Theaetetus

Plato

Theaetetus

Plato (428–347 BC)

Plato's Theaetetus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.


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SOC. But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

THEAET. And properly so.

SOC. Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

THEAET. Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?

SOC. After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax —; when this is the case, and in such men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

SOC. Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds.

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