Republic
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Republic in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Paul Shorey's English translation.
Book 1
Section 327
Section 328
Section 329
Section 330
Section 331
Section 332
Section 333
Section 334
Section 335
Section 336
Section 337
Section 338
Section 339
Section 340
Section 341
Section 342
Section 343
Section 344
Section 345
Section 346
Section 347
Section 348
Section 349
Section 350
Section 351
Section 352
Section 353
Section 354
Book 2
Section 357
Section 358
Section 359
Section 360
Section 361
Section 362
Section 363
Section 364
Section 365
Section 366
Section 367
Section 368
Section 369
Section 370
Section 371
Section 372
Section 373
Section 374
Section 375
Section 376
Section 377
Section 378
Section 379
Section 380
Section 381
Section 382
Section 383
Book 3
Section 386
Section 387
Section 388
Section 389
Section 390
Section 391
Section 392
Section 393
Section 394
Section 395
Section 396
Section 397
Section 398
Section 399
Section 400
Section 401
Section 402
Section 403
Section 404
Section 405
Section 406
Section 407
Section 408
Section 409
Section 410
Section 411
Section 412
Section 413
Section 414
Section 415
Section 416
Section 417
Book 4
Section 419
Section 420
Section 421
Section 422
Section 423
Section 424
Section 425
Section 426
Section 427
Section 428
Section 429
Section 430
Section 431
Section 432
Section 433
Section 434
Section 435
Section 436
Section 437
Section 438
Section 439
Section 440
Section 441
Section 442
Section 443
Section 444
Section 445
Book 5
Section 449
Section 450
Section 451
Section 452
Section 453
Section 454
Section 455
Section 456
Section 457
Section 458
Section 459
Section 460
Section 461
Section 462
It is, indeed, he said. Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints of the good and do not suit those of the evil? By all means, he said. Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one? We do not. Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths? By all means, he said. But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants? Of course. And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as mine and not mine, and similarly with regard to the word alien?Precisely so. That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression mine and not mine of the same things in the same way. Much the best. And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man. For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for integration with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure. The same, he said, and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism. That is the kind of a state, then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole. Inevitably, he said, if it is well governed. It is time, I said, to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies the qualities agreed upon in our argument. We must, he said.