Prologus auctoris ad lectorem

PROLOGUE OF THE AUTHOR

TO THE READER.

Concerning this second edition let the reader note that in the earlier commentaries I deliberately did not wish to append the whole text of St. Thomas. For I was writing for Theologians, to all of whom I judged the Theological Summa of the holy Doctor to be at hand. But now, with all Theologians calling for it, I have willingly changed my opinion. For the poor Theologians complain and protest (as do the rich, if any are rich): the former because not everyone has the money to buy separately the parts of St. Thomas's Summa and separately the Commentaries: the latter assert that it is troublesome to them to open and turn over two volumes, one of the text, the other of the commentaries, at once before their eyes. I have surely found a way to satisfy both. I have inserted the whole text of St. Thomas, sparing no expense of my own, composed with such art that, even if I have added many things in the commentaries, this book is nevertheless not sold for more than the earlier edition. Where an addition has been made, it is denoted by this sign †. Furthermore, from each article of St. Thomas I further mark the conclusions corresponding to the title of the question, and for each of them, briefly and in sum, where it can conveniently be done, I intimate the force and nerve of the reasoning, which I have experienced to have pleased disciples very much and profited them very much. But in the course of the disputations I use the name of doubts, lest, when it is necessary to cite things said or to be said, I create some confusion in the reader's mind with the questions of St. Thomas. Finally, since you will see the margins of this book clean, without little notes and citations, know that I have done this not from negligence but on purpose, consulting your utility. For I have left you room, so that you yourself by your own judgment may more conveniently exercise both memory and genius. For I have learned by experience how little such marginal notes, set down and marked at another's pleasure, profit me for the exercise of memory. Add also that, since in Scholastic meditations there always occurs either a new reason for confirming a conclusion, or a new solution of an argument, or an impugning of an author's opinion, all these will nowhere be more aptly at hand for you than if you have written them in the very margins. You have besides a copious Index, which refers you to the columns and letter-characters so distinctly that the marginal notes seem superfluous. Farewell. Given at Salamanca, on the Kalends of November, in the year of the Lord 1585.

In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio

OF BROTHER DOMINIC BAÑES

ON THE PROOEMIUM OF ST. THOMAS

MEDITATION.

Revolving for many years, in almost continual reading, the erudition and doctrine of this Angelic Doctor, I seem to myself now to be beginning, and I long more ardently to become his disciple anew. For while I contemplate more attentively the prooemial entrance of this work, I cannot sufficiently admire his divine genius. It is not the luxuriance of welling words, not the little flowers of the rhetoricians' speech, that delight or frighten me: but that which deservedly affects my mind with the highest admiration is how great the gravity, how great the sweetness of speech, how great the modesty and profound humility with which he offers and promises himself as a teacher of Catholic truth. But whether he has accomplished this, no one who has dwelt with a candid mind in this marvelous Summa of sacred Theology can fail to know. But indeed, since many who aspire to glory in the name of Theologians are not pleased by the waters of Siloah, which flow in silence, namely, this holy Doctor's tranquility in teaching, and a sweetness abounding in most profound erudition and proceeding like a great and clear river running sweetly: they have turned to the writings of other Schoolmen: in which they find a great multitude of useless arguments resounding like the roar of a turbid torrent: and, hunting their own glory in these, they are delighted not a little: and they insult the followers of St. Thomas, and reprove them for following a superficial method of doctrine, and for touching and teaching theological difficulties less profoundly. It has seemed good also to me, the last among all of my order, professor of the First Chair in this renowned University of Salamanca, with the Lord's help following in the footsteps of my masters and diligently attaining their teaching, to publish, for the common utility of the Theologians of our time, the Scholastic commentaries which were wanting on this first part of St. Thomas. Trusting therefore in divine aids, and imploring the patronage of St. Thomas, I shall begin. And I wish the candid Reader to be warned before all things that what Cajetan, in explaining the prooemium of St. Thomas, testifies concerning himself, be regarded as having been said as it were by me.

This prooemium of St. Thomas, in a brief compendium, promises a great store of erudition. From it I gather three lessons for myself. The first is: that two things pertain to a perfect Doctor of Catholic truth, namely, to instruct the advanced, and to educate beginners.

The second lesson is: what the intention of a Scholastic Doctor ought to be while he prepares and undertakes to interpret the Theological Summa of St. Thomas, namely, that he strive with all his powers to elucidate the things which pertain to the Christian religion.

The third lesson is: what method is to be observed in Scholastic questions, namely, that useless arguments and their sophistical multiplication be wholly avoided: then that the order of true doctrine be preserved, so that every theological difficulty be examined and defined in its proper place: and finally that he pursue all things briefly and clearly (which is a most difficult thing), as far as possible according to the dignity of the matter at hand. All of which the Theologian will attain the more surely, or at least the more fruitfully, by humility and confidence in divine aid, and by assiduous prayers.

Meditation on the first lesson.

St. Augustine, book 5 on Genesis, chap. 3, says: Sacred Scripture so speaks as to mock the proud by its height, terrify the attentive by its depth, feed the great by its truth, and nourish the little ones by its affability. But since the sacred writings, written with the Holy Spirit dictating, preserving the aforesaid form of speech, produce effects so varied and so marvelous according to the diversity of hearers, it will not be foreign to a Doctor of Catholic truth to adapt and dispose his doctrine according to the capacity of beginners, in accordance with the testimony of the Apostle cited by St. Thomas, 1 Corinthians 3: As to little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat. Moreover, the diligent and solicitous teacher of Sacred Theology will not for that reason be worthy of reproach if, consulting the more advanced both in virtue and in learning, he diligently and profoundly disputes the subtler and deeper questions, observing the Apostolic precept of him who said in Romans 1: I am a debtor to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, to the wise and to the unwise. And again: But we speak wisdom among the perfect, 1 Cor. 2. Whence also the most prudent Cajetan deservedly notes that this divine work of the Theological Summa, published by the Angelic Doctor, is adapted to novices, not by reason of facility or of a superficial and introductory treatment: but because in exactly treating the most profound matters and the most hidden mysteries, that mode of disposing doctrine and of brevity of words is preserved which the infant genius of disciples who come from the discipline of Aristotle to the study of Sacred Theology requires.

On the second lesson: a meditation containing the division of the whole Theological Summa.

In Isaiah, chap. 8, we read: I am the Lord, who teaches you useful things. But where such useful things for us who seek eternal salvation are contained, the Apostle, speaking by the same Spirit, 2 Timothy 3, instructing his dearest disciple for the evangelical ministry, says: From infancy you have known the sacred writings, which can instruct you to salvation through the faith which is in Christ Jesus. In which words note in passing that the faith which is in Christ Jesus is the foundation for the instruction and understanding of the sacred writings. Then he says: All Scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for arguing, for reproving, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, instructed for every good work. From the explanation of this sacred testimony, which I received from the same St. Thomas in lecture 3 on the same passage of the Apostle, it has seemed good to me to offer such an understanding of the second lesson, that the clear division of the whole sacred Theology according to the due order of doctrine may be had before the eyes of novice Theologians, part by part.

Others distribute in other ways, pleasing to themselves, the order of sacred Theology observed by St. Thomas. To me, however, this one has especially pleased. And so St. Thomas says that the intention of the Doctor ought to be that he strive with all his powers to elucidate the things which pertain to the Christian religion. The first foundations, then, of the Christian religion are the fourteen articles of the Catholic faith, which are proposed to the whole people for belief. Seven of them we say pertain to the divinity, namely, that God is one, that He is the Father, that He is the Son, that He is the Holy Spirit. Behold four articles. The fifth is, that He is the Creator: the sixth, that He is the Savior: the seventh, that He is the Glorifier. Then the Catholic Church distinguishes seven others pertaining to the humanity of Christ. The first, that the Son of God the Father and true God was incarnate by the power of the Holy Spirit. The second is that the Son Himself was made man, was born of Mary ever virgin. The third, that under Pontius Pilate He suffered, and was crucified, and died, and was buried. The fourth, that He descended into hell. The fifth, that He rose from the dead on the third day. The sixth, that He ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father. The seventh, that from there He will come to judge the living and the dead, so as to render to each according to his merits.

Perhaps there will not be lacking one who mocks me and reproves me for at last distinguishing and commending so exactly, to Theologians, the things which are proposed to infants learning their first letters. If there is anyone who objects this to me, let him receive this answer. I indeed have read in the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13: When I was a little one, I spoke as a little one, I understood as a little one, I thought as a little one. But when I became a man, I put away the things that were of a little one. We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face. From which testimony we plainly understand that all, as many as still walk by faith, are little ones: but those who, bathed in the light of glory, behold God face to face are called men. The Apostle abundantly enough admonishes us of this when, adapting the proposed metaphor of the little one and the man to the condition of the body, he says: We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face. Let no one therefore think, however great the genius with which he has been endowed and having become a partaker of the divine doctrine, that he is not still to be numbered among the little ones. Nay rather, if he is truly wise, then he recognizes the more how much he is a little one. For when a man has finished, then he will begin. This difference, indeed, I find between the greatest Theologians and the common men of the Christian people, namely, that the wiser any Theologian is, the more he acknowledges his own ignorance and weakness: and in his own eyes he appears to himself a little one. But others, who have less knowledge of the divine science, do not know how much they lack, and are ignorant of their own ignorance.

That therefore we may return whence we digressed, let us attend to what the Apostle says: We see now through a mirror in an enigma, and let us observe that the foundations of Sacred Theology are divine enigmas, from which, nevertheless, we may not turn away the keenness of the mind even for an hour while we devote ourselves to Sacred Theology by scientific discourse. But lest I delay you longer, now receive the beautiful and serene division of the parts of our whole Theology: which will then be best if I reduce the manifold matter of this divine wisdom to the aforesaid foundations as to its proper principles.

The division of the whole Theology.

St. Thomas therefore, in a marvelous order, divided this Theological Summa.

He distinguished it therefore into three parts. In this first part he disputed, explained, and defined all things which seemed deservedly to be disputed, explained, and defined concerning the five articles of our faith pertaining to the divinity. For through twenty-six questions he contemplates all things which pertain to God Himself as He is one in Himself. Then, however, from the twenty-seventh question up to the forty-third, he is occupied with the three articles concerning the mystery of the Trinity. And finally from the forty-fourth question to the end he discusses many things concerning the Creator of all things and the creatures proceeding from Him, lest ignorance of creatures be turned into an injury to the Creator.

But now, what is the most difficult business for a Theologian, but most necessary for the intended end, the Angelic Doctor treated most exactly in the second part. For the sixth article of the divinity is that God is Savior, namely the justifier of sinners. But since God has manifested His omnipotence most of all by sparing and showing mercy, and since the end of our faith and of the Sacred Writings is that we miserable ones obtain salvation, it is necessary that the Doctor Theologian, as it were a heavenly physician of souls, intend most of all to those things which contribute to the salvation of souls. Wherefore St. Thomas composed the volume of the Second Part, where the Savior and the salvation of men to be acquired are treated, so great that it was necessary for his disciples to divide it again into two parts: the former of which they called the First of the Second, and the latter the Second of the Second. Now therefore, that novices may understand the most fitting order of the matters treated in both, I have indeed meditated thus. For I contemplate man, from the original sin of the first parent, left most miserable, wounded, and half-dead. To cure whom it is necessary, besides the physical disciplines, that another science of salvation be applied. The Theologian, therefore, who prepares to show himself a fit teacher of that science of the salvation which has been given by the Lord for the remission of sins, in the place of God the Savior: it is necessary, before all things, as physicians of bodies are accustomed to do, that he test the pulse of the arteries of the sick man to be cured, so that from it he may recognize the magnitude of the disease and, at the opportune time, devise and prescribe the medicinal remedy. Insisting therefore on the metaphor of this similitude, behold, Theologian, I set before you, in due order, all the things which St. Thomas contemplates and discusses in what follows after the First Part. For in the First of the Second, while at the very beginning he inquires whether it befits man to act for an end, and whether all things are ordered to the ultimate end, and the rest which can in any way regard that ultimate end, what else does he do than test the pulsific power and vital motion of the infirm rational nature? And this he pursues through no fewer than forty-eight questions, which, if you read attentively, you will see not only the pulse of man carefully tested, but also all the motions of the mind and its parts and passions distinctly known, and, as it were, a most exact anatomy made of all of them. Then, from the forty-ninth question concerning good and evil habits, and concerning the very infirmity of human nature derived from original sin, he extends his consideration most copiously up to the eighty-ninth question. But now, from the ninetieth question, he sets before the eyes of the infirm man the divine and human rule and norm of law which the rational nature ought to observe, so that he may begin to cry out, Who will deliver me from the body of this death? and, acknowledging his own infirmity, may hear what follows in the Apostle, The grace of God through Jesus Christ, Romans 7. Whence St. Thomas consequently, from the one hundred and ninth question to the end of the First of the Second, is occupied with this alone, to set forth and commend the necessity of grace. Furthermore, in the Second of the Second he consequently proceeds to distribute, in a more special and more exact method, the formal causes of the justification of the impious, and most copiously to show each of the things which can be desired for perfect salvation. Namely, concerning the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, concerning the four Cardinal virtues, to which the innumerable multitude of the other virtues is reduced, there is nothing which he has not examined to the nail.

But because no one receives grace and all the virtues from God except through Jesus Christ our Savior, he composed the Third Part of this divine Theological Summa, so that in it he might openly teach, and distinctly set before the eyes, whatever pertained to explaining and defending the seven articles of the humanity. And this he completed through forty-nine questions. Moreover, since the divine power of our Head is applied through the seven sacraments of the Church, as it were through instrumental causes, while Christ sits at the right hand of God: at last, from the sixtieth question of the Third Part, he began to discuss the seven sacraments of the Church instituted by Christ the Lord. But the Angelic Doctor, prevented by untimely death, did not complete it, but completed the disputation only on the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist; and he left the treatise on Penance imperfect. But the remaining things which are wanting must be taken from his writings on the fourth book of the Sentences. Where also, concerning the last article of the divinity, that God is Glorifier and Rewarder, and concerning the glorious second coming of Christ the Lord, which is the seventh article of the humanity, St. Thomas treated so as to surpass the other Schoolmen: but he did not attain to himself such as we contemplate him in the Theological Summa, nor has anyone been able to attain to it so far. Behold now, novice Theologian, in what way from the aforesaid you can grasp the understanding of the Apostolic testimony which was the beginning of our meditation. The Apostle therefore says, in the second letter to Timothy, 3: All Scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching and arguing, for reproving and instructing in justice. For Sacred Scripture is the foundation, so that he who has the faith which is in Christ Jesus may be able, exercised by study and meditation of it, to draw profit for teaching the truth, and for defending it against those who contradict, as the Apostle says to Titus, 1: That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine, and to refute those who contradict. Then from the same Sacred Scripture are gathered the lessons necessary for reproving men from vices and instructing them in justice. Whence it comes about that sacred doctrine yields profit to the Catholic Doctor, so that he may be instructed and be able to instruct others, not only in speculative truths, but also in practical ones. Thus therefore the effect of Sacred Scripture is fourfold, as St. Thomas says on the same passage, namely, to teach truth and to refute falsehood as regards the speculative part; but as regards the practical, to reprove from evil and lead to good. By instruction of this kind, therefore, the man of God will be perfect, instructed for every good work. But the Apostle calls the man of God, in a special sense, the evangelical minister and teacher of truth. According to that text of 2 Peter, 1: Holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. For so too of old the prophets were called men of God, as is plain in 4 Kings, first chapter, and elsewhere more often.

Now therefore, Theologian, if you desire to be a perfect man of God, that is, a doctor of Catholic truth, attend to yourself and to doctrine, and strive to emulate St. Thomas, the most excellent among the Scholastic Doctors and the most diligent among all and the greatest prince in the art of teaching. For he marvelously distinguished and ordered all things which pertained to the speculative part. But the things which regarded the practical he treated with no less diligence and erudition.

From all the aforesaid it is openly clear that a Scholastic Theologian who has dwelt in the doctrine of St. Thomas is a fit teacher of Sacred Scripture; especially in those dogmas which are the principal ones and most useful for the salvation of men and the edification of the Church. As for example, the things which pertain to the articles of faith, to the account of Hope and Charity and the other virtues, which also regard the obligation of God's commandments, predestination and justification, the ministry of the sacraments: no one will attain them as will he who has dwelt in the doctrine of this Angelic master. But the remaining things which, besides these, are found in the Sacred Writings are easier and the Theologian can, if he wishes, attain them by simple diligence. Whence undeservedly certain diligent grammarians, who glory in the name of Theologians, mock the Schoolmen as if they were ignorant of the sacred writings; whereas they themselves are much more ignorant, not understanding that the greater utility of Sacred Scripture lies in the understanding of dogmas. In which an error will be much more pernicious than in the morose computation of times and numbers and in observing the phrases of Sacred Scripture, in all of which the pious grammarians sometimes surpass the Scholastic Theologians more by diligence than by genius: although there are not wanting among our own those who are of very great worth even in this part. Thus far let what has been said of the meditation on the second lesson of St. Thomas and on the division of Sacred Theology suffice.

Concerning the third lesson of St. Thomas: the same author's meditation on the best style and order of proceeding in Scholastic discipline.

But now it remains to speak of the third lesson. For St. Thomas says that the purpose of his intention is to hand on the things which pertain to the Christian religion in the manner that is expedient for the instruction of beginners. But the manner which best suits the instruction of beginners consists most of all in this, that the teacher of Sacred Theology pursue the things which pertain to sacred doctrine briefly and clearly, according as the matter allows, as St. Thomas himself says. There are therefore three things which produce confusion and overwhelm the genius of the learner. The first is the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments. The second is that the things which are necessary are not handed on according to the order of doctrine. The third is the frequent repetition of the same things, which is altogether tedious. These impediments, surely, he will avoid who pursues briefly and clearly the things which are necessary to be known. For one who strives for brevity easily abstains from the multiplication of useless questions and from the frequent repetition of the same things. But while he strives to proceed distinctly and clearly, it is necessary that he embrace the due order of doctrine. Here now I would say, not without admiration: Who is this, and we will praise him? To strive to be brief, I become obscure, Horace had said, understanding that it is no small difficulty to join perspicuity of words and things with brevity. The holy Fathers Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory, and many others of the Greeks most learned, handed on abundantly enough the understanding of the Sacred Scriptures and many seeds of doctrines. Yet they were not solicitous to preserve the order of doctrine; either because it did not befit their gravity to pursue each thing so morosely, or because the manners of those times and the temperaments of men did not demand so exact a manner of disputing and teaching: but rather they composed theological books and treatises most copiously as the occasion of disputing against heretics offered itself. But after the Church obtained so many and so varied writings of sacred doctrine from the holy Fathers, and after heretics, equipped with a thousand subtleties and diabolical arts of deceiving, began to understand perversely and to preach pestiferously both Sacred Scripture and the doctrine of the holy Fathers, it was very necessary and divinely arranged by providence that the Doctors of the Catholic Church reduce all the dogmas of the holy Fathers into an order of doctrine. Nor did they accomplish this alone, but also reduced the teachings of the Philosophers, by which sacred doctrine was accustomed to be attacked, into an art, so that they now serve Theology as, as it were, faithful handmaids. Whence it came about that, by a marvelous compendium and in a short time, disciples of Sacred Theology become doctors fit for every disputation against heretics. Among all these, therefore, who devoted themselves to Scholastic wisdom, the Angelic Doctor so excelled that deservedly he seems to have had not a human but an angelic genius. He surely pursues all things briefly and clearly, as far as is possible according to the dignity and depth of the matter. Whoever has imitated him will not have strayed far from the mark in the method of teaching.

Furthermore, that we may complete in practice what we say in theory: concerning the aforesaid lesson I shall briefly note certain things, both for disciples and for teachers.

It is to be noted, therefore, first, that a multitude of questions is not dissonant with the brevity of Scholastic doctrine, but a multitude of useless questions. For St. Thomas himself, in this Theological Summa, which, prevented by death, he did not give finished in all its numbers, nevertheless disputed no fewer than five hundred and twelve questions. But of articles and arguments we can scarcely comprehend the number. But that brevity is to be required in Scholastic discipline which wholly avoids useless questions and the superfluous repetition of the same things. This the diligent teacher will attain if he discusses each thing in its own and legitimate place.

Note, second, that many questions seem useless in Sacred Theology to those little exercised in it. But if one has looked into them, he will find very great utility for treating the graver matters. You will often have an example of this in these commentaries on the first Part, but especially from question 53 up to 58, where many questions are disputed concerning the motion and cognition of the Angels, which at first sight will perhaps appear more curious than profitable. Yet these contribute very much to the understanding of the mystery of the Trinity and of divine cognition and of God's existence and operation in things. I confess, nevertheless, that sometimes we are pressed into one fault by another's fault, while we report the arguments of many opinions adversant to the doctrine of St. Thomas, in order that the truth may shine forth the more. But in all these a measure is to be observed, as much in the things themselves as in the words, lest by prolixity of doctrine tedium be generated in the minds of the hearers.

Note, third, that not every repetition is vicious. For St. Thomas too, in this Theological Summa, sometimes repeats the same things which had been treated elsewhere, when the order of matters can scarcely be preserved otherwise. Let there be an example. In the Second of the Second, question 10, article 12, he asks: Whether the children of Jews and of other unbelievers are to be baptized against the will of their parents? This title he repeats again in the third part, q. 68, article 10; but for different reasons. For in the Second of the Second, when he was treating of those who receive the faith, and asked whether unbelievers could be compelled to receive the faith? but children do not receive the faith otherwise than through baptism; it was necessary consequently to define whether the sacrament of faith could be conferred on them against the will of their parents. Again in the Third Part, the order of the disputation demanded that there be speech concerning all who were capable of baptism, and accordingly it was necessary to dispute whether the will of the parents was necessary, or whether they could be baptized against their will. But if you consider attentively, he dealt much more briefly in the Third Part, adding something new, than he had discussed in the Second of the Second.

Note, fourth, how necessary it is for the teacher of Theology, especially when dictating in school, to abstain from eloquent and ornate speech: since this cannot be done without the loss of much time: and the softness of diction enervates the force of Scholastic arguments. Let the industrious teacher therefore take care to elucidate the gravest matters briefly with propriety of words: and what can be said in one word, it is superfluous to use two. Brother Melchior Cano, a most wise master of our order and my teacher, while he was dictating in the First Chair of Sacred Theology at Salamanca, it was a marvel with how great a compendium of words and brevity of speech he distinctly embraced many things. But when afterwards he had composed his book on the Theological Places, and, before sending it to the press, had handed it to me to read, so that (such was his modesty) the master might seek the judgment of the disciple; I remember that, after I read the book, I answered my teacher: the gravity and depth of the doctrine had indeed pleased me very much: but the continuous and affected sweetness of speech had displeased me. He, however, hearing my objection willingly, confessed that the matter stood so. But he added this excuse, that he had written the book rather for foreign nations, which are very much delighted by eloquence, so that, allured by the sweetness of diction, they might imbibe Catholic doctrine. And the outcome of the matter proved it. For among the Spaniards that book is not esteemed as much as the dignity of its doctrine deserves. But the other nations venerate it greatly both for the utility of its doctrine and for the sweetness of its speech. But I, with the Lord's help, shall strive with all my powers to compose this work for the utility of readers in such a way that the style of speaking and the method of proceeding accord with the gravity of the questions. Nor indeed shall I be very solicitous to serve the ears of the grammarians; provided that the truth be understood the more distinctly. For I am always mindful of that which Augustine, in book 4 of De Doct. Christ., chap. 11, teaching the Ecclesiastical Doctor, says: What does a golden key profit, if it does not open? or what does a wooden one harm, if it opens? I had intended, in the exordium of this first part, to prescribe the method of Scholastic Theology. But because for the sake of elucidating this argument I have meditated many things which required a whole book, for that reason I have determined to publish a treatise of this kind separately at another time. But behold Rhodes, behold the leap. Now let us begin what is at hand, with the Lord's help.

Commentarium

BEFORE we come to the graver disputations, certain things are to be noted, especially for novice theologians.

The first is that theology, according to the propriety of the word, is the same as discourse about God, or the account and expertise of divine things. Whence the theologian is an expert in divine things; and his office is to contemplate and to speak of God, and of other things insofar as they are from God and tend to him. Now theology is twofold, namely natural and supernatural. The former indeed contemplates those truths which can be investigated about God by the natural light and by discourse, such as that God is one, infinite, etc. The supernatural, however, inquires into and considers those truths which can be had by divine revelation, or are gathered from the things revealed themselves.

NEXT observe that doctrine is called revealed which has not been devised by human wit, but handed down by divine revelation alone: according to Gal. 1: I make known to you the gospel which was preached by me, that it is not according to man. For neither did I receive it from man, nor did I learn it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. Where Jerome observes that Apocalypse, that is, revelation, is a word proper to the Scriptures, deservedly devised by the Seventy interpreters: for it is not found among Gentile writers. Now the proper and genuine signification of this word is not revelation in any way whatever, but when something which of itself was covered and veiled, the impediment now being removed, is shown and brought forth into the light. Whence the theologian who prepares to profess the discipline of this sacred doctrine should consider that he himself is to be transferred into another, invisible world, and that, as it were a second Paul, the natural scales are to be removed from his eyes, that he may see the kingdom of God.

NOW revealed doctrine, according to its common signification, is divided into faith, into prophecy, and into that doctrine which is necessary for explaining the divine letters. The Apostle makes mention of this in Eph. 4 when he said: And he gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors. Namely, doctors able to instruct the people in divine and human things which are necessary for eternal salvation. Which doctrine indeed is sometimes occupied with the explanation of the Sacred Scriptures and of the articles of faith; sometimes it gathers from the things revealed and understood themselves conclusions conducive to a fuller knowledge of the mysteries and to their defense against heretics. Wherefore it uses different means according to the variety of errors and arguments by which sacred doctrine is attacked by the ignorant.

MOREOVER the physical discipline in the present article is not taken strictly, as signifying only the science of mobile being, but is used broadly, as signifying every discipline which can be had from the power of nature.

AND finally, necessary can be taken in two ways. In one way for the simply necessary, as that God exists, that man is an animal: in the other way, for what is useful and fitting for the end: but in either way the necessary is said according to the four kinds of causes, as Aristotle teaches, 5 Metaphysics, text 6, e.g. a stone must rise on the part of the efficient cause, if it is pushed upward by a greater power. Likewise, a man must be risible from the formal cause; and corruptible from the material cause; and endowed with virtue from the necessity of the end, that he be blessed. In the present article, therefore, it is clear that the discourse concerns the necessary according to the final cause, namely, whether revealed doctrine is necessary for man unto salvation. But whether he speaks of the simply necessary, as an eye is necessary for seeing, or rather of the necessary in a certain respect, that is, for the more commodious attainment of the end, as a horse is necessary for a journey and shoes for walking; there is a difference among the interpreters of St. Thomas.

