Sophist

Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

Theaet. Why?

Str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

Theaet. Yes, it must.

Str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

Theaet. I understand.

Str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

Theaet. It is a hard choice that you offer me.

Str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

Theaet. So it will.

Str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

Theaet. That certainly seems to be true.

Str. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

Theaet. Precisely.

Str. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

Theaet. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.