Sophist

Str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

Theaet. You are perfectly right.

Str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say being. For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.— If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

Theaet. Not in the least.

Str. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one what they mean when they say being?

Theaet. Of course we must.

Str. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Is it what you call one, using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

Theaet. What is their next answer, Stranger?

Str. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

Theaet. Why not?

Str. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

Theaet. Of course it is.

Str. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.

Theaet. Why?

Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

Theaet. True.

Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.

Theaet. Necessarily.

Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,Parmenides Fr. 8.43then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

Theaet. Certainly.