Theaetetus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Theaetetus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 142
Section 143
Section 144
Section 145
Section 146
Section 147
Section 148
Section 149
Section 150
Section 151
Section 152
Section 153
Section 154
Section 155
Section 156
Section 157
Section 158
Section 159
Section 160
Section 161
Section 162
Section 163
Section 164
Section 165
Section 166
Section 167
Section 168
Section 169
Section 170
Section 171
Section 172
Section 173
Section 174
Section 175
Section 176
Section 177
Section 178
Section 179
Section 180
Section 181
Section 182
Section 183
Section 184
Section 185
Section 186
Section 187
Section 188
Section 189
Section 190
Section 191
Section 192
Section 193
Section 194
Section 195
Section 196
Section 197
Section 198
Section 199
Section 200
Section 201
Section 202
Section 203
Section 204
Section 205
Section 206
SOC. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?
THEAET. What experience?
SOC. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.
THEAET. That is very true.
SOC. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?
THEAET. Yes, that is all true.
SOC. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?
THEAET. No, we must not.
SOC. Now what are we intended to understand by rational explanation? I think it means one of three things.
THEAET. What are they?
SOC. The first would be making one’s own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?
THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.
SOC. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.
THEAET. True.