Republic
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Republic in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Paul Shorey's English translation.
Book 1
Section 327
Section 328
Section 329
Section 330
Section 331
Section 332
Section 333
Section 334
Section 335
Section 336
Section 337
Section 338
Section 339
Section 340
Section 341
Section 342
Section 343
Section 344
Section 345
Section 346
Section 347
Section 348
Section 349
Section 350
Section 351
Section 352
Section 353
Section 354
Book 2
Section 357
Section 358
Section 359
Section 360
Section 361
Section 362
Section 363
Section 364
Section 365
Section 366
Section 367
Section 368
Section 369
Section 370
Section 371
Section 372
Section 373
Section 374
Section 375
Section 376
Section 377
Section 378
Section 379
Section 380
Section 381
Section 382
Section 383
Book 3
Section 386
Section 387
Section 388
Section 389
Section 390
Section 391
Section 392
Section 393
Section 394
Section 395
Section 396
Section 397
Section 398
Section 399
Section 400
Section 401
Section 402
Section 403
Section 404
Section 405
Section 406
Section 407
Section 408
Section 409
Section 410
Section 411
Section 412
Section 413
Section 414
Section 415
Section 416
Section 417
Book 4
Section 419
Section 420
Section 421
Section 422
Section 423
Section 424
Section 425
Section 426
Section 427
Section 428
Section 429
Section 430
Section 431
Section 432
Section 433
Section 434
Section 435
Section 436
Section 437
Section 438
Section 439
Section 440
Section 441
Section 442
Section 443
Section 444
Section 445
Book 5
Section 449
Section 450
Section 451
Section 452
Section 453
Section 454
Section 455
Section 456
Section 457
Section 458
Section 459
Section 460
Section 461
Section 462
Section 463
Section 464
Section 465
Section 466
Section 467
Section 468
Section 469
Section 470
Section 471
Section 472
Section 473
Section 474
Section 475
And, in short, there is no pretext you do not allege and there is nothing you shrink from saying to justify you in not rejecting any who are in the bloom of their prime. If it is your pleasure, he said, to take me as your example of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument. Again, said I, do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of wine? They welcome every wine on any pretext. They do, indeed. And so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of honor, if they can’t get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company. And if they can’t be honored by great men and dignitaries, are satisfied with honor from little men and nobodies. But honor they desire and must have. Yes, indeed. Admit, then, or reject my proposition. When we say a man is keen about something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not? The whole, he said. Then the lover of wisdom, too, we shall affirm, desires all wisdom, not a part and a part not. Certainly. The student, then, who is finical about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know by reason what is useful and what is not, we shall say is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom, just as we say that one who is dainty about his food is not really hungry, has not an appetite for food, and is not a lover of food, but a poor feeder. We shall rightly say so. But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, shall we not? To which Glaucon replied, You will then be giving the name to a numerous and strange band, for all the lovers of spectacles are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some new thing are a very queer lot to be reckoned among philosophers. You couldn’t induce them to attend a serious debate or any such entertainment, but as if they had farmed out their ears to listen to every chorus in the land, they run about to all the Dionysiac festivals, never missing one, either in the towns or in the country-villages. Are we to designate all these, then, and similar folk and all the practitioners of the minor arts as philosophers? Not at all, I said; but they do bear a certain likeness to philosophers. Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers? Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamored, said I. Right again, said he; but in what sense do you mean it? It would be by no means easy to explain it to another, I said, but I think that you will grant me this. What? That since the fair and honorable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are two.