Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Section 36
Section 37
Section 38
Section 39
Section 40
Section 41
Section 42
Section 43
Section 44
Section 45
Section 46
Section 47
Section 48
Soc. And shall we not find them full of ineffable pleasures? Or must I remind you of the anger?Which stirs a man, though very wise, to wrath,And sweeter is than honey from the comb,Hom. Il. 18.108-109 and of the pleasures mixed with pains, which we find in mournings and longings?
Pro. No, you need not remind me; those things occur just as you suggest.
Soc. And you remember, too, how people enjoy weeping at tragedies?
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. And are you aware of the condition of the soul at comedies, how there also we have a mixture of pain and pleasure?
Pro. I do not quite understand.
Soc. Indeed it is by no means easy, Protarchus, to understand such a condition under those circumstances.
Pro. No at least I do not find it so.
Soc. Well, then, let us take this under consideration, all the more because of its obscurity; then we can more readily understand the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases.
Pro. Please go on.
Soc. Would you say that envy, which was mentioned just now, was a pain of the soul, or not?
Pro. I say it is.
Soc. But certainly we see the envious man rejoicing in the misfortunes of his neighbors.
Pro. Yes, very much so.
Soc. Surely ignorance is an evil, as is also what we call stupidity.
Pro. Surely.
Soc. Next, then, consider the nature of the ridiculous.
Pro. Please proceed.
Soc. The ridiculous is in its main aspect a kind of vice which gives its name to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.
Pro. You mean Know thyself, Socrates?
Soc. Yes; and the opposite of that, in the language of the inscription, would evidently be not to know oneself at all.
Pro. Of course.
Soc. Protarchus, try to divide this into three.
Pro. How do you mean? I am afraid I can never do it.
Soc. Then you say that I must now make the division?
Pro. Yes, I say so, and I beg you to do so, besides.
Soc. Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their condition in one of three ways?
Pro. How is that?
Soc. First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is richer than he is.
Pro. Certainly a good many are affected in that way.
Soc. And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than is the case.
Pro. Certainly.