Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

I answer affirmatively. The definition is: eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life.

COMMENTARY.

On this matter the Doctors dispute in 1, d. 9 and 19; and in 2, dist. 2; St. Thomas 1 Cont. Gent., ch. 15; St. Augustine vol. 1, book 11 of the Confessions, ch. 11, and vol. 8 Super Psal. 101, second sermon, and Super Gen. q. 31 and 45, Super Exodum. St. Gregory 16 Moral., ch. 21.

First of all, something must briefly be said about the name of eternity and its signification and manifold acceptance. And indeed I have diligently inquired whence this name is derived, or what its etymology may be; nor have I found anything that fully satisfies me. For some, who invent etymologies at their own pleasure, say that the eternal is so called as outside limit (extra terminum), because eternity lacks beginning and end. But these do not notice that the eternal (aeternum) is written with a diphthong, which by no account could be derived from that particle, extra. I too once thought that the eternal or eternity was derived from aether and unity, because among the things perceived by the senses nothing is so uniform as the aether, that is, the upper heaven, which is understood by the name of aether: and that the name was thence transferred to signify the uniformity of God in duration. But since aether is written with th, while eternity (aeternitas) is without that aspiration, the etymology is not pleasing. I have also noticed that in the Hebrew language the measure of the duration of our to-be, namely time, is signified by this word, Etas, and what is written with the letter, Aaim, and au, and the instant itself is called Eetah; hence I have suspected that perhaps the name of eternity is derived from there. Nor is it surprising, since on account of the antiquity of the Hebrew language, from which the division of languages was made, we find some remnants in the other idioms of the nations. To someone another derivation of this name, eternity, from thrice-three age (aetate terna), will perhaps be more pleasing. For they say that age (aetas) is derived from the Greek name αἰών. And since our age is successively threefold, according to some: hence the measure of the divine duration which embraces at once the whole succession of our age is called eternity, as threefold age (aetas trina) or terna. But whatever may be the case concerning such a derivation of the name, this one thing is most certain, that by the name of eternity the Theologians understand the duration of God himself, altogether immutable. Its definition is explained in this article, that it is «the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life». And this is the first and chief acceptance of that name, eternity, for that which is altogether immutable, lacking beginning and end, of which sort is God alone. Further, by analogy and likeness to the eternity of God himself, eternal or eternity is said in many ways. In one way it is taken for the thing which has a beginning of duration but lacks an end: of this sort is the earth, according to The earth stands forever; and also Go into the eternal fire. In a third way something is called eternal which endures immovably through the longest times, although it has beginning and end: and in this way the eternal mountains are so called. To these we can add another way according to the Philosopher, so that it is taken for that which lacks beginning and end yet is mutable: of this sort are time and the world, if they existed from eternity and should endure forever. But in the first way the name eternal must be taken in the title of the article.

The first DOUBT is whether eternity has succession? and it seems so. First, eternity is greater now than it was a thousand years ago: but this cannot be without succession; therefore. The consequence is good, and the minor is manifest: but the major is proved. To the eternity which was then, a thousand years have been added; therefore it is greater now.

Second. Eternity compared to time is greater: but this cannot be without succession; therefore it has succession. The consequence is good, the major is proved: for every duration compared to another duration is greater or smaller; but eternity is a duration: therefore compared to time it is greater. The minor is proved. Time has succession; but eternity is something greater: therefore it has succession.

Third. The part of eternity which was in the time of Adam now is not, and the part of eternity which will be on the day of judgment now is not: therefore it has succession.

Last. If eternity is something indivisible having no succession, it follows that in the same instant two contradictories are true, namely, Peter runs, Peter does not run; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is proved: eternity is something altogether indivisible, and in it there is verified that Peter runs, and that he does not run; therefore. It is confirmed: the same altogether indivisible instant is part of eternity which corresponds to diverse times: but in diverse times there is verified that Peter runs, and that he does not run; therefore also in the same indivisible instant of eternity.

On the opposite side is the definition of Boethius, found in book 5 De Consolat., prose 6, at the beginning, and admitted by all the Theologians, and by St. Thomas here, and by St. Augustine Super Psal. 101 and St. Gregory in the cited place. Yet it is true that Aureolus in 1, d. 9, q. 1, and Gabriel in 2, d. 2, seem to hold the opposite entirely.

FOR the explanation of this question note first, that a measure, as Aristotle says in 10 Metaphysics, ch. 2, is nothing other than that by which we know the quantity of a thing, and is as a certain rule for recognizing it; but quantity is manifold, of extension, of multitude, of perfection and of duration: hence measure is manifold, for the measure must be proportioned to the measured thing. Note second, that duration is not of the same account in all things. For just as to-be is not of the same account in all things, so the quantity of duration is not the same in all things. For things are in a threefold difference: some variable according to substance and according to affections and thoughts, as man; others invariable according to substance, yet varied according to accidents, as angel. But God is altogether immutable in every respect, and so his measure is altogether invariable and immutable, whole at once and perfect, so that there is always proportion between the measure and the measured. Note third, that just as Aristotle in 4 Physics describes one flowing and variable now, from whose succession and variation time is caused; and from the point drawn through a plane a line is caused: so Boethius explains the nature of eternity through one uniform and invariable now. For the rest, just as that now formally is not time, nor is that succession properly the cause of time; so that invariable now is not eternity, nor the cause of eternity, but we must know time and eternity in that manner. Note last, that eternity is a most eminent and excellent measure; and so just as God, who is measured by eternity, is most eminent and excellent and contains the perfections of all things in the account of being; so eternity, which is the measure of God, contains the perfections of all measures in a most eminent way. And hence it comes that this measure, on account of its eminence, is not only compared to God as to the measured, but can also be compared to other measures.

LET the certain conclusion be, then, that eternity has no succession. This is of faith, and so say all the Theologians in the places cited above. And it is proved by reason. Eternity is the same as the divine essence, and differs from it only in account; but it is of faith that God has no succession or variety, as was proved in the last article of the preceding question: therefore it is of faith that eternity has no succession. The major is proved. Eternity is not something created; therefore it is God himself: but in God there is no real distinction except between the Persons; therefore. And it is confirmed: measure and measured must have proportion between them; but God has no succession: therefore neither his measure. But to solve the arguments, notice that it is so ordered by nature that the things which in lower things are scattered are united in higher things; and so one individual of a higher order is equivalent to infinitely many of a lower order, since it contains the perfection of all those in a more eminent way. Just as an angel knows through a single concept the various and diverse things which are known by us through diverse concepts, so eternity, which is the measure of a higher order, contains in the most united way the things contained in time through succession and with diversity.

To the first argument I answer that eternity is not greater now, considered in itself, than it was a thousand years ago: for it is always the same, altogether indivisible and immutable, although time is greater now than it was then. Second I answer that even if a thousand years were added to eternity, they would not make anything greater, since nothing of the same account is added, as Soncinas teaches in 12 Metaph., q. 31, to the first. For when something of the same account is added, then something greater results, as when one line is added to a line. For the rest, if something of another account is set beside, nothing greater results, as when many points are added to a line, it does not become greater. And God and the world, on the one hand, are not anything greater and more perfect than God alone, since nothing of the same account is added; so in the case proposed.

To the second I answer that eternity is called greater than our time just as the soul is called greater than the head or the hand, since it can inform not only the head and the hand but all the members; so eternity is called greater than our time, since it coexists with our time, and if our time had been before, it would coexist with it. Hence Cajetan, art. 2 of this question, explaining this solution, says that eternity is not greater, speaking formally, than our time; it is however greater virtually and eminently. Second I answer with Cajetan, here, that properly speaking eternity is not greater than our time: for comparison must be between things of the same account and order; but time is not of the same account as eternity.

To the third I answer that eternity is the same, altogether indivisible and invariable; and the differences of past and future found in time with diversity and succession are found in eternity without any diversity and succession: since it is something more eminent, as we said in the note for the solution of the arguments. Hence in Scripture, since eternity eminently contains time, sometimes the past or the future is attributed to it.

To the last I answer that it is not unfitting that in some indivisible of a higher and more perfect order two contradictories should be verified: since that indivisible, although in its perfection, contains virtually and eminently succession and division. It is however most unfitting that two contradictories should be verified for the same altogether indivisible instant: for then they have the true account of contradiction. And through this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

Yet this solution, although it once pleased, now, the matter more attentively inspected, displeases. First, because it must in no way be granted that two contradictories are verified at once. For it is a necessary principle, Whatever is, is, or is not, which is of eternal truth: to which it is opposed that contradictories be at once true, even if you add in eternity. Next the solution fails in that it says our instant to be altogether indivisible, as though eternity were not less divisible, although it more eminently contains the measure of time, and eminently measures the things measured by time. But that it may appear wherein that common solution errs, note that propositions are in a twofold difference: for some are those whose truth is eternal, and is measured by eternity, as four and three are seven, man is rational. And these are said to be absolved from time, and concerning such there is no difficulty as to contradiction: for they cannot be verified, even in respect of eternity. Others are enunciations whose truth is contingent, and they are measured, as by their proper measure, by time or by our instant; as is their falsity. Note second that not all the things which coexist with eternity must coexist with each other: for I coexist with eternity, and the Antichrist coexists with the same; and yet I and the Antichrist do not coexist. The reason is that the coexistence of contingent things is attended to simply according to the proper measure of the duration of their to-be. Hence it is gathered that although the truth of this, Peter runs, coexists with eternity, and the truth of this, Peter does not run, which is measured at another time, also coexists with eternity: yet it cannot be said that they are contradictories at once true in eternity. And the reason is that their contradiction is considered in respect of the proper measure of their contingency, so that for the time in which one is true, the other denies the union of running with Peter. Hence it implies contradiction that they be contradictories and at once true, even in eternity. For the rest these propositions, Peter runs, Peter does not run, if compared to eternity or referred to eternity, each with its own time in which it is verified, are subcontraries, and at once true, in eternity, which eminently measures two distinct times, and thus are equivalent to these: Peter at some time runs, Peter at some time does not run.

The second DOUBT is: Whether eternity, truly and really, is the measure of the divine to-be? And it seems not. First, for St. Thomas says in the article that eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of the divine to-be; and in art. 2, to the third, that God is in no way measured; but the account of measure in God is taken according to our apprehension: therefore, setting aside our apprehension, there is no account of eternity in God, and consequently it is a being of reason.

Second. A measure really differs from the measured thing, at least from the nature of the thing, for nothing really measures itself; but eternity does not really differ from God himself, for in God there is no real distinction except between the Persons: therefore eternity does not really measure God.

Third. Eternity signifies something distinct from God himself, except through a relation of reason; therefore, formally, eternity imports a relation of reason; and consequently eternity in the account of measure is something of reason. It is confirmed. Eternity adds something formally upon God himself; and that is not real; therefore it is something of reason. The minor is proved: for whatever is in God is God himself; and there is nothing in God which adds anything real upon God.

Fourth. Setting aside the personal relations, God really is neither equal nor like, but only through a relation of reason; therefore the account of measure and of eternity in God is not anything real, but something of reason. The consequence is clear: for eternity is not more distinguished from God himself than likeness and equality are from the divine essence.

Last. For the account of measure three conditions are necessary: the first is proportion and adequation between the measure and the measured; the second, the distinction between the measure and the measured; the third, that the measured be in some way limited. But the last two conditions, and especially the last, cannot belong to eternity; therefore. The minor is proved: for God is immense and unlimited.

On account of these arguments some authors judge that eternity is not the measure of the duration of the divine to-be: so holds Gabriel in the place cited above, near the end; and Durandus in 1, dist. 19, q. 2, to the first, holds the same. And of the disciples of St. Thomas, some judge that eternity is a real measure of the divine to-be. So judges Cajetan, here; and he explains St. Thomas when he says that eternity consists in apprehension etc., namely of objective apprehension, which is in the divine uniformity, not of formal apprehension, which is in our intellect; and this apprehension is nothing other than the uniform and invariable divine to-be. Ferrara, 1 Contra Gent., ch. 15, judges that eternity has its essential complement through the operation of the intellect; and so he explains St. Thomas in this place. And he adds an example: for just as time, although it is a real being, yet has its essential complement from the work of the intellect, so he judges that eternity, as to its essential complement, depends on the work of the intellect. But whatever may be the case concerning eternity, the example he adduces has no truth: for time does not depend on the work of the intellect as to its essential complement, but as to its accidental complement, namely as to actual numbering.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be: Eternity in its formal account imports the account of the measure of the divine to-be, just as time imports the account of the measure of corruptible things. This is against Durandus and Gabriel in the cited places: it is however the express opinion of St. Thomas, here, and is gathered from the definition of Boethius. And it is proved by reason. First, Sacred Scripture and the Saints oppose eternity to time: for they say that God is in eternity, just as corruptible things are in time; but time, in its formal account, imports the account of the measure of corruptible things; therefore eternity imports the account of the measure of the divine to-be. The minor is clear: but the consequence is proved. For if eternity did not import the account of measure, it would be opposed to time no more than any other divine attribute. It is confirmed: for God, in Scripture, is said to inhabit eternity on account of his greatest perfection, as is clear in Isa. 57: «The high and lofty God, inhabiting eternity»: therefore eternity has the account of measure in respect of the divine to-be.

Second. The Saints speak of eternity in respect of the duration of the divine to-be just as they speak of time in respect of the duration of corruptible things: but time, in its formal account, imports the account of measure; therefore eternity.

The second conclusion. The account of measure imported in the formal account of eternity is a relation of reason. This is proved. For in God there is no real relation besides the personal relations; but measure imports a relation: therefore such a relation is of reason. The major and the consequence are clear. But the minor is proved: for the account of measure imports an order to the measured thing. But against this conclusion is the argument: a measure does not import relation formally, but fundamentally; therefore the account of measure, in eternity, is not a relation of reason. It is confirmed: eternity is to the duration of the divine to-be as time is to the duration of corruptible things: but time, in the account of measure, does not bespeak a relation of reason, but something real; therefore eternity, in the account of measure, does not bespeak a relation of reason. To this argument it is said that the account of measure, in time, is something absolute and real: it includes however a transcendental relation, which is real, and is not a true predicamental relation. But eternity, in the account of measure, bespeaks something of reason, which indeed cannot be except a relation of reason.

