Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative, which St. Thomas proves by a threefold demonstration: the first proceeds from the fact that He is pure act; the second from the fact that He is not composite; the third from the fact that He is infinitely perfect.

COMMENTARY.

Note that the conclusion is certain in faith; Mal. 3: I am God and I am not changed; James 1: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration. And it is defined in the chapter Firmiter, On the Most High Trinity. And the arguments of St. Thomas are natural demonstrations.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: God alone is altogether immutable.

Second conclusion: All creatures can be changed as to to-be, not through a power which is in themselves, but through the divine power alone, through which they were produced.

Third conclusion: All generable and corruptible things are mutable through a passive power which is in them, both according to substantial and according to accidental to-be. Fourth conclusion: The heavenly bodies are not mutable according to substantial to-be, but according to local to-be.

Fifth conclusion: Incorporeal substances have no intrinsic power toward non-to-be. The ground is: because they themselves are subsistent forms, which although they stand toward their own to-be as potency to act, yet do not admit together with themselves the privation of such an act of being.

Last conclusion: in incorporeal substances a twofold mutability is found, one according as they are in potency toward an end, namely supernatural beatitude, another according to place.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE first in this article, that the second conclusion is understood of to-be speaking absolutely, not of such, or so limited, a to-be: for in that way it is not repugnant that many creatures have an intrinsic power toward non-to-be, as the third conclusion says.

Note second, that when St. Thomas says in the third conclusion that in lower bodies there is mutability according to substantial to-be, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the to-be itself be the substance of the thing, or a part of the substance. In another way, that substantial to-be be called the to-be of existence which is received in the substance. In the prior way it cannot be taken for the to-be of existence itself, because that cannot be a substance, nor a part of a substance, since no creature exists through its own essence; but the third conclusion can be verified according to specific to-be, which is formally from the substantial form; and with this sense the ground of St. Thomas agrees: because (he says) their matter can be with the privation of their substantial form. Nevertheless, if to-be be taken for the to-be of existence, which is received in the substance with the limitation of species and individual, the same third conclusion will also be able to be verified. For even through generation and corruption change comes to be according to that to-be, inasmuch as it is so limited through the substantial and individual form.

Note third, that when St. Thomas says in the fourth conclusion that to-be follows upon form, this can likewise be understood in two ways. In one way, of specific to-be; and thus it is true that to-be follows upon form, just as to be white is the formal effect of whiteness. In another way, of the to-be of existence; and thus it follows upon no created form, speaking absolutely, except as to limitation: and thus the teaching of the fourth conclusion can be verified, and its ground, which says that nothing is corrupted except through this, that it loses its form, namely, in which the to-be of existence itself, limited, is received. Whence it is gathered that subsistent forms, such as angels are, have no intrinsic power toward non-to-be, because they cannot lose their form, since it is not in any subject which could remain with the privation of the form. But to-be itself cannot immediately and of itself be lost and cease, except through annihilation, which is in the active power of God alone, just as when to-be is produced immediately and of itself: therefore there is no power in angels toward non-to-be.

There is a DOUBT: whether an angel or the rational soul, from their own nature, lack power toward non-to-be? And it seems not. First, because in the 6th general Synod of Constantinople, Sess. 11, Epistle of Sophronius, which is approved by the Council in action 15, it is said that an angel and the rational soul have immortality not through their own nature, but through the grace of God. It is confirmed from 1 Tim. 6: Who alone hath immortality, namely, God alone, from His own nature, is immortal.

Second. To every active power there corresponds some passive power, as Arist. teaches, 9 Metaph.; but God has active power to change angels from to-be to non-to-be: therefore in angels there is found an intrinsic passive power toward such a change.

Third. If an angel from its own nature is immortal, it follows that through no power can it be annihilated: the consequent is false, therefore. The consequence is proved: for what belongs to a thing through its own nature cannot be separated by any power: e.g. because it belongs naturally to man to be discursive, it cannot even through the divine power be non-discursive. It is confirmed: for Arist. 10 Metaph., text 26, teaches that corruptible and incorruptible are essential differences of things: but what is essential cannot be separated from anything; therefore what from its own nature is incorruptible cannot lose to-be.

Fourth. From the ground of St. Thomas, in which it is presupposed that to-be follows upon form, it follows that this proposition, an angel exists, is per se and necessary; therefore through no power will its contradictory be able to be verified, namely no angel exists.

