Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Section 36
Section 37
Section 38
Section 39
Section 40
Section 41
Section 42
Section 43
Section 44
Section 45
Soc. Then if we wished to discover what the nature of pleasure is, we should look, not at the smallest pleasures, but at those which are considered most extreme and intense.
Pro. Every one would agree to that now.
Soc. And the commonest and greatest pleasures are, as we have often said, those connected with the body, are they not?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Are they greater, then, and do they become greater in those who are ill or in those who are in health? Let us take care not to answer hastily and fall into error. Perhaps we might say they are greater in those who are in health.
Pro. That is reasonable.
Soc. Yes, but are not those pleasures the greatest which gratify the greatest desires?
Pro. That is true.
Soc. But do not people who are in a fever, or in similar diseases, feel more intensely thirst and cold and other bodily sufferings which they usually have; and do they not feel greater want, followed by greater pleasure when their want is satisfied? Is this true, or not?
Pro. Now that you have said it, it certainly appears to be true.
Soc. Then should we appear to be right in saying that if we wished to discover the greatest pleasures we should have to look, not at health, but at disease? Now do not imagine that I mean to ask you whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but assume that I am asking about the greatness of pleasure, and where the greatest intensity of such feeling normally occurs. For we say that it is our task to discover the nature of pleasure and what those who deny its existence altogether say that it is.
Pro. I think I understand you.
Soc. Presently, Protarchus, you will show that more clearly, for I want you to answer a question. Do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean greater in number, but greater in intensity and degree—in riotous living or in a life of self-restraint? Be careful about your reply.
Pro. I understand you, and I see that there is a great difference. For the self-restrained are always held in check by the advice of the proverbial expression nothing too much, which guides their actions; but intense pleasure holds sway over the foolish and dissolute even to the point of madness and makes them notorious.
Soc. Good; and if that is true, it is clear that the greatest pleasures and the greatest pains originate in some depravity of soul and body, not in virtue.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Then we must select some of these pleasures and see what there is about them which made us say that they are the greatest.