Sophist
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Sophist in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 216
Section 217
Section 218
Section 219
Section 220
Section 221
Section 222
Section 223
Section 224
Section 225
Section 226
Section 227
Section 228
Section 229
Section 230
Section 231
Section 232
Section 233
Section 234
Section 235
Section 236
Section 237
Section 238
Str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.
Theaet. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.
Str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?
Theaet. Of course.
Str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?
Theaet. Certainly not.
Str. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.
Theaet. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.
Str. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.
Theaet. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.
Str. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?
Theaet. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.
Str. When we say things which are not, do we not attribute plurality to them?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And in saying a thing which is not, do we not equally attribute the singular number?
Theaet. Obviously.
Str. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.
Theaet. Very true.
Str. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?
Theaet. Absolutely.
Str. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject.
Theaet. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?
Str. Why, my dear fellow, don’t you see, by the very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?
Theaet. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.
Str. You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say that which is not. You understand surely?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?
Theaet. Yes, of course.