Dubium 1

IT IS DOUBTED, then, first, concerning the first conclusion: whether it was simply necessary for human salvation that revealed doctrine be handed down to men.

It is argued first for the negative side. All creatures can attain their end by their own powers; therefore man does not simply need some supernatural gift for attaining his own end, otherwise he would seem to be of a worse condition than the other created things.

It is argued second. For the Apostle, Rom. 1, vehemently accuses the Gentile philosophers, not indeed because they did not know God, but because, when they had known him naturally, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks: therefore natural knowledge suffices for worshipping God, and consequently for the end of beatitude. And it is confirmed. For that God exists and that he is a rewarder are knowable by the natural light: but, as the Apostle testifies, Heb. 11: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to them that seek him; these things seem to suffice for justification: therefore revealed doctrine is not simply necessary. And it is confirmed secondly. For when a man first comes to the use of reason, if he does what is in him by the powers of nature, so as to be converted to God, he is justified from sin; and yet he has no supernatural knowledge, therefore.

It is argued third. For although according to the ordinary law no one attains salvation except through some revealed doctrine; nevertheless, speaking absolutely, God could lead a man into eternal life without any supernatural revelation conferred on him in this life; therefore, speaking absolutely, revealed doctrine is not necessary for salvation, as an eye is for seeing.

It is argued fourth. Be it granted that some revealed doctrine is necessary for salvation, yet our theology does not seem to be simply necessary; therefore St. Thomas asserted in vain that this sacred theology, to the study of which we come, is necessary. The minor is proved from Mark, last chapter: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And it is proved by reason. For by faith our end and the means necessary for it are sufficiently known.

AND finally it is argued. For be it granted that knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures is necessary in the Church of Christ, namely that there be doctors who interpret the Sacred letters; yet our scholastic theology seems superfluous, which so tediously, and with so great a number of arguments tossed about on this side and that, divine things with excessive curiosity discusses and handles; therefore such subtle disputation is superfluous. The minor is proved. For the holy Fathers, who were fit doctors of the Church of God, did not engage in ventilating subtleties of this kind. And it is confirmed from Chrysostom, Hom. 1 on the Epistle to Titus, where he says that the sacred Gospel contains all things, present and future, and all things which are necessary for piety. And St. Augustine, tract. 49 on John, says: Not all the things which the Lord Jesus did are written, as John testifies, but those things were selected which should be written, all things which are necessary for the human race unto salvation. Likewise St. Basil, in the Homily on the human generation of Christ, says: O absurd and depraved ingratitude! The Magi come to adore, and Christians more curiously ask how God is in the flesh, and of what flesh, and whether the man assumed is perfect or imperfect. Let the curious be silent, and let them cease to investigate superfluous things in the Church of God. And yet our scholastics dispute questions of this kind, and others much more curious, namely: whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be distinguished from him? and whether, if Adam had not sinned, the Son of God would have assumed human nature? and very many others of this kind, therefore.

FOR the decision of this doubt let there be a first conclusion, most certain according to the Catholic faith. Revealed doctrine is simply necessary according to the ordinary law of God for the salvation of individual men who have come to the use of reason. I have said 'according to the ordinary law of God'; for according to his absolute power God could have justified men by his grace and transferred them to beatitude. This conclusion has a special place where it is explained by theologians and confirmed by the testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures and of the Councils; namely, in 2-2, q. 2, arts. 3, 4, 5 and following. For the present, however, let that testimony suffice for us, Heb. 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. And faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things that appear not. We have, therefore, that if by the name of revealed doctrine we understand also the doctrine of the Catholic faith, as in truth it is most of all to be understood under such a name, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for men to obtain salvation: and that this is certain according to the Catholic faith.

NEVERTHELESS certain of the modern theologians linger overmuch in this place, asking: whether it can be proved by natural reason that, besides the physical disciplines, another revealed doctrine is necessary for man for living rightly and obtaining happiness. And they argue in many ways for the affirmative side. First indeed by induction. For it is the common sense of men that such doctrine is necessary: e.g. unbelieving Jews hold that they have a revealed doctrine, awaiting the Messiah. The Saracens too think that Mohammed was a prophet of God who brought a salutary law to men. Likewise heretics think that they have a revealed doctrine; indeed the Gentiles also think the same. And their foundation is: that what they have received from their parents is to be believed: and for that reason they are called Gentiles. For Augustine relates, 8 City of God, ch. 5, from Varro, that among the Gentiles there was a threefold theology; a certain natural one, which men devised by their own powers; another fabulous, which the poets invented; a third civil, which belonged to the priests, by which cities were ordered to the worship of God. And this they held to have been handed down to men by God through revelation. And finally the Christians above all affirm that this is necessary. Hence, therefore, a morally evident argument is drawn. It is impossible that that in which all nations agree be false: but all nations agree in this, that revealed doctrine is necessary for men, therefore this is true. To me, however, this argument seems persuasive rather than demonstrative. For among the philosophers who were judged wise by men, some denied that God exists, as Pythagoras and Protagoras; some denied the providence of God, as the Epicurean and his followers; and, what is more to be wondered at, Aristotle seems to have denied divine providence. For he asserted nothing about the providence of God; indeed he thought that the world emanated from God himself by a necessity of nature, not by his free will, which, below, in q. 19, art. 10, we shall show to have been an error against the natural light; and in q. 46, art. 1. It is also clear how doubtful Aristotle was about the immortality of the soul.

Likewise, 12 Metaphysics, ch. 8, after he had demonstrated certain things which can be demonstrated about God himself, he says thus: Certain things have been handed down by our forefathers and by the most ancient, besides these: but all the rest have been brought forward fabulously to persuade the multitude, or on account of the laws, or for expediency. Behold, therefore, how the aforesaid argument, drawn from authority and the consensus of all, can be shaken.

A second argument is brought from St. Thomas, 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 3, namely: because we naturally desire to know the quiddity of whatever thing comes in any way into our knowledge, therefore we naturally desire to know the quiddity of the first Cause. Again: But through the physical disciplines we cannot know God quidditatively, as is plain from Aristotle, 2 Metaphysics, ch. 1, where he says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things of nature as the eye of the night-owl to the light of the sun. And Plato in the Parmenides, when he had said many things about the first being, concluded: that man cannot know what it is, but only what it is not; therefore it follows that a revealed science is necessary. But this argument and others like it, which are drawn from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the place cited above, contribute to this (as St. Thomas says at the end of the aforesaid chapter): that it be shown that what is said of God is not to be cast aside as false, although it cannot be investigated by reason: indeed it is also shown how revealed doctrine does not destroy but rather perfects nature, in that it perfects and completes imperfect but natural desires, which are rather called velleities. For I will never grant, revelation being set aside, that there is in man or in an angel a natural desire, simply and absolutely, of knowing God quidditatively: indeed, if an angel were created in pure natural endowments, he would tend by no way to such knowledge of God, nor desire it, since he would evidently judge it impossible for himself. Let us then conclude, in confirmation of the first fundamental conclusion, asserting what is said in Wis. 13: Vain are all men who have not the knowledge of God. Therefore the aforesaid conclusion cannot be had certainly by any other way than from the Catholic faith. But that this revealed doctrine is made evidently credible by many arguments: it is not for this place to show. But this we have done in 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

Second conclusion. If by the name of revealed doctrine we understand prophecy, it is necessary in the Church, not indeed that prophetic revelation be made to each individual man, but to those whom God has chosen, that through their ministry he might instruct the faithful concerning future things. This conclusion is to be understood according to the law ordained by God, who, according to the diversity of times, prophetically enlightened the minds of certain men, that on God's part they might instruct and console the rest, according to Amos, ch. 3: For the Lord God will do nothing, unless he reveal his secret to his servants the prophets. Whence the first prophet was Adam, when he said, Gen. 2: This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife. The mystery of which prophecy the Apostle explains, Eph. 5: This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. But how much utility prophetic doctrine brought to the confirmation of the Gospel doctrine, the Apostle sufficiently teaches, Rom. 1, when he says: Separated unto the gospel of God, which he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scriptures, concerning his Son. See on this matter Chrysostom on Isaiah, ch. 6, Homil. 2, where he says: Prophetic oracles are not promulgated for this, that men know future things in any way, but that they reap great benefits from them. The first is that men be made more modest through fear of punishment and of the prophetic threat. The second is that men be made more eager to undertake virtue from the promise of goods. The third is that from both sides they may know the power of God and his providence toward men. The fourth, that they may judge that the future things which are foretold come about not by chance but by God's most firm decree. The fifth, that men may know themselves to be sinners and have recourse to Christ.

Third conclusion. If by the name of revealed doctrine is understood the science which is occupied with the understanding and explanation of the Sacred Scriptures and of those things which pertain to faith, it is not simply necessary for individual men unto salvation. This is plain. For many are simple Christians who, simply believing the articles of faith, keep his commandments out of love of God and are saved.

Fourth conclusion. Nevertheless a doctrine of this kind, revealed, which by us is called theological science, is necessary in the Church of God for the salvation of men and the preservation of the faithful. This conclusion is understood of the necessity of the end simply, supposing the divine ordination. For the understanding and confirmation of this conclusion it is to be observed, as we intimated before, that theological science is occupied in two ways with the things which have been revealed by God. First, by interpreting the Sacred Scriptures from what precedes and what follows, from the traditions of the Church, from expertise in languages, and other similar things. In the other way, by gathering from the testimonies of the Scriptures or from the truths of faith conclusions by a good or probable consequence, for the edification of the faithful or the defense of the faith. Note secondly that although the theologian exercises these two offices with diligence and study; nevertheless, because he proceeds from faith and from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, sometimes also by a special grace of God freely given, such sacred science is deservedly called sacred and revealed. For what is ours in it is the least part. Now, therefore, the conclusion is proved in both senses; and first in the former sense, from Eph. 4: And he gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. Behold the end of these offices, namely the edification of the faithful. Likewise, 1 Cor. 12, where Paul, relating the gifts with which Christ adorned his Church, says: To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, to another the interpretation of speeches. What is, I ask, the word of wisdom and of knowledge, if not the spirit of teaching and declaring all things which are necessary for salvation? And ch. 14 he speaks elegantly of the interpretation of revelations, which he calls prophecy: whose use is, as St. Thomas explains, to set forth the word of exhortation to the people, by expounding the Sacred Scriptures. And the same Apostle calls interpreters those same men whom he calls prophets; and he calls interpreting prophesying. And St. Peter in the second epistle, ch. 1, says thus: Knowing this first, that no prophecy of scripture is made by private interpretation. That is, it is not of human wit, nor of private authority, but proceeds from the divine light. And ch. 3 he says: In the epistles of Paul there are some things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, to their own destruction; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary, which may explain what is doubtful and interpret what is difficult. Moreover the same is effectively confirmed. For God never fails in necessary things, much less than nature: but not only is the handing down of the Scriptures necessary, but also the understanding of them; therefore God has not left his Church without doctors sufficient for explaining the Sacred Scriptures. Moreover, if holy Scripture is obscure and ambiguous, and has diverse and contrary expositions; to whom must one have recourse for the true understanding of Scripture? e.g. concerning these four words, This is my body, there is great controversy in the Church of Christ. For Oecolampadius says that their legitimate interpretation is: this is a sign of my body. Calvin declares: this is my body in power. The Church says: this is truly my body. In a matter, therefore, of so great moment, to whom must one have recourse? Certainly to none other than the doctors of the Church. Just as the Antiochenes in a very difficult matter fled to none other than the apostles and elders who were at Jerusalem.

But here two things are to be observed. The one is that this doctrine is not necessary for all Christians, but it is necessary that it exist in the Christian commonwealth. Just as it is not necessary that all Christians be bishops, but it is necessary that there be bishops in the Church. The other is that this doctrine is not necessary for new revelations, nor for bringing forth a new faith, but for eliciting the true expositions of sacred Scripture already handed down to us. Whence the doctors of this discipline do not have new revelations; they have, however, a special divine assistance and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, that they may proceed fittingly in the exposition of sacred Scripture, as is expedient for the utility of the Church.

NEXT the conclusion is proved in the other sense, namely insofar as sacred theology, from the divine revelations and the articles of faith, which are as it were first principles, gathers conclusions conducive to the edifying of the faithful and the defense of the Church from the attack of heretics. Of this science the Apostle speaks, 1 Cor. 12, when he says: To another is given the word of knowledge in the same Spirit. Explaining which passage, Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, says: This is the science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, strengthened and defended. With which science indeed very many of the faithful are not endowed, although they are endowed with faith. For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for obtaining beatitude; and another to know how this very faith helps the pious and is defended against the impious. So he. The Apostle also makes mention of this science, Titus 1, when he says: A bishop must be blameless, etc., embracing him who is according to doctrine, the faithful word, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers; that is, to convince with arguments and to refute the errors of those who contradict. To this also pertains what the Apostle Peter in the first canonical epistle, ch. 3, admonishes the faithful, that they be ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you. And although this office in a certain way pertains to individual faithful; nevertheless it especially belongs to the doctors of the Church, who give continuous attention to sacred theology. Moreover we find examples of this sacred theology also in the authors of the Sacred Scriptures, who often argue and reason from certain revealed things to persuade men of the truth. But there is a very great difference between those canonical writers and the other doctors of the Church. Since the former argue infallibly by the same Spirit of God; the other doctors, however, in their argumentations do not have infallibly the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the canonical writers have left us most firm examples, which we might imitate in our theological discourses. Indeed Christ the Lord himself, the supreme Doctor of all doctors, often argued to convince the experts in the law and the Pharisees. As for example, John 10: Is it not written in your law, I said, You are gods? If he called them gods, to whom the word of God was made, and the scripture cannot be broken, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world; you say, because I blaspheme, because I said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, if you will not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father. Moreover Luke 11 he says: If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children; how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him? And in the same chapter, against those blaspheming that he cast out devils in Beelzebub the prince of devils, he argues wonderfully. The apostles themselves also, imitating their master, very often made theological arguments, among whom the Apostle, the doctor of the Gentiles, seems to have excelled. In whose epistles there are examples so frequent that it is not pleasing to relate any one of them above the others. But the other doctors, imitating these examples, have left us very many writings filled with theological arguments. To this doctrine also is consonant what was instituted in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. 11: that readers of sacred Scripture be established in all cathedral churches, and especially of those things which pertain to the reformation of morals. Which was confirmed in the Council of Trent, session 22, On Reformation, ch. 2. Very many supreme pontiffs also established universities of studies, in which the divine science of sacred theology might be taught, and adorned them with riches, honors and privileges. How much utility, moreover, scholastic theology has brought to the Church of God, the doctrine of St. Thomas alone manifests. For in all the councils celebrated after St. Thomas, almost all the dogmas decreed by them were taken from the doctrine of the holy doctor. Which is plain in the Council of Vienne under Clement V, in the Council of Florence under Eugene IV, in the Lateran under Leo X, and in Trent under Paul III and Julius III and Pius IV. Wherefore not without cause do heretics pursue scholastic theology with the utmost hatred: since by the shrewdness of the theologians their pestiferous arguments are dissolved.

TO the arguments in opposition.

TO the first argument certain of the modern theologians, in order to answer, dispute in this place, not opportunely enough, that celebrated question: whether to see God as he is is the natural end of man. Which question nevertheless claims for itself its proper place in 1-2, q. 3, art. 8. We, however, will say something in part about this difficulty below, in q. 12, art. 1, where it is also opportunely disputed by others. In the meantime, however, that we may satisfy the argument, we suppose that a man in the state of fallen nature cannot be made blessed by the attainment of any end, unless he first obtain salvation by the grace of the Savior. But if man had been created in pure natural endowments, he would have needed some gift of the Creator in order to acquire natural beatitude by his own actions. Which gift God supplied much more abundantly, creating man with grace healing nature and ordering him to a supernatural end. After sin, however, no remedy remains except the grace of God through Jesus Christ.

TO the second argument it is answered that from the testimony of the Apostle it is not gathered that natural knowledge is sufficient for worshipping God as was required for the end of beatitude. But only this is gathered, that natural knowledge is a sufficient cause for the condemnation of those who, when they had known God, did not glorify him as God, but turned to idolatry. To the first confirmation it is answered that it does not suffice for justification, as far as concerns the intellect, that a man believe that God exists as the author of nature, and that he is a rewarder with a natural reward: but it is required that God be believed as the author of the grace that justifies the impious, and as a rewarder promising supernatural beatitude; according to the word of the Apostle, Rom. 4: But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God. But on this difficulty, whether for justification a supernatural faith is required also on the part of the object believed: I have disputed more at length in 2-2, q. 2, art. 8, doubt 2, where we showed that it is not enough for someone to have an implicit faith in Christ, without which no one is justified, that he believe some natural principle. Since in that principle what is supernatural cannot be contained implicitly. To the second confirmation it is answered that when a man first comes to the use of reason, he can indeed sin by the powers of nature, if he is not converted to the good. But by the powers of nature he cannot be sufficiently disposed to be converted to God and justified from sin, unless he has been forestalled by the help of divine mercy. And thus it will be verified that God does not deny grace to him who does what is in him. But to what a man is bound when he comes to the use of reason is usually disputed in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6. I, however, having found an occasion not unsuitable, disputed it at length in 2-2, q. 10, art. 1, doubt 2.

TO the third argument the intent of it is granted, as we explained in the first conclusion.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that it proves the third conclusion.

TO the fifth argument, where objection is made against the necessity of scholastic theology, and indeed it is intended that it is superfluous, useless and pernicious; one must answer carefully against certain men of our own time who are students of human rather than of divine writings, who on account of the difficulty of scholastic theology and their own sloth or natural dullness do not cease continually to bark against the scholastic theologians. These surely seem to me like sluggish hare-hounds, which, when they cannot by the swiftness of their course pursue the hare, bark vehemently against the others who pursue and outrun it swiftly. I for my part am not of the number of those who despise expertise in languages and the diligent reading of histories; on the contrary, mindful of the apostolic doctrine: As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God; I have always venerated men of this kind who profess expertise in languages, and especially those who devote themselves to elucidating the phrases of the Sacred Scriptures. But the arrogance and pernicious ignorance of some I cannot bear. For they think that we, occupied with useless questions, lose oil and labor. Against them let a certain conclusion be laid down.

