Republic
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Republic in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Paul Shorey's English translation.
Book 1
Section 327
Section 328
Section 329
Section 330
Section 331
Section 332
Section 333
Section 334
Section 335
Section 336
Section 337
Section 338
Section 339
Section 340
Section 341
Section 342
Section 343
Section 344
Section 345
Section 346
Section 347
Section 348
Section 349
Section 350
Section 351
Section 352
Section 353
Section 354
Book 2
Section 357
Section 358
Section 359
Section 360
Section 361
Section 362
Section 363
Section 364
Section 365
Section 366
Section 367
Section 368
Section 369
Section 370
Section 371
Section 372
Section 373
Section 374
Section 375
Section 376
Section 377
Section 378
Section 379
Section 380
Section 381
Section 382
Section 383
Book 3
Section 386
Section 387
Section 388
Section 389
Section 390
Section 391
Section 392
Section 393
Section 394
Section 395
Section 396
Section 397
Section 398
Section 399
Section 400
Section 401
Section 402
Section 403
Section 404
Section 405
Section 406
Section 407
Section 408
Section 409
Section 410
Section 411
Section 412
Section 413
Section 414
Section 415
Section 416
Section 417
Book 4
Section 419
Section 420
Section 421
Section 422
Section 423
Section 424
Section 425
Section 426
Section 427
Section 428
Section 429
Section 430
Section 431
Section 432
Section 433
Section 434
Section 435
Section 436
Section 437
Section 438
Section 439
Section 440
Section 441
Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture? We have to assume it as a third, he said. Yes, said I, provided it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive. That is not hard to be shown, he said; for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late. Yes, by heaven, excellently said, I replied; and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above: He smote his breast and chided thus his heart. Hom. Od. 20.17 For there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing. You are entirely right, he said. Through these waters, then, said I, we have with difficulty made our way and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us. That is so. Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise? Surely. And so whereby and as the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way? Necessarily. Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just. That too is quite inevitable. But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function. I don’t think we have forgotten, he said. We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair. We must indeed remember, he said. Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally? Assuredly.