Republic
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Republic in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Paul Shorey's English translation.
Book 1
Section 327
Section 328
Section 329
Section 330
Section 331
Section 332
Section 333
Section 334
Section 335
Section 336
Section 337
Section 338
Section 339
Section 340
Section 341
Section 342
Section 343
Section 344
Section 345
Section 346
Section 347
Section 348
Did you hear, said I, all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man? I heard, he said, but I am not convinced. Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true? Of course I wish it, he said. If then we oppose him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders. Quite so, he said. Which method do you like best? said I. This one, he said. Come then, Thrasymachus, I said, go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete. I affirm it, he said, and have told you my reasons. Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice? Of course. Justice the virtue and injustice the vice? It is likely, you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn’t pay. But what then, pray? The opposite, he replied. What! justice vice? No, but a most noble simplicity or goodness of heart. Then do you call injustice badness of heart? No, but goodness of judgement. Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good? Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice, he said, and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing, he said, if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described. I am not unaware of your meaning in that, I said; but this is what surprised me, that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class. Well, I do so class them, he said. That, said I, is a stiffer proposition, my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer.