences are of perpetual and eternal things, since things, as considered by science, have no cause of corruption, for they abstract from matter, which is the principle of corruption. To the confirmation, Soncin. 5 Metaph., q. 30, at the end of the question, answers very well that sciences, which consider truths in the abstract, are referred to their objects by the relation of the measured to the measure through the operation of the intellect alone, whether the thing exists or not. For the existence of the object seems impertinent to the commensuration of a science considering only truths about its object. To me, however, it seems more probable that science is referred by a real relation of the measurable to the measure so long as the object exists; otherwise when it does not exist. Hence to the confirmation, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the antecedent, as far as founding a predicamental relation of the third genus is concerned.

To the fourth it is answered that between the producible and the productive there is only a relation of reason, as Soncinas teaches, in the place already cited. For the relation of the product to the producer, which is a real relation, requires an action, which is the ground of founding. To the confirmation it is answered that things, before they are, are called producible, not through a real potency which is in them, but through the extrinsic potency of the agent. To the last it is answered that the essence, before it exists and when it exists, is the same negatively, not positively. For for some things to be one positively, each extreme must exist; but the essence, when it does not exist, has no to-be, and so they are not one positively. See Soncin., 9 Metaph., q. 3 and 4, especially in the solution of the arguments.