Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: God is infinite and perfect. The ground is that the most formal of all is to-be itself; but God is subsistent to-be itself, not received in anything; therefore.

COMMENTARY.

THIS GROUND of St. Thomas rests on this: that although matter and form mutually limit each other, matter is perfected when it is limited by form; but form, when it is limited by matter, is not perfected — its amplitude, rather, is constricted. Hence it follows that the infinite on the side of form has the character of the perfect, while the infinite on the side of matter has the character of the imperfect. From this, then, the force of St. Thomas's ground becomes manifest, subsuming under the aforesaid foundation thus: the infinite on the side of to-be itself is the infinite on the side of the most sovereign form and actuality; therefore, if God is to-be itself, not received nor limited, He will be infinite and perfect. Cajetan, in his exposition of this article, says some subtle and obscure things; but all will be explained in settling the doubt that follows.

IT IS DOUBTED, then, whether the conclusion of St. Thomas is true. For the negative side it is argued, first: the infinite is taken either privatively or negatively; but in neither way does it befit God; therefore the conclusion is false. The minor is proved: for the infinite taken privatively expresses imperfection — namely, that something be apt to be limited and yet not be limited. Taken negatively, however, it expresses no perfection; therefore it is not a divine attribute.

Second. If God is infinite in essential perfection, it follows that all creatures are equal in perfection; but this is false; therefore. The consequence is proved: for the greater or lesser perfection of creatures is gauged by greater or lesser distance from God; but if God is infinitely perfect, no creature is more distant than another. The consequence is proved: for an infinite distance is not greater in one case than in another; and consequently all creatures are equally distant and equally perfect.

Third. If by any ground God were shown to be infinite, it would above all be by St. Thomas's ground; but it is insufficient; therefore. The minor is proved: for that ground presupposes that form is limited by matter; but this is false; therefore. The minor is proved: for every form is finite in itself as pre-understood before comparison to matter; therefore it is not limited by matter. This is the argument of Scotus in Book 1, d. 2, q. 1. It is confirmed, for from that foundation it would follow that immaterial forms, such as the angelic ones, would be infinite. The consequence is proved: for they are not received in matter, neither physical nor metaphysical, since the essence of an angel is receptive of its own to-be rather than itself received.

Fourth, against what is said in the foundation of the ground — that form is not perfected by being received in matter — this seems false, for every form receivable in matter strives to preserve itself in matter; therefore its perfection is to be in matter. And this ground also holds for the rational soul, which, when it is outside the body, desires to be reunited to the body. It is confirmed: for such forms need matter to exercise the proper operations of their species, and likewise the rational soul, which has its understanding through abstraction of likenesses from matter. Let the first conclusion be certain according to faith: God is infinite in His most perfect substance and essence. It is proved from Baruch, ch. 3: «The Lord is great and has no end, lofty and immense». And Ps. 144: «Great is the Lord and highly to be praised... etc.».

Second conclusion: This truth belongs to faith in such a way that it can be demonstrated by natural reason. This is against Augustine Niphus in the question On the Infinity of the First Mover, where he says that it can be persuaded by probable grounds that God is infinite; he denies, however, that it can be proved by an efficacious ground. His opinion is utterly false, and against all the theologians in Book 1, d. 23; and hence it seems reckless to us. For it is reckless in a grave matter, without a fitting ground, to depart from the common opinion of the Scholastics. And it is argued against that opinion. For according to faith it is certain that God can be demonstrated to exist, following Rom. 1, «For the invisible things of Him,» etc.; therefore it can also be demonstrated «that God is infinite.» The consequence is clear: for to assert that God exists, and is finite, is a contradiction. For if He is finite, He is limited by something else, nor will He be pure act. The consequence is clear: for the more potentiality a thing has, the more imperfect it is, and the less potentiality it has, the more perfect it is, as is plain by induction running from the lowest creature up to the highest angel; therefore what lacks all potentiality, since it is pure act, must necessarily be infinitely perfect.

Second, God is outside every genus; therefore He is infinite. The antecedent is proved above, q. 3. The consequence is proved: for what is not enclosed within the substantial bounds of any genus must necessarily be infinite in substance.

