Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: It must be that God is in all things, and intimately.

SECOND conclusion, in the solution to the third: Things are said to stand distant from God through unlikeness of nature or grace: and in this way humanity stands distant from the Divinity of Christ infinitely.

THIRD conclusion, to the fourth: It is not to be granted without qualification that God is in demons, but with a qualification, as they are certain things. The reason is: because this name, demon, imports according to use the deformity of fault.

COMMENTARY.

The principal CONCLUSION of this article is Catholic, and is asserted by all the Scholastics in 1, dist. 37; and by all the holy Doctors, whose testimonies see there, in the Master; especially see Augustine, lib. 1 Confes., c. 2 and 3. And the conclusion is proved from Scripture, Jerem. 23: "Do I not fill heaven and earth"; Wis. 1: "The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world, and that which containeth all things hath knowledge of the voice". And most of all in Psal. 138: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy face? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there: if I descend into hell, thou art present", etc. And in Acts 17 Paul says of God himself: "He is not far from every one of us, for in him we live, and move, and are". And the conclusion is proved by reason: because God according to faith and natural reason is immutable; therefore he is in all created things. The consequence is proved: for God can be in some creature which already is; therefore if now he is not in it, he will be mutable. It is confirmed: God according to natural reason is infinite through essence, as we have proved; therefore he is in all things according to his essence. The consequence is proved: because if the Divine Essence is not everywhere, and is somewhere, it will not be infinite; therefore either it must be denied that God can be in some creature, or granted that he is in all: see more reasons in St. Thomas, lib. 3 Cont. Gent., c. 68. But the strongest reason is that which St. Thomas uses in this article.

There is a DOUBT, for the explanation of the conclusion of St. Thomas, whether such a reason is sufficient? It is argued for the negative side. First, God can operate where he is not; therefore the consequence is not good in which it is gathered that God is in all things because he operates in all things. The antecedent is proved: because God could now produce an Angel outside the whole Universe, where there is utterly nothing; therefore God will operate where he is not.

Second, the Will of God stands equally to the near and the remote; but for God to operate is nothing other than for God to will that something be: therefore for God to operate stands to the remote as to the near.

Third, it is prior that a creature be produced by God than that God be present in it: therefore God produces it by producing it, and not by being present to it. The consequence is proved: because what is prior does not depend on the posterior; therefore it will be able to be without it.

Fourth, it is not necessary that natural agents be present in their effects, but it suffices that they be present according to power, or that they touch one another according to conjunction of quantity; e.g. the sun by its own power produces an effect in the bowels of the earth, where it is not according to substance. Likewise fire acts upon wood, in which it is not according to substance, but is near to it; therefore from the fact that God operates intimately in all things, it is not sufficiently gathered that he is in them through his substance.

Fifth, God does not operate in all things with immediacy of supposit; therefore he is not in all things according to substance. Many of the Thomists grant the antecedent. And it is proved; because God produces man by means of man, which is a particular agent, to which the effect is assimilated univocally; therefore in the production of man the immediate operating supposit is another man, and consequently God does not operate with immediacy of supposit, nor will he be immediately in the effect through his essence, since in God supposit and nature are not distinguished.

Sixth, the to-be of things is not the proper effect of God, such that universally, without a mediating cause, God is the cause of the to-be of every thing; therefore it does not follow from this that God is intimately in every thing, immediately. The antecedent is proved first, because the form of a thing is what gives to-be to the thing; second, because a particular agent is the efficient cause of a particular effect, that it be; e.g.: fire makes this fire be, since it generates this fire: therefore God alone is not the cause of the to-be of every thing through himself. In this difficulty Scotus in 1, dist. 37, q. unica, although he agrees in the conclusion, nevertheless denies the sufficiency of the reason of St. Thomas on account of some of the aforesaid arguments. And John of Bassolis affirms in the same place that it cannot be proved by natural reason that God is in all things, but is only confirmed by authorities. But let the conclusion be certain: it is sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason that God is in all things. It is proved from that Psalm, above: "For thither thy hand shall lead me: and thy right hand shall hold me"; where the Prophet renders the reason why he cannot flee and stand distant from God, from the divine operation concerning himself. Likewise in Acts 17 the Apostle concludes by the same reason that God is not far from every one of us, because in him we live, and move, and are. Indeed also the holy Doctors, in the distinction cited in the Master, use the same reason to assert that God is everywhere. See especially Ambr. lib. 1 De Spiritu sancto, c. 7; and Hilar. bk. 8 De Trinit.

