Statesman
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Statesman in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 257
Section 258
Section 259
Section 260
Section 261
Section 262
Section 263
Section 264
Section 265
Section 266
Section 267
Section 268
Section 269
Section 270
Section 271
Section 272
Section 273
Section 274
Section 275
Section 276
Section 277
Section 278
Section 279
Section 280
Section 281
Section 282
Section 283
Section 284
Section 285
Section 286
Section 287
Section 288
Section 289
Section 290
Section 291
Section 292
Section 293
Section 294
Section 295
Section 296
Section 297
Section 298
Section 299
Section 300
Section 301
Section 302
Str. Can we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that arise and are destined to arise in such kinds of government, when they are based upon such a foundation, and must conduct their affairs in accordance with written laws and with customs, without knowledge? For every one can see that any other art built upon such a foundation would ruin all its works that are so produced. Ought we not rather to wonder at the stability that inheres in the state? For states have labored under such conditions for countless ages, nevertheless some of them are lasting and are not overthrown. Many, to be sure, like ships that founder at sea, are destroyed, have been destroyed, and will be destroyed hereafter, through the worthlessness of their captains and crews who have the greatest ignorance of the greatest things, men who have no knowledge of statesmanship, but think they have in every respect most perfect knowledge of this above all other sciences.
Y. Soc. Very true.
Str. Is it, then, our duty to see which of these not right forms of government is the least difficult to live with, though all are difficult, and which is the most oppressive, although this is somewhat aside from the subject we had proposed for ourselves? On the whole, however, perhaps all of us have some such motive in mind in all that we are doing.
Y. Soc. Yes, it is our duty, of course.
Str. Well then, you may say that of the three forms, the same is both the hardest and the easiest.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. Just this: I mean that there are three forms of government, as we said at the beginning of the discussion which has now flowed in upon us—monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.
Y. Soc. Yes, there were those three.
Str. Let us, then, by dividing each of these into two parts, make six, and by distinguishing the right government from these, a seventh.
Y. Soc. How shall we make the division?
Str. We said that monarchy comprised royalty and tyranny, and the rule of the few comprised aristocracy, which has a name of good omen, and oligarchy; but to the rule of the many we gave then only a single name, democracy; now, however, that also must be divided.
Y. Soc. How? On what principle shall we divide that?
Str. On the same that we used for the others, though the name of this form is already twofold in meaning. At any rate, the distinction between ruling according to law and without law applies alike to this and the rest.
Y. Soc. Yes, it does.
Str. Before, when we were in search of the right government, this division was of no use, as we showed at the time but now that we have set that apart and have decided that the others are the only available forms of government, the principle of lawfulness and lawlessness bisects each of them.
Y. Soc. So it seems, from what has been said.
Str. Monarchy, then, when bound by good written rules, which we call laws, is the best of all the six; but without law it is hard and most oppressive to live with.