Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

I answer affirmatively. The definition is: eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life.

COMMENTARY.

On this matter the Doctors dispute in 1, d. 9 and 19; and in 2, dist. 2; St. Thomas 1 Cont. Gent., ch. 15; St. Augustine vol. 1, book 11 of the Confessions, ch. 11, and vol. 8 Super Psal. 101, second sermon, and Super Gen. q. 31 and 45, Super Exodum. St. Gregory 16 Moral., ch. 21.

First of all, something must briefly be said about the name of eternity and its signification and manifold acceptance. And indeed I have diligently inquired whence this name is derived, or what its etymology may be; nor have I found anything that fully satisfies me. For some, who invent etymologies at their own pleasure, say that the eternal is so called as outside limit (extra terminum), because eternity lacks beginning and end. But these do not notice that the eternal (aeternum) is written with a diphthong, which by no account could be derived from that particle, extra. I too once thought that the eternal or eternity was derived from aether and unity, because among the things perceived by the senses nothing is so uniform as the aether, that is, the upper heaven, which is understood by the name of aether: and that the name was thence transferred to signify the uniformity of God in duration. But since aether is written with th, while eternity (aeternitas) is without that aspiration, the etymology is not pleasing. I have also noticed that in the Hebrew language the measure of the duration of our to-be, namely time, is signified by this word, Etas, and what is written with the letter, Aaim, and au, and the instant itself is called Eetah; hence I have suspected that perhaps the name of eternity is derived from there. Nor is it surprising, since on account of the antiquity of the Hebrew language, from which the division of languages was made, we find some remnants in the other idioms of the nations. To someone another derivation of this name, eternity, from thrice-three age (aetate terna), will perhaps be more pleasing. For they say that age (aetas) is derived from the Greek name αἰών. And since our age is successively threefold, according to some: hence the measure of the divine duration which embraces at once the whole succession of our age is called eternity, as threefold age (aetas trina) or terna. But whatever may be the case concerning such a derivation of the name, this one thing is most certain, that by the name of eternity the Theologians understand the duration of God himself, altogether immutable. Its definition is explained in this article, that it is «the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life». And this is the first and chief acceptance of that name, eternity, for that which is altogether immutable, lacking beginning and end, of which sort is God alone. Further, by analogy and likeness to the eternity of God himself, eternal or eternity is said in many ways. In one way it is taken for the thing which has a beginning of duration but lacks an end: of this sort is the earth, according to The earth stands forever; and also Go into the eternal fire. In a third way something is called eternal which endures immovably through the longest times, although it has beginning and end: and in this way the eternal mountains are so called. To these we can add another way according to the Philosopher, so that it is taken for that which lacks beginning and end yet is mutable: of this sort are time and the world, if they existed from eternity and should endure forever. But in the first way the name eternal must be taken in the title of the article.

The first DOUBT is whether eternity has succession? and it seems so. First, eternity is greater now than it was a thousand years ago: but this cannot be without succession; therefore. The consequence is good, and the minor is manifest: but the major is proved. To the eternity which was then, a thousand years have been added; therefore it is greater now.

Second. Eternity compared to time is greater: but this cannot be without succession; therefore it has succession. The consequence is good, the major is proved: for every duration compared to another duration is greater or smaller; but eternity is a duration: therefore compared to time it is greater. The minor is proved. Time has succession; but eternity is something greater: therefore it has succession.

Third. The part of eternity which was in the time of Adam now is not, and the part of eternity which will be on the day of judgment now is not: therefore it has succession.

Last. If eternity is something indivisible having no succession, it follows that in the same instant two contradictories are true, namely, Peter runs, Peter does not run; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is proved: eternity is something altogether indivisible, and in it there is verified that Peter runs, and that he does not run; therefore. It is confirmed: the same altogether indivisible instant is part of eternity which corresponds to diverse times: but in diverse times there is verified that Peter runs, and that he does not run; therefore also in the same indivisible instant of eternity.

On the opposite side is the definition of Boethius, found in book 5 De Consolat., prose 6, at the beginning, and admitted by all the Theologians, and by St. Thomas here, and by St. Augustine Super Psal. 101 and St. Gregory in the cited place. Yet it is true that Aureolus in 1, d. 9, q. 1, and Gabriel in 2, d. 2, seem to hold the opposite entirely.

FOR the explanation of this question note first, that a measure, as Aristotle says in 10 Metaphysics, ch. 2, is nothing other than that by which we know the quantity of a thing, and is as a certain rule for recognizing it; but quantity is manifold, of extension, of multitude, of perfection and of duration: hence measure is manifold, for the measure must be proportioned to the measured thing. Note second, that duration is not of the same account in all things. For just as to-be is not of the same account in all things, so the quantity of duration is not the same in all things. For things are in a threefold difference: some variable according to substance and according to affections and thoughts, as man; others invariable according to substance, yet varied according to accidents, as angel. But God is altogether immutable in every respect, and so his measure is altogether invariable and immutable, whole at once and perfect, so that there is always proportion between the measure and the measured. Note third, that just as Aristotle in 4 Physics describes one flowing and variable now, from whose succession and variation time is caused; and from the point drawn through a plane a line is caused: so Boethius explains the nature of eternity through one uniform and invariable now. For the rest, just as that now formally is not time, nor is that succession properly the cause of time; so that invariable now is not eternity, nor the cause of eternity, but we must know time and eternity in that manner. Note last, that eternity is a most eminent and excellent measure; and so just as God, who is measured by eternity, is most eminent and excellent and contains the perfections of all things in the account of being; so eternity, which is the measure of God, contains the perfections of all measures in a most eminent way. And hence it comes that this measure, on account of its eminence, is not only compared to God as to the measured, but can also be compared to other measures.

LET the certain conclusion be, then, that eternity has no succession. This is of faith, and so say all the Theologians in the places cited above. And it is proved by reason. Eternity is the same as the divine essence, and differs from it only in account; but it is of faith that God has no succession or variety, as was proved in the last article of the preceding question: therefore it is of faith that eternity has no succession. The major is proved. Eternity is not something created; therefore it is God himself: but in God there is no real distinction except between the Persons; therefore. And it is confirmed: measure and measured must have proportion between them; but God has no succession: therefore neither his measure. But to solve the arguments, notice that it is so ordered by nature that the things which in lower things are scattered are united in higher things; and so one individual of a higher order is equivalent to infinitely many of a lower order, since it contains the perfection of all those in a more eminent way. Just as an angel knows through a single concept the various and diverse things which are known by us through diverse concepts, so eternity, which is the measure of a higher order, contains in the most united way the things contained in time through succession and with diversity.

To the first argument I answer that eternity is not greater now, considered in itself, than it was a thousand years ago: for it is always the same, altogether indivisible and immutable, although time is greater now than it was then. Second I answer that even if a thousand years were added to eternity, they would not make anything greater, since nothing of the same account is added, as Soncinas teaches in 12 Metaph., q. 31, to the first. For when something of the same account is added, then something greater results, as when one line is added to a line. For the rest, if something of another account is set beside, nothing greater results, as when many points are added to a line, it does not become greater. And God and the world, on the one hand, are not anything greater and more perfect than God alone, since nothing of the same account is added; so in the case proposed.

To the second I answer that eternity is called greater than our time just as the soul is called greater than the head or the hand, since it can inform not only the head and the hand but all the members; so eternity is called greater than our time, since it coexists with our time, and if our time had been before, it would coexist with it. Hence Cajetan, art. 2 of this question, explaining this solution, says that eternity is not greater, speaking formally, than our time; it is however greater virtually and eminently. Second I answer with Cajetan, here, that properly speaking eternity is not greater than our time: for comparison must be between things of the same account and order; but time is not of the same account as eternity.

To the third I answer that eternity is the same, altogether indivisible and invariable; and the differences of past and future found in time with diversity and succession are found in eternity without any diversity and succession: since it is something more eminent, as we said in the note for the solution of the arguments. Hence in Scripture, since eternity eminently contains time, sometimes the past or the future is attributed to it.

