Sophist

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

Theaet. Yes, they agree to this also.

Str. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

Theaet. Yes, they say that.

Str. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

Theaet. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

Str. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

Theaet. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon’s teeth among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

Theaet. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

Str. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exit. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

Theaet. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

Str. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.

Theaet. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.