SCHOLASTIC theology as it is learned and held in the Church of God from the time of the Master of the Sentences to the present day is necessary with that necessity which we explained in the fourth conclusion. This conclusion is proved by the same arguments by which the fourth was also confirmed. Then it is proved. Since scholastic theology does not differ from the theology of the holy Fathers as to substance, but differs only as to its compendious mode and as reduced more to the art of a discipline, so that the theologian may now have, as it were in ready cash, all the heads of things and the arguments by which Catholic doctrine can both be explained and defended against heretics. Of which matter a great proof is what we did above in the meditation on the second document on the prologue of St. Thomas. Supposing, therefore, the variety of the heresies of the most recent times, and the fox-like cunning of heretics, it is necessary that there be at hand in the Church of Christ doctors who may answer subtly, learnedly and briefly the sophistries of the heretics, and strongly refute them. For this pertains to the providence of Christ, that he make such doctors in his Church as he knows to be necessary according to the diversity of times. But in this scholastic theology many things are contained which pertain to ornament and perfection rather than to utility. And nevertheless they are sometimes not without utility. For Augustine teaches, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 4, that to assume human disciplines for the ornament of Christian doctrine is nothing other than to imitate the children of Israel, who, fleeing Pharaoh, carried off with them the vessels of gold and all the furniture of the Egyptians, that they might afterwards spend all precious things for the ornament of the Tabernacle. So also St. Jerome, in the epistle to Magnus the orator; and to Pope Damasus, On the prodigal son, says: To assume human philosophy and all human disciplines for the ornament of Christian doctrine is to bring a most beautiful woman as a believing captive into the people of God. According to Deut. 21, where it was commanded that if anyone took in war a woman who pleased him, he should bring her into his house and shave her hair and cut her nails, and put off the garment in which she was taken captive. So, therefore, it befits the theologian to learn human disciplines, that he cut away whatever in them is superfluous, and make them serve the holy doctrine. For what harm did it do to Daniel that he learned the letters of the Chaldeans? What to Moses, that he was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians? On which matter see the excellent treatise of Rupert the abbot, On the works of the Holy Spirit, book 7, or, what is the same, On knowledge, in a single book, especially from ch. 10 to the end. Where he shows elegantly and very learnedly the utility of the liberal arts for the treatment of the Sacred Scriptures.

TO the testimonies of the Saints cited in the last argument it is answered. To St. Chrysostom: that he speaks of the Gospel as containing these things as in a principle and a fountain: but it is necessary that the things contained in the Gospel be explained and defended by the doctors. And similarly it must be said to Augustine. But to St. Basil it is answered that he inveighs against certain imprudent men who in the churches disputed such questions before the people. For which vice certain preachers of our own time are deservedly to be reproved, who dispute and define before the people scholastic and subtle questions, of which perhaps they themselves would not dare to speak in the schools. But that such scholastic disputations, however subtle, are very useful in the Church of Christ, provided they be conducted with due modesty, the examples of the saints confirm. For such things did the holy Doctor dispute, who sometimes, out of excessive love of Christ, was rapt into ecstasy; such things did he also dispute who is called the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure. And among the holy Fathers we find not a few examples of this, as often as the perverse and subtle dogmas of heretics compelled them to dispute piously indeed, but subtly. Read, I beseech you, St. Hilary, book 2 On the Trinity, where among other things he says thus: We are compelled by the vices of heretics and blasphemers to do unlawful things, to climb steep places, to speak the ineffable, to presume what is not granted, and to extend the lowliness of our speech to things that are ineffable, and we are forced into one fault by another's fault. So he. Do not, however, think that Hilary judged anything to be done viciously, but he speaks in the manner in which it is commonly said: it is lawful to repel force by force. Although defense ought not properly to be called force. Now, indeed, the prudent reader will pardon me that in this first doubt I have not altogether kept the scholastic method of disputing. Nor is it wonderful, since this first question of St. Thomas, and especially this first article, still has an affinity with the plan of the prologue.

Dubium 2

IT IS DOUBTED second: Whether the second conclusion of St. Thomas is true and its ground good.

It is argued first for the negative side. When a man first comes to the use of reason, he sufficiently knows by the natural light those things which he is bound to know, so as to convert himself to the good; therefore revealed doctrine is not necessary for man to tend to his natural end. The antecedent is plain. For otherwise a man would not sin in the first instant of the use of reason, even if he did not convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason: which is contrary to St. Thomas, in 1-2, q. 89, art. 6.

It is argued second: supernatural revelation cannot be proportioned except to a supernatural object; therefore a truth which by its nature is of the natural order cannot be known under the account of supernatural revelation.

It is argued third: a faithful simple man is not of a better condition than a faithful philosopher: but a faithful philosopher does not assent to those natural truths from divine revelation, but from a natural means; therefore a faithful simple man does not assent from divine revelation. The consequence is plain, because otherwise he would be of a better condition.

It is argued fourth: if any natural truth ought to be known through divine revelation, this most of all, God exists; but it seems to imply a contradiction that this truth be known from divine revelation; therefore. The minor is proved: for if anyone assents to this truth, God exists, because God himself reveals it, he already presupposes that God exists: inasmuch as he presupposes that God is a revealer, and consequently before divine revelation man knows that God exists.

FINALLY it is argued against the ground of the conclusion, which presupposes that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of natural truth. This seems false: because it is possible for natural truth to be investigated by natural reason, and consequently natural knowledge would suffice: since the whole salvation of man depends on it.

TO this doubt Cajetan in this place teaches that this second conclusion is to be understood of a necessity not simply, but of well-being. Nevertheless St. Thomas seems to hold the contrary in 2-2, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1, where he expressly teaches that natural knowledge does not suffice for the human race for the knowledge of divine things, even of those which can be demonstrated by natural reason; and in 3 Sent., dist. 23, art. 3, q. 1, ad 1, he says that sufficient provision could not be made for the natural knowledge of God through man's nature; therefore not only for well-being, but simply, revealed doctrine must be asserted to be necessary for knowing truths of this kind. Wherefore Cajetan, in 2-2 above, moderates the opinion which he had held here. For either, he says, we speak of the human race according to individual men, or according to the community of the human race itself. If we speak in the former way, revealed doctrine is simply necessary for many. For there are many who, on account of natural ineptitude or other reasonable occupations, cannot investigate such truths by their own powers. If, however, we speak of the community itself of the human race; he says that such revelation is not necessary for all, because some can know those truths by their own powers. But neither does this moderation seem to us to agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. For then it would already be verified that natural reason suffices for the knowledge of those truths. For that this knowledge fails in some proceeds from an accidental cause: and yet St. Thomas refers a defect of this kind to human nature. Then because even the philosophers themselves acquired such knowledge only over a long time and with an admixture of errors, as is plain to one reading the dogmas of the philosophers.

IT must therefore be said, as seems to us, and let it be a certain conclusion, that revealed doctrine is necessary in order that men be instructed even in natural truths as much as is required for them to be taught concerning supernatural things. For grace presupposes nature. And it is proved first. For although some knowledge of God can befall some after a long time, nevertheless this does not in fact befall without some admixture of errors. Whence it is necessary that revealed doctrine perfect nature. It is proved secondly. For the wound of ignorance, which we drew with original sin, is not only in the practical reason, but also in the speculative, inasmuch as in the state of integral nature the speculative intellect had an infallible order to the true, nor could it be retarded by the corruptibility of the body. Whence St. Thomas below, q. 101, art. 1, ad 3, grants to children in the state of innocence a sufficient knowledge which would direct them in good works. But after sin man remained with a corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, so that it cannot tend infallibly to the true. And the intellect itself, to which it is natural to understand by conversion to phantasms, received the wound of ignorance, so that it easily declines from the true; therefore, etc. And finally, distinct knowledge, certain and without admixture of error and acquired in a short time, concerning natural truths about God himself, which are indeed necessary for man, cannot be had in the state of fallen nature by human powers; therefore revealed doctrine is necessary for instructing men about truths of this kind. Through which doctrine, as Chrysostom says, hom. 4 to the people, Christians, even peasants, learn more in one day than the philosophers attained in the whole time of their life: for straightway through sacred doctrine the untaught countrymen, once instructed, believe that God is one and that his providence exists and that he is to be worshipped and adored above all things. But even the most weighty philosophers attained some truths after much time and with an admixture of errors. For Plato traveled to Egypt and Italy to learn philosophy. Aristotle labored twenty years with Plato. And these men fell into very grave errors. For Plato said that matter is coeternal with God and is not created by him, and he posited a return of souls to bodies. Likewise he said that every soul of brute animals is immortal and that all are of the same species, and that God is the soul of the world. Aristotle also said that the world necessarily existed from eternity. Nor does he make mention of human eternal happiness. And in 7 Politics he asserted that men who are born deprived of some limb or in any way monstrous are to be killed. He also taught in the same place that abortion is to be procured, at least before the animation of the fetus. Then Cicero denied the providence of God, and to make men free he made them sacrilegious. Likewise with Aristotle he judged that indignation at the prosperity of inferiors is a virtue, which is absurd according to right reason. And in book 3 of Offices he taught that it is just to harm the guilty, which is against the law of nature. Moreover Galen, a man most brilliant in genius, taught that the soul is mortal and that it is a relation, that is, a harmony and concord of the humors. Augustine finally, endowed by nature with a most excellent genius, was held for nine years in many errors of the Manichees. Therefore if men of such great and excellent genius erred concerning natural things, revealed doctrine is necessary for all, lest error befall them in those matters in which ignorance or error is even opposed to Catholic doctrine.