Third conclusion. Eternity does not import the account of measure as the formal account of itself; but it imports, as its formal account, the uniformity of the immutable nature, under the account of measure, of the duration of the divine to-be. For the explanation of this conclusion, note first, that just as time imports number under the account of the measure of motion having the succession of before and after, so eternity imports uniformity under the account of the measure of the duration of the divine to-be. For just as time imports a measure determined by the number of motion, so eternity imports a measure consisting in unity. Note second, that just as time bespeaks a number not numbering but numbered and concrete in such matter, namely in the motion of the first mobile, since it is most regular and most perfect, so eternity bespeaks a unity concrete and determined to the immutable and invariable divine nature. From which there follows first, that it is more truly said that eternity is uniformity, as Cajetan wills, here, than to say that eternity is unity, in the divine nature. The reason is: for the uniformity of the divine nature signifies that concrete unity determined to the divine to-be. Second it follows that eternity formally imports that uniformity of the divine to-be; its intrinsic and necessary mode however is the account of the measure of the duration of the divine to-be. Third it follows that eternity is a real being, and a true real divine attribute; and so just as goodness is something real, and a true real passion, yet includes, as it were obliquely, a certain mode of reason; so eternity is something real, and a true real attribute; yet it includes intrinsically a certain mode of reason. Hence, just as being is good and has goodness, setting aside the work of the intellect, since in the thing there is the foundation of such a relation; so God is said to have eternity, and is eternal, setting aside the work of the intellect, since in him, on account of his perfection and eminence, there is the foundation of such a relation. Likewise, since eternity formally and as its formal account does not import a relation of reason, but uniformity. Fourth conclusion. Eternity is the measure of the duration of the divine to-be, fundamentally real; completively, however, from the work of the intellect. I mean that eternity, since it bespeaks the uniformity of the immutable nature, bespeaks something real, which founds a relation of reason through which the account of eternity is completed; but this relation has its foundation in the thing itself. This is proved. Eternity, as we have said, bespeaks the uniformity of the immutable nature under the account of measure; but uniformity is something real, while that completive mode is something of reason: therefore. Note however that that relation of reason has its foundation in the divine nature. For God, on account of his eminence and perfection, and since he contains the perfections of all things in a most eminent way, has a foundation in order to our intellect, so that we can form various and diverse concepts. For our intellect forms various concepts of diverse things; but setting aside diversity and imperfection, those things are found in God: and so in God there is a virtual and eminent foundation, so that our intellect can form various concepts. Hence the divine attributes, namely eternity and wisdom, are distinguished not only by reasoning reason, which has no foundation in the thing, but by reasoned reason, which has a foundation in the thing. To the arguments to the opposite it is answered. To the first it is said that St. Thomas only means that the necessary and completive mode of eternity has to-be through the apprehension of reason. For that the uniformity of the divine to-be be taken as rule and measure in respect of the divine duration, and as something distinct from itself, this it has not in the thing, but through the apprehension of the intellect.

To the second I answer that eternity is a real measure fundamentally; completively however it has to-be from the work of the intellect. Note however that it is one thing to say eternity, another to say the measure of the divine duration; just as it is one thing to say wisdom, another the attribute of wisdom: for what wisdom bespeaks in obliquo, the attribute of wisdom bespeaks formally and as it were in recto. So it is one thing to say eternity, another the measure of the divine duration: for eternity imports the account of measure in obliquo, and is as it were the completive mode of eternity; but the measure imports that mode formally and in recto. Hence eternity formally and absolutely is something real; but the measure of the duration of the divine to-be formally bespeaks something of reason. Just as wisdom formally is something real, while the attribute of wisdom formally bespeaks something of reason.

To the third I answer that eternity signifies something distinct not really from God himself, but according to reason; but it is distinguished by the intrinsic and completive mode of eternity, by reason of which eternity and the divine nature do not formally signify the same; but eternity, upon the divine nature, adds a mode completing the uniformity of being. For the understanding of which, note that just as being is intimately included in all things and nothing can escape the account of being, and therefore being is determined through intrinsic modes, not through differences, since no thing can add anything upon being, and so the passions of being add upon being only intrinsic modes determining the nature of being: for good is nothing other than being determined with a certain mode; so God stands in respect of all the things in him. For God is of the concept of all those, and so the divine nature is determined, in our way of understanding, through certain intrinsic modes: the divine goodness is nothing other than the Godhead with an order to the will, and so of each. So eternity is nothing other than the Godhead with a certain mode, namely with the account of measure etc. And through this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the fourth I answer that the relation of measure found in God is a relation of reason, as of the same to itself; yet it has a foundation in the thing, as we have said. But the divine likeness and equality is a relation of reason; yet it has no foundation in the thing, but in the intellect and in reasoning reason. The reason of the difference is that equality and likeness in substance and nature are relations requiring extremes, that is, foundations and terms really distinct; but the divine nature is altogether the same in all three Persons, and has no distinction, not even of reason. And so that the intellect consider distinct extremes in the divine equality and likeness is something fashioned by the intellect, having no foundation in the thing, like the equality of myself to myself; but the account of measure does not require two extremes, but two formally distinct accounts, as is clear in the motion of the first mobile: for the duration of that motion, as it is a certain duration, is something measured, and according to a certain other account, it has the account of measure. And so, since in the immutable and invariable nature two accounts are found, the relation of measure in God is a reasoned relation of reason, having a foundation in the thing. To the last I answer that a measure, as it bespeaks the rule through which we know the quantity and perfection of a thing, does not require that the measured be finite: hence the third condition is not necessary. Yet it is true that in the common way of speaking, what is measured is called finite; and so, speaking absolutely, since God is immense, he ought not to be called measured, yet he can be called measured by eternity, for then just as the measured is something unlimited and infinite, so also the measure. Second I answer that that third condition is necessary when the account of measure is completed outside the intellect. But the account of measure, in eternity, is completed through the apprehension of the intellect. This solution is that of St. Thomas, in the following article, to the third.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First Conclusion: God is supremely eternal.

Second: God is his own eternity.

Third: No creature is its own duration.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE, concerning the article, that the first Conclusion is of faith. For Ecclus. 18 it is said: He who lives forever etc. And Isaiah 40: The eternal God, the Lord. Ps. 101: His years shall not fail. And Dan. 7: His power, an eternal power. And this truth is defined in the chapter Firmiter, on the Supreme Trinity, and in the Athanasian Creed. And the argument of St. Thomas is a demonstration. For from immutability eternity arises, as a proper attribute. But if someone should say that immutability and eternity in God are altogether the same, therefore one is not the cause of the other, and consequently there will be no demonstration, for a demonstration must proceed through a cause; it is answered that for the account of a demonstration it suffices that it proceed through the formal ground: for in Logic there are true demonstrations, and yet one is not the cause of the other, but only the formal ground; and if it could have a cause, one being of reason would cause another; for predicability, if it could have a cause, would have universality as its cause: so too eternity, if it could have a cause, would have immutability. It is answered secondly that although immutability and eternity are the same in God, nevertheless immutability is the cause of eternity in a most eminent and most perfect way: but for it to be a cause in that way, no real distinction is required; an eminent distinction suffices. Note secondly, concerning the second Conclusion, that it too is of faith. For as was said in q. 3, art. 3, God is Godhead, and all the Attributes in the abstract. For the supposit in divine things adds nothing real over and above the divine nature, whereas in creatures it adds something real, distinct from the nature. Note thirdly that the third Conclusion is also most certain, since to-be is not of the essence of any creature, as was said in the place just cited, but is a certain quasi-accidental mode: therefore if to-be is not of the essence of a creature, neither is duration in to-be; for the duration of anything is identified with its to-be. Note lastly that eternity, speaking formally, is not duration. I mean that the account of eternity is not the account of duration (whatever Cajetan may say, here). The reason is, for eternity is the measure of duration, while the divine duration is the thing measured: therefore the account of eternity is not the account of duration. It is true that this proposition is true, eternity is duration, just as wisdom is justice, since in God all the Attributes are one. See the solution to the first, and note it. But the treatment of duration and of its distinction from to-be belongs to the matter concerning the Angels.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: If we speak of eternity, properly and strictly, to be eternal is proper to God. The reason is that God alone is immutable.

Second conclusion: If we speak of eternity, by participation, it also belongs to creatures.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning this article note the answer to the second: for if we speak of time, in rigor, as it is the number of motion etc., it is of faith that after the day of Judgment there will be no time, as is clear from Apoc. 10. The Angel swore by him who lives forever and ever, that time shall be no more. But if we speak of time, in the broad use of the word, as it is opposed to eternity, after the day of Judgment there will be time of another account, as St. Thomas explains.

There is a DOUBT concerning the answer to the third: Whether those complex enunciables, that man is an animal, is risible, are something real from eternity, outside the divine intellect? It is argued first that they are. That man is an animal, is from eternity, and is something real, created and predicamental: therefore something created is from eternity. The consequence and the major are clear; the minor is proved. That man is an animal does not have to-be in the soul, otherwise it would be a being of reason; therefore it has to-be outside the soul, and consequently is a real being. And it is not God, as is agreed. Therefore it is something created from eternity. Secondly. That man is an animal is at some time something real and a being in the nature of things; therefore it was from eternity. The antecedent is clear. The consequence is proved. The antecedent: the to-be of an animal has no efficient cause of itself; therefore if at some time it is, it always was. The antecedent is clear: it has an efficient cause, therefore it has a final one, for the agent acts for the sake of some end; then further, it acts for the sake of some end; therefore it can be demonstrated through the final cause. The consequent is false: for that man is an animal is a first indemonstrable principle; therefore. Thirdly. Sciences are of things real, perpetual and eternal, as is clear; but sciences are of essences and quiddities: therefore quiddities are eternal. It is confirmed: science is really referred to its object, even if it does not exist; therefore things, before they are, have some real quidditative and essential to-be. The consequence is proved: for of being to non-being there is no real relation. The antecedent is proved: for this complex, that man is risible, measures science in the same way, whether man exists or not; therefore. Fourthly. Between the productive and the producible there is a true real relation, for it is founded in a real potency; therefore the producible essence, before it exists, has some real to-be in the nature of things. It is confirmed: the essence, before it exists, is producible; therefore it has some potency, and consequently some real to-be. Lastly. The same in number essence of Peter is, before it exists, and after it exists: therefore before it exists it is not non-being. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent. On account of these arguments some, among whom is Scotus, say that the essences of things, which are signified through complexes of this sort, that man is an animal, etc. have to-be from eternity, not indeed the to-be of existence, but the essential and quidditative to-be. So Sonc. 9 Met., q. 4 reports. And so these authors say that in man, since there is a twofold to-be in him, one essential and quidditative, the other of existence, man is from eternity, as to the essential and quidditative to-be. So that what some say, that God by absolute power can preserve an essence without existence, these say that, as a matter of fact, the essence is from eternity without existence.

For the explanation of the question note with St. Thomas above, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2, that to-be is threefold: one essential and quidditative, another the to-be of existence, and a third which signifies the connection and truth of the proposition: which connection is fundamentally in the thing, formally in the intellect.

Note secondly that the to-be of existence does two things with respect to the to-be of essence. The first is to constitute the to-be of essence in act, which before was in potency: hence man, before he exists, is a potential being and not an actual one. The second thing it does is that it be a created being, for before it exists it is a creatable being, yet not a created being. For creation is terminated to the quiddity under existence, as St. Thomas teaches, De Potentia, q. 3, art. 5, ad 2. Hence real being in the first division is divided into uncreated being, which has to-be through its own essence, and into created being, which has to-be not through its own essence, but through existence, which is accidental to the essence. Note lastly with Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, c. 4, q. 6, that real being is said in two ways: in one way as it is distinguished against being fashioned by the intellect, in the other way it is said as it is distinguished against the non-existent.

First conclusion. The essences of things which are signified through those enunciable complexes are not from eternity, neither as to the to-be of existence, nor as to the quidditative and essential to-be. The first part is manifest, for God alone exists from eternity. The second is proved. First from St. Thomas, in the place cited above, and q. 3 De Potentia, art. 5, ad 2, where he expressly says that essence without existence is nothing. It is proved secondly: that quidditative to-be which they say is from eternity either is produced by God or not. If the first, then it has existence, for the production of God is terminated to the essence under existence. If the second, then some being, which is not God, has no respect to God. Lastly, if this opinion is true it follows that creation is not possible, for creation is the production of the whole being, but things are from eternity as to quidditative to-be: therefore they cannot be produced according to every account of being. See other reasons in Sancin., in the place cited above.

Second conclusion. That man is an animal, is from eternity, if the word, is, expresses the essential to-be and the connection of animal with man. This conclusion is proved, for animal from eternity is of the essence of man. Note, however, that this to-be is not to-be simply with respect to the creature, but in a qualified sense, for it is to-be in potency.

Third conclusion. If the word, is, expresses the truth of the proposition, that man is an animal, it is not from eternity, except in the divine intellect. This is proved: for the true is in the intellect; but from eternity there is no other intellect except the divine; therefore. From these conclusions it follows that the essences of things, before they exist, are real beings, as real being is distinguished against a being of reason or fictitious being; not, however, in the second sense.

To the first argument it is answered that for essences to be constituted in a predicament it is not necessary that they exist, but it suffices that they be finite creatable essences; for the predicament expresses an order of reason, but an order of reason can be before things exist. To the second it is answered that just as an essence has no cause except under existence, for the action of the producer is terminated to the essence under existence, so it has no end, except under existence; and therefore it cannot be demonstrated that animal belongs to man on account of an end, except perhaps insofar as it is under existence. That necessary connection of the extremes is nevertheless not demonstrable: because animal belongs to man immediately and without cause. To the third it is answered that sciences are of perpetual and eternal things, since things, as considered by science, have no cause of corruption, for they abstract from matter, which is the principle of corruption. To the confirmation, Soncin. 5 Metaph., q. 30, at the end of the question, answers very well that sciences, which consider truths in the abstract, are referred to their objects by the relation of the measured to the measure through the operation of the intellect alone, whether the thing exists or not. For the existence of the object seems impertinent to the commensuration of a science considering only truths about its object. To me, however, it seems more probable that science is referred by a real relation of the measurable to the measure so long as the object exists; otherwise when it does not exist. Hence to the confirmation, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the antecedent, as far as founding a predicamental relation of the third genus is concerned.

