Statesman

Plato

Statesman

Plato (428–347 BC)

Plato's Statesman in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.


Section 257

Section 258

Section 259

Section 260

Section 261

Section 262

Section 263

Section 264

Section 265

Section 266

Section 267

Section 268

Section 269

Section 270

Section 271

Section 272

Section 273

Section 274

Section 275

Section 276

Section 277

Section 278

Section 279

Section 280

Section 281

Section 282

Section 283

Section 284

Section 285

Section 286

Section 287

Section 288

Section 289

Section 290

Section 291

Section 292

Section 293

Section 294

Str. You got ahead of me a little with your question, Socrates; for I was just going to ask whether you accepted all I have said, or were displeased with anything. But now it is clear that we shall have to discuss the question of the propriety of government without laws.

Y. Soc. Of course we shall.

Str. In a sense, however, it is clear that law-making belongs to the science of kingship; but the best thing is not that the laws be in power, but that the man who is wise and of kingly nature be ruler. Do you see why?

Y. Soc. Why is it?

Str. Because law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and must just for one and all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing, I may say, in human life is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and for all time. We agree to that, I suppose?

Y. Soc. Yes, of course.

Str. But we see that law aims at pretty nearly this very thing, like a stubborn and ignorant man who allows no one to do anything contrary to his command, or even to ask a question, not even if something new occurs to some one, which is better than the rule he has himself ordained.

Y. Soc. True; the law treats each and all of us exactly as you describe.

Str. So that which is persistently simple is inapplicable to things which are never simple?

Y. Soc. I suppose so.

Str. Why in the world, then, is it necessary to make laws, since law is not the most perfect right? We must ask the reason for this.

Y. Soc. Yes, of course.

Str. Well, there are here at Athens, as in other cities, classes for practice in athletics to prepare for contests in running or the like, are there not?

Y. Soc. Yes, a great many of them.

Str. Now let us recall to mind the orders given by the professional trainers when they are in charge of such classes.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. They think they cannot go into details in individual cases and order what is best for each person’s physique; they think they must employ a rougher method and give a general rule which will be good for the physique of the majority.

Y. Soc. Good.

Str. And therefore they nowadays assign equal exercise to whole classes; they make them begin at the same time and stop at the same time, whether they run or wrestle or practise any other kind of bodily exercise.

Y. Soc. That is true.

Section 295

Section 296

Section 297

Section 298

Section 299

Section 300

Section 301

Section 302

Section 303

Section 304

Section 305

Section 306

Section 307

Section 308

Section 309

Section 310

Section 311

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