Sophist

Plato

Sophist

Plato (428–347 BC)

Plato's Sophist in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.


Section 216

Section 217

Section 218

Section 219

Section 220

Section 221

Section 222

Section 223

Section 224

Section 225

Section 226

Section 227

Section 228

Section 229

Section 230

Section 231

Section 232

Section 233

Section 234

Section 235

Section 236

Section 237

Section 238

Section 239

Section 240

Section 241

Section 242

Section 243

Section 244

Section 245

Section 246

Section 247

Section 248

Section 249

Section 250

Str. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.

Theaet. What questions? Remind me.

Str. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

Theaet. That is right.

Str. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

Theaet. Yes, I do.

Str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

Theaet. By no means.

Str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

Theaet. Of course not.

Str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

Theaet. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

Str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

Theaet. Apparently.

Str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

Theaet. You are about right.

Str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

Theaet. What indeed?

Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?

Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.

Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

Theaet. Of course I do.

Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

Section 251

Section 252

Section 253

Section 254

Section 255

Section 256

Section 257

Section 258

Section 259

Section 260

Section 261

Section 262

Section 263

Section 264

Section 265

Section 266

Section 267

Section 268

↑ Top of work