To the fourth it is answered that between the producible and the productive there is only a relation of reason, as Soncinas teaches, in the place already cited. For the relation of the product to the producer, which is a real relation, requires an action, which is the ground of founding. To the confirmation it is answered that things, before they are, are called producible, not through a real potency which is in them, but through the extrinsic potency of the agent. To the last it is answered that the essence, before it exists and when it exists, is the same negatively, not positively. For for some things to be one positively, each extreme must exist; but the essence, when it does not exist, has no to-be, and so they are not one positively. See Soncin., 9 Metaph., q. 3 and 4, especially in the solution of the arguments.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. And the chief ground is, that eternity is whole at once, whereas time is not.

COMMENTARY.

Note that the title of this article is commonly circulated as, whether eternity differs from aevum and time, although that phrase, from aevum, is redundant, as is clear in the ancient originals; and also because St. Thomas in the whole article makes no mention of aevum, but only compares eternity to time.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: The aeon differs from eternity and time; thus it is a mean between eternity and time.

SECOND conclusion: The aeon has no before and after, but is all at once; yet before and after can be joined to it.

THIRD conclusion, in the reply to the first: The natural to-be of the angel is measured by the aeon.

FOURTH conclusion, in the same reply: The operations of the angel, which have succession, are measured by time.

LAST conclusion, in the same reply: The beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. For the reasons for the aforesaid conclusions, see in the article.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED first concerning these articles, whether it is necessary to posit this measure which is called aeon? And it seems not. First. A measure ought to be known, for it is that by which we know the duration of a thing; but the aeon is not anything known to us, as is evident, and we know the duration of the angel through time: therefore it is not necessary to posit this measure. Second. If God were to annihilate the angel, it would not be measured by the aeon: therefore neither is it now measured. The consequence is proved: for the angel's being annihilated is impertinent to the account of a measure. The antecedent is proved: things which are changed from to-be to non-to-be are not measured by the aeon, but by time; but the annihilated angel is changed from to-be to non-to-be: therefore it is not measured by the aeon, but by time, and consequently it will not be necessary to posit such a measure. Third. The reason why St. Thomas posits this measure is that angels have their whole to-be at once; but corruptible things also have their whole to-be at once, as is evident, and nevertheless are measured by time: therefore there is no need to posit the aeon. Fourth. In the duration of the angel there is long and brief; but these are properties of time; therefore the angel is measured by time, not by the aeon. The consequence is good, and the minor true. The major is proved: for if God were to create one angel before the others, the duration of the former would be greater than that of the others. Fifth. The aeon is neither the angelic to-be itself, nor some accidental respect: therefore it is not to be posited. The consequence is good. The antecedent is proved: for a measure ought to be distinguished from the thing measured. Also, that respect is wholly unknown: therefore it cannot have the character of a measure.

On account of these arguments, Gabriel, in 2, dist. 2, q. 1, thinks that it is not necessary to posit such a measure, distinct from time.

For the explanation of this question note that the aeon is taken in many ways: but as far as our purpose goes, the aeon is nothing but a certain measure by which we know the duration of a thing in to-be invariable in substance, yet variable in operation. For time measures the duration of a wholly variable thing, for it measures corruptible things, which are in perpetual flux and corruption; eternity, however, measures the duration of a wholly invariable thing, both in substance and in operation. The aeon, however, holds itself in a middle way, for it measures invariable to-be, while admitting variation in operation.

Hence let the first conclusion be: It is necessary to posit this measure. This conclusion is St. Augustine's, book 33 of the Questions, q. 72; and it is proved by reason. The to-be of the angel is of an order inferior to the divine to-be, and of an order superior to the to-be of all corruptible things: therefore a certain measure must necessarily be posited which measures the angelic to-be. The consequence is plain: for between measure and measured there ought to be proportion, as Aristotle says, 10 Met., text 4. It is proved second. The angel does not know its duration through time; for in order for it to know its duration, it need not have recourse to time; therefore it must use another rule; there is none but the aeon: therefore. It is confirmed: even if there were no time, the angel could know its duration: therefore it has some other measure distinct from time by which it can know its duration; but it cannot be eternity, since that is of a higher order: therefore it is necessary to constitute the aeon.

The second conclusion, which is gathered from the preceding: The aeon is a measure distinct from eternity and time. It is gathered thus: for through eternity we measure wholly invariable to-be, through time wholly variable to-be is measured; therefore a distinct measure must necessarily be posited,

which measures to-be invariable in substance, yet variable in operation. And thus St. Thomas, art. 5, to 2, says that the aeon is all at once, as is angelic to-be; yet it admits variation and succession, in operation.

To the first it is answered that it is not necessary for this measure to be known to us; but it suffices that it be known to the angels, who use it. It is also to be noted that from our knowing other measures, through comparison to our time, and likewise the durations of higher things, it is not thence gathered that our time measures higher things, for our intellect knows higher things imperfectly and through comparison to lower things. To the second it is answered that the angel is measured by the aeon, since from its nature it is invariable and incorruptible in substance; but its being annihilated is above nature and miraculous. And so, from the nature of the thing, the angel is not changed from to-be to non-to-be; hence it is not measured by time, but is measured by the aeon, which has proportion with this to-be. To the third it is answered that angelic to-be is all at once, having no succession, since it is invariable and immutable in substance; but the to-be of corruptible things is not all at once, but has succession, since it is in perpetual flux and corruption, and always tends toward non-to-be. To the fourth it is answered that if some angel were created before another, such an angel would not have a longer duration in itself, since the duration of the angel is all at once, having no succession; and thus just as eternity is not now longer than in Adam's time, since it is all at once, so is the aeon. It is true that in comparison to our time, that angel would be said to endure through a longer duration, not in itself, but because the aeon coexists with our time. Also, because the aeon contains time in a certain eminent way, and thus contains succession virtually and in a certain excellence. Second it is answered that the creation and annihilation of the angel are certain changes measured by the now of discrete time, not by the aeon; and since the conservation of the angel depends on its creation, thence it is that, by reason of creation and annihilation, the duration of the angel can be called longer or briefer, since these changes are not measured by the aeon; yet speaking formally, one angel does not have a longer duration than another. To the fifth it is answered that the aeon is not distinguished really from the duration of the angel itself; yet it is distinguished by reasoned reason. Thus, just as eternity is the same really and formally as the duration of the divine To-Be, so the aeon is the same really and formally as the duration of angelic to-be. It is to be noted, however, that in God eternity is the same really and formally as the divine Essence, since in God to-be and essence are not distinguished; and thus duration in to-be is the same as the divine Essence. But in angels, although the aeon is identified and is the same formally as duration in angelic to-be, it is nevertheless not the same, at least formally, as the essence of the angel: since in angels, to-be and essence are distinguished formally at least, and from the nature of the thing. Second it is answered to be probable that the aeon is distinguished formally, from the nature of the thing, from the duration of angelic to-be, as time is formally distinguished from the motion of the first movable. For the aeon bespeaks the uniformity of angelic to-be, invariable and immutable; but the thing measured is the duration of the angel, in substantial to-be.