Third, God produced things from nothing; therefore He is infinite. The antecedent is of faith, as is plain from the chapter Firmiter. The consequence is shown below by St. Thomas, q. 45, art. 5: for the less potency there is in the recipient for receiving the agent's form, the greater the power required in the agent; but in creation no potency at all is presupposed in the recipient; therefore creation requires infinite power in the Creator. The consequence is clear: for there is no proportion between no potency and some potency, such as the finite power of an agent presupposes in the recipient; therefore there will be no proportion between an agent acting from no potency and an agent acting from some potency of the recipient.

Fourth, whatever species of things has been produced, God can still produce a more perfect one; therefore He Himself is infinite in essential perfection. The consequence is proved: for it is not intelligible that an agent of finite perfection in itself could without end produce a more and more perfect effect. The fifth ground, and the most powerful, is the one St. Thomas gives in this article, which proceeds from that foundation: that God is by His essence His own to-be, not received in anything. But since this ground is not penetrated by all, the arguments to the contrary must be answered.

To the first it is said that the infinite, as attributed to God, is taken negatively; and although a negation, speaking formally and absolutely, is not a perfection, still certain negations are said of God which fundamentally presuppose the greatest perfection in Him — such as that He is immutable, incomprehensible to a created intellect, etc. And in this way, for God to be infinite is the greatest perfection.

To the second, Gregory answers in Book 1 of the Sentences, d. 45, q. 2, that the perfection of created things is not gauged by approach to the highest when it is infinitely perfect, but is gauged by the greater or lesser participation derived from that highest. It is answered, second, from Cajetan in the treatise On the Infinity of God, that if something is infinite in every respect, then one infinite is not greater than another. If, however, there is an infinite in one respect that in another respect is finite, it can well be greater or lesser in the respect in which it is finite. For the distance between God and creature is infinite in one respect — namely, on God's side — while on the creature's side the distance is finite; hence it can be greater or lesser. On which account one creature is nearer to God than another. Just as, if time had been from eternity, today would be more distant from eternity than yesterday.

Third, it is answered, and better, that the perfection of creatures is gauged by something intrinsic by which they are likened to God, and is not gauged formally by remoteness and unlikeness from God Himself. For this infinite distance there is, but the likeness is not infinite. Hence it can be greater or lesser. The ground of this may be as follows: that although the same creature is like and unlike God, still likeness is gauged by the act of being, received and limited in such a form; while unlikeness and distance are considered in respect of this — that the creature is from nothing — in which there is no more and less.

To the third it is answered: I deny the minor. To the proof it is said that a form receivable in matter cannot be understood as finite according to its proper character without an intrinsic ordering to matter, although it can be understood as finite before it is understood as united to matter. To the confirmation it is answered that the angelic form, since it bespeaks no ordering to matter, consequently has no limitation that in any way constricts the amplitude of the angelic species; and thus each angel has, without limit, every perfection possible to its species. And hence it is that within one species neither can be understood nor be but one supposit. To the argument, then, as put in form, the consequence is denied if it is understood of the infinite simply; if of the infinite in a qualified respect, let it pass, as will be plain in the following article. For the angelic form within its proper species, since it has every possible perfection, even individual — which of itself is indivisible — is called infinite. For the rest, St. Thomas in his foundation does not mean that every form is simply finite by the sole fact of being received in matter; but from the fact that a form receivable in matter is limited because it is received in matter, he means to gather that what is most formal — namely, to-be itself — is simply infinite, if indeed it is not receivable in anything, as is the divine to-be.

To the fourth it is answered that it is one thing to speak of form and act insofar as it is form and act, and another to speak of such a form insofar as it is such. In the first way, no act is perfected by being received in something; but in the second way it is not unfitting that a form be perfected when united to matter — not because it is united, but because from such a union there results a certain whole, perfect in species, which can perform its proper and natural operations. And in this manner the rational soul is more perfectly in the body than outside it. In the prior way, however, the rational soul is in a more perfect manner outside the body than within, for it operates after the manner of operation of substances separated from matter. On this see St. Thomas, 1. 2., q. 4, art. 5, ad 1 and 2 and ad 5; and in the supplements to the 3rd Part, q. 75, art. 1, ad 5. And through this the reply to the confirmation is clear. For we grant that in that second way such a form is perfected when united to matter, since it is fitted to the proper operation of its species.