For the solution of the arguments, note first that, as far as natural agents go, it is not always necessary that the agent be present, according to substance, in every thing in which it operates, but it suffices that it be present according to power; e.g. for the sun it suffices to be virtually present in the minerals produced in the bowels of the earth; nevertheless in that thing in which it immediately produces the effect, the agent must be present to it according to its own substance; just as the sun according to its substance is immediately present to the orb which it immediately illuminates. Note second that just as in corporeal things a corporeal agent becomes present to the patient itself and to the effect through contact of its own quantity, so a spiritual agent becomes present to the patient through virtual contact, or through application of its own power. There is nevertheless a difference between spiritual and corporeal agents, that the latter through conjunction of quantity are present to that in which they act; yet they are not said to be in it, because the quantity of one body is not within another body. But spiritual agents, through virtual contact, are present to the subject in which they immediately act, so that they are in it, just as an angel is said to be in the heavenly orb which it moves. The reason of this is that the contact of spiritual power is within, where the effect is. But the power itself either is in the spiritual substance as in a subject, or is the very essence and substance of God acting; therefore where such power shall be, there will also be the substance of the agent.

To the arguments it is answered. To the first, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I grant the antecedent, and I deny the consequence, if the consequent be understood in the composite sense, namely, that God operate something, and not be in that which he operates. For by the very fact that the thing operated begins to be, at once God is in it; yet God will well be able to operate where now he is not.

To the second it is answered that with respect to God nothing is remote, as to that which is God's being in it, as St. Thomas explains, to the third. For it does not pertain to the perfection of a natural agent in operating that it act upon something distant without acting upon the medium. But it is of greater power that the agent act intimately in all things, and exist in them, according to that Wis. 7: "For she reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity, that is, simplicity"; and ch. 8: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly".

To the third, which is that of Scotus, above, it is answered first, I deny the antecedent: indeed the reason why God is present to his creature is that he gives to-be and conserves it. Second it is answered, I deny the consequence. To the proof it is said that there are some posterior things which necessarily follow from prior things, although the prior things do not depend on the posterior; e.g. the aid of God is prior to the motion of free choice, nor does it depend on free choice, and yet the motion of free choice necessarily follows from such aid, with the necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent. And as to the concept of the creature, I deny the consequence: because natural agents on account of their materiality and imperfection sometimes need to operate by certain media, nor can they glide within the patient, although they touch it in quantity, but through one part of the patient they move another; e.g. fire heats the more remote parts of the fire, the nearer mediating; but because God intimately produces and conserves the to-be of the thing by himself alone, it is well gathered that he is intimately in all things.

To the fifth, I deny the antecedent, speaking simply. To the proof it is said, I deny the consequence. For although man is the immediate supposit with respect to other natural and universal agents, nevertheless with respect to God he is not immediate; but God himself is innermost and more immediate, according to his substance, in every effect: because God is the cause of the whole being and of the to-be itself, with respect to which God alone is the efficient and conserving cause.

But for the fuller understanding of the difficulty, and for the solution to the sixth argument, it is worthwhile to report the various opinions of the Thomists in the explanation of this point. Ferrara, lib. 3 Cont. Gent., c. 70, thinks it is gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas there, to the first argument, that it is not unfitting that the same effect be immediate from each, namely from God and from the lower agent, though in one and another way. From God indeed, with immediacy of power; but from the lower agent, with immediacy of supposit. And this opinion seems to be that of St. Thomas, there. For he says that in any agent there are two things to consider, namely, the thing itself which acts, and the power by which it acts, just as fire heats through heat. But the power of the lower agent depends on the power of the superior agent, inasmuch as the superior agent gives the very power to the lower agent, through which it acts, or conserves it, or applies it. It must be, therefore, that the action of the lower agent be from it through its own power and through the power of all superior agents: for it acts in the power of all; and just as the lowest agent is found immediate as active, so the power of the first agent is found immediate for producing the effect, because of itself it is productive of the effect. Thus far St. Thomas.