A SECOND DOUBT: Whether the aeon has succession, or is all at once? And it seems to have succession. It is argued first. For Jerome seems so to say in the letter to Marcella, where he says that eternity alone is all at once, having no succession: therefore. Second. The angel is conserved in to-be in this instant, and is conserved in another distinct instant: therefore it has succession, and does not have its whole to-be at once. Third. If the aeon is all at once having no succession, it follows that it eminently contains time, as does eternity: the consequent is false: therefore. The consequence is proved: for it is something indivisible, all at once coexisting with all our time. The minor is proved: for otherwise, the angel would know future contingents, for future time coexists with the aeon; therefore it is now in the aeon, and consequently can be known by the angel. It is confirmed and explained. For this reason God knows future contingents, since in comparison to eternity they are, for eternity is an indivisible measure, and having its whole to-be at once, so perfect that it surrounds and embraces the aeon and all time; but the aeon is not a successive measure, but rather coexists all at once with all time: therefore. Fourth. If the angelic measure is something indivisible, having no succession, it follows that God cannot annihilate the angel; the consequent is false: therefore. The consequence is proved: it has its to-be all at once in something indivisible; therefore it cannot cease to be in that indivisible. The consequence is plain: for if a thing is in something indivisible, it cannot cease to be in that indivisible. Whence arose that proverb: A thing, when it is, must necessarily be. And in the same instant in which God produces any thing, He cannot annihilate it. It is confirmed and explained: An annihilated angel either had the duration its nature demands, or not; if the first, then it was variable and corruptible from its own nature, and was not annihilated; if the second, then something of its duration remains, and consequently its duration has succession. It is confirmed second. Supposing God produces something indivisible, it cannot but endure through the duration owed and possible to it; but the duration of the angel is indivisible and all at once: therefore supposing God produces the angel, He cannot annihilate it.

On account of these arguments, Gabriel, in 2, d. 2, q. 1, holds that the aeon is something successive; and St. Bonaventure holds the same, and explains this succession through comparison to divine conservation. For some things are conserved by God successively, without innovation and change; others, however, are conserved with innovation and change, and he adds the example: light, which is in the air, is conserved successively, and yet without any innovation and change; but a stream is conserved by its source with innovation and change. Thus he says that incorruptible things are successively conserved by God, and yet without immutation and innovation; corruptible things, however, are conserved successively by God, and yet with innovation and succession. St. Thomas reports this opinion in the article, and disproves it.

The second opinion is common among the Theologians, that the aeon is all at once, having no succession. St. Thomas holds this, here; Durandus in 2, d. 2, q. 3; Scotus, q. 1. This opinion is proved, and the foundation of the contrary disproved at once. The conservation of the angel is taken either for active or for passive conservation. If the first, then it is all at once having no succession: for it is a divine action. If the second, it is the angelic to-be itself, invariable and immutable: therefore it has no succession. It is confirmed. Conservation cannot have change and innovation unless the thing conserved has innovation and change; but the thing conserved, namely the angel, has no innovation and change: therefore. Second. Time has succession, and is not all at once, for this reason: that motion, which is measured by time, has before and after, and is not all at once; but angelic to-be, which is measured by the aeon, has no succession, but is all at once: therefore the aeon has no succession, but is all at once. The consequence is plain: for a measure ought to be proportioned to the thing measured. To the first argument it is answered that Jerome and the Saints say that this is proper to eternity, to have no succession, since eternity neither has succession in itself, nor admits of succession. Time, however, has succession in itself. The aeon is a certain mean participating in both extremes; and thus, although it has no succession in itself, it can yet be joined to it, since it has variation and succession, in operation. To the second it is answered that, just as angelic to-be is wholly invariable and all at once, so is conservation; and there are not distinct conservations, but one and the same most simple one. We say, however, that it is conserved in this instant and in another instant, through comparison to our time: for although the aeon, since it is all at once, coexists nevertheless with all instants of time, and has succession virtually and equivalently; just as divine to-be is in this instant and in another, without succession ta...

...that, since it is equivalent to one hour or day, it seems that a future contingent coexists with it in that hour or day; it is answered likewise that the instant measuring the angel's cognition contains no time eminently: hence future contingents do not coexist with that instant, unless when they exist in their proper measure and time. Through this, the reply to the confirmation is plain. To the fourth it is answered that the indivisible which is all at once is of two kinds: one is what has no succession, neither formally nor virtually, like the now of time; and if God produces something in that indivisible, it implies a contradiction for it to cease to be in that indivisible, otherwise it would at once be and not be. The other is an indivisible of a higher and more perfect order, which indeed has no succession formally, yet has it virtually and equivalently; and thus it has past and future virtually, and in this indivisible something can be and be annihilated; and an indivisible of this kind is the aeon. To the first confirmation it is answered that the annihilated angel had the duration of the aeon all at once, yet ceases to be, since that duration, although it has no succession formally, has it nevertheless virtually and equivalently. To the second confirmation it is answered that it concludes concerning the indivisible of the first kind, but is false concerning the indivisible of the second kind, since it has succession virtually.

A THIRD DOUBT: whether the operations of the angel are measured by the aeon. It is argued for the affirmative side: first, because the operation of the angel is of the same order as the substance of the angel: therefore. Second. The operation of the angel is not measured by eternity, since it is of an inferior order, nor by time, since it is of a superior order; therefore it is measured by the aeon. Third. St. Augustine, book On Faith to Peter, ch. 18, says that the beatific vision is measured by the aeon, since it is indivisible and all at once; but the operation of the angel is indivisible, and all at once: therefore.

On account of these arguments, Scotus in 2, d. 2, q. 4, holds that these operations are measured by the aeon. For explanation, note that here we speak of natural operation, which is of the same order as the angelic substance; for supernatural operations are of a more divine order. Note second that the operation of the angel is twofold: one immanent, which remains in the angel itself, as understanding and willing, another is transient, as the motion of the heavens; and although this operation in strictness is perhaps not transient, it is nevertheless transient as to effect and virtually. Note last that immanent operation is twofold: one connatural to it, as knowledge of self and of God as author of nature, and love of self and of God; another is a free operation which can be corrupted, as knowledge and love of some particular thing.

First conclusion: the transient operation of the angel is measured by our time. This is St. Thomas's, Opusc. 36, second-to-last chapter: and it is proved by reason. Transient operation is of the same order as our operations, and is corruptible; therefore it is measured by our time. It is confirmed: such action is a true motion of an inferior order; therefore it is measured by the measure of these inferior motions.

Second conclusion: the operations of the angel connatural to it are measured by the aeon. This is St. Thomas's, Quodlib. 5, art. 7; and it is proved by reason. These operations are of the same order and account as the substance of the angel; and they are invariable and immutable as is the angel itself: therefore they are measured by the aeon, as is the angel. It is confirmed: the operation of God is measured by eternity, since it is invariable as is God; but the operation of the angel has the same immutability as the angel, as the Theologians say, below, q. 57: therefore.