TO the arguments, then, in opposition.

TO the first it is answered that it is true that when a man first comes to the use of reason he is most sufficiently enlightened by the natural light, synderesis dictating, so as to convert himself to the good to be pursued according to reason. But afterwards he will not be able to live his life without some error concerning natural things, unless he has been enlightened by revealed doctrine.

TO the second argument it is answered that revealed doctrine is not proportioned to natural truths as regards this, that it demonstrates them through itself, as they are demonstrable. But the proportion is in this, that through revealed doctrine a man is certified by a light of a higher order concerning those truths which by their nature are demonstrable.

TO the third argument it is answered that a faithful simple man is not of a better condition, other things being equal, than a faithful philosopher. And to the proof it is answered that a faithful philosopher is not less certain that God exists than a faithful simple man. And the reason is: because faith in the philosopher does not destroy the demonstration of the conclusion, but moreover as to certainty confirms it with supernatural certainty: although as to the obscurity of faith the philosopher cannot assent to a conclusion that is known. But on this matter we have said more, 2-2, q. 1, art. 5.

TO the fourth argument, I deny the minor. To the proof it is answered that divine revelation certifies at once and together that God exists and that God reveals, in exercised act. Just as at once and together we see light and colors.

TO the last argument it is answered that it is one thing to say that the whole salvation of man depends on the knowledge of certain natural truths: and another to say that the knowledge of them suffices for salvation. The second St. Thomas did not say. The first, however, is true. But observe that a dependence of this kind is rather as on a material cause and the capacity of nature, which is presupposed to grace, just as intellect and free will are presupposed; so too faith presupposes that there be no error in the intellect concerning certain natural truths. Whence that God exists is said to be a preamble to faith rather than to pertain per se to faith.

IT could be doubted third, concerning the third conclusion, which we noted in the solution to the second: whether theology and metaphysics differ in species, or rather in kind? And the reason for doubting was: because each is in the predicament of quality and in the species of habit. But the solution of this doubt will easily appear in the following article. In the meantime, however, know that this generic difference must be weighed according to the formal account of the knowable, which in respect of theology is elevated to such a degree that it surpasses by its abstraction every formal account of the natural knowable.

AND finally observe, concerning the solution to the second, that St. Thomas so answers as to deny expressly the consequence of the argument, and he assigns the reason: because concerning the same material knowable there can be several sciences under different accounts. From which it follows that Cajetan contends in vain with Scotus, who censures this solution, objecting that by it the necessity of theology is not saved. We, however, answer that it does not pertain to a good solution to prove the conclusion, but to defend it from the contrary objection. Which the solution of St. Thomas abundantly enough provides.

THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.

It is argued first for the negative side by the first argument of St. Thomas: every science properly so called must proceed from principles known per se: but theology does not proceed from principles known per se, therefore it is not a science. But if you reply, with St. Thomas, that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known by the light of a higher science; it is urged against this. For if someone were now to take the principles of optics, which are otherwise conclusions of geometry, and assented to them only on the authority of the master of geometry who hands them down, that man would not have a science properly of optics; therefore neither do we properly have the science of theology. The antecedent is proved. For the whole discourse of the disciple is founded on the human faith of the master. And it is confirmed. If the principles of our theology are not evident to us, it follows that our theology is only a science of consequences, not of conclusions, and hence does not differ from logic. The consequence is proved. For in this consequence: every man is risible, Christ is a man, therefore Christ is risible, the major is evident to the physicist, the minor belongs immediately to faith; therefore the theologian's office will be only to judge that the consequence is good.

It is argued second: a heretic who errs in one article of faith can syllogize from the other articles. And yet a syllogism of this kind in a heretic does not generate science, therefore neither in a Catholic. The minor is admitted by all. The consequence is proved. For those principles from which the heretic proceeds are also known per se in the light of the science of the Blessed; therefore if this suffices for our theology to be a science, that too will be a science, or neither. And it is confirmed, and I suppose, that a Catholic theologian falls into one error only, e.g. that there is no purgatory, or that the souls of the saints do not see God until the day of judgment. Then this theologian does not immediately lose the acquired habit of theology; therefore if in that man that habit is not a science, neither was it a science before in the same Catholic.

It is argued third: if a conclusion which is called theological is to be deduced from the principles of faith, this must be done either by an evident consequence or by a probable one. If by an evident one, then the conclusion is also of faith, e.g. Christ is risible. But if by a non-evident one; then the conclusion will for the most part be a probable opinion, therefore theology is not properly a science.

It is argued fourth: a science properly so called must be concerned with necessary conclusions and from necessary principles: but very many of the principles of our theology are contingent, e.g. that the Word was made flesh, that he suffered in the flesh, that Antichrist will be born, and other similar things: to which nevertheless we assent immediately through faith; therefore the conclusions which are gathered from such principles are not necessary, and consequently there is no science properly so called concerning them.

FOR the solution of this difficulty note that although Cajetan said in the preceding article that by the name of sacred doctrine St. Thomas did not understand faith determinately, or theology determinately, but took it indifferently for revealed doctrine either immediately, such as faith is, or mediately, such as theology is; nevertheless now in this article sacred doctrine is verified not of faith, but of the doctrine which inclines to the assent of the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith. For faith is related to this doctrine as the habit of first principles is to the natural sciences

Note secondly that Aristotle in 1 Posterior Analytics defined science with the utmost rigor, so that scarcely can any demonstration be brought into the middle for the form of that exemplar, except in mathematics. Just as Cicero also described the supreme orator, such as you will never find. But he will be a good orator who has come for the most part to the prototype. Wherefore Aristotle himself also taught, book 1 Ethics, ch. 3, that it is foolish to demand in every science and matter demonstrations equal in certainty and clarity. For this is the mark of an undisciplined mind. But in each science one must require demonstrations more or less exact according to the subject matter. For there is greater certainty and clarity in mathematics than in physics, inasmuch as physics, which is concerned with mobile being, shows its principles from the effect. But mathematics, since it deals with quantity, which is also plain to the senses, although it abstracts from sensible matter and from things subject to motions, nevertheless in the account of whole and part is most manifest to the intellect, and therefore the mathematical principles, Every whole is greater than its part, and, Things equal to one third thing are equal to one another, and similar ones, are most manifest to the intellect: since the terms of these principles are known to all. But in metaphysics, on account of the excessive abstraction of the object from intelligible matter, not all the principles are known per se to us. Whence very many metaphysical demonstrations are with difficulty comprehended by us. But indeed in moral matters, according to the Aristotelian precepts, a demonstration can scarcely be made, unless one adds that the demonstration is according to the subject matter. And nevertheless disciplines of this kind are called and are sciences.

Dubium 1 (continuatio)

Second conclusion. If we speak of theology as it is in us wayfarers, who do not know the principles evidently, but nevertheless assent to them most certainly and immediately by the light of faith; it is truly and properly a science, although imperfect. This conclusion is proved first. For a theological habit of this kind is an intellectual virtue, since it always inclines to the true: but this virtue is not the habit of first principles, since it is occupied with conclusions, nor is it prudence, because it is not occupied with singular things to be done here and now, nor is it art, because it is not occupied with things to be made, therefore it is wisdom or science. I prove the consequence. Since Aristotle, 6 Ethics, distributed the intellectual virtues into the aforesaid number.

But perhaps someone will reply that theology is a theological virtue, which is called faith. But against this is that faith does not assent to complex truths by discourse, but rests immediately on divine revelation, as we discussed at length in 2-2, q. 1, art. 1. And it is confirmed from the first canonical epistle of John, ch. 5: He that believeth in the Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself: therefore the theological habit is deservedly and properly called a science. It is proved secondly. For when Aristotle taught that science proceeds from evident things, he either understood from things evident to us or from things evident in themselves. If the first, then metaphysics will not be properly a science, which often proceeds from things evident in themselves only and not to us, e.g. when it is demonstrated that substances separate from matter are incorruptible: and that God is eternal, because he is immutable, and that he moves all things, because he is the first being; which principles are not known per se to us, such as that God exists, or that an angel exists. But if he understands it of principles known per se in themselves; then I argue thus. Theological principles are most certain and most evident in themselves, e.g. that the Father begets the Son, therefore on this side it will not cease to be properly a science.