To the last I answer that it is not unfitting that in some indivisible of a higher and more perfect order two contradictories should be verified: since that indivisible, although in its perfection, contains virtually and eminently succession and division. It is however most unfitting that two contradictories should be verified for the same altogether indivisible instant: for then they have the true account of contradiction. And through this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

Yet this solution, although it once pleased, now, the matter more attentively inspected, displeases. First, because it must in no way be granted that two contradictories are verified at once. For it is a necessary principle, Whatever is, is, or is not, which is of eternal truth: to which it is opposed that contradictories be at once true, even if you add in eternity. Next the solution fails in that it says our instant to be altogether indivisible, as though eternity were not less divisible, although it more eminently contains the measure of time, and eminently measures the things measured by time. But that it may appear wherein that common solution errs, note that propositions are in a twofold difference: for some are those whose truth is eternal, and is measured by eternity, as four and three are seven, man is rational. And these are said to be absolved from time, and concerning such there is no difficulty as to contradiction: for they cannot be verified, even in respect of eternity. Others are enunciations whose truth is contingent, and they are measured, as by their proper measure, by time or by our instant; as is their falsity. Note second that not all the things which coexist with eternity must coexist with each other: for I coexist with eternity, and the Antichrist coexists with the same; and yet I and the Antichrist do not coexist. The reason is that the coexistence of contingent things is attended to simply according to the proper measure of the duration of their to-be. Hence it is gathered that although the truth of this, Peter runs, coexists with eternity, and the truth of this, Peter does not run, which is measured at another time, also coexists with eternity: yet it cannot be said that they are contradictories at once true in eternity. And the reason is that their contradiction is considered in respect of the proper measure of their contingency, so that for the time in which one is true, the other denies the union of running with Peter. Hence it implies contradiction that they be contradictories and at once true, even in eternity. For the rest these propositions, Peter runs, Peter does not run, if compared to eternity or referred to eternity, each with its own time in which it is verified, are subcontraries, and at once true, in eternity, which eminently measures two distinct times, and thus are equivalent to these: Peter at some time runs, Peter at some time does not run.

The second DOUBT is: Whether eternity, truly and really, is the measure of the divine to-be? And it seems not. First, for St. Thomas says in the article that eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of the divine to-be; and in art. 2, to the third, that God is in no way measured; but the account of measure in God is taken according to our apprehension: therefore, setting aside our apprehension, there is no account of eternity in God, and consequently it is a being of reason.

Second. A measure really differs from the measured thing, at least from the nature of the thing, for nothing really measures itself; but eternity does not really differ from God himself, for in God there is no real distinction except between the Persons: therefore eternity does not really measure God.

Third. Eternity signifies something distinct from God himself, except through a relation of reason; therefore, formally, eternity imports a relation of reason; and consequently eternity in the account of measure is something of reason. It is confirmed. Eternity adds something formally upon God himself; and that is not real; therefore it is something of reason. The minor is proved: for whatever is in God is God himself; and there is nothing in God which adds anything real upon God.

Fourth. Setting aside the personal relations, God really is neither equal nor like, but only through a relation of reason; therefore the account of measure and of eternity in God is not anything real, but something of reason. The consequence is clear: for eternity is not more distinguished from God himself than likeness and equality are from the divine essence.

Last. For the account of measure three conditions are necessary: the first is proportion and adequation between the measure and the measured; the second, the distinction between the measure and the measured; the third, that the measured be in some way limited. But the last two conditions, and especially the last, cannot belong to eternity; therefore. The minor is proved: for God is immense and unlimited.

On account of these arguments some authors judge that eternity is not the measure of the duration of the divine to-be: so holds Gabriel in the place cited above, near the end; and Durandus in 1, dist. 19, q. 2, to the first, holds the same. And of the disciples of St. Thomas, some judge that eternity is a real measure of the divine to-be. So judges Cajetan, here; and he explains St. Thomas when he says that eternity consists in apprehension etc., namely of objective apprehension, which is in the divine uniformity, not of formal apprehension, which is in our intellect; and this apprehension is nothing other than the uniform and invariable divine to-be. Ferrara, 1 Contra Gent., ch. 15, judges that eternity has its essential complement through the operation of the intellect; and so he explains St. Thomas in this place. And he adds an example: for just as time, although it is a real being, yet has its essential complement from the work of the intellect, so he judges that eternity, as to its essential complement, depends on the work of the intellect. But whatever may be the case concerning eternity, the example he adduces has no truth: for time does not depend on the work of the intellect as to its essential complement, but as to its accidental complement, namely as to actual numbering.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be: Eternity in its formal account imports the account of the measure of the divine to-be, just as time imports the account of the measure of corruptible things. This is against Durandus and Gabriel in the cited places: it is however the express opinion of St. Thomas, here, and is gathered from the definition of Boethius. And it is proved by reason. First, Sacred Scripture and the Saints oppose eternity to time: for they say that God is in eternity, just as corruptible things are in time; but time, in its formal account, imports the account of the measure of corruptible things; therefore eternity imports the account of the measure of the divine to-be. The minor is clear: but the consequence is proved. For if eternity did not import the account of measure, it would be opposed to time no more than any other divine attribute. It is confirmed: for God, in Scripture, is said to inhabit eternity on account of his greatest perfection, as is clear in Isa. 57: «The high and lofty God, inhabiting eternity»: therefore eternity has the account of measure in respect of the divine to-be.

Second. The Saints speak of eternity in respect of the duration of the divine to-be just as they speak of time in respect of the duration of corruptible things: but time, in its formal account, imports the account of measure; therefore eternity.

The second conclusion. The account of measure imported in the formal account of eternity is a relation of reason. This is proved. For in God there is no real relation besides the personal relations; but measure imports a relation: therefore such a relation is of reason. The major and the consequence are clear. But the minor is proved: for the account of measure imports an order to the measured thing. But against this conclusion is the argument: a measure does not import relation formally, but fundamentally; therefore the account of measure, in eternity, is not a relation of reason. It is confirmed: eternity is to the duration of the divine to-be as time is to the duration of corruptible things: but time, in the account of measure, does not bespeak a relation of reason, but something real; therefore eternity, in the account of measure, does not bespeak a relation of reason. To this argument it is said that the account of measure, in time, is something absolute and real: it includes however a transcendental relation, which is real, and is not a true predicamental relation. But eternity, in the account of measure, bespeaks something of reason, which indeed cannot be except a relation of reason.

Third conclusion. Eternity does not import the account of measure as the formal account of itself; but it imports, as its formal account, the uniformity of the immutable nature, under the account of measure, of the duration of the divine to-be. For the explanation of this conclusion, note first, that just as time imports number under the account of the measure of motion having the succession of before and after, so eternity imports uniformity under the account of the measure of the duration of the divine to-be. For just as time imports a measure determined by the number of motion, so eternity imports a measure consisting in unity. Note second, that just as time bespeaks a number not numbering but numbered and concrete in such matter, namely in the motion of the first mobile, since it is most regular and most perfect, so eternity bespeaks a unity concrete and determined to the immutable and invariable divine nature. From which there follows first, that it is more truly said that eternity is uniformity, as Cajetan wills, here, than to say that eternity is unity, in the divine nature. The reason is: for the uniformity of the divine nature signifies that concrete unity determined to the divine to-be. Second it follows that eternity formally imports that uniformity of the divine to-be; its intrinsic and necessary mode however is the account of the measure of the duration of the divine to-be. Third it follows that eternity is a real being, and a true real divine attribute; and so just as goodness is something real, and a true real passion, yet includes, as it were obliquely, a certain mode of reason; so eternity is something real, and a true real attribute; yet it includes intrinsically a certain mode of reason. Hence, just as being is good and has goodness, setting aside the work of the intellect, since in the thing there is the foundation of such a relation; so God is said to have eternity, and is eternal, setting aside the work of the intellect, since in him, on account of his perfection and eminence, there is the foundation of such a relation. Likewise, since eternity formally and as its formal account does not import a relation of reason, but uniformity. Fourth conclusion. Eternity is the measure of the duration of the divine to-be, fundamentally real; completively, however, from the work of the intellect. I mean that eternity, since it bespeaks the uniformity of the immutable nature, bespeaks something real, which founds a relation of reason through which the account of eternity is completed; but this relation has its foundation in the thing itself. This is proved. Eternity, as we have said, bespeaks the uniformity of the immutable nature under the account of measure; but uniformity is something real, while that completive mode is something of reason: therefore. Note however that that relation of reason has its foundation in the divine nature. For God, on account of his eminence and perfection, and since he contains the perfections of all things in a most eminent way, has a foundation in order to our intellect, so that we can form various and diverse concepts. For our intellect forms various concepts of diverse things; but setting aside diversity and imperfection, those things are found in God: and so in God there is a virtual and eminent foundation, so that our intellect can form various concepts. Hence the divine attributes, namely eternity and wisdom, are distinguished not only by reasoning reason, which has no foundation in the thing, but by reasoned reason, which has a foundation in the thing. To the arguments to the opposite it is answered. To the first it is said that St. Thomas only means that the necessary and completive mode of eternity has to-be through the apprehension of reason. For that the uniformity of the divine to-be be taken as rule and measure in respect of the divine duration, and as something distinct from itself, this it has not in the thing, but through the apprehension of the intellect.

To the second I answer that eternity is a real measure fundamentally; completively however it has to-be from the work of the intellect. Note however that it is one thing to say eternity, another to say the measure of the divine duration; just as it is one thing to say wisdom, another the attribute of wisdom: for what wisdom bespeaks in obliquo, the attribute of wisdom bespeaks formally and as it were in recto. So it is one thing to say eternity, another the measure of the divine duration: for eternity imports the account of measure in obliquo, and is as it were the completive mode of eternity; but the measure imports that mode formally and in recto. Hence eternity formally and absolutely is something real; but the measure of the duration of the divine to-be formally bespeaks something of reason. Just as wisdom formally is something real, while the attribute of wisdom formally bespeaks something of reason.

To the third I answer that eternity signifies something distinct not really from God himself, but according to reason; but it is distinguished by the intrinsic and completive mode of eternity, by reason of which eternity and the divine nature do not formally signify the same; but eternity, upon the divine nature, adds a mode completing the uniformity of being. For the understanding of which, note that just as being is intimately included in all things and nothing can escape the account of being, and therefore being is determined through intrinsic modes, not through differences, since no thing can add anything upon being, and so the passions of being add upon being only intrinsic modes determining the nature of being: for good is nothing other than being determined with a certain mode; so God stands in respect of all the things in him. For God is of the concept of all those, and so the divine nature is determined, in our way of understanding, through certain intrinsic modes: the divine goodness is nothing other than the Godhead with an order to the will, and so of each. So eternity is nothing other than the Godhead with a certain mode, namely with the account of measure etc. And through this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the fourth I answer that the relation of measure found in God is a relation of reason, as of the same to itself; yet it has a foundation in the thing, as we have said. But the divine likeness and equality is a relation of reason; yet it has no foundation in the thing, but in the intellect and in reasoning reason. The reason of the difference is that equality and likeness in substance and nature are relations requiring extremes, that is, foundations and terms really distinct; but the divine nature is altogether the same in all three Persons, and has no distinction, not even of reason. And so that the intellect consider distinct extremes in the divine equality and likeness is something fashioned by the intellect, having no foundation in the thing, like the equality of myself to myself; but the account of measure does not require two extremes, but two formally distinct accounts, as is clear in the motion of the first mobile: for the duration of that motion, as it is a certain duration, is something measured, and according to a certain other account, it has the account of measure. And so, since in the immutable and invariable nature two accounts are found, the relation of measure in God is a reasoned relation of reason, having a foundation in the thing. To the last I answer that a measure, as it bespeaks the rule through which we know the quantity and perfection of a thing, does not require that the measured be finite: hence the third condition is not necessary. Yet it is true that in the common way of speaking, what is measured is called finite; and so, speaking absolutely, since God is immense, he ought not to be called measured, yet he can be called measured by eternity, for then just as the measured is something unlimited and infinite, so also the measure. Second I answer that that third condition is necessary when the account of measure is completed outside the intellect. But the account of measure, in eternity, is completed through the apprehension of the intellect. This solution is that of St. Thomas, in the following article, to the third.