Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion is affirmative. The metaphysical reason is: because God is the first efficient cause of all things, therefore He is supremely desirable and good. The consequence is proved: because in all effects there is a certain likeness of the agent; but this is supremely desirable, that the effect share in the likeness of the agent; therefore.

COMMENTARY.

AGAINST this reason there is an argument. For it follows from it that God is good only in relation to creatures. The consequence is plain: because only in relation to them is He the first efficient cause. It is answered: I deny the consequence. For just as it is sufficiently gathered that God exists from the fact that He is the cause of the whole to-be of creatures, so it is gathered that He is good absolutely in Himself from the fact that every effect desires, as an end, to be assimilated to God. For these are demonstrations a posteriori, and therefore it is not necessary that they proceed through the formal cause.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The Conclusion is affirmative. The ground is that good is in God as in the first cause of all things, not univocal, but outside every genus of things; therefore in God are all the accounts of good, in the most excellent mode.

The second conclusion: The highest good adds above good only a relation of reason in God.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

Conclusion: God alone is good through essence. St. Thomas proves this with an elegant argument, which rests on this, that each thing is called good according as it is perfect: but since perfection is threefold, none of them belongs to a creature through essence, as it belongs to God who is through essence the very to-be.

COMMENTARY.

THERE IS A DOUBT whether the essence of a created thing is the perfection and goodness of the thing itself.

An argument is made first for the affirmative side. One thing is essentially more perfect than another, e.g. man is essentially more perfect than a horse; therefore man is perfected through his essence; and consequently the essence of man is his goodness. It is confirmed: because rationality is an essential act of man himself, since it is the ultimate difference; therefore it is an essential perfection of man. The consequence is plain: because every act is a perfection of the thing.

Second. The essence of a created thing is a certain participation of the divine perfection; therefore it is itself the perfection and goodness of the creature.

Third. Because in q. 5, art. 3, it was established that every being, insofar as it is a being, is good; but a created thing is a being through essence; therefore it is good through essence. The minor is proved: because every substance is essentially a being through itself: for being is divided, through intrinsic modes, into the ten predicaments. On account of these arguments certain Thomists say that when St. Thomas denies that the threefold perfection of a thing belongs to a creature through essence, he means that those three perfections taken together do not belong to a creature through essence. But against this teaching stands the fact that St. Thomas shows one by one in the article that none of the three perfections belongs to a creature through essence. And in the reply to the third he says that the goodness of a created thing is not its essence itself, but something superadded.

It is answered, therefore, and let this be our conclusion, that speaking simply and absolutely, no essence of a creature, with the actuality of to-be set aside, is goodness absolutely. It is proved: because every essence of a creature, as it is distinguished from to-be, has the character of potency, and not of act; therefore it is not good, nor goodness absolutely, but only in potency. The consequence is plain. The antecedent is St. Thomas, above, q. 4, art. 1, at the third. And it is confirmed, because no essence of a thing is desirable except on account of existence; therefore from that it has the character of goodness.

To the first argument it is said that when one thing is called essentially more perfect than another, the comparison can be made either in perfection in potency, or in act. In the first way I grant that a thing is good in potency through essence; but this is not to be good simply through essence, but in a qualified sense, namely in potency, just as prime matter too is good in potency through essence. If, however, the comparison is made in the second way, then man is called essentially more perfect than a horse, inasmuch as the essence of man more perfectly contracts and receives the very to-be, which is the first act of essence. To the confirmation, it is said that, with existence set aside, rationality conveys act and perfection in potency, but not absolutely.

To the second it is answered that the essences of things, with existence set aside, are not participations of the divine progression absolutely.

To the third it is answered that if being is taken as it conveys an order to to-be, every thing is a being through essence, and likewise good; this, however, is to be good in potency.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

First Conclusion: Each thing is called good by the divine goodness as by the first exemplary, efficient, and final principle. Second Conclusion: Each thing is called good by a likeness of the divine goodness inherent in it, which is formally its own goodness denominating it.

COMMENTARY.

The doctrine of this article is to be noted against the Lutherans, who hold that men are good not by an inherent goodness, but only by the extrinsic goodness and justice of Christ.