Republic
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Republic in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Paul Shorey's English translation.
Book 1
Section 327
Section 328
Section 329
Section 330
Section 331
Section 332
Section 333
Section 334
Section 335
Section 336
Section 337
Section 338
Section 339
Section 340
Section 341
Section 342
Section 343
Section 344
Section 345
Section 346
Section 347
Section 348
Section 349
Section 350
Section 351
Section 352
Section 353
Section 354
Book 2
Section 357
Section 358
Section 359
Section 360
Section 361
Section 362
Section 363
Section 364
Section 365
Section 366
Section 367
Section 368
Section 369
Section 370
Section 371
Section 372
Section 373
Section 374
Section 375
Section 376
Section 377
Section 378
Section 379
Section 380
Section 381
Section 382
Section 383
Book 3
Section 386
Section 387
Section 388
Section 389
Section 390
Section 391
Section 392
Section 393
Section 394
Section 395
Section 396
Section 397
Section 398
Section 399
Section 400
Section 401
Section 402
Section 403
Section 404
Section 405
Section 406
Section 407
Section 408
Section 409
Section 410
Section 411
Section 412
Section 413
Section 414
Section 415
Section 416
Section 417
Book 4
Section 419
Section 420
Section 421
Section 422
Section 423
Section 424
Section 425
Section 426
Section 427
Section 428
Section 429
Section 430
Section 431
Section 432
Section 433
Section 434
Section 435
Section 436
Section 437
Section 438
Section 439
Section 440
Section 441
Section 442
Section 443
Section 444
What you say is entirely true, Socrates. Well, said I, if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is in them, I think we should not be much mistaken. No indeed, we should not, he said. Shall we affirm it, then? Let us so affirm. So be it, then, said I; next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice. Obviously. Must not this be a kind of civil war of these three principles, their meddlesomeness and interference with one another’s functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general, all turpitude. Precisely this, he replied. Then, said I, to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so. How so? Because, said I, these are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference. In what respect? he said. Healthful things surely engender health and diseaseful disease. Yes. Then does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice? Of necessity. But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature. Yes, that is so. And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? Exactly so, he said. Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness. It is so. Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice? Of necessity.