Third conclusion: corruptible free operations are measured by the discrete time of the angels. It is proved: these operations are not measured by our time, since they are of a higher order; and they are not measured by eternity, nor by the aeon, since they are corruptible: therefore they are measured by the discrete time of the angels. This time regards the number of the cogitations and operations of the angels, of which we shall say more below, q. 53.

To the arguments: to the first it is said to be of the same account as the angel in something, since they stand as subject and operation; yet they are not of the same account as to immutability. To the second, it is plain from the conclusions posited. To the third, it is answered first that that opinion is not found in St. Augustine. Second it is answered that if it be found, by the name aeon is understood participated eternity.

A FOURTH DOUBT: Whether the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. Scotus in 4, d. 49, q. 6, holds that the beatific vision is measured by the aeon. And this opinion is proved. First. The beatific vision is not more perfect than the essence of the angel, for it is its accident; but the essence of the angel is measured by the aeon, and not by participated eternity: therefore neither is the beatific vision. Second. The beatific vision is not more immutable than the essence of the angel, which is measured by the aeon: therefore. The antecedent is proved: the essence of the angel is wholly immutable, for the angel is incorruptible in substance; therefore the beatific vision

is not more immutable. Third. The things measured by eternity are wholly immutable and invariable; but the beatific vision is not wholly invariable and immutable, for it is a creature that can be reduced to nothing: therefore. Fourth. The vision of St. Paul, by which he saw the divine Essence, is of the same species and order as the vision of the blessed, for it is terminated at the same object; and it comes about through the same likeness, namely the divine Essence; but Paul's vision is not measured by eternity: therefore neither is the vision of the other Blessed. The minor is proved. Paul's vision was variable and changeable, and ceases to be; therefore it is not measured by eternity. Fifth. The charity of heaven is not measured by eternity: therefore neither is the beatific vision. The consequence is plain; for charity and the beatific vision are of the same order and account. The antecedent is proved: the charity of the way and of heaven is the same in number, but the charity of the way is not measured by eternity, for it is corrupted and ceases to be; therefore the charity of heaven is not measured by eternity, otherwise the same thing in number would be measured by different measures. It is confirmed: for all supernatural goods are of the same order and account as the beatific vision; but goods of this kind are not measured by eternity, as is manifestly plain concerning Grace, Faith, Hope and Charity, which are had in this life: therefore. Last. The beatific vision has something natural, therefore it cannot be measured by eternity. The consequence is proved: for eternity measures only those things which exceed the whole of nature. The antecedent is proved: the beatific vision is a vital act proceeding from a naturally vital power; therefore it has something natural. The consequence is plain, otherwise a naturally vital power would do nothing. But the antecedent is plain. Against is the opinion of St. Thomas, to the first.

First conclusion: the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. This conclusion is proved first. The beatific vision is more immutable than the substance of the angel: therefore it is measured by a more perfect measure, and consequently is not measured by the aeon, but by participated eternity. The consequence is plain: the antecedent is proved first. Since the beatific vision proceeds from an intellect informed by the divine Essence as by an intelligible likeness: therefore from its principle it has utter immutability. Second the antecedent is proved: the essence of the angel is varied in accidents, for it receives variable accidents, although it is not varied in substance; but the beatific vision is in no way varied: therefore. Second the conclusion is proved. The beatific vision is of the divine order, and is a certain participation of the divine vision, according to 1 John 3: When he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is; but God is immutable in substance and in operation: therefore the beatific vision is wholly immutable. Third. The beatific vision is not measured by time, since it has no succession or variation; nor by the aeon, for the aeon measures those things which belong to the order of nature, but the beatific vision belongs to the supernatural order: therefore it is measured by participated eternity.

There is a difficulty, however, whether participated eternity is a measure distinct from eternity in essence. For the understanding of which let there be a second conclusion: it is more probable that participated eternity is not a measure distinct from that by which the divine To-Be is measured, although the opposite is probable. This conclusion has two parts; and for the exposition of the first, note that just as time first and per se adequately measures the most regular motion of the first movable, but secondarily and as if inadequately measures all other inferior motions: so eternity, first and per se and adequately, measures the duration of the divine To-Be and of its operation, which is most regular; but secondarily and inadequately it measures the participation of the divine To-Be and of the divine operation. From which it follows that according to this way of speaking, when we say participated eternity, that term participated does not hold itself on the side of the measure, as if there were some participated measure; but it holds itself on the side of the thing measured. Thus we mean to say that the beatific vision secondarily and participatively is measured by the eternity of God. This part, so explained, is proved; for St. Thomas and all the Theologians posit only three measures, namely time, aeon, eternity; therefore no other measure is to be posited. It is confirmed: for measures are not to be posited without necessity; but one and the same measure can measure the divine operation and the beatific vision, as we said concerning time: therefore. Second. The beatific vision is of the same order and account as the divine operation; therefore it is measured by the same measure. The consequence is good; the antecedent is proved, for it is of divine order and invariable, as is the divine operation. This part is held by St. Thomas in 4, d. 49, q. 1, art. 2, quaestiuncula 3, to 3. And Ferrara, 3 Contra Gent., ch. 61.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-tertius:liber.3/capitulum.61 The second part is explained: for just as the beatific vision is a certain participation of the divine vision, so that in me there is a vision distinct from the vision by which God sees Himself: so it must be said, according to the probable opinion, that the measure by which the divine operation is measured is one thing, and that by which the beatific vision is measured another, although it be a participation of the former. This opinion is proved: the beatific vision, although of invariable and immutable divine order, yet God and the Blessed differ in their way of having it. For God has it through essence, the creature through participation: therefore the measure by which

the beatific vision is measured is distinct from that by which God and the uncreated vision are measured.