Cajetan, however, seems to proceed by a middle way. For he says in this article that the conclusion of St. Thomas is not understood of immediacy of power alone, but of God himself according to himself, so that he is in all things acting immediately suppositively, that is, as proximate and nearest suppositively, so that between God and any thing no supposit acting upon it mediates. He says second that that dictum of St. Thomas — namely, created to-be is the proper effect of God — can be understood in two ways. In one way, that "proper" be said in the sense of nature as against the common: and thus the sense is that there is one effect coming from God alone, excluding every mediating efficient cause. In another way, that "proper" be taken as it is distinguished as against the alien; but "alien" in the present matter denotes every to-be which is in a thing through another, even if it be in it through itself: and thus "proper" signifies the same as through itself primarily. And in this second sense St. Thomas understands it; but not in the first. He says third that to-be is the proper, or through-itself-primarily, effect of God, because God alone can do all things which are required for something to be. Whence he gathers that, since every thing is material or immaterial, if it is material, matter is required for its to-be, which is created and conserved by God alone; but if it be immaterial, it is totally from God alone; whence it is clear that in every thing there is something produced and conserved by God alone, proximately and immediately, with immediacy of supposit; and therefore God is called an agent more immediate even as to supposit. For in material things, at least, God alone produces and conserves matter itself. For it is not needful that God, acting more immediately, omit all things, but it suffices that it be something. He says finally, concerning the solution to the third, that to educe form from the potency of matter does not make the agent immediate with immediacy of supposit, but immediate with immediacy of power.

This opinion, however, pleases us. And indeed here Cajetan argues against the opinion of Ferrara. First, because if God were not the proximate agent moving all things, St. Thomas would not rightly subsume under that major, every agent is conjoined to that in which it immediately acts; therefore St. Thomas understands himself to speak of God as the agent according to himself existing in things, and not according to power. Likewise Cajetan argues. Because from immediacy of power alone the conclusion of St. Thomas is not inferred, namely, that God according to himself is in all things. For the sun also operates with immediacy of power, than does fire, and yet according to itself it is not immediate in the effect. Nevertheless we say that consequence to be materially good, namely speaking of God himself. And the reason is: because the power of God for acting is his very substance; therefore if he acts immediately with immediacy of power, he will also operate with immediacy of his own substance. Besides, the words of St. Thomas cited for the opinion of Ferrara do not stand in the way, namely, that the same effect is immediate from each, though in one and another way. For the mode by which God concurs with immediacy of power does not exclude that he concur with immediacy of supposit: indeed, because the immediately concurring power is God himself, it is gathered that God concurs immediately according to himself. It is confirmed: because if immediate concurrence excluded the mediate concurrence of another thing, God would not concur with immediacy of power for effecting heat when he concurs through the medium of fire; therefore just as the mediating power of fire does not exclude the immediacy of the power of God, so neither does the mediating supposit of fire exclude the immediacy of the supposit of God, as we shall explain in the resolution of the question.