Concerning this difficulty the Parisian Doctors reprehend St. Thomas. For they think that he asserts there to be some being, simply necessary, besides God. But for the understanding of the question, note first, that we can speak of natural things in two ways. In one way according to natural power and with respect to natural causes. In another way with respect to the divine and absolute Power. And certainly St. Thomas, when here he asserts that some substances are immutable as to to-be, speaks in the first way, but not in the second way. And this is what Cajetan says, here, that those things are immutable according to physical power, but not according to logical power. Note second, that, since the theological office is chiefly engaged about the consideration of the divine and supernatural Power, often the Theologians say that some things are mutable according to the to-be of substance, which nevertheless the natural Philosophers, considering the strength of natural causes, say to be altogether immutable and necessary as to the to-be of substance. Just as they also say it to be impossible that a virgin give birth, namely, according to the course of nature; of which nevertheless the Theologian asserts the opposite: yet each says what is true, according to the proper cause which he considers. These things being posited, the opinion of St. Thomas is most true, because he speaks of natural power; and the opposite does not seem to us safe enough in faith. It is proved: because in the Lateran Council under Leo X, Session 8, it is defined that the rational soul is incorruptible: and certainly the Council seems to speak of the proper nature of the soul. It is confirmed: the motion of heaven cannot cease to be except through miracle on the day of Judgment; therefore it is perpetual from its own nature. Second. An angel and the rational soul and heaven cannot cease to be through corruption properly so called, nor through any other change: therefore they have incorruptibility from their own nature. The consequence is good. The antecedent, as to the first part, is proved. Corruption is when form is separated from matter: but in an angel and the rational soul there is no matter, but they are forms subsisting of themselves; but the heavens, although they have matter, that matter has no inclination toward another form, because that form fills the capacity of it; therefore. The second part is proved in the angel and the soul, for to-be follows necessarily upon form; therefore to-be is inseparable from form. Lastly it is proved by the ground which is gathered from Cajetan, here. No thing has power and inclination toward non-to-be, unless it have power and inclination toward another to-be with which the to-be which it now has is not compatible; but an angel, the rational soul, and the heavens have no inclination toward another to-be; therefore neither do they have power toward non-to-be. The major is proved: because there is no power, nor inclination, in the nature of things toward evil; but non-to-be is evil; therefore there is no power toward it. To the first argument it is said that angels are incorruptible through nature:

but the definition of the Council is against some who asserted that an angel, in its to-be which it has and in which it is conserved, does not depend on the divine will. But the Council defines that even angels, in their to-be, depend on the divine concurrence: which concurrence indeed pertains to the order of nature. Yet it is called grace in the Council itself, because that concurrence is voluntary and from the divine Will. To the confirmation, it is answered that God alone has immortality from Himself, independently of another, just as He alone has Goodness, as is said Luke 18: for through His own essence He is being and existent and good. But an angel has immortality not from itself, but from God, and dependently.

To the second it is answered that that maxim is false: for in God there was active power to create the world before its creation, and yet there was no passive power. And so, now there is active power in God to annihilate an angel, and no passive power corresponds, except perhaps obediential, which is a supernatural power, as Cajetan teaches, 1 p., art. 1. It is true that in natural agents a passive power corresponds, because the agent itself is engaged about determinate matter.

To the third, I deny the consequence: but only this follows, that an angel cannot be corrupted through nature, or through natural and ordinary power: for what belongs to something through its own nature cannot be separated from it, just as rationality from man. But an angel is incorruptible through nature, not through something positive, but because in itself it has not whence it may be corrupted. To the confirmation it is answered that incorruptible and corruptible are essential conditions of things: but corruption or non-corruption is not an essential condition of things, because these regard to-be, which belongs contingently to created things. Thus God can conserve for infinite time what from its own nature is corruptible; but what from its own nature is incorruptible He can annihilate; yet He cannot make that what from its own nature is corruptible be, with the same adjunct, incorruptible from its own nature, nor the converse.

To the fourth it is answered that this predication, an angel exists, is not necessary and per se, speaking absolutely, but from supposition, supposing that the angel has been created: for with that supposed, an angel cannot cease to be through nature: for it has no cause of its own corruption.