Statesman
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Statesman in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 257
Section 258
Section 259
Section 260
Section 261
Section 262
Section 263
Section 264
Section 265
Section 266
Section 267
Section 268
Section 269
Section 270
Section 271
Section 272
Section 273
Section 274
Section 275
Section 276
Section 277
Section 278
Section 279
Section 280
Section 281
Section 282
Section 283
Section 284
Section 285
Section 286
Section 287
Section 288
Section 289
Section 290
Section 291
Section 292
Section 293
Section 294
Str. You got ahead of me a little with your question, Socrates; for I was just going to ask whether you accepted all I have said, or were displeased with anything. But now it is clear that we shall have to discuss the question of the propriety of government without laws.
Y. Soc. Of course we shall.
Str. In a sense, however, it is clear that law-making belongs to the science of kingship; but the best thing is not that the laws be in power, but that the man who is wise and of kingly nature be ruler. Do you see why?
Y. Soc. Why is it?
Str. Because law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and must just for one and all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing, I may say, in human life is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and for all time. We agree to that, I suppose?
Y. Soc. Yes, of course.
Str. But we see that law aims at pretty nearly this very thing, like a stubborn and ignorant man who allows no one to do anything contrary to his command, or even to ask a question, not even if something new occurs to some one, which is better than the rule he has himself ordained.
Y. Soc. True; the law treats each and all of us exactly as you describe.
Str. So that which is persistently simple is inapplicable to things which are never simple?
Y. Soc. I suppose so.
Str. Why in the world, then, is it necessary to make laws, since law is not the most perfect right? We must ask the reason for this.
Y. Soc. Yes, of course.
Str. Well, there are here at Athens, as in other cities, classes for practice in athletics to prepare for contests in running or the like, are there not?
Y. Soc. Yes, a great many of them.
Str. Now let us recall to mind the orders given by the professional trainers when they are in charge of such classes.
Y. Soc. What do you mean?
Str. They think they cannot go into details in individual cases and order what is best for each person’s physique; they think they must employ a rougher method and give a general rule which will be good for the physique of the majority.
Y. Soc. Good.
Str. And therefore they nowadays assign equal exercise to whole classes; they make them begin at the same time and stop at the same time, whether they run or wrestle or practise any other kind of bodily exercise.
Y. Soc. That is true.