But now, against Cajetan it is proved that God alone is the cause of the to-be of all things, both material and immaterial; not only insofar as the to-be itself belongs to matter, but also insofar as it belongs to form, and to the whole subsisting composite. And indeed concerning immaterial things, Cajetan himself confesses that God alone is the cause of to-be, as to all things. But concerning material things it is proved, because the to-be of material things does not belong immediately to matter, for it is not created or conserved through itself by God, as St. Thomas teaches 1 p., q. 45, art. 4. But it belongs first to the form, or to the whole composite; therefore when fire is generated it cannot be said that God alone is the efficient cause of the to-be of matter, and not of the to-be itself of the form, or of the composite: since there is a single to-be which is received first in the composite, or in the form, than in matter. For properly, created things are subsistents, as St. Thomas says above. Likewise from the opinion of Caiet. it follows that God is not intimately in the lion as he is in the angel. The sequel is proved. Since according to Caiet. he does not operate so intimately and immediately in the lion while it is generated and conserved as in the angel while it is created and conserved: since in the lion he is immediately the efficient cause of matter alone, with immediacy of supposit; but in the angel he is totally the efficient cause, in each way with immediacy of power and of supposit: therefore he does not exist so intimately in the lion as in the angel. The consequence is proved: because for God the reason of existing in things is operation itself. For St. Thomas proves from this that he is intimately in things, because he operates intimately the very to-be of things. It must be said, therefore, that the difference which St. Thomas assigns between God acting immediately and a lower agent acting immediately, with respect to the same effect, consists in this, that the lower agent concurs immediately only with immediacy of supposit, but God concurs in this way, and also with immediacy of his own power: indeed, with every immediacy of supposit, because with immediacy of his own power; for his power is his substance and supposit. And if anyone should object: How can two agents be immediate, with immediacy of supposit? It is answered, because each is united of itself, in its own way, to the immediate effect; e.g. body is united to body by its quantity, but spirit by its operative power; indeed even two spirits can act immediately, with immediacy of supposit, especially if they are subordinated: e.g. the Angel moving the orb, and God, are in the moved orb immediately, with immediacy of supposit; but the angel with respect to God effects nothing immediately with immediacy of power, because it moves in the power of God. From which it follows that, speaking simply, God alone acts with immediacy of power, but other agents are said to act immediately with immediacy of power with respect to this or that other agent, and not with respect to all agents. With these supposed, to the sixth it is answered, I deny the antecedent, if we speak of to-be absolutely insofar as it is to-be, not insofar as it is such, or so limited to species or individual. To the first proof of that antecedent, I deny that form through itself is the formal cause of to-be, that is, of existing; otherwise substance through its essence would be, namely through a part of the essence, which is form. Likewise, I deny that from the substantial form itself the to-be itself flows secondarily as a secondary formal effect; for this implies a contradiction, as has been proved above. Because for the substantial form to be the root of to-be, it would have had to be something more perfect than the to-be flowing forth, which is impossible: because to-be is the first actuality of every form, and every created form and essence stands with respect to to-be as potency with respect to act; therefore it cannot be more perfect than the to-be itself, but will only be capable of the to-be itself, as is matter with respect to form. It is true, however, that after the form is understood to be actuated by the to-be itself, it communicates it to the matter of which it is the form; but to the form itself, apart from the rational soul which comes to be through creation, to-be is communicated from the supposit, which is the receiver of to-be as first subsisting. To the second proof it is answered that no agent, besides God, is the cause of to-be itself, according as to-be is the actuality of being insofar as being. It is proved: because the becoming of being, insofar as being, cannot be except from non-being simply, which God alone can do. It must be said, therefore, that God alone is the efficient cause of being insofar as being, because he alone from nothing makes and conserves being insofar as being. But a particular agent effects such being, indeed it effects this being from not-this-being. And note that in the way in which created agents concur to the to-be received in the form, or composite, namely, by determining it to this to-be in this species, so they concur to the to-be which is received in matter here and now as limited by this form. And the reason is: because in the individual substance there is only one to-be of existence, which actuates the form and the matter and the whole composite. But if anyone should object that at least as to that determination and limitation of the to-be itself, it follows that God does not concur so immediately as to to-be simply. The consequence is proved, because he concurs through the mediating efficient second cause. It is answered, I deny the consequence: because the account of the concurrence of God for causing to-be is more immaterial and simpler than every other account of a lower agent. Whence it reaches to every determination of the effect, more intimately than any other efficient cause.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: God is in place, as in all other things, giving it to-be and locative power. Second conclusion: God is in place insofar as He fills place, yet not as a body. Third conclusion, to the third: As the soul is whole in any part of the body, so the whole God is in all things and in each one, with totality of essence.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE that the first conclusion, if understood of true and real places, is certain according to faith, as is clear from the testimonies adduced in art. 1. The second conclusion, however, is not to be so understood as though God filled place circumscriptively or definitively, but He is said to fill place causally, not only because He gives to-be to place, and locative power, but also because He gives to-be to all things contained in place, existing in them and making them to be contained by place.

THERE IS A DOUBT, however: Whether God should be said to be outside the universe, in imaginary places. And it seems so. A spiritual substance is said to be in a place when it so has its operative power applied that without change of itself it can operate, although in act it does not operate; but God so has His power outside the whole world that without change of Himself He can operate there; therefore He is there.

It is argued second. If God is not outside the whole world, it follows that He is in the whole world definitively, as the soul is in the whole body. The consequence is proved: because the existence of God does not extend beyond the world, if He is not outside the world.

It is argued third. If God is not outside the whole universe, it follows that if God moved the whole universe to another imaginary place, upward or downward, God Himself would be moved accidentally, at the motion of the universe. The consequence is proved: because through that motion of the universe God would be in another place, and would have departed from the place in which He was before; the consequent is false; therefore.

Fourth. God is said to have been before all time, and outside all time; therefore He should be said to be outside every place.

Fifth. From Sacred Scripture it is gathered that God is not comprehended by the whole fabric of creatures, according to that text of 3 Kings 8: «For if heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much more this house which I have built for Thee?» And St. Augustine seems to hold thus, Conf. 1, chs. 2 and 3; and book 7, ch. 5, where he contemplates God Himself as an infinite sea, within which is a sponge penetrated by the water of the sea, to which sponge the whole world is compared; therefore God is outside the whole world, as that sea would be outside the sponge. And in book 11 De Civit., ch. 5, he seems to hold the same. Cajetan follows the same opinion on that text of John 12: «I am come a light into the world.»

But on the opposite side: no creature is outside heaven; but God is not in nothing; therefore He is not outside heaven. It is confirmed. Before God made the world He was nowhere, because there was nothing where He might be; therefore, by equal reasoning, now too He is not outside the world, because there is nothing outside the world where He might be. Second. God is not in possible creatures; therefore much less will He be said to be in imaginary ones. On this doubt Alexander of Hales, 1. p., q. 9., memb. 5; Scotus, q. unica; St. Bonaventure, Capreolus, in 1., dist. 37, say that in act God is only in true places; in imaginary ones, however, He is in potency, not in act. To us, however, two things seem to need saying. Hence let the first conclusion be: God is not in act in a place outside heaven. It is proved: because there is no place outside heaven. Again it is proved: because outside heaven He is not through essence, presence, and power; therefore in no way is He there. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, art. 3 of this question, from the definition of these three modes, none of which is verified of God outside the universe. Second conclusion: God is outside heaven, but not in anything other than in Himself, as He was from eternity; and as He is said to be before the world, so is He outside the world. This conclusion needs explanation rather than proof; for the particle, outside, can be taken in two ways: in one way, as marking something real outside the world where God is; and in this way God is not outside the world. In the other way outside can be taken for what is not within in a limited way: and thus God is outside the universe, because He exceeds it: for the operative power of God is not limited to this universe. And this we grant, as to the arguments made for the affirmative side. For the first argument does not prove that God has His operative power applied outside the world. The second argument, however, is easily solved: for not dif-

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: God is in the rational creature in a special mode, through grace. Second conclusion: In other created things, God is through essence, presence, and power. Through essence indeed, inasmuch as He is to all things the cause of to-be: through presence truly, inasmuch as all things are present to His eyes: through power moreover, inasmuch as all things are subjected to the divine power. Third conclusion, to the fourth: There is another singular mode of God being in man, through union, namely hypostatic, which is treated in 3. p., q. 2.

COMMENTARY.

CONCERNING the first conclusion note that it is certain according to faith, according to that text of John 15: «Remain in me, and I in you. And that text: «He who remains in charity, remains in God, and God in him». And Luke 2: «Simeon just and God-fearing, and the Holy Spirit was in him». From these testimonies and many others, the Holy Fathers, as Augustine Epist. 28, Bernard on the Gospel, The angel was sent, on those words, The Lord be with thee; and the Scholastics in 1., d. 37, explain this special mode by which God is in the just through this, that God works in them grace and the virtues, raising them to fellowship of the divine nature. But St. Thomas here seems to explain this mode of existing, as it were through this, that just men tend toward God Himself through knowledge and desire of God Himself, which is an effect of grace.

NOTE moreover that the second conclusion is held certain according to faith from the testimonies cited, in art. 1, and from the common opinion of the Saints and of the Scholastics in 1. Sent., dicit. 27; which conclusion Cajetan explains here excellently.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion is: To be everywhere primarily and of itself belongs to God, and is proper to Him. The ground is: because wherever places may be posited, it must be that God is in each, not according to part, but according to Himself.

COMMENTARY.

NOTE concerning the conclusion, that to be everywhere does not so belong to God of itself primarily as to belong to Him necessarily, speaking absolutely; for before He made the world, He was not everywhere. But it belongs to God upon a supposition, supposing that the world exists: or otherwise, that to have the power of existing everywhere however much places be multiplied, belongs to God of itself primarily and absolutely.