Theaetetus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Theaetetus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 142
Section 143
Section 144
Section 145
Section 146
Section 147
Section 148
Section 149
Section 150
Section 151
Section 152
Section 153
Section 154
Section 155
Section 156
Section 157
Section 158
Section 159
Section 160
Section 161
Section 162
Section 163
Section 164
Section 165
Section 166
Section 167
Section 168
Section 169
Section 170
Section 171
Section 172
Section 173
Section 174
Section 175
Section 176
Section 177
Section 178
Section 179
Section 180
Section 181
Section 182
Section 183
Section 184
Section 185
Section 186
Section 187
Section 188
Section 189
Section 190
Section 191
Section 192
Section 193
Section 194
Section 195
Section 196
Section 197
Section 198
Section 199
Section 200
Section 201
Section 202
SO. for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even itself or that or each or alone or this or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?
THEAET. That was it exactly.
SOC. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?
THEAET. Precisely.
SOC. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?
THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.
SOC. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.
THEAET. What point?
SOC. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.
THEAET. Is that not right?
SOC. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.
THEAET. What examples?
SOC. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?
THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.