To the first argument it is answered that the substance of the angel and its vision have no comparison between them, for they are of most diverse accounts; but things of diverse account cannot be compared. It is answered second that if they have some comparison in the account of immutability and invariability, the beatific vision is more perfect than the angel, not indeed in itself, for a substance in itself is more perfect than any accident; but it is more perfect in the account of immutability: since the beatific vision is an act proportioned to the divine nature, and the immutability of an act is taken through the order and nature to which that act is proportioned; but the divine nature in the account of immutability exceeds every creature infinitely, as in the account of being, and thus the beatific vision, since it is an act proportioned to the divine nature, exceeds the substance of the angel in immutability. Through this the reply to the second argument is plain. To the third it is answered that the things measured by eternity first and per se ought to be wholly immutable: but the things measured secondarily and participatively need not be wholly invariable, but must participate divine immutability; and of this kind is the beatific vision. To the fourth it is answered first that the vision of Paul and the vision of the other Blessed perhaps differ in species as to mode; for Paul's vision was by way of passage and disposition, but the vision of the Blessed is by way of permanence and habit. And thus they differ on this side as to immutability, and have different measures, for Paul's vision is measured by time. There is an example. The light of the sun and the light of these inferior things differ in species as to mode: since light is in the sun as a proper passion, but in inferior things it is an accident and not a proper passion, and thus the light of the sun is from its own nature incorruptible, and is measured by the aeon, as is the sun itself. But the light of these inferior things is corruptible and is measured by time. Second it is answered that the vision of Paul and of the other Blessed are of the same species, yet it does not thence follow that they are measured by the same measure, for the heavenly bodies and the inferior are of the same species, and differ only accidentally, yet the heavenly are measured by the aeon, the inferior by time; and thus Paul's vision, although it differs only accidentally from the vision of the other Blessed, is measured by time. To the fifth it is answered that although the charity of the way and of heaven are of the same species, the charity of the way is measured by time, but the charity of heaven by eternity. For supernatural acts and forms in this life are imperfect in their genus, since they have no state proportioned to them; and therefore they participate the nature of the subject in which they are, and are transmutable and corruptible on the side of the subject, not on the side of the form itself, which is incorruptible from its own nature. But in heaven, since these forms have a most perfect state proportioned to their nature, they perfect the subject and raise it to immutability, and thus are not corruptible on the side of the subject. And this is what St. Thomas said, 2-2, q. 24, art. 11, that charity in this life is corruptible on the side of the subject, and is had losably, since in this life, having no perfect state, it does not fill the whole capacity of the subject: but in heaven it has a perfect state, and therefore fills the whole capacity of the subject and is had unlosably; and thus on the way it is measured by time, but in heaven by eternity. Through this the reply to the confirmation is plain. To the last it is answered that without doubt the beatific vision, as to substance, proceeds from a naturally intrinsic principle, and has something natural admixed. For by this reason the Theologians say that supernatural acts do not effectively increase habits, since a habit is purely supernatural; but a supernatural act has something natural admixed, namely the substance of the act; for an effective cause ought to have proportion with its effect. Nevertheless the beatific vision is measured by eternity, since that admixed natural element is raised to participate divine immutability. As we said concerning the angel that sees God, which is raised to participate divine immutability.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The CONCLUSION is affirmative.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED first whether the conclusion of this article is true. It is proved that it is not. First, a measure ought to be known to him who is measured and uses it; but to a lower angel his own duration is better known than the duration of the highest angel: therefore his duration is the measure, and not the duration of the highest angel, and consequently there is not a single aevum, but many. Second, according to the probable opinion of St. Gregory, Lucifer was the highest angel; but it is absurd to say that Lucifer is the measure of the soul of Christ and of the blessed Angels: therefore. It is confirmed: the Angels who fell remained intact in their natural endowments; but Lucifer was the highest angel in natural endowments, according to that opinion: therefore he is the measure, which seems absurd. Third. A lower angel is infinite in duration: therefore he is not measurable by any measure, at least extrinsic. The consequence is plain, for the infinite is not measurable, especially by an extrinsic measure. Fourth. If aevum is placed in the highest angel, it follows that aevum is a being of reason; the consequent is false, therefore. The consequence is proved. That which can come to a subject without change of the subject is a being of reason, for a real being, if it comes, changes the subject. But if aevum is placed in the highest angel, it can come without change of the subject, for if God were now to annihilate the highest angel, the aevum will be in another angel, and yet through the mere annihilation of the other without change of itself: therefore. Likewise, if God were to create another higher one, the aevum would cease to be in the lower one, through the mere creation of the other without change of the lower one: therefore it is a being of reason. Fifth. in the same cases it follows that there is not one aevum only, but many; this is false: therefore. The consequence is proved. The aevum which was in the lower angel is identified with his duration in to-be; therefore it cannot be the same aevum as that which is now in the newly created angel, for the aevum which is now in such an angel is identified with his duration in his own to-be; but the duration of one angel in to-be and the duration of another are distinguished as thing from thing. It is confirmed and explained. The to-be of a newly created angel and the to-be of the angel who was previously highest are distinguished as thing from thing: therefore the durations in to-be are distinguished as thing from thing: therefore they cannot be identified with one aevum.

On account of these arguments Durandus in 2, d. 2, q. 5, holds that there is not one aevum only, but there are as many aeva as there are angels. Aegidius Romanus holds the same opinion, and Capreolus reports it in the same distinction and question. Nevertheless the conclusion of St. Thomas is most certain, and is that of all the Theologians. And it is proved by reason. First, in each genus there is a cause and measure of the rest, as Aristotle teaches in 10 Metaph., text 2: but the highest angel is first in that genus: therefore he is the measure of all the others. It is confirmed: the highest angel is the simplest and most uniform in duration and operation: therefore he is the measure of the others. The consequence is plain: for a measure is reduced to unity. Second, the motion of the first movable is the measure of the rest, since it is most regular and most uniform; but the highest angel is most regular and has the greatest uniformity: therefore.

To the first argument it is answered that for the character of a measure it suffices that it be better known according to its own nature, but it need not be better known to him who uses it. For as far as we are concerned, the motions of these lower bodies are better known than the motion of the first movable; and yet the motion of the first movable is our measure. It suffices, therefore, for the character of a measure that it be known to him who uses it, and that it be the most perfect rule in that genus, in relation to which the perfection of the others is derived. To the second it is said that Lucifer, although he remained intact in natural endowments, yet was in some way changed in them through sin, because he is affected by sin. And thus the Saints say that he did not remain as regular and uniform and invariable as before. Second, it is said that if before the aevum was in the sinning Angel, I judge that after the sin it remained in him, for uniformity in duration was not changed through sin; but he remained as uniform in to-be as before. Likewise, he was the highest species of the Angels, and through sin the species was not taken away: therefore he remained the measure of the others in to-be. It is confirmed. Man, although he has sin, is always the measure of the other animals, since he is the most perfect species: therefore the same will hold of the highest Angel. Nor is it unfitting to say that Lucifer is the measure of the soul of Christ and of the other blessed Angels, as regards duration in natural to-be. And through this the answer to the confirmation is plain. To the third it is answered that even if an Angel is infinite in duration, he can be measured by a measure which has infinity; but whether that measure is intrinsic or extrinsic is irrelevant. To the fourth it is said that there are some beings of so slight an entity, especially relative ones, which can come to a subject and cease to be in a subject without change of the subject through relation to something extrinsic; just as the same external act is called good and bad through relation to an extrinsic law, without change of the act itself, so it is to be said of aevum. To the last, I say first that this is not against the conclusion of St. Thomas, for St. Thomas only says that there is only a single aevum, and it is always true that there is a single aevum; for even if a more perfect angel is created, there will be only a single aevum in him. Second, it is answered that it is probable that if God were to create another higher angel, or annihilate the highest, the same aevum would always remain. For that variation would be material, not formal, because the formal subject of aevum is the most regular and most uniform to-be: but this always remains the subject of aevum, though it is varied materially, since this most uniform to-be is now in one angel, afterwards in another. Just as the same place in number exists whether it has the surface of water or of air: since that variation of surfaces is material, not formal, and the same formal subject always remains, namely the surface at such a distance; and just as it is not unfitting that the same place in number be identified now with the surface of water, and afterwards with the surface of air, so it is not unfitting that the same aevum in number be identified now with the to-be of one angel, and afterwards with the to-be of another. And through this the answer to the confirmation is plain.