BUT someone will say that the principles of the other sciences, although they are not immediately evident to us, nevertheless become evident to us a posteriori, e.g. from the motion of things, evident to us, we gather that God exists and that he is one, and similar things, and that nature is the principle of motion and rest: but this does not happen in theological principles. For their assent always remains obscure in us. I admit that this is so. But hence I shall make a stronger argument. If the evidence of the conclusions which are deduced from such principles need not be produced in us from the evidence of the principles in themselves, then it is not per se necessary that the scientific assent of the conclusion receive its evidence from the principles: since it is granted that the principles, as principles, do not have evidence as regards us, but only have evidence from without and from the effect. And it is confirmed. If for the account of a proper science it suffices that the principles have in us a certain evidence, as it were borrowed from the effects; and on account of it the assent of the principles is held as certain and necessary, so that from there the effects may in turn be demonstrated; then much more ought it to suffice that the principles of our theology have their certainty from God himself, infallibly revealing to us by the light of faith that those principles are most true. The conclusion is proved third. When Aristotle said, no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge; he did not exclude our theology from the account of science. For we theologians have either knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge, namely divine faith, which surpasses all human science, indeed even the natural light itself. And it is confirmed. For evidence is required in the principles to the extent that it conduces to the intellect being convinced and adhering firmly to the truth: but the certainty of our faith alone makes the intellect adhere more strongly to the assent of the principles than any natural habit, therefore our theology will with better right be called properly a science than all the other human disciplines. And also most rightly is our theology called by St. Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and book 12 On the Trinity, ch. 14, a science by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened. But he says that faith is begotten by this science, because it is the theologian's office by reasoning to remove the impediments by which unbelievers are held back from receiving the faith. St. Jerome too, in the epistle to Paulinus, tome 4, says: Let us learn on earth such a science as may persevere with us in heaven. It must be observed, however, that what we said in the second conclusion, that our theology is an imperfect science, can be understood in two ways. In one way by comparison with the other sciences. And thus it is not to be called imperfect, but rather simply much more perfect than all human sciences: since it surpasses them incomparably in certainty. It will, however, be imperfect in a certain respect on account of its non-evidence. In the other way it can be called imperfect by comparison with the perfection which it can have within its own species. As an infant is an imperfect man: because he cannot yet exercise the perfect actions of his proper species. And in this way our theology is truly imperfect, because for this present state it lacks the evidence which it will have within its own species in the fatherland, when that which is perfect shall come. For then the principles to which we now assent by faith we shall see by the light of glory. In the meantime, however, we shall sit under the shadow of him whom we desire, however sweet its fruit may be to our palate. And the contrary was the error of certain men, who are called the Illuminati in Spain, who boasted that they had evidence of the mysteries of faith.

TO the arguments in opposition it is answered. TO the first St. Thomas answers very well that it suffices for the character of a science that its principles be known per se by the light of a higher science. But to the rejoinder it is answered that in that case that man would not have science, but human faith as regards the principles immediately, and as regards the conclusions mediately, whose assent would be called an opinion founded on human faith. And then I deny the consequence. For the parallel adduced by St. Thomas is not so to be understood that one man has only optics and another geometry. For in that way optics would not be a science, according to the Aristotelian doctrine: no one will know unless he has had knowledge of the premises, or something greater than knowledge. But that man does not have knowledge of the premises, but mere human faith; therefore he cannot have the science of optics. The parallel is therefore to be understood as regards this, that just as the science of optics receives its principles from another science; and this does not prevent it from being a science: so our theology receives its principles from the blessed science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed. But there is a great difference. For our theology can be a science even if it is not together with the blessed science; but optics cannot be a science unless it has been conjoined with the science of geometry in the same intellect. And the reason for this difference is: because the principles of theology are communicated to us from the blessed science of God through the light of the supernatural order, which is the light of faith, which is firmer than every human science, although the evidence of the science of the Blessed is not communicated to us. But the principles of optics in one who lacks geometry are not communicated to him except through human faith, which ground of assenting is weak, and hence he will not have science of the conclusions either. And in this way let the example be understood which St. Thomas brings, On Truth, q. 14, art. 10, where he compares our theology to the discipline of some disciple who believes the principles on the authority of the master. But there is surely a difference, that our master is God himself, who opens our ears that we may hear him as a master and be truly taught of God, as is said John 6. And because the authority of this master is altogether infallible, our theology, reasoning from there to the conclusions, properly has the account of a science. To the confirmation the consequence is denied. For the assent of that conclusion, Christ is risible, is produced jointly from the assent of the premises. And to that extent, from the light of the antecedent applied through a good consequence, there is caused an acquired light of a higher order than the natural. And that causes certainty in the assent of the conclusion. Which is more evident when each premise is of faith.

TO the second argument it is denied that a heretic can be a true theologian, even if he was previously a Catholic. And the reason is: because now he believes all the principles by human faith alone or by opinion. And to the confirmation it is answered that the other sciences are not lost on account of one error concerning a conclusion. But if the error were concerning the formal account of the principles; then the whole science would be corrupted: although a certain aptitude would remain, as it were the corpse of a science. And because a heretic errs concerning the formal account of the principles, which is divine revelation, for believing the things which the Church proposes; therefore consequently the whole theology, which rests on those principles, is straightway destroyed, just as also the whole faith perishes.

TO the third argument the most learned Master Friar Dominic de Soto, 1 Posterior Analytics, q. 2, at the confirmation of the seventh argument, says that when a conclusion is deduced from a principle of faith by an evident consequence, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith. Wherefore he judges that only those conclusions pertain to theological science which are deduced from the principles of faith by probable consequences. But this opinion is false. It is proved first. For it would follow that our theology is mere opinion. The consequence is plain. For from principles however certain and evident, through a probable consequence, nothing but opinion can be generated; as is plain in the argumentation which is taken from evident examples, e.g. Peter in some business became rich; and Paul likewise; therefore if you have done business in that way, you will be rich. Here nothing but an opinion of the consequent is generated. Likewise it is false that he says that it is similarly of faith that Christ is a man and that Christ is risible. For if anyone confessed that Christ is a perfect man, but denied that he is risible; because he is of the opinion that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. Since it has not been defined by the Church up to now that Christ is risible. But if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, namely human and divine; then whoever denied that Christ is risible would be a heretic. Because he would be opposing the doctrine of the Church, which is the pillar and ground of truth.

It is answered, therefore, to the argument that the conclusions which are deduced from principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident, by a good consequence, are properly conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith not immediately, but mediately: and the opposite of them is said to be an error concerning faith mediately: and he who holds the contrary comes into suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher: because he is not to be believed to deny the things which are known by the natural light, and consequently he is believed to deny a principle of faith. This opinion my teacher Cano holds, in book 12 On Theological Places, ch. 2.

TO the fourth argument it is answered that certain first principles of theology are most necessary, e.g. that God is three and one, that the Father begets the Son. Others, however, there are which, considered from their proper terms, seem to be contingent, e.g. that Christ was crowned with thorns. But if these very things are considered as they are subject to divine revelation, they are altogether necessary: just as it is necessary that God be truthful, so that he can neither be deceived nor deceive. And this suffices for the certainty of theological science.

Prologus auctoris ad lectorem

In D. Thomae prooemium meditatio

Quaestio I: De sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat

Articulus I: Utrum sit necessarium praeter Physicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi

Commentarium

Dubium 1

Dubium 2

Articulus II: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia

Commentarium

THE principal doubt is concerning the first conclusion: whether sacred doctrine is truly and properly a science.

First conclusion (Latin text without a Spanish translation)

Dubium 1 (continuatio)

Dubium 2

Dubium 3

Articulus III: Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia

Commentarium

Dubium 1 (pars prior)

Dubium 1 (continuatio)

Articulus IV: Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica

Commentarium

Dubium 1: Objectiones

Dubium 1: Commentarium

Dubium 1: Responsiones

Articulus V: Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis

Commentarium

Dubium 1 (textus Latinus sine versione Hispanica)

Dubium 1

Articulus VI: Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia

Commentarium

Dubium I

Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae

Commentarium

Dubium I

Textus Augustini ante articulum 8

Articulus VIII: Utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa

Commentarium

Dubium 1

Dubium 2

Dubium 3

Dubium 4

Dubium 5

Dubium 6

Articulus IX: Utrum Sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris

Commentarium

Commentarium; Dubium I

Articulus X: Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus

Commentarium

Dubium 1

Dubium 2

Dubium 3

Dubium 4

Dubium 5

Dubium 6

Dubium 7

Dubium 8

Dubium 9

Quaestio II: De Deo, an Deus sit

Articulus I: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum

Articulus II: Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile

Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit

Quaestio III: De Dei simplicitate

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit corpus

Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae

Articulus III: Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia, vel natura

Articulus IV: Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse

Articulus V: Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo

Articulus VI: Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia

Articulus VII: Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex

Articulus VIII: Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat

Quaestio IV: De Dei perfectione

Articulus I: Utrum Deus sit perfectus

Articulus II: Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum

Articulus III: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo

Quaestio V: De bono in communi

Articulus I: Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente

Articulus II: Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens

Articulus III: Utrum omne ens sit bonum

Articulus IV: Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis

Articulus V: Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine

Articulus VI: Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile