Sophist

Theaet. I will, to the best of my ability.

Str. Theaetetus sits. It isn’t a long sentence, is it?

Theaet. No, it is fairly short.

Str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

Theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

Str. And how about this sentence?

Theaet. What one?

Str. Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.

Theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

Str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

Theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true.

Str. The true one states facts as they are about you.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

Theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

Str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

Theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

Str. And secondly it has a subject.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And if you are not the subject, there is none.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Str. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

Theaet. Quite right.

Str. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

Theaet. Yes, very truly.

Str. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

Theaet. How is it plain?

Str. You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures and the several differences between them.

Theaet. Give me an opportunity.

Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

Theaet. True.

Str. And in speech we know there is just—

Theaet. What?

Str. Affirmation and negation

Theaet. Yes, we know that.