Republic
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Republic in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Paul Shorey's English translation.
Book 1
Section 327
Section 328
Section 329
Section 330
Section 331
Section 332
Section 333
Section 334
Section 335
Section 336
Section 337
Section 338
Section 339
Section 340
Section 341
Section 342
Section 343
Section 344
Section 345
Section 346
Section 347
Section 348
Section 349
Section 350
Section 351
Section 352
Section 353
Section 354
Book 2
Section 357
Section 358
Section 359
Section 360
Section 361
Section 362
Section 363
Section 364
Section 365
Section 366
Section 367
Section 368
Section 369
Section 370
Section 371
Section 372
Section 373
Section 374
Section 375
Section 376
Section 377
Section 378
Section 379
And I replied, Adeimantus, we are not poets, you and I at present, but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables. Right, he said; but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods, what would they be? Something like this, I said. The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse. We must. And is not God of course good in reality and always to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But further, no good thing is harmful, is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful harm? By no means. Can that which does not harm do any evil? Not that either. But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either? How could it? Once more, is the good beneficent? Yes. It is the cause, then, of welfare? Yes. Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless. Entirely so, he said. Neither, then, could God, said I, since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause. For good things are far fewer with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God. What you say seems to me most true, he replied. Then, said I, we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods when he says Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and are filled with Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts that are evil, Hom. Il. 24.527-8 and to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled— Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his portion, Hom. Il. 24.530 but the man for whom he does not blend the lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil— Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world, Hom. Il. 24.532 nor will we tolerate